Blue remembered hills (2) – the history we hold within us

What unites people?” Armies? Gold? Flags?” No. It’s stories, he said. “There’s nothing in the world more powerful than a good story. Nothing can stop it. No enemy can defeat it. And who has a better story than Bran the Broken? The boy who fell from a high tower and lived… He’s our memory. The keeper of all our stories. The wars, weddings, births, massacres, famines, our triumphs, our defeats, our past. Who better to lead us into the future?”
Tyrion Lannister, Game of Thrones, Season 8

A couple of years ago In That Howling Infinite published a long meditation on nostalgiaentitled Blue remembered hills – a land of lost contentment. It wandered through Housman and Homer, Facebook nostalgia groups and old LPs and cassette tapes, Spike Milligan and Dusty Springfield, milkmen and memberberries, touching along the way on memory, ageing, and that curious ache that seems to settle upon us as the years accumulate and our lives begin to look less like roads stretching ahead and more like maps folded and unfolded over time.

This ramble through memory’s brambles was never really about the past itself. It was about our relationship with the past – why we keep glancing over our shoulders even as technology either frog-marches us unwillingly into the future or lures us there like the sirens of yore; why old songs can unexpectedly inflict  sweet pain; why memories unsummoned but never ignored can transport us across decades with a force that no deliberate act of memory quite manages. It was very much about that peculiar territory where memory, longing and identity overlap.

In an essay published in The Australian and republished below, sociologist Frank Furedi covers much the same terrain, thought from a somewhat different direction and with a more explicitly political destination in mind.

It him brought me back immediately to Blue Remembered Hills because I realised we were traversing similar landscapes, though perhaps by different paths. He is concerned principally with nostalgia as a cultural and political phenomenon; I was more interested in nostalgia as a human condition, a state of mind, perhaps even a permanent feature of consciousness itself. Yet the overlap is considerable, and worth exploring.

Furedi begins with an observation that feels difficult to dispute. In contemporary political and cultural discourse, nostalgia is rarely employed as a neutral descriptor. It usually arrives as an accusation. To describe someone as nostalgic is no longer simply to suggest wistfulness or sentimentality; it increasingly carries implications of intellectual weakness or moral deficiency. Nostalgia becomes shorthand for reactionary impulses, coded language for a desire to return to a world in which minorities “knew their place,” women remained within prescribed roles, social conformity prevailed, and authority went largely unquestioned. This conservatism itself is often dismissed as little more than “weaponised nostalgia.”

Furedi argues that this caricature misses something fundamental about human beings. We require continuity. Individuals and societies alike need some sense of connection across time if they are to understand themselves. Identity does not simply emerge from acts of self-invention. We understand who we are partly through knowing where we have come from, and that understanding is transmitted through families, customs, traditions, rituals, stories and shared memories. Drawing upon psychologists such as Erik Erikson and Roy Baumeister, Furedi suggests that stable identities depend upon linking past, present and future together. When that continuity is disrupted, people become untethered. The de-authorisation of the past – the tendency to regard inherited traditions chiefly through the lens of their failures – risks creating citizens detached not merely from particular customs but from historical memory itself. In this formulation, nostalgia becomes less an irrational yearning for a golden age than a search for home.

Reading him, I was reminded immediately of Roger Scruton’s small-c conservatism and also of one of the most resonant lines in English literature, from Thomas Babington Macaulay’s Horatius at the Bridge: “And how can man die better/Than facing fearful odds/For the ashes of his fathers/And the temples of his gods?”

The line is often invoked in patriotic contexts, but its significance extends well beyond nationalism. Macaulay was attempting to articulate what people fight for when circumstances become existential. They do not fight primarily for policy settings or administrative arrangements or economic forecasts. They fight for inheritance. “The ashes of his fathers” speaks of continuity itself – reverence for ancestors, memory, sacrifice, lineage and identity accumulated across generations. “The temples of his gods” points towards those sacred structures, literal and metaphorical, that provide coherence and meaning: religion perhaps, but also customs, symbols, institutions and moral frameworks. And “facing fearful odds” follows naturally once these things matter deeply enough.

In Macaulay’s poem, the Roman soldier is not merely defending a bridge into Rome. He is defending an entire civilisational story and all that has been invested in this: ancestry, faith and ultimate sacrifice – the belief that preserving one’s inherited world can be a noble undertaking. The late British philosopher Roger Scruton understood something similar. His conservatism was not fundamentally ideological but ecological. Human beings live within webs of affection and obligation that they inherit rather than construct. Home, family, language, neighbourhood and nation are not assembled from scratch like flat-pack furniture. They are inherited houses, perhaps imperfect and drafty, requiring repair and maintenance, but home, nonetheless. Burning them down because some parts are structurally unsound rarely ends well.

This is where Blue Remembered Hills perhaps parts company slightly with Furedi, because while it shares his concern regarding continuity, it remains cautious about nostalgia itself – or more accurately, nostalgia in excess.

As it observed, “nostalgia is not just wanting to go back to something that no longer exists but wanting to go back because it no longer exists”. That distinction matters because memory is not a neutral recording device. Memory is an artist, and often a romantic one. It edits and embellishes. It softens edges and airbrushes imperfections. Like objects in a rear-view mirror, the past often appears larger and closer than it actually was. The roads where we grew up seem wider; summers seem longer; music seems better; friendships seem deeper; and the world itself somehow appears more coherent and comprehensible.

Or, as in AE Housman’s “land of lost content”, “The happy highways where I went/And cannot come again”, the oft remembered lines from The Shropshire Lad. The crucial phrase here is not happy but cannot come again, because the longing itself derives partly from irretrievability. The ache comes not simply from what was, but from knowing it has gone forever.

This is where the distinction made by the late artist and scholar Svetlana Boym becomes useful. She wrote of two forms of nostalgia: restorative nostalgia which attempts to rebuild the lost world and reflective nostalgia which simply contemplates its loss.

The distinction matters enormously because much contemporary politics increasingly resembles restorative nostalgia. Whether in “Make America Great Again”, “Take Back Control” ans national flag marches in England and Australia, or broader calls to restore traditional values, the promise offered is not remembrance but return. Yet return is impossible. The world changes, and we change with it. Lewis Carroll put it succinctly through Alice: “It’s no use going back to yesterday, because I was a different person then”. Reflective nostalgia, by contrast, understands that the longing itself may reveal something important.

This was what was fascinated about the Facebook nostalgia communities discussed in Blue Remembered Hills. On the surface, people appear to be reminiscing about milkmen, trams, proper binmen, fish-and-chip shops, sweet shops, old television programmes and the countless banalities of everyday life. Yet they are rarely mourning the objects themselves. Nobody seriously wants coal deliveries or outside toilets back. Very few wish to exchange modern medicine for the old days or surrendering a smart phone wired to the world for queuing up outside a telephone kiosk in winter rain and then fumbling with pennies to connect.  What they seem to miss is something much harder to define: predictability, familiarity, social coherence and a sense that the world itself made sense.

And here lies the danger, because loss can become attached to myth. The comments beneath nostalgic posts often drift rapidly from warm recollection towards grievance. “Everyone knew their place.” “People respected authority.” “Families stayed together.” “Children behaved.” “Things were simpler.” Much of Blue Remembered Hills wandered through precisely these landscapes because nostalgia communities frequently become repositories not merely for memory but also for disappointment and dislocation.

Not always, of course. Often, they are charming and deeply touching. But they can also become vessels carrying resentment. The difficulty is that social solidarity and exclusion frequently travelled together. The supposedly cohesive worlds people remember often contained rigid hierarchies and invisible outsiders. There was always an “other”, Irish, Catholics, West Indians, travellers, beatniks and hippies, homosexuals, single mothers, long-haired layabouts, anyone deemed insufficiently conformist. The problem with some nostalgic narratives is not that they remember the past, but that they remember selectively.

Yet contemporary culture often risks making the opposite error. If some nostalgists remember only the good, many contemporary critics remember only the bad. History becomes reduced to oppression, traditions become little more than systems of exclusion, and inherited identities become sources of guilt rather than belonging. Continuity itself becomes suspect.

But human beings do not thrive in a historical vacuum. People need stories. They need rootedness. They need to feel themselves situated within something larger than themselves. Otherwise identity becomes an endless project of self-construction. Perhaps this explains something of our present condition – that strange mixture of anxiety and certainty, fragmentation and tribalism. If the old maps are discarded and no convincing new maps emerge, people begin drawing their own, often with thick permanent marker.

So perhaps Frank Furedi and Blue Remembered Hills are not ultimately in disagreement after all. Furedi reminds us that continuity matters. Our concern was simply to remind us that memory lies – or at least embellishes. Nostalgia is perhaps neither pathology nor virtue. It may simply be part of being human.

We cannot live entirely in the past, but neither can we sever ourselves from it. The challenge is to carry forward what was best without importing what was worst; to preserve solidarity without exclusion, belonging without mythmaking, and continuity without embalming it. Or, as Roger Scruton might have put it, to repair the house rather than set fire to it.

Because ultimately Horatius was not defending stones and timber. He was defending meaning itself. And perhaps all of us, in one way or another, spend our lives doing much the same thing – carrying fragments of home with us as we move through time, searching always for those blue remembered hills shimmering in the distance, knowing perfectly well that we cannot return there, yet unwilling entirely to let them disappear beneath the horizon.

Coda: the power of stories

Recall the quotation at the head of this article – Tyrion Lannister’s’s final speech in Game of Thrones, addressed to the assembled nobles of the erstwhile Seven Kingdoms of Westeros.

It fits remarkably well into the thread running through both Furedi and Blue Remembered Hills, because beneath all the discussion of nostalgia, continuity, memory and belonging sits a simpler and much older question: how do human beings hold themselves together across time? Tyrion’s speech, whatever one thought of the controversial series ending itself, touched on something ancient and surprisingly profound:

“What unites people? Armies? Gold? Flags?…There’s nothing in the world more powerful than a good story.”

The speech sits very comfortably beside Macaulay’s “the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods.” Armies may defend states, gold may purchase influence, and flags may function as symbols around which people rally, but stories explain why any of these things matter in the first place. Beneath institutions and political structures there almost always lies a narrative – some account of who we are, where we came from, and what obligations and meanings flow from that inheritance.

Rome was held together not merely by its legions but by stories about Rome itself – Romulus and Remus suckled by the she-wolf, Cincinnatus leaving his plough to save the Republic and returning quietly to his farm, Horatius standing at the bridge against impossible odds. Britain carried stories of Dunkirk and the Blitz spirit, of endurance and muddling through. America possesses its frontier myth and constitutional narratives. Australia has Gallipoli and the digger tradition, Ned Kelly and the battler, Clancy of the Overflow and the secular civic religion of giving everyone “a fair go”.

Whether these stories are entirely true in a strict historical sense is almost beside the point. They function as interpretive frameworks, shared narratives through which societies understand themselves and situate individuals within a larger continuity extending backward and forward through time.

This perhaps returns us to what Furedi is really lamenting. Beneath his discussion of nostalgia lies not simply concern over the loss of affection for the past but anxiety regarding a broader loss of confidence in inherited stories themselves. Increasingly our old narratives are subjected, often quite rightly, to forensic examination. We ask difficult questions. Who was excluded? Who suffered? Whose voices were ignored or omitted? Such questions are entirely legitimate and indeed necessary. Historical narratives that are immune from criticism become dogma.

Yet something else can be lost if all inherited stories are reduced solely to exercises in power, domination or hypocrisy. Human beings do not seem able to live indefinitely without narratives that locate them in time and place. Remove old stories entirely and people rarely become liberated, detached rational actors. More often they begin constructing new tribes, new identities and new mythologies of their own.

Blue Remembered Hills circled around much the same thought without quite expressing it this directly. The Facebook nostalgia groups it wrote about, with their endless photographs of everyday life in those golden, olden days, were never really about the objects themselves. These fragments were really pieces of larger stories people were attempting to preserve. What they were saying, consciously or otherwise, was something closer to: this is where I came from; this is the world that made me; this is how I understand myself.

That may explain why nostalgia can be both comforting and dangerous. Stories bind communities together, but stories can also become myths. The “good old days” can cease being memory and become something approaching scripture. The selective recollection of the past can harden into certainty, grievance and exclusion.

Which is why Tyrion’s choice of Bran becomes more interesting than it first appears. Bran is not presented as the strongest warrior, the wealthiest lord, or the most charismatic leader. Tyrion describes him instead as: “our memory. The keeper of all our stories.” And the important word there is all. Not some stories. Not only the glorious ones. The wars and the weddings, the triumphs and the massacres, the births and the famines, the victories and the defeats. In other words, continuity without selective amnesia, memory without mythmaking.

A people who remembers only their triumphs eventually become propagandists; a people who remember only their crimes risk becoming paralysed by self-reproach. A mature culture probably requires both: stories that inspire affection and belonging, and stories that remind us where we failed and what we learned.

Which returns us, inevitably, to Horatius standing at the bridge, and perhaps also to those blue remembered hills shimmering on Housman’s horizon. We do not ultimately fight for stones and timber, borders and institutions alone. We fight for meaning, for the stories that tell us who we are, where we came from, and why any of this matters.

If Tyrion was right, and he probably was, then what ultimately joins past and future is not power at all. It is narrative itself. We are, in the end, storytelling creatures carrying old tales forward as we walk into countries, we have not yet seen.

Paul Hemphill, May 2026

See also in In That Howling Infinite, Blue remembered hills – a land of lost contentment. A précis of this follows Furedi’s essay.

What’s so wrong with the good old days? In defence of nostalgia

Frank Furedi, The Australian, 21 May 2026

Nostalgia isn’t a political insult. Populists and conservatives are condemned for attachment to the values associated with ‘the good old days’. Here’s why we need it.

In the Western world – particularly among the intelligentsia and the cultural elites – nostalgia has a bad press. As one study of how the use of this label is seen or used stated: “To have one’s ideas, program, policies or style labelled ‘nostalgic’ is to be on the end of one of the most enduring and non-negotiable insults in modern political discourse.” The accusation of nostalgia serves to delegitimate individuals and movements by associating it with outdated and irrelevant sentiments.

Nostalgia is continually affixed to ideological attacks on populism and conservatism. Typically, the coupling of nostalgia with conservatism and populism serves to signify the fear of facing up to the present and an irrational escape into a mythical past. Time and again the accusation of nostalgia is coupled with a denunciation of everything its practitioners value about the past.

Critics of nostalgia contend that the “good old days” never existed. They insist that those who idealise the world of intact families, stable communities and solid intergenerational bonds are living a lie. These critics assert that people who possess an affinity to the past do so because in the old days racial minorities knew their place, women were confined to the kitchen and the LGBTQ+ community had no visibility or voice. Writing in this vein, one critic stated, “conservatism is just weaponised nostalgia”.

It is worth noting that anyone who voices a positive attitude towards Australia’s past is likely to be accused of the reactionary crime of nostalgia. So earlier this year, commentary broadcast on the ABC suggested that former prime minister John Howard’s legacy represented “nostalgia for a whiter, more conservative Australia”.

In the same vein, Tony Abbott’s book, Australia, is frequently denounced as the product of colonial nostalgia. Those labelled as members of the Nostalgia Right are regarded as irredeemable racists and xenophobes.

John Howard during Question Time, December 1999.

John Howard during Question Time, December 1999.

Critics of nostalgia do not merely caution people about the problem of living in the past: they also seek to delegitimate the values and customs that prevailed in yesteryear.

The aim of the political critique of nostalgia is to distance society morally from its history. Its goal is to undermine a nation’s sense of cultural continuity. Australian conservatives and populists are frequently attacked for invoking three nostalgic pasts: the social order and prosperity of the 1950s Menzies era; the celebration of the nation’s connection with the British monarchical past, and; the social solidarity that prevailed in pre-multicultural Australia.

Yet maintaining a sense of historical and cultural continuity with the past is essential if we are to know where we come from and who we are. So don’t get defensive when you are told off for being nostalgic.

Without falling into the trap of uncritically celebrating the “good old days”, it is vital to affirm the legacy of our past, especially the sense of solidarity and community we are at risk of losing.

Nostalgia assists the maintenance of cultural continuity.

The sense of historical continuity plays an important role in the constitution of the self. Understanding where we come from influences and strengthens individuals’ sense of who they are. A feeling of continuity with the experience of previous generations lends stability to a people’s identity.

Continuity across time is achieved through the intergenerational transmission of a community’s way of life and its ideals. It is difficult to develop a sturdy sense of community identity without a shared memory and a common attachment to conventions or customs that are rooted in the past.

The sense of continuity across time is, as psychologist Roy Baumeister stated, one of the defining criteria of identity. This point was echoed by American social psychologist Kenneth Keniston, when he stated, “one of the chief tasks of identity formation is the creation of a sense of self that will link the past, the present and the future”.

The common ground on which people live requires a shared understanding of where members of a community come from. Learning about the past helps children to know their place in the world and develop their identity. German psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, who formulated the concept of an identity crisis, attached great importance to providing young people with a sense of cultural continuity. He noted that “true identity … depends on the support which the young individual receives from the collective sense of identity characterising the social groups significant to him: his class, his nation, his culture”.

Tea and army cake refreshed then-Prime Minister Robert Menzies on a visit to Seymour military camp back in 1939. Picture:News Corp

Tea and army cake refreshed then-Prime Minister Robert Menzies on a visit to Seymour military camp back in 1939. Picture:News Corp

For socialisation to occur successfully, adults draw on the experience of previous generations to provide young people with a meaningful account of adulthood. Erikson remarked that the values with which children are trained “persist because the cultural ethos continues to consider them ‘natural’ and does not admit of alternatives”.

He observed: “They persist because they have become an essential part of the individual’s sense of identity, which he must preserve as a core of sanity and efficiency. But values do not persist unless they work, economically, psychologically and spiritually; and I argue that to this end they must continue to be anchored, generation after generation, in early child training; while child training, to remain consistent, must be embedded in a system of continued economic and cultural synthesis.”

Valuing the past

The socialisation of children is key to the transmission of this legacy of the past. It is integral to an intergenerational transaction whereby moral norms are communicated by authoritative adults to the young. Though this form of socialisation is likely to be perceived as impregnated with nostalgia by the technocratic-managerial elites, it is essential for providing the young with roots.

Once the moral status of the past is put into question, the achievement of a stable identity becomes fraught with uncertainty. The de-authorisation of the past renders the experiences of the older generations redundant and complicates the task of socialisation. Adulthood becomes compromised by its association with the past. Instead of being able to serve as a model to the young, it ceases to serve that role effectively.

Erikson’s reference to the “collective sense of identity” that adults communicate to young people has as its premise the capacity of the older generation to communicate a model of identity to their offspring. However, with the loss of the “sense of the past”, cultural continuity has become disrupted and the capacity of adults to serve as models to the young has diminished.

Nostalgia can be understood as the cultural antithesis to the loss of a sense of the past. As sociologist Fred Davis noted, nostalgia “leads us to search among remembrances of persons and places of our past in an effort to bestow meaning upon persons and places of our present”. From the anti-populist standpoint, the very search for meaning in tradition and the experience of the past is likely to encourage opposition to the value system of the defenders of the cultural status quo.

A yearning for home

Instead of responding to the critics of nostalgia by dismissing the charge of being drawn towards it, it is preferable to embrace it. Nostalgia refers to a yearning for home. It expresses an understandable and genuine sense of cultural loss underwritten by the belief that values that had once provided the unity of social relations and personal experience have become marginalised.

Populists and conservatives are on solid ground when they seek to reconnect with the legacy of their nation’s past. Those who possess a positive orientation towards the past should not be seen as emotionally illiterate, naive simpletons. Through their nostalgic orientation, they attempt to retrieve and develop sources of identity, agency or community.

Tony Abbott’s book, Australia, is frequently denounced as the product of colonial nostalgia. Picture: Jane Dempster / The Australian

Tony Abbott. Jane Dempster / The Australian

The attempt to forge a sense of historical continuity is a prerequisite for providing the present with the sturdy foundation needed to face the future. Those who have become detached from the past inevitably become obsessed with inventing an identity to the point that they become detached from the project of facing the future. Call it what you will, but the attempt to forge a consciousness of historical continuity makes an indispensable contribution to the creation of a bridge between the past and the present, and the present and the future. It is an effective way of cultivating a genuine sensibility of belonging.

Nostalgia is not only good for society but also for the wellbeing of individuals. Studies suggest that those who “reminisce are more likely to keep friends and expand social networks”, and are able to forge closer and more durable relations than those who are indifferent to their past. Common sense suggests that the individual’s attempt to forge and maintain a sense of continuity with the past assists the development of an individual’s identity and feeds the soul of society.

In the 21st century, the main distinguishing feature of movements labelled as populist is their tendency to challenge the cultural values espoused by the political establishment. Often, the challenge posed by populist movements to elite values is expressed through their reluctance to abandon customs and traditions that elites have discarded: sentiments described by the use of that confusing term “nostalgia”.

Yet without a close connection with the past, we become prisoners of fate. Why? Because we can only truly understand what humanity has achieved so far and acquire insight into what it can achieve in the future by evaluating the experience of our forebears. The legacy of the past provides the moral and intellectual resources for developing a 21st-century narrative of what solidarity and community looks like. Very importantly, it also provides the foundation for freedom.

Once society becomes de-historicised, it will become lost in a timeless wasteland. Those with an impoverished historical imagination are doomed to embark on an eternal quest for meaning because we become connected and situated in time through cultivating an empathetic relationship with the past as members of a community. Without such an attachment, we struggle to intuit where we have come from and are constantly in search of an identity. Navigating our way into the future is harder when we are deprived of a means to assimilate the experience of our ancestors. Put simply, to determine where to go, we need to know where we came from.

It’s an Australia that did exist

In Australia, hostility towards nostalgia is motivated by a venomous hatred towards the nation’s past. Take the hatred directed at former opposition leader Peter Dutton. According to the National Indigenous Times, his “path to the party leadership has been defined not by nation-building, nor a vision for Australia’s future, but through obstruction and division, wedded with a nostalgia for an Australia that never truly existed”.

Peter Dutton is another pilloried for valuing nostalgia and the past. Picture: Dan Peled /Getty Images

Peter Dutton. Dan Peled /Getty Images

The reference to an “Australia that never truly existed” is frequently invoked by critics of nostalgia. Implicit in this statement is the dispossession of Australia’s historical legacy of any positive features.

Populist conservatives do not want to go back to a golden age, but nor do they want their communities to be dispossessed of the customs and ways of being that made them who they are.

Keeping alive the traditions, customs and rituals that have inspired their communities over the generations provides populism with the cultural power to motivate millions of people. It provides the foundation for the kind of cultural security that allows people to face the future.

Frank Furedi is a sociologist, author and former professor of sociology at the University of Kent. This is an edited extract from his new book, In Defence of Populism (Polity Press), which will be published on May 22 in Australia

Précis: Blue Remembered Hills — a land of lost contentment

Nostalgia is one of those curious human afflictions that sits somewhere between memory and myth. The Greeks called it nostos: the longing for home, the ache of return. Homer built The Odyssey around it. Houseman called childhood “the land of lost content”. We all know the feeling: that sudden gust of memory carrying with it a place that perhaps never quite existed in the form we remember it. A song, a smell, a taste, a street corner glimpsed through rain — and suddenly one is standing again in those “blue remembered hills”.

The trouble is that nostalgia can be both consolation and deception. Memory does not preserve the past like amber trapping an insect; it edits, softens, rearranges and, occasionally, invents. It is less a historical archive than a film editor’s cutting room. We tend to remember not the world as it was, but the world as it felt. Childhood roads seem wider when revisited, old houses smaller, old certainties larger. Looking backward is a little like looking in a rear-view mirror: objects appear closer than they really are.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Quite the opposite. Nostalgia often provides continuity in a world moving at bewildering speed. Long-term memory can become a kind of inner refuge, perhaps even biology’s consolation prize for ageing. As we move through life, the past gradually acquires sovereignty over the present. The older we get, the more we discover that Hartley was probably right: the past really is another country. More disconcertingly, we begin to realise it has become home.

Yet nostalgia also has its darker uses. It can become what South Park hilariously called “memberberries”: seductive little fragments of selective memory that rot the brain with sentimental half-truths. “Remember when things were better?” they whisper. Remember when streets were cleaner, people knew their place, children behaved, and chips came wrapped in newspaper? The problem is that these memories often airbrush out the less attractive features of the era: poverty, prejudice, corporal punishment, rigid social hierarchies, casual cruelty and exclusion. There is a tendency to remember cohesion while forgetting whom that cohesion excluded.

And nowhere is this more visible than in those sprawling Facebook nostalgia communities now largely colonised by us boomers. They are fascinating anthropological sites — digital village greens where people gather not to discuss wars, elections or grand historical events but milkmen, street sweepers, bin men, old sweets, cassettes and television programmes long vanished into history.

At first glance it all appears harmless enough: a warm bath of collective memory. Yet beneath pictures of “proper bin men” and school playgrounds often lurk deeper currents of anxiety and resentment. The mundane becomes symbolic. The old milkman becomes shorthand for social trust; the local high street for community; black-and-white photographs of tidy streets for a world supposedly more ordered and comprehensible.

What many are mourning, however, may not be the world itself so much as their own place within it. We do not merely miss old streets or old songs; we miss younger versions of ourselves inhabiting them. We miss possibility. We miss novelty. We miss being twenty and imagining that life was still unfolding rather than slowly arranging itself into memory.

The political danger arrives when nostalgia stops being reflective and becomes restorative — when longing for the past becomes a demand to reconstruct it. The right has often understood this instinct well. It does not necessarily need to persuade people of a compelling future if it can offer an idealised yesterday. “Take back control”, “make things great again”, “return to traditional values”: all are variations on the same emotional melody.

But return tickets are unavailable. The past cannot be restored because it never truly existed in the form imagined. There were never really “good old days”; there were simply days — complicated, contradictory and viewed through younger eyes.

None of this means memory should be discarded. Far from it. There is immense pleasure in basking in les temps perdus. I happily indulge in musical rabbit holes and Facebook reminiscences myself. Songs especially are magical portals because music does not merely remind us of the past — it briefly resurrects it. A song can collapse fifty years in three minutes.

But I would still choose today.

For all its noise and absurdity, for all the algorithms, grievances and existential clutter of modern life, today contains wonders unimaginable to my younger self. Medicine keeps people alive who once would not have survived. Knowledge sits literally in our hands. Distances have collapsed. Possibilities have expanded.

The trick perhaps is to hold memory gently: to enjoy nostalgia without becoming captive to it. To remember that we are, as Maria Popova put it, all our previous selves stacked inside us like Russian dolls — not discarded versions, but incorporated ones.

The little boy still exists somewhere in the old streets and schoolyards and songs. He is still playing in the enchanted forest with Pooh and Christopher Robin.

 

Meet the Crybully, a hybrid of victim and victor

https://spectator.com/article/meet-the-cry-bully-a-hideous-hybrid-of-victim-and-victor/

In April 2015, The Spectator published an essay by British columnist and provocateur Julie Burchill entitled Meet the Crybully: a hideous hybrid of victim and victor.

Her piece is essentially an early diagnosis of a cultural type that has since become almost ubiquitous: the person who combines aggression with performative victimhood. Her central argument is that modern society has blurred what used to be clearer moral categories. Once upon a time, she says, with typical Burchillian exaggeration and sardonic nostalgia, bullies bullied and cry-babies cried. They occupied different social roles. The novelty of contemporary culture is the emergence of people who do both simultaneously: attack others while claiming emotional persecution the instant they are challenged.

Hence the “Cry-Bully”: “a hideous hybrid of victim and victor, weeper and walloper.”

The article’s tone is very much old-school polemical journalism – caustic, theatrical, gleefully impolite, full of tabloid-energy metaphors and comic overstatement. But beneath the mischief lies a recognisable argument about contemporary moral culture.

Her broader thesis is that modern media and politics increasingly reward this fusion of aggression and grievance. The crybully uses claims of hurt feelings, victimhood, or marginalisation not merely defensively but offensively – as a weapon to silence critics, claim moral superiority, or evade accountability. The crybully’s sense of victimhood actually intensifies their feeling of entitlement to lash out. “I am wounded; therefore, I may wound. “Burchill sees this dynamic everywhere: celebrity culture, social media, political activism, and ideological extremism.

What makes the article interesting in retrospect is that it appeared in 2015, just as social media outrage culture was becoming fully institutionalised. Burchill intuited early that public life was shifting toward a strange emotional economy where claims of harm could become instruments of power. Victimhood was no longer merely a condition deserving sympathy; it was becoming a source of status, leverage, and immunity.

This links directly to what In That Howling Infinite has discussed earlier about moral capture and conditional empathy. Once victimhood becomes morally sacralised, people compete for it. The crybully therefore occupies a privileged rhetorical position: simultaneously aggressor and protected class, prosecutor and plaintiff. They can strike while claiming defence.

Burchill’s article also reflects a broader generational irritation with what many saw as the rise of therapeutic language in public life – the migration of emotional fragility into politics, media, and everyday discourse. Her complaint is not that suffering is unreal, but that public culture increasingly incentivises people to dramatise injury while behaving atrociously themselves.

What she perhaps underplays – partly because satire flattens nuance by design – is that some of this phenomenon emerges from genuine historical grievances. Not all claims of harm are manipulative performances. Real discrimination, exclusion, and trauma exist. The difficulty, as we discussed, lies in distinguishing authentic vulnerability from weaponised vulnerability.

Still, her phrase has endured because it captured something many people recognised instinctively but lacked vocabulary for. The “crybully” is not simply hypocritical. Hypocrisy at least tacitly acknowledges standards. The crybully goes further: they transform their own grievance into moral permission. Their suffering – real, exaggerated, or entirely performative – becomes justification for intimidation, censorship, cruelty, or coercion.

In that sense, the essay was less a passing cultural jab than an early sketch of a defining personality type of the social-media-political age: emotionally exhibitionist, morally absolutist, permanently aggrieved, and often surprisingly ruthless beneath the tears

While  Burchill is widely credited with the term “cry-bully” through this article, she almost certainly did not invent it outright. Variations of the word had appeared earlier in American political and online discourse, usually as an informal insult describing someone who bullies others while presenting themselves as persecuted.

What Burchill did, however, was crystallise and mainstream it. Her article gave the term a memorable definition and a vivid cultural framing at precisely the moment when social-media outrage culture was exploding into mainstream politics and journalism. She turned a loose internet epithet into a recognisable social archetype.

That often happens with language. Orwell did not invent every political tendency he described in “Newspeak”; Tom Wolfe did not invent the social climbers of Radical Chic; but certain writers capture a phenomenon so cleanly that they become permanently associated with naming it. Burchill’s essay performed that function for “crybully.”

And the timing mattered. Around the mid-2010s, Western discourse was undergoing a marked shift toward what critics called “call-out culture,” “cancel culture,” or “performative victimhood.” Universities, media, and online activism increasingly framed disagreement through the language of harm, safety, and trauma. Burchill sensed – with her usual mixture of spite, wit, and instinctive cultural radar – that a new rhetorical type was emerging: people who could deploy the moral prestige of victimhood while behaving in domineering or vindictive ways themselves.

So while she probably didn’t coin the word ex nihilo, she gave it cultural traction and enduring shape. After Burchill, “crybully” stopped being just slang and became shorthand for a broader pathology of contemporary public life.

Let us look further …

The Age of the Crybully

One of the stranger developments of contemporary politics is how ubiquitous and indeed, iniquitous the phenomenon has become. It seems that almost everyone now claims to be oppressed, even – perhaps especially – those wielding considerable cultural, institutional, or social power. The old image of the bully was comparatively straightforward: the loudmouth in the schoolyard, the party apparatchik, the censorious cleric, the overmighty state. Bullies once tended to enjoy their own authority openly. They boasted of strength. They gloried in dominance.

The modern crybully is different. He (and increasingly she, they, and the algorithm itself) seeks not merely power but moral exemption. The crybully wishes simultaneously to strike and to claim injury, to silence while proclaiming persecution, to intimidate while insisting upon fragility. It is domination wrapped in the language of vulnerability. A clenched fist wearing a mitten.

The crybully is hardly confined to one ideology. In fact, one reason the term has gained traction is because nearly everyone recognises it in their opponents while remaining remarkably blind to it in themselves. The progressive activist who demands dissenting speakers be deplatformed because their words create “unsafe spaces”; the nationalist demagogue who attacks minorities while insisting his majority culture is “under siege”; the billionaire politician who controls vast media ecosystems while lamenting persecution by “elites”; the online influencer who launches mobs against critics before posting tearful videos about “harassment” – all belong to the same broad family. Different uniforms, same manoeuvre.

And manoeuvre is the right word, because crybullying is fundamentally strategic. Its psychological architecture resembles what psychologists term DARVO: Deny, Attack, Reverse Victim and Offender. The aggressor denies wrongdoing, attacks critics, and then claims to be the real victim. The rhetorical reversal happens with such speed nowadays that public discourse resembles one of those old farces where everyone keeps running through different doors wearing each other’s hats.

We have discussed before how modern political culture increasingly rewards emotional performance over persuasion. In earlier democratic ideals – however imperfectly realised – argument involved evidence, logic, rhetoric, appeals to principle. One attempted to convince opponents or at least neutral observers. Now the primary objective is often moral positioning within one’s tribe. The goal is not to win the argument but to establish innocence and wickedness: saint and heretic, victim and oppressor.

Victimhood, in this moral economy, becomes a form of currency. Not always consciously, of course. Human beings naturally seek sympathy; suffering confers legitimacy. Historically, societies extended compassion toward the weak because weakness usually correlated with actual vulnerability. But modern media ecosystems – especially social media – have transformed victimhood into performative capital. Visibility accrues to outrage. Status accrues to grievance. Algorithms reward emotional escalation because fury and fear generate engagement. The crybully thrives in precisely such conditions.

One sees this particularly clearly in online political discourse. A person launches a vicious public attack on someone’s livelihood or reputation, encourages pile-ons, delights in humiliation –  and the instant they receive criticism in return, they present themselves as traumatised targets of abuse. The asymmetry is extraordinary. “Speech is violence,” they say while engaging in campaigns designed explicitly to destroy reputations, careers, and social standing. The old liberal distinction between disagreement and physical harm collapses conveniently whenever useful. Language becomes simultaneously powerless (“words don’t matter”) and apocalyptic (“this opinion endangers lives”), depending on tactical necessity.

There is, moreover, something deeply theatrical about the crybully phenomenon. Contemporary politics increasingly resembles moral melodrama rather than civic negotiation. Everyone must perform identity publicly; everyone must display emotional authenticity; everyone must signal wounds. Suffering itself becomes competitive. Oppression acquires a prestige hierarchy. Entire ideological ecosystems form around curating grievance narratives – national, racial, sexual, religious, historical – each group insisting its pain uniquely legitimises coercion against others.

And yet genuine suffering is real. This is where the matter becomes morally complicated. Many movements now dismissed as “crybullying” originated in legitimate grievances: racism, antisemitism, sectarianism, misogyny, homophobia, colonial dispossession, economic collapse. We have discussed this tension in relation to Israel-Palestine, where competing historical traumas often become mutually weaponised. Israelis invoke centuries of persecution culminating in the Holocaust; Palestinians invoke dispossession, occupation, and statelessness, encapsukred in al Nakba and al ‘Awda, The Return. Both narratives contain truth. Both can also become rhetorical shields against self-criticism. Trauma explains behaviour; it does not automatically justify it.

The same dynamic appears across Western politics. Parts of the progressive left rightly identified real injustices – discrimination, police abuses, structural inequalities – but sections of the movement gradually drifted toward moral absolutism, where disagreement itself became harm. Meanwhile parts of the populist right, reacting against elite condescension and cultural dislocation, developed their own grievance-industrial complex: every criticism became “censorship,” every electoral loss “theft,” every demographic change “replacement.” Each side increasingly mirrors the other while imagining itself uniquely virtuous.

This mirroring effect is one of the great ironies of the age. The activist denouncing “fascism” adopts authoritarian tactics. The anti-authoritarian populist demands strongman rule. The defender of free speech cheers censorship when directed at enemies. The champion of tolerance displays extraordinary intolerance. The crybully exists because modern political tribes often derive identity less from consistent principles than from emotional narratives of injury.

The media environment intensifies all this. Traditional journalism, for all its flaws, once imposed certain filters: editorial standards, institutional caution, reputational constraints. Social media dissolved many of these barriers. Outrage now travels instantly, context arrives later if at all, and emotional certainty routinely overwhelms factual ambiguity. A claim of victimhood can mobilise millions before verification occurs. By the time nuance appears, the reputational execution has often already taken place.

One might call this the democratisation of accusation.

The result is a culture simultaneously hyper-moralised and strangely amoral. People speak incessantly about empathy while displaying astonishing cruelty toward designated enemies. Public shaming becomes entertainment. Humiliation becomes activism. Entire careers now revolve around ritual denunciation. The crybully does not merely seek victory but emotional submission: the confession, the apology, the compelled affirmation. Medieval heresy trials have returned wearing progressive HR language and algorithmic amplification. Torquemada with a podcast.

Nor is this confined to politics. Corporate culture absorbed the same instincts. Universities too. Institutions increasingly govern through therapeutic language –  “harm,” “safety,” “trauma,” “belonging” –  while exercising bureaucratic coercion beneath the soft vocabulary: power functioning most effectively when disguised as care.

Yet the phenomenon also reflects a broader civilisational anxiety. Modern Western societies, particularly affluent ones, have become psychologically uncomfortable with conflict itself. We possess immense material comfort yet display extraordinary emotional fragility. Ordinary disagreement is recast as existential threat. Politics becomes therapy; therapy becomes politics. The language of clinical distress migrates into every domain of life. One no longer simply dislikes a viewpoint; one feels “unsafe.” The crybully emerges naturally from cultures where emotional discomfort is moralised and resilience subtly pathologised.

But there is another side to this story. The rise of the crybully also reflects declining trust. People increasingly feel unheard by institutions, alienated from elites, suspicious of media, uncertain about the future. In such environments, grievance becomes identity because shared civic narratives weaken. If citizens no longer believe institutions will treat them fairly, they turn to emotional mobilisation instead. The loudest victim often wins attention. Politics becomes less about governing plural societies than about competing claims to injury.

The danger is obvious. A society where everyone claims victimhood eventually loses the capacity to distinguish between genuine oppression and manipulative performance. Real suffering becomes trivialised through inflation. If all disagreements are violence, then actual violence disappears into semantic fog. Worse still, reciprocal crybullying creates permanent escalation: each faction justifies its aggression as defensive retaliation against the aggression of others. Everyone becomes both persecutor and persecuted in their own mythology.

History offers grim precedents. Ethno-national conflicts frequently evolve through precisely such reciprocal narratives of victimhood. Each atrocity becomes justification for the next. Every side remembers its own dead more vividly than the other’s. The Balkans, Northern Ireland, the Levant, Rwanda – all contain examples of communities simultaneously capable of genuine suffering and genuine cruelty while insisting exclusively upon the former.

What, then, is the alternative?

Perhaps merely recovering the old unfashionable liberal virtues: proportion, reciprocity, scepticism toward one’s own tribe, the ability to distinguish discomfort from oppression, disagreement from violence, criticism from persecution. Perhaps also recovering a thicker skin. Democracies require citizens capable of enduring offence without demanding censorship and capable of exercising power without theatrically claiming helplessness.

Most importantly, they require moral consistency. If intimidation is wrong, it remains wrong when committed by one’s own side. If free speech matters, it matters for opponents too. If empathy is a virtue, it cannot operate tribally alone.

The crybully thrives where morality becomes entirely performative – where appearing wounded matters more than behaving decently. That may be why the phenomenon feels so omnipresent today. We inhabit cultures saturated with public displays of virtue but increasingly uncertain about virtue itself.

And so the age oscillates endlessly between aggression and grievance, outrage and self-pity, accusation and lamentation: societies shouting at one another in the language of trauma while quietly competing for power underneath. The schoolyard bully has not disappeared after all. He has merely discovered the therapeutic vocabulary of the guidance counsellor.

The Morality of the Crybully

What makes the crybully phenomenon so corrosive is not merely hypocrisy –  hypocrisy is ancient, almost a constant of political life – but the way it corrodes the very language by which societies distinguish justice from manipulation. In our discussions about moral capture, conditional empathy, intellectual honesty, and the strange contest between the “high” and “low” moral ground, the same pattern kept resurfacing like a half-visible reef beneath modern discourse.

Moral capture occurs when a person or movement becomes so emotionally or ideologically invested in a cause that the cause itself ceases to be examined critically. The tribe absorbs the conscience. One no longer asks, Is this true? Is this proportionate? Is this humane? One asks only: Whom does this help? Whom does this hurt? Morality becomes instrumental rather than principled. At that point, the crybully emerges almost naturally, because any criticism of the cause is experienced not as disagreement but as sacrilege.

And once criticism becomes sacrilege, coercion begins to feel virtuous.

This is where conditional empathy enters the story. We have spoken often about the peculiar narrowing of compassion in modern ideological life: how suffering increasingly counts only when experienced by the “correct” people within the “correct” narrative framework. The dead child in Gaza evokes tears; the murdered Israeli family becomes an inconvenient footnote. Or the reverse: outrage at Islamist terror paired with indifference toward flattened neighbourhoods and stateless civilians. Empathy becomes selective, curated, tribalised. One grieves not for human beings but for symbols.

The crybully weaponises precisely this asymmetry. “Your empathy for them proves your hostility toward us.” Compassion itself becomes grounds for accusation. Nuance becomes betrayal. And so discourse collapses into competitive grievance theatre, each side insisting exclusively upon its own wounds while minimising, rationalising, or outright mocking those of others.

Intellectual honesty is the first casualty.

Not because people necessarily become consciously deceitful, though some do, but because the emotional rewards for self-deception become overwhelming. It is psychologically comforting to believe one’s tribe uniquely moral, uniquely endangered, uniquely justified. The crybully mentality depends upon this self-absolution. One’s own aggression is always defensive; one’s own censorship is protection; one’s own intimidation is accountability. Every act becomes morally laundered through claimed victimhood.

This is why so much contemporary rhetoric feels simultaneously hysterical and curiously hollow. The language of existential peril is deployed constantly, often by people occupying highly privileged institutional positions. Editors, celebrities, politicians, academics, influencers — people with immense platforms and cultural authority — present themselves as besieged dissidents while actively policing dissent around them. The paradox would be comic were it not so socially damaging.

And this returns us to the distinction we discussed between the high and low moral ground.

The low moral ground is simple: naked tribalism, explicit hatred, open authoritarianism. History recognises it easily enough. The high moral ground is more dangerous precisely because it cloaks itself in virtue. The crybully insists not merely that opponents are wrong, but that suppressing them is itself an act of compassion. The language softens while the coercion hardens. One need not burn books if one can socially anathematise their authors. One need not imprison dissenters if one can algorithmically erase them, professionally ruin them, or morally quarantine them.

The old tyrannies often announced themselves with drums and banners. The new ones frequently arrive wrapped in therapeutic language, carrying diversity statements and safeguarding protocols.

That does not mean all claims of harm are fraudulent, nor all activism manipulative. Far from it. There are real injustices, real exclusions, real cruelties. The difficulty lies precisely in disentangling authentic suffering from performative victimhood — and in resisting the temptation to excuse cruelty merely because it is rhetorically framed as justice.

This demands intellectual consistency, which is perhaps the rarest civic virtue of all. It requires the uncomfortable ability to apply one’s standards equally to allies and enemies alike. To condemn dehumanisation even when committed by one’s own side. To acknowledge suffering without immediately converting it into political currency. To resist the narcotic pleasures of outrage and self-righteousness.

Because ultimately the crybully phenomenon reveals something larger about our civilisation: a profound confusion between moral status and moral behaviour.

To suffer does not automatically make one virtuous. To belong to a historically wronged group does not sanctify every action. Nor does possessing power automatically invalidate every grievance. Human beings remain morally complicated creatures, capable of both victimhood and cruelty, often simultaneously. History’s most unsettling lesson may be that the oppressed do not become angels when circumstances change; they become human beings with power.

And perhaps that is the hardest truth modern politics struggles to admit. We prefer melodrama to ambiguity. Saints and monsters are easier to process than flawed people navigating impossible histories. Yet once societies lose the capacity for moral complexity, they drift toward permanent mutual denunciation, each faction simultaneously convinced of its innocence and its persecution.

The crybully is therefore not merely an irritating personality type of the social media age. It is the symbolic citizen of a culture that increasingly confuses feeling wounded with being right, visibility with virtue, and accusation with truth.

A civilisation cannot survive indefinitely on those terms. Eventually reality intrudes. Actions still have consequences. Power remains power even when exercised tearfully. And no amount of therapeutic vocabulary can entirely conceal the ancient human temptation underneath it all: to dominate while claiming righteousness, to wound while insisting one is wounded, to occupy both the throne and the scaffold at once.

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: selected, tested, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, including:: Moral capture, conditional empathy and the failure of shock, Standing on the high moral ground is hard work and Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty 

Postscript 1. The biggest Crybully of them all?

The term “crybully” usually describes someone who presents themselves as a victim while simultaneously wielding considerable power, attacking opponents, or intimidating critics. Donald Trump is often described that way by critics because his political style combines grievance and dominance in almost theatrical tandem: he portrays himself as persecuted by “elites,” the media, courts, universities, bureaucrats, foreign allies, even election systems – while also projecting strength, retaliation, and triumph.

What makes the label stick for many observers is the contrast. He is, after all, one of the most powerful and protected figures on Earth: billionaire celebrity, former president, political movement unto himself. Yet much of his rhetoric is built around betrayal and victimhood. The emotional engine of Trumpism is often not “we rule,” but “they are cheating us.” That sense of embattlement is politically potent because it invites supporters to feel both aggrieved and righteous simultaneously.

But the phenomenon is hardly unique to Trump, and that is where things become culturally interesting rather than merely partisan. Modern politics across the spectrum increasingly rewards performative vulnerability married to aggression. Institutions, movements, and leaders now compete not just for power but for moral victim status. The language of injury has become a form of authority. In that sense, Trump may be less an aberration than the loudest, most gifted practitioner of a broader age of grievance politics — part WWE heel, part populist tribune, part tabloid Jeremiah railing against the storm while selling tickets to it.

The image itself captures that familiar Trumpian mode: mouth open mid-declaration, fingers pinched in emphasis, occupying the room entirely. It is performance as politics, politics as performance – the old television instinct that attention is oxygen. Whether one sees him as a demagogue, a showman, a symptom, or a political genius often depends on whether one thinks the grievance which he channels is fabricated, exaggerated, or fundamentally real.

Postscript 2. Outside looking in

One of the more curious spectacles of contemporary politics is the rise of the insider who markets himself as an outsider: the millionaire broadcaster presenting as a battler, the nationally syndicated columnist lamenting that “people like me aren’t allowed to speak”, the television panellist with a nightly platform insisting he is being silenced by “the elites”. It is a performance now so common that it barely registers as contradiction.

In Australia, this phenomenon is especially visible in parts of the Sky News ecosystem – Rowan Dean, the opinionated, contrarian editor of the Spectator Australia portal and host of Sky News’ Outsiders programme, being an obvious example – where commentators cast themselves as tribunes of the “forgotten people”, channelling the language of suburban grievance and cultural dispossession while operating from within one of the country’s most powerful media networks. The rhetorical trick is not new. What is new is the intensity with which institutional power now dresses itself in the clothes of marginalisation.

This is where the idea of the “crybully” becomes useful. The crybully combines aggression with perpetual claims of victimhood: attacking, denouncing, ridiculing, demanding consequences for opponents — while simultaneously insisting they are the ones under siege. They are not merely critics of power; they are often participants in it, sometimes beneficiaries of it, but they derive moral energy from presenting themselves as embattled dissidents standing against a corrupt orthodoxy.

The irony, of course, is that many of these figures possess enormous cultural reach. They dominate newspaper columns, television panels, radio slots, publishing circuits, and increasingly lucrative social-media ecosystems built on outrage and resentment. Yet every criticism becomes “censorship”; every disagreement, proof of persecution; every loss of cultural dominance, evidence of oppression.

There is also something profoundly theatrical about it. The old conservative self-image was one of authority, stewardship, and institutional confidence. The new populist pose prefers the aesthetics of rebellion: the leather jacket of anti-establishment defiance worn over the tailored suit of establishment access. The outsider identity becomes less a sociological reality than a branding exercise.

And so we arrive at the peculiar modern spectacle: insiders cosplaying as insurgents, powerful voices speaking endlessly about their powerlessness, media elites railing nightly against “the media elite” – a hall of mirrors in which grievance itself becomes both commodity and shield.  For more on this subject in In That Howling Infinite, see: Outside Looking In. Although written ten years ago, it remains relevant.

Rowan Deane

Postscript 3. Solid Rock

I am reminded of the Dire Straits song Solid Rock, featured on their 1980 album Making Movies: “When you point your finger ’cause your plan fell through / You got three more fingers pointing back at you “Written by Mark Knopfler, it focuses on themes of accountability, authenticity, and avoiding illusions. It’s a critique of blaming others for personal failures, highlighting that when you blame someone else, the majority of your hand is actually pointing back at yourself.

It is relevant here insofar as it reminds us in its lyrical simplicity about accountability and of how The crybully mentality depends upon the permanent externalisation of blame. Failure is always someone else’s oppression; criticism is persecution; consequences are violence; disagreement is abuse. The self becomes morally untouchable because it is permanently aggrieved. But, as Solid Rock suggests, reality is less accommodating. The line quoted is almost proverbial in its clarity, yet it contains an older moral wisdom modern culture increasingly resists: the possibility that one’s own failures, excesses, delusions, or moral compromises might actually contribute to one’s predicament.

That is precisely what ideological movements captured by grievance struggle to admit. Every setback becomes evidence of conspiracy or persecution rather than occasion for introspection. We see it across the spectrum. Progressives unable to understand why ordinary voters recoil from moral hectoring conclude the electorate is bigoted or “misinformed.” Populists unable to sustain coherent governance blame “deep states,” traitors, immigrants, globalists, or cultural saboteurs. Each side points furiously outward while refusing the quieter, more difficult question: what if part of the problem is us?

Knopfler’s lyric also matters because it quietly rejects the seduction of moral theatre. Making Movies is full of people constructing performances, illusions, romantic myths, cinematic versions of themselves. The crybully does something similar politically: they curate a self-image of perpetual innocence. Yet the hand itself betrays the illusion. Three fingers point back. Human beings remain implicated in their own stories.

That idea has become oddly countercultural. Contemporary discourse rewards certainty, not self-scrutiny. To hesitate, to admit contradiction, to acknowledge one’s tribe capable of cruelty – these are treated as weaknesses. Yet intellectual honesty begins precisely there. We discussed earlier the distinction between the high and low moral ground: the low ground brutalises openly, while the high ground often disguises domination as virtue. Knopfler’s line punctures both forms. It reminds us that moral seriousness begins not with denunciation but with reflection.

There is almost something biblical about it. Before condemning others, examine yourself. Remove the beam from your own eye before pointing out the speck in another’s. The old religious traditions understood a truth modern politics often forgets: self-righteousness is one of the most dangerous intoxicants because it makes cruelty feel deserved.

And perhaps that is why the line lingers. It is not merely a rebuke to blame-shifting; it is a warning against the human tendency to transform disappointment into accusation. The crybully points outward incessantly because looking inward is painful. Self-examination threatens the entire emotional architecture of victimhood. If even part of the responsibility lies within, then the performance collapses.

Knopfler, characteristically, says it with understated elegance rather than ideological bombast. No manifesto, no therapeutic jargon, no grand theory of oppression – just a hand, a finger, and the uncomfortable geometry of blame. Three fingers pointing back. An old truth hiding in plain sight, solid as rock.

 

 

An Australian Jew’s submission to the Royal Commission

The Royal Commission into Antisemitism was convened in the shadow of the Bondi Beach massacre of December 2025, when fifteen people were murdered at a Hanukkah gathering in what has been described as the deadliest antisemitic attack in Australian history. It was, on any reading, a rupture –  not only because of its scale, but because it forced into the open a question that had been building, uneasily, for more than two years: how a country that prides itself on pluralism and civic ease had arrived at a moment where Jews could be targeted so explicitly, and so lethally, in public space.

That question does not begin at Bondi. Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, Australia has seen a sustained wave of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist protest – much of it framed in the language of human rights, some of it more strident, even incendiary. Alongside this mobilisation has come a marked rise in antisemitic incidents: abusive chants at early demonstrations, harassment of visibly Jewish individuals, vandalism of synagogues and community institutions, graffiti, threats, social and professional exclusion, and a steady current of online vilification. Some of these episodes have been highly visible; many more have been ambient, cumulative, and privately absorbed. For the Jewish community, the sense has not been of isolated but of a gathering atmosphere – a shift in what can be said, and done, about Jews in public without consequence.

It is into this unsettled landscape that the Commission steps. Its task is not only to examine the failures that allowed Bondi to occur, but to consider whether that attack can be understood in isolation at all – or whether it belongs to a broader pattern of escalating hostility, contested language, and fraying social norms. In that sense, it is as much an inquiry into civic culture as it is into security.

Andrew Wirth’s submission is written with precisely that broader frame in mind. He contributes not as a representative of any organisation, but as a Jewish Australian – the child of Holocaust survivors, a member of a contemporary community that now finds itself, again, thinking seriously about questions of safety and belonging. His purpose is not to collapse legitimate criticism of Israel into antisemitism, nor to deny the moral force of Palestinian advocacy. Rather, it is to interrogate the relationship between the forms that advocacy has taken in Australia since October 2023 and the lived experience of many Jews during that same period.

He is, in effect, asking the Commission to look not only at events but at environment. To consider whether the prevailing ways of understanding harm – episodic, attributable, legally discrete — are adequate to a phenomenon that may instead be cumulative, ambiguous, and socially mediated. And to ask, quietly but insistently, whether Bondi was an isolated act of hatred, or the most violent expression of a climate that had already, for some time, been forming in plain sight.

The complete submission is republished in full below. As it is very lengthy, In That Howling Infinite has used AI to provide a comprehensive summary.

Much of the testimony before the Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion dealt not with abstract politics, but with the way the Israel-Palestine conflict has spilled into everyday Australian life: schools, workplaces, music venues, synagogues and online spaces. Among the most striking evidence was that of singer and author Deborah Conway, who described cancelled performances, organised protest campaigns, doxing, online abuse and threats directed at her for publicly identifying as both Jewish and Zionist. Whatever one’s views on Israel or Gaza, her testimony underscored the increasingly blurred line between political activism, social intimidation and hostility directed at Jews as Jews – a tension that sat at the heart of the inquiry’s hearings. Conroy’ testimony and that of others is also republished below.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

Long story short …

Wirth’s submission is, at heart, an attempt to change the lens through which the Commission looks – away from the forensic habit of isolating moments (a chant, a placard, a lone actor, a single atrocity) and toward something more diffuse and disquieting: the social atmosphere in which those moments become possible. He writes as a Jewish Australian, and as the son of survivors, but resists the pull of memoir. The authority he claims is not moral witness so much as analytic patience – an effort to describe how a climate forms, thickens, and, eventually, breaks.

His central contention is that the harms experienced by Jewish Australians since October 2023 are systemic and cumulative. Bondi – horrific, unprecedented – is not treated as an aberration but as a point of condensation, where a long-gathering set of pressures became visible in a single, devastating act. To understand that act, he argues, one must look not for a clean causal chain (this slogan → this shooter → this event), but for patterns of probability: the way repeated exposure to certain forms of rhetoric, symbolism, and social signalling can lower inhibitions, sharpen antagonisms, and render violence imaginable to those already inclined toward it. The analogy he reaches for is telling: not criminal law, but climate science. You cannot attribute a single storm to climate change with precision; you can, however, describe the conditions that make storms more frequent, more intense, more likely.

From this premise, the essay unfolds in widening circles.

He first dismantles the idea of a singular “pro-Palestinian movement.” What exists instead, he suggests, is an ecosystem: formal advocacy bodies fluent in the language of human rights; looser activist formations oriented toward protest and disruption; and a penumbra of fellow travellers – ideological extremists, vandals, conspiracists — who share space, slogans, and emotional energy if not formal affiliation. These elements are not centrally controlled, nor are they uniformly motivated. That, in a sense, is the point. The diversity allows for elasticity: respectable actors can maintain a principled public face while disclaiming the excesses of the wider milieu (“a few bad actors,” “not representative”), even as those excesses contribute to the overall tone and impact of the movement. Plausible deniability is not a bug but a feature.

Language is the next terrain. Wirth is careful not to claim that particular phrases are intrinsically violent in a narrow, lexical sense. Instead, he insists that meaning is contextual, historical, and relational. Words arrive carrying baggage. “Intifada,” whatever its literal translation, is heard by many Jews through the memory of suicide bombings and mass-casualty attacks; “from the river to the sea,” however it is intended, resonates with anxieties about elimination; “Zionists are…” constructions collapse a vast and internally diverse population into a single moral category, often freighted with the most toxic imagery available. The key point is not that every speaker intends harm, but that in a crowded, emotionally charged public sphere, ambiguity is not neutral. It creates room for multiple readings, including the most hostile ones, and allows those who wish to intimidate to do so under cover of contestability. The same words can be defended as benign and experienced as threatening – and both facts can be true at once.

Central to this slippage is the term “Zionist.” In activist discourse it operates as a floating signifier: sometimes a political descriptor, sometimes a moral indictment, sometimes a proxy for a people. Wirth’s claim – backed by survey data — is that the overwhelming majority of Australian Jews feel some connection to Israel and many are comfortable with the label “Zionist” in a broad, cultural or existential sense. To target “Zionists,” then, is in practice to target Jews as they understand themselves, even if the formal claim is otherwise. The distinction between Jew and Zionist, while logically defensible, does little work sociologically. Indeed, he suggests, the insistence on that distinction can become a way of telling Jews what they are allowed to be – a curious inversion in a discourse otherwise attentive to self-identification.

The essay then turns to causation – or rather, to the limits of conventional thinking about it. The familiar retort to concerns about protest rhetoric is that no direct link can be proven between speech and a specific act of violence. Wirth concedes the point and then sidesteps it. In complex systems, he argues, causation is rarely linear or attributable. The relevant question is not “did this slogan cause this attack?” but “does a given communicative environment increase or decrease the likelihood of such attacks occurring?” Here he draws on the literature around “stochastic violence”: the idea that repeated, dehumanising or inflammatory messaging can, over time, prime a small subset of individuals to act, even in the absence of explicit incitement. Responsibility is diffuse; effects are real. It is an uncomfortable model for legal systems built on individual intent, but a familiar one in other domains of risk.

If this is the mechanism, the effects are not confined to headline events. A large portion of the submission is devoted to what might be called the low-grade, high-frequency harms: insults, exclusion, intimidation, the steady drip of being cast as suspect or illegitimate. Synagogues require guards; schools adjust routines; people speak more cautiously, or not at all. There is a contraction of presence — a subtle withdrawal from the public square. Wirth is at pains to stress that for every reported incident there are many more that never reach formal channels but accumulate in private memory, at dinner tables, in the small recalibrations of daily life. This is where his argument edges closest to the experiential without relinquishing its analytic frame: harm as something lived continuously rather than episodically.

Against this backdrop, he is sharply critical of two patterns in the public response. The first is the tendency, among some pro-Palestinian advocates, to dismiss Jewish concerns as bad faith – “weaponisation,” an attempt to silence criticism of Israel, a manoeuvre in a political contest. This, he suggests, substitutes motive-hunting for engagement with the substance of the claims. The second is the reliance on generalised anti-racism frameworks as a sufficient policy response. Such frameworks, he argues, are necessary but not sufficient, because antisemitism does not map neatly onto the paradigms those frameworks were designed to address. Jews are often perceived simultaneously as powerful and vulnerable, insiders and outsiders – a dual coding that allows hostility to evade categories built primarily around visible disadvantage. Subsumed into the general, antisemitism risks disappearing.

He extends this scepticism to legal doctrine. Courts, tasked with balancing free expression against harm, tend to look for discrete, demonstrable injuries traceable to particular acts. But if the harm is cumulative, ambient, and probabilistic, that evidentiary demand becomes almost impossible to meet. The result is a persistent gap between lived experience and legal recognition – a sense, on the part of those affected, that the system cannot quite “see” what is happening. This is not, in his telling, an argument against free speech so much as a claim that the existing conceptual toolkit is ill-suited to a new class of problem.

The question of representation threads through the latter part of the submission. Wirth does not contest the right of anti-Zionist Jewish groups to participate in the debate, but he cautions against treating them as broadly representative. Their prominence, he suggests, owes less to their numbers than to their utility: they provide a form of internal validation for those who wish to deny any connection between anti-Zionist activism and antisemitic harm. The risk, for the Commission, is that such voices — legitimate but minority – might be weighted in a way that obscures the concerns of the larger community.

All of this leads to a set of recommendations that are, in tone, more calibrative than punitive. He does not call for the suppression of protest or the prohibition of criticism of Israel. Instead, he argues for clearer moral boundaries around language and conduct; for accountability within advocacy movements for what they tolerate as well as what they endorse; for policy approaches that acknowledge systemic harm; and, crucially, for investment in education – a rebuilding of the shared understandings that make any legal framework meaningful. Law, in his formulation, can draw lines; it cannot, by itself, restore the sensibility that gives those lines legitimacy.

Running beneath the analysis is a quieter, more disquieting claim: that the deepest failure of the past two years has been one of recognition. Not simply a failure to prevent specific acts, but a failure of institutions — governmental, cultural, civic – to articulate, early and clearly, that Jews are a vulnerable minority entitled to the same reflex of solidarity extended to others. Silence, in this reading, is not neutral. It is read, by all parties, as permission.

The essay closes, as it began, with Bondi –  not as origin but as revelation. A society that prides itself on its egalitarian reflexes is asked to consider whether, in this instance, those reflexes faltered; whether a movement framed in the language of rights allowed, in some of its forms, the targeting of a minority at home; and whether the balance between free expression and communal belonging has been misjudged. The question Wirth leaves hanging is not whether protest should be free – it must be – but whether it can remain so without eroding the conditions that make a plural civic life possible.

Author’s Note…

This opinion piece is one of several on the attitudes of progressives towards the Israel, Palestine and the Gaza war.

The first is Moral capture, conditional empathy and the failure of shock, a discussion on why erstwhile liberal, humanistic, progressive people from all walks of life have been caught up in what can be without subtly described as that anti-Israel machinery. Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty– regarding the Gaza war, intellectual dishonesty is everywhere, on both sides of the divide, magnified by mainstream and social media’s hunger for moral simplicity and viral outrage. Standing on the high moral ground is hard work! discusses the issues of free speech and “cancellation”, and boycotts with regard to the recent self-implosion of the Adelaide Writers’ Festival, one of the country’s oldest and most revered.

As governments federal and state weigh the prohibition of potentially inflammatory phrases, we also consider syntax and semantics. Lawyers parse syllables and activists insist that what is heard is not what is meant, and what is meant is not what is said. The words hover, untethered from consequence, yet curiously heavy with it. If words can be made infinitely flexible, then meaning itself becomes negotiable; and if meaning is negotiable, then so too are responsibility and harm. See: Same old stone, different rock. What’s in a word? and What’s in a word? A world of meaning and of pain 

There are moments when public argument stops being a search for truth and becomes a test of belonging. Facts are no longer weighed so much as auditioned; empathy is rationed; moral language hardens into a badge system, issued and revoked according to rules everyone seems to know but few are willing to articulate. One learns quickly where the trip-wires are, which sympathies are permitted, which questions are suspect, and how easily tone can outweigh substance.

What interests me here is not the quarrel itself – names, borders, histories—but the habits of mind it exposes. The ease with which conviction can slide into choreography. The way intellectual honesty is praised in the abstract and punished in practice. The curious transformation of empathy from a human reflex into a conditional licence, granted only after the correct declarations have been made.

Across these pieces I circle the same uneasy terrain: the shaping of facts to fit feelings; the capture of moral language by ideological gravity; the performance of righteousness as both shield and weapon. Cultural spaces that once prided themselves on curiosity begin to resemble courts, where innocence and guilt are presumed in advance and the labour lies not in thinking, but in signalling.

This is not an argument against passion, nor a plea for bloodless neutrality. It is, rather, a meditation on how quickly moral seriousness curdles into moral certainty – and how much intellectual work is required to stand on what we like to call the high ground without mistaking altitude for clarity.

The position of In That Howling Infinite with regard to Palestine, Israel and the Gaza war is neither declarative nor devotional; it is diagnostic. Inclined – by background, sensibility, and experience – to hold multiple truths in tension, to see, as the song has it, the whole of the moon. It is less interested in arriving at purity than in resisting moral monoculture and the consolations of certainty. That disposition does not claim wisdom; it claims only a refusal to outsource judgment or to accept unanimity as a proxy for truth.

On Zionism, it treats it not as a slogan but as a historical fact with moral weight: the assertion – hard-won, contingent, imperfect – that Jews are entitled to collective political existence on the same terms as other peoples. According to this definition, this blog is Zionist. It is not interested in laundering Israeli policy, still less in romanticising state power, but rejects the sleight of hand by which Israel’s existence is transformed from a political reality into a metaphysical crime. Zionism is not sacred, but its delegitimisation is revealing – because it demands from Jews what is demanded of no other nation: justification for being.

On anti-Zionism, it has been unsparing. It sees it not as “criticism of Israel” (which you regard as both legitimate and necessary) but as a categorical refusal to accept Jewish collective self-determination. What troubles it most is not its anger but its certainty: its moral absolutism, its indifference to history, its willingness to borrow the language of justice to license erasure. It is attentive to how anti-Zionism recycles older antisemitic patterns – collectivisation of guilt, inversion of victimhood, and the portrayal of Jews as uniquely malignant actors – while insisting, with studied innocence, that none of this concerns Jews at all. If not outright antisemitism, the line separating it from anti-Zionism is wafer—thin, and too often crosses over.

Running through all of this is a consistent stance: a resistance to moral theatre, an impatience with historical amnesia, and a belief that intellectual honesty requires limits – on language, on fantasy, and on the indulgent belief that one’s own righteousness exempts one from consequence. And a lifelong hatred of antisemitism. The new antisemitism looks a lot like the old hatred!

We are not asking culture to choose sides; we are asking it to recover judgment

See in In That Howling Infinite, A Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany. and also: This Is What It Looks Like“You want it darker?” … Gaza and the devil that never went away … , How the jihadi tail wags the leftist dog, The Shoah and America’s Shame – Ken Burns’ sorrowful masterpiece, and Little Sir Hugh – Old England’s Jewish Question

A Royal Commission into Antisemitism: One Australian’s Submission

Aftermath of Bondi Beach massacre, Sydney 2025 (Image available under the Creative Commons)

Australia is in the midst of a major enquiry into antisemitism- a Royal Commission- following the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach. The community has been invited to make submissions. Below, I share mine. It is analytical rather than personal and represents my attempt to understand the links between anti-Zionist protest and harms to the Jewish community.

Who I am

I write as an Australian Jew.

I am writing entirely in my personal capacity and do not represent any Jewish communal, political or Zionist organisation. I am an engaged member of the Jewish community and regularly attend a local “egalitarian orthodox” synagogue.

I am a child of holocaust survivors. My father survived Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen concentration camps and death marches; my mother was hidden in a convent for the latter part of the second World War. All four of my grandparents were murdered in Auschwitz.

I strongly support the right of Australians to advocate for the welfare, human rights and self-determination of both Jewish and Palestinian communities. I have been involved in inter-communal dialogue both in Melbourne and in Israel-Palestine and am commited to a just outcome in Israel and Palestine.

I am a medical specialist in the public hospital system and an associate professor at at Melbourne University.

Aims of this submission

I am writing primarily to reflect on, and critically evaluate, common claims made in reference to the relationship between pro-Palestinian advocacy and harms affecting the Australian Jewish community.

My primary contentions are that:

  1. The adverse impacts of the protest movement need to be understood as a systemic and cumulative phenomenon- this includes chronic low level psychological harm, social exclusion and the generation of an atmosphere associated with a heightened risk of sporadic violence
  2. The heterogeneity of participants and their motivations, the ill-defined targets (Israel, Zionists or Jews), and the ambiguity of protest language and symbols, together make attribution of harm and intent difficult. This ambiguity and heterogeneity allow a protest environment that tacitly fosters exclusionary, vilifying and even violent behaviour while allowing protest spokespeople plausible deniability.
  3. Consequently, the courts and relevant legislation, which assess the protest movement on a “slogan by slogan” or “event by event” basis -that is, through the lens of individual cases – cannot adequately “see” the broad environment as experienced by the Jewish community. It is a case of forest and trees.

Background

The attack on December 14, 2025, was the worst act of antisemitic violence ever committed on Australian soil. Fifteen people were murdered at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach.

Some have drawn a straight line between the Bondi massacre and anti-Zionist incitement, particularly focusing on the slogan “Globalise the Intifada”. Anti-Zionist advocates, in contrast, attribute blame to the shooters’ ISIS connection and the influence of radical Sydney clerics, insisting that the Bondi shootings have nothing to do with peaceful anti-Zionist activism.

Yet this murder was, in the perpetrators own words, intended to condemn “the acts of ‘Zionists”. It seems implausible that this targeting of Zionists was entirely unrelated to two years of inflammatory anti-Zionist rhetoric or that hate speech played no role in pushing perpetrators, primed by fundamentalist influencers, to cross some threshold to action.

Most Jewish Australians view Bondi against a backdrop of over two years of escalating incitement and a hardening anti-Jewish atmosphere. The Opera House protest in October 2023 marked a turning point. Reported chants, including “Where are the Jews?” and “F*** the Jews”, suggested a real shift in what could be said about Jews in public, seemingly without consequence.

Since then, high-profile incidents, such as arson attacks on synagogues, have attracted significant media attention.  Less visible are cumulative, psychologically harmful effects of effects of chronic “low level” stigmatisation.

Many find it hard to avoid the conclusion that this environment may have lowered the threshold for violence. A long-standing vulnerability has been brought into sharper focus, prompting calls for a precautionary response, including greater restraint in protest language.

The Bondi tragedy has produced grief, fear and anger within the Jewish community, alongside shock and sympathy across the wider Australian society. The subsequent critical national conversation has led to the present Royal Commission. Could we, as a nation, have done more to counter antisemitism and ensure Jewish safety? Why did our security services fail?  Was anti-Zionist activism a contributing factor for Bondi?

If so, do we need constraints on forms of protest? Should constraints be established through legislation or, at a deeper level, through education and cultural change?

Debate over public discourse and anti-Jewish incidents

Palestinian advocacy organisations have condemned the violence at Bondi and expressed sympathy for the victims. However, Jewish expressions of fear or calls for reassurance and safety have typically been dismissed as “weaponising antisemitism”, silencing debate or even “defending genocide”.

Anti-Israel groups like US Jewish Voice for Peace and the Australian Palestine Advocacy Network insist their activism is guided by justice and human rights and rejects racism or violence. Those claims are in their mission statements. Jewish anti-Zionist commentators and groups have denied any possible relationship between the language of protest and the attack.  “Zero evidence”, according to one commentator.

Consequently, they have criticised Jewish calls for safety and protections, and government proposals to restrict aspects of protest, as overreach or an attack on free speech rather than an attempt to provide community safety.

This insistence that no restrictions be placed on the language and forms of protests is accompanied by several claims that warrant critical evaluation:

  1. That the pro-Palestinian movement is peaceful and simply protesting injustice (including alleged genocide)
  2. That the language of protest, including terms such as “Globalise the intifada” is inherently non-violent;
  3. That public protest is directed against Israel and Zionists and not against Jews;
  4. That consequently activist speech cannot be linked with violence, or harms more broadly, affecting Jews
  5. That the imputation of violent connotations is simply an attempt to stifle free speech.

How might we reconcile this Jewish experience of harm with claims by Palestinian advocacy groups that the movement is non-violent and explicitly rejects antisemitism?

Below, I address a number of key questions and issues in turn.

1.The pro-Palestinian movement is a complex ecosystem and not accurately characterised as entirely peaceful

Palestinian advocacy groups stress that their activism is grounded in human rights. They claim that violence against Jews cannot be attributed to a movement that explicitly rejects antisemitism or the use of violence. This is a superficially reassuring but incomplete framing. It fails to acknowledge the range of actors (and agendas) within the pro-Palestinian advocacy community and beyond it, not all of whom necessarily share these peaceful ideals.

This heterogeneity is even reflected in the several labels used to describe the movement: pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist. While they may be used interchangeably, they represent very different agendas and targets: supporting the rights of a people, opposing the policies of a state and opposing, and often vilifying, those who can be linked with that state- that is, Jews.

A 2014 study of over 20 Palestinian civil society groups by the General Delegation Of Palestine in Australia captures the heterogeneity of the groups – likely a fraction of the number of groups active in 2026.

The study notes that Palestinian organizations “often have multiple desired outcomes and target audiences and undertake different kinds of activities.” The study explicitly distinguishes “advocacy groups” and “activist groups”. The former are the public facing, suit and tie wearing (my words) groups, that speak the language of human rights and engage in, to quote the study, “persuasion, lobbying and negotiation”.

“Activist groups”, in contrast, are described as “denunciative” engaging in “protest, street demonstrations, strike actions, public meetings” and whose desired outcomes are “diffuse and not necessarily … within defined policy and political parameters”. They “articulate messages in different forums, to different audiences” with different “tone, tenor, and language of the message”… “in language that resonates with their niche constituencies.” Of course we are now also increasingly aware of Islamist (and) influences in Australia which we now know to have been connected to the Bondi massacre.

Beyond explicitly Palestinian groups lies a wider ecosystem. It includes direct-action networks, unaffiliated vandals, right-wing extremists, Islamic fundamentalist groups and “old school antisemites”. They often mobilise around the same events, language and grievances or share physical and online spaces with non-violent advocacy groups. Their presence may shape how protests are experienced by those on the receiving end.

Speaking at the Lowy Institute lecture ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess observed that activist groups are often not “centrally controlled” or “uniformly motivated,” and may include “individuals who are increasingly willing to embrace or threaten violence to achieve their goals.”

This heterogeneity within the activist community allows for plausible deniability when violent or threatening behaviour is observed For example, after chants of “F-ck the Jews” and “where’s the jews” were reported at the Opera house protest, Fahad Ali of the Palestinian Action Groups dismissed this as reflecting a “small group of troublemakers” The same disavowal was made regarding a pro-Palestinian bikie group. This allows spokespeople to claim entirely benign aims while wider affiliates of movement take a more aggressive approach to members of the Jewish community.

To put it simply: claims that the Palestinian advocacy community is entirely peaceful is a very incomplete description of reality.

2.The language and forms of protest are not unambiguously peaceful, but rather contain phrases and symbols with the potential to be interpreted as violent by elements in the protest movement and broader society

The language and symbolism of protest span a wide range. Some slogans are political and entirely unobjectionable: “Stop the war,” “Free Palestine”.

Then there are the explicitly or implicitly violent slogans and symbols that often accompany protest. They include phrases such as “where’s the Jews”, “f*** the jews” “death to IDF” and  “by any means necessary” as well as symbols (terrorist flags, pictures of the Ayatollah, the Jewish Star of David in rubbish bins)  Symbols of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran can be understood as implying support for their violent and eliminationist goals (described here, here, here, here, here). This celebration of violence was evident immediately after the Hamas massacre at the Opera House protest and the Lakemba celebration (and indeed there was further language of celebration and an anniversary event at Lakemba a year later.)

Slogans such as “Zionists are baby killers” and “all Zionists are terrorists” are clearly intended to, or can reasonably be expected to, incite hatred towards those who support Israel’s existence or are affiliated with Israel, regardless of their views on the conduct of the war.

In between are phrases whose meaning is contested, such as “from the river to the sea” and “globalise the intifada.” Many have expressed concern that such phrases are coded calls for violence or for the elimination of the Jewish state. Palestinian advocates have emphasised the innocent meaning of “river to the sea” and “Intifada” (here, here, here) and some go so far as to argue that attributing violent intent to such slogans is Islamophobic.

It is frequently explained, for example, that “intifada” simply means “shaking off” political oppression and is not inherently violent. But language does not operate through dictionary definitions alone. For many Jews, the word “intifada” evokes, and is inseparable from the Second Intifada — a sustained campaign of terrorism that killed more than 1,000 Israelis. That history inevitably shapes how the term is heard. As Susan Benesch of the Dangerous Speech Project explains, the experience of speech as “inflammatory” depends on the speaker, the audience, the medium and the context.

“Globalise the intifada” may carry one meaning in an academic lecture and quite another in a mass street march. Its impact can shift with the size, tone and location of a protest; with accompanying slogans (“death to the IDF,” “by any means necessary”); and with symbols associated with Hamas or Hezbollah. Such language may land very differently in demonstrations held immediately after the Hamas attacks of 2023 or in the wake of the Bondi terror attack. It will be experienced differently in the public square and outside a synagogue.

The activist community is not an army of philologists. Whatever the linguistic origins of “intifada”, its meaning is contested and may be interpreted differently by different groups. As the Palestinian led report mentioned above states, in some circumstances “…human rights and international law arguments can lose their meaning in inflammatory and, at times, ideological criticisms.”

It is that very ambiguity that allows those who do seek to intimidate (or even provoke violence) to use it with plausible deniability. As Susan Benesch states “One cannot make a list of words that are dangerous, since the way in which any message will be understood – like its effect on an audience – depends not only on its content but on how it is communicated…. The very same words can be highly inflammatory, or benign.”

3.The use of the term Zionist as the target of protest implicates most Jews despite claims by protesters that they are not antisemitic and do not target Jews

Activists claim to target Zionists and not Jews.

The problem is that the vast majority of Australian Jews are Zionists- if you target Zionists you are generally targeting Jews.

A 2023 Australian survey reported 80-90% of respondents indicated personal connectedness with and concern for Israel and 77% identified as Zionist. Most Australian Jews have cultural, religious or historical connections to Israel and support for the security and safety of its citizens, including for many Jews, close family. Some use the label Zionist to describe this connection. It is often an element of cultural identity and for Australia’s substantial post-Holocaust community, it carries connotations of “refuge”. For many Jews, this sense of connection does not imply endorsement of specific Israeli policies or leadership.

Anti-Zionists are well aware of this deep connection between Jews, Israel and Zionism, yet work hard to maintain the fiction that their activism does not target Jews.

They do it by presuming to tell Jews about their identity. (Something that would be considered offensive if directed at other groups. Jews are told that they are a disembodied “faith group” with no sense of peoplehood or organic connection to Israel. Palestinian advocates showcase the tiny minority of antizionist Jews who agree with them. Anti-Zionists insist that Zionism and Judaism are distinct noting that  “Not all Jews are Zionist” or “being Jewish is not identical to being Zionist”. This distinction is technically correct but doesn’t negate the connection of the vast majority of Jews with Israel.

Indeed, the identification of Zionists and Jews in the mental landscape of some activists is evoked by the use of classic antisemitic tropes in antizionist discourse. They speak of  “…the Jewish Lobby and the Zionist Lobby infiltrating” with their “Tentacles”, of powerful elites(including Jewish Law firms) and conspiracist notions  “We already know that Zionists are parasitic upon progressive spaces. It is under the guise of progressivism that Zionists launder their genocidal colonialism, while weaponising their influence to amplify occupation propaganda and steer cultural narratives away from Palestinian liberation.”

Thus, though the protest movement insists its focus is Israel and its policies, the use of the term Zionist does much unrecognised work in redirecting hostility from Israel to Jews. This reflects the multiple and conflicting resonances of the term Zionist in protest culture. In protest messaging, the term “Zionist” is a placeholder for a catalogue of evils: colonialism, racism, apartheid and genocide. It can be loaded with the most inflammatory rhetoric: Zionists as “child killers,” “Nazis” or “genociders.” It functions loosely as a political descriptor, a moral accusation and a marker of identity.

These dual resonances – Zionist as object of hate and Zionist as Jew – ripple through disparate communities, tacitly “criminalising” even the most benign connection with Israel and indirectly reinforcing antipathy towards Jews, without ever explicitly naming them. When “Zionist” functions simultaneously as a term of vilification and as a label many Jews apply to themselves, political critique almost inevitably slides into group-based hostility. The effect is to generate antipathy toward Jews without ever explicitly naming them.

It is not surprising that in some community sectors, a simple public expression of concern for the safety of Jews in Israel may be enough to evoke all the hostility now reflexly associated with the term Zionist. This leaves many Jews uncertain how to speak publicly at all.

Many Australians who support Palestinian rights in good faith may not recognise how protest language may facilitate this “slippage” of anger from Israel to Zionists, to Jews.  This slippage blurs the boundary between political critique and hostility toward the Jewish community.

A distressing incident in 2025 illustrates how boundaries between antisemitism and the language of anti-Zionist protest can blur. Year-5 Jewish students on an excursion were reportedly subjected to a barrage of insults from older students from another school including: “dirty Jews”, “baby killers”, and “Free Hezbollah”.

It is tragic that the Bondi attackers, allegedly motivated by opposition to “Zionists”, murdered Jews.

4.The reflex denial of any possible links between protest and violence is based on simplistic and outmoded understandings of causality in complex social systems

In response to Jewish community concerns about protest language and community safety, it is common to hear the reply that the relationship between speech and a specific terrorist act cannot be “proven”. This is technically true, but misleading. In complex systems, causation is a statistical concept.

It is widely accepted in the broader community that certain harms operate probabilistically: for example the relationship between climate change and extreme weather events is well recognised even though one cannot prove causation for an individual bush-fire or storm event. The same applies to the relationship between smoking and individual cases of lung cancer.

Similarly, there is a substantial literature supporting the view that the risk of harm from hate-speech is also probabilistic and operates at a population level.  This is true, even though we cannot attribute a given event (such as Bondi) to a specific persons, actions, slogan or protest event.

This phenomenon has been described as “stochastic terrorism” or “stochastic violence”. This has been defined as “…the use of mass communications to stir up … lone wolves to carry out violent or terrorist acts that are … individually unpredictable”. This literature recognises that violent acts are likely related to the emotional and cognitive effects of activism in the media and on the street. Psychological and linguistic studies and a recent major metanalysis of 55 studies on the impact of media messaging all describe similar mechanisms. This literature describes how rhetoric circulates within communities and can lower the threshold for violence in primed individuals. In these systems no one need explicitly call for violence, and no one is individually responsible. Risk arises through cumulative effects rather than direct incitement.

Susan Benesch of the Dangerous Speech Project describes dangerous speech as “Any form of expression (e.g. speech, text, or images) that can increase the risk that its audience will condone or commit violence against members of another group.” She further notes that “Hate speech … uses derogatory group slurs, metaphoric language, exaggeration, images, and symbols. … Its public expression ….allows like-minded individuals to find an echo chamber for their shared beliefs. And it has real and painful consequences for victims.”

Mike Burgess, speaking a month prior to the Bondi massacre, said that “Since October 2023, we’ve seen more provocative protests and a notable uptick in intentionally disruptive and damaging tactics by anti-Israel activists, including multiple acts of arson, vandalism and violent protest…” and “The conflict in the Middle East …. prompted protest, exacerbated tension, undermined social cohesion and elevated intolerance (making)  acts of politically motivated violence more likely. …. Inflammatory rhetoric and provocative, disruptive actions had been normalised, and the normalisation of violence and hatred against one community had created a permissive environment for similar behaviours in other communities.”

This is not an argument about direct causation or “collective blame”, but the debate over language and anti-Jewish violence requires the recognition of this well described sociological phenomenon and  constructive engage with its policy implications.

The inadequacy of frameworks premised on direct causation is not merely  theoretical but regularly surfaces in permissive court findings regarding the right to protest near synagogues, or to display language vilifying “Zionists”.

5.The harms to the Jewish community are not limited to dramatic violent acts but include chronic psychological and social harm

Bondi was a tragic event that finally shocked our community into recognising and responding to a problem that had been evident to most of the Jewish community for two years.

Pro-Palestinian/ anti-Zionist activism had invaded “intimate” Jewish spaces, with mobs outside synagogues or at recreational spaces in Jewish neighbourhoods. There has been vandalism of Jewish homes, schools, synagogues, community centres and of the offices of a university academic. Jews in the arts and other sectors of our community have been marginalised and doxxed and private businesses intimidated and shut down. There have been death threats to Jews and Jewish organisations.

A steady drum beat of vilification: “baby killers”, “genocidaires” and “Nazis” has created a charged and heated atmosphere in which many Jews have come to feel unwelcome or unsafe. For every act that hits the media there are countless stories, often related over the Sabbath dinner table, of personal slights, off-hand comments and slurs. There has been endless on-line hate. This incitement has been marked by episodes of violence, acts of arson and now murder.

The dramatic rise in incidents negatively impacting Australian Jews since October 2023 has been well documented in Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) incident reports, as have Jewish experiences of antisemitism (2024 survey ) and antisemitic attitudes held by non-Jewish Australians (2021, 2025, ASECA survey).

Hate speech itself can be profoundly harmful psychologically. This is true for Jews in Australia (and)  the US Jewish community just as it was for the indigenous community during the voice debate. For some antizionists, the intimidation and marginalisation of Jews is not a by-product of activism but rather a specific goal. ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess, commenting on anti-Israel activists observed: “Directly or indirectly, their actions can marginalise, stigmatise and frighten sections of the community.”

A 2024 survey conducted in the weeks after the start of the Gaza war (including approximately 8% of the adult Jewish population) reported that 64% felt that antisemitism was a big problem, far higher than in a 2017 survey. One in five had personally experienced an insult or harassment because they are Jewish and a similar number was less open in showing their identity in public. Similar findings have been reported in the UK, Europe and the US.

This is particularly sensitive in Australia’s post Holocaust community. As Jeremy Waldronwrote of hate speech: “It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like—or what other societies have been like—in the past. In doing so, it creates something like …a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word…”

6.Jewish community calls for support and safety reflect genuine grass roots concerns and are not simply political attempts to stifle legitimate debate as often claimed by anti-Zionist groups

Against the overwhelming evidence of adverse Jewish experiences, non-Jewish and Jewish pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist groups regularly attempt to downplay the issue by:

  • disputing definitions of antisemitism, survey methodology and measurement.
  • dismissing communal concerns as “weaponising” antisemitism
  • claiming Jews are simply conflating antisemitism with criticism of Israel.
  • claiming that antizionist slogans and activism have nothing to do with Jews because “not all Jews are Zionists” or “Zionism and Jewishness are not identical”. Such claims, while true, are facile and in no way negate the experiences and views of the vast majority of the Jewish community who have strong connections with and concerns for Israel and are targets for antizionist activism
  • focusing on antisemitism from the political right, distracting from the complex and cumulative effects of anti-Zionist speech and activism from the progressive left, religious fundamentalist and anti-Israel groups.

The pattern is one of disputing and distracting rather than engaging with patterns of fear, withdrawal and marginalisation.

This approach stands in opposition to recommendations in the AHRC Framework which stresses that the  approach to racism should be “community-centric” and recognise that racism as a “complex and shifting phenomenon”.

7.Claims that antisemitism can adequately be addressed through existing “universal” mechanisms are not supported by evidence

Anti-Zionists resist specific policies to respond to antisemitism, casting their lot with generalised anti-racism frameworks. They reject the Special Envoy’s report on antisemitism, in part for reasons of free speech. The claim that the AHRC Framework is sufficient as the primary mechanism to deal with antisemitism is flawed.

While society-wide approaches to racism are essential, Indigenous Australians, migrants, women, LGBTQ+ communities, Muslims and Jews all have different histories of oppression and face different challenges.

The need for targeted measures for antisemitism is not about moral priority but relates to its specific dynamic. Jews are often not recognised as a minority let alone a vulnerable one, because they are coded “white” and linked with power, money, conspiracy and influence. There is growing ignorance of antisemitism’s history, its genocidal expression within living memory. A UN report highlighting the lack of awareness of antisemitism’s modern manifestations.

It must also be noted that the AHRC document was framed and developed primarily to deal with indigenous disadvantage. Its preamble it states that: “racism operates by racialising various groups of people negatively to maintain the dominance of groups racialised as white….”. This strong conceptual frame around issues of colour raises questions about its suitability as the sole vehicle for addressing antisemitism.

The assertion made by Jewish anti-Zionists, that “general anti-racism” measures, including the AHRC Framework, will be effective for antisemitism does not reflect what is known about antisemitism nor about the AHRC Framework.

As human rights law academic Kenneth Marcus has observed, when  antisemitism is subsumed under generalised frameworks of disadvantage, it often disappears from view.

The Special Envoy’s plan, while open to criticism, is consonant with Global Guidelineswhich have been endorsed by over 40 states and regional groups, and consistent with UN recommendations that addressing antisemitism requires specific strategies in addition to general anti-racism measures.

In public statements the JCA has argued that calls to curb the most hostile forms of anti-Zionist speech risk making Jews less safe, by exposing them to blame for increased state repression. It is worth asking whether reframing such calls as political manoeuvres rather than expressions of communal fear does not itself heighten that risk — by casting concern for safety as bad faith.

8.Minority Jewish voices substantially misrepresent the concerns of the wider Australian Jewish community

The Jewish Council of Australia (JCA) has expressed the intention to engage with the Commission, as is their right. However, public positions taken so far by the JCA and other anti-Zionist Jewish groups raise concerns about the nature and impact of their likely submissions.

The JCA presents itself as an expert voice that provides a counterbalance to allegedly unrepresentative communal leadership bodies such as the ECAJ.

While Jewish peak bodies are not directly elected by the whole of community (what community peak bodies are?), they include a wide range of community organisations across the country and are closely aligned the community’s concerns regarding safety and connection with Israel. Concerns regarding community safety are widespread and a deep connection to Israel and concern for Israel’s welfare are shared by around 90% of Australian Jews. Around three quarters self-identify as Zionist.(2017, 2023 and 2024).

The JCA and other anti-Zionist groups have a small number of high-profile spokespeople, however their views are unlikely to reflect more than a small minority of a Jewish community of over 110,000. The JCA claims over 1,300 supporters. However, many claimed supporters are anonymous and signing on to their website entails endorsing values such as human rights, freedom and equality. not necessarily the anti-Zionist nature of the group. It is far from clear that their those who have signed endorse the JCA’s view that antisemitism is unrelated to progressive and antizionist activism.

This doesn’t delegitimise their participation or views but should have bearing on the weight given these views at the Royal Commission.

Anti-Zionist Jewish positions are often cited by the broader anti-Zionist advocacy community and by segments of the media and civil society. This is not because the JCA is representative of the community, but rather because their views suit the agenda of those who seek to vilify the Jewish community without restriction.

This “spoiler effect” is not without precedent.

The recent referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, though set in a different political context, is illustrative. Tanya Muscat and Katharina Wolf from Curtin University described how “No” proponents “… were selectively framed by media to present a picture of broad Indigenous opposition, thereby neutralising support for the Yes campaign…(this)  illustrates the need for communication strategies that are not only inclusive, but genuinely representative and responsive to the diversity within Indigenous communities.”

The Commission should be alert to the risk that anti-Zionist Jewish voices, amplified beyond their representative weight, may obscure the genuine concerns and aspirations of the wider Jewish community.

9.Jewish vulnerability is not adequately recognised in legal and progressive cultural frameworks

Over the last two years or more, hostile speech targeting Jews has circulated, escalated and become normalised in a manner that seems unimaginable were this another minority.

Cautious responses across government, media, legal and other civic institutions have contributed to a permissive environment in which hostile language and behaviour have gone unchallenged.

In part this has happened because concerns expressed by Jews regarding antisemitism are often understood primarily through the lens of the Israel–Palestine conflict, where they are interpreted as attempts to “silence protest”. They are also contested through disputes over definition or methodology.

At a deeper level, Jews are not widely recognised as a vulnerable minority, despite being one of Australia’s smallest communities and carrying profound collective trauma within living memory. Jews are targeted by “the right” as “non-white” and conspiratorial (with replacement theories proliferating, particularly in the US) as well as by progressives who characterise them as white, European, powerful and conspiratorial. This antipathy from both sides of the political spectrum is not experienced by other minorities, and other vulnerable groups typically do not offer solidarity to the Jewish community.

Existing legal and anti-discrimination mechanisms are designed to deal with harms attributable to individual people and events. As discussed above, much of the harm associated with the protest movement can be understood as cumulative in nature, with risks being statistical. This framing is more akin to climate change than to individual criminal behaviour and so grappling with the cumulative effects and diffuse responsibility of mass movements needs alternative conceptual approaches and  mechanisms of mitigation and redress.

The NSW Court of Appeal’s April 2026 decision striking down the Public Assembly Restriction Declaration scheme found that it imposed an impermissible burden on the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. The courts framework assumes that harms from political expression are discrete and traceable, and that a more precisely targeted instrument is always available and always superior.

The stochastic violence framework challenges both assumptions. Where harm operates through cumulative population-level exposure and threshold effects, demanding tight causal specificity as a condition of constitutional validity is demanding something the nature of the harm structurally cannot provide. Where the relevant risk is ambient and systemic rather than incident-specific, a broader precautionary mechanism may be more — not less — consistent with the underlying harm theory than a narrowly targeted one would be.

Legal mechanisms designed to adjudicate individual acts, individual intent and individual causation are poorly suited to harms that are diffuse, cumulative and probabilistically distributed across a population.

The Commission should draw two conclusions from this. First, that the safety concerns motivating the legislation were genuine and documented. Second, that the gap between what existing legal frameworks can address and what the harm actually requires cannot be closed by litigation. It requires policy development grounded in the empirical literature on dangerous speech and probabilistic violence — to develop regulatory responses that are both constitutionally defensible and adequate to the harm being addressed. That is precisely the kind of deeper recommendation this Commission is positioned to make.

10. This is not just another free speech/protest issue- the current protests are the first large-scale human rights protest movement in Australia that explicitly or implicitly targets an Australian minority community

The claim that anti-Zionist protest stands in the tradition of great Australian civic activism deserves scrutiny. Australia has a proud history of protest in the cause of human rights.

Opposition to the Vietnam War targeted government military policy. The anti-apartheid movement targeted a foreign regime. Activism for LGBTQ+ and Indigenous rights targeted discriminatory laws and the Australian state. In each case the object of protest was governmental policy or the policies of a foreign state.

No Australian minority community was targeted, vilified or made to feel unsafe in its own country as a direct consequence of the protest itself.

The anti-Zionist protest movement is different.  Its stated target is the Israeli government but, as argued above, the language and conduct of significant elements of the movement extend — through slippage and cumulative normalisation — from Israel, to Zionists, to Jews. The people bearing the cost are not governments or institutions. They are Jewish schoolchildren, Jewish academics, and Jewish families whose synagogues have been vandalised and whose neighbourhoods have been subject to intimidatory protest.

A human rights movement that targets a vulnerable minority undermines its own foundational premise. This not simply the case of speaking truth to power but rather a large movement directing its forces at a vulnerable minority.

Powerful and effective advocacy for Palestinian rights is entirely legitimate and possible without dehumanising language, without intimidation in Jewish communal spaces, and without slogans carrying violent resonances for a community that has known genocide within living memory.

Some notes from personal experience

My parents came to Australia to escape European antisemitism. It was largely a successful migration, and this country has been good to our family and to the Jewish community more broadly.

Antisemitism has nonetheless been a sporadic presence throughout my life. As a child I heard comments about Jews and money. Walking to synagogue in a kippah I have had “bloody Jews” shouted from passing car windows on several occasions. A close friend was beaten in a football ground car park while wearing a kippah . A few years ago a tradesman stormed out of my home after apparently noticing a Jewish artefact, shouting in the street as he left: “the Nazis should have finished you off.”

This was unpleasant but had never risen to the sense of a systematic anti-Jewish campaign.

Since October 2023 something has changed.

Partly it is what has been said and done — the graffiti, the vandalism of Jewish centres, the tearing down of hostage photographs from public walls. Partly it is what has not been said. I have watched colleagues receive institutional solidarity after attacks on their communities over time After October 7th 2023 I received communications from institutional leaders that mentioned Gaza, mentioned the conflict, but did not mention Jews, did not mention what had happened to Israeli civilians and did not acknowledge what the Australian Jewish community was living through. That silence communicated something profound.

I have watched security guards at synagogues and Jewish schools become so normalised that we have largely stopped remarking on it. Soon after October 7th 2023 a Jewish nursing home in Melbourne started to employ guards at the entrance. My uncle, a Holocaust survivor, needs guards to protect him from antisemitic attack in Melbourne in 2026.

The sense that there has been a tectonic shift in attitudes towards Jews is widely shared in my community, and it deserves to be taken seriously.

Conclusions and recommendations

The concerns currently being expressed by Australian Jews do not turn on Bondi.

Rather, Bondi has served to crystallise awareness of the sustained and normalised hostility toward a minority community. This has operated through language, symbolism, social pressure and physical intimidation in a civic environment that has consistently failed to recognise, constrain or respond to it with the seriousness applied to harms affecting other minorities.

There is a moral accounting that has not yet been done. For two years, government and civic institutions sent a series of signals — largely through acts of omission— that shaped the environment in which hostility toward Jews escalated and became normalised. Just two early examples were the silence after the Opera House protest in October ’23 and our Foreign Minister’s refusal to visit the Nova memorial while in Israel. The has been a continuing absence of clear public statements about what forms of protest and language are acceptable — not legally, but morally.

This continuing silence and apathy were read, by the Jewish community and by the protest movement, as tacit acceptance of unconstrained forms of protest. The failure of government to reinforce moral and civic norms has had consequences that no subsequent legislative response can fully undo.

A Royal Commission that focuses narrowly on security failures at Bondi, without grappling with this broader institutional failure of leadership, will fail.

The protest movement should address its own accountability. Palestinian advocacy organisations that present themselves as defenders of human rights carry a particular responsibility. Tolerating, excusing or deflecting attention from dehumanising language directed at Jews is a contradiction the Commission should name directly. “We reject antisemitism” in a mission statement is not accountability. Genuine commitment to human rights principles requires actively calling out vilifying language when it appears, refusing to share platforms with those who use it, and accepting that the credibility of a movement is shaped by what it tolerates as much as by what it explicitly endorses. The question the Commission should put to these organisations is not whether they intend harm, but rather whether they effectively provide cover for unacceptable conduct incompatible with the protection of human rights.

The Commission will hear from minority Jewish voices who are seeking to limit scrutiny of anti-Zionist activism and minimise the widely held concerns of the community they claim to represent. Anti-Zionist Jewish voices are amplified not because they reflect Australian Jewish experience but because they are useful to those who wish to deflect that scrutiny. It would be a serious failure if the genuine and widely held fears of over 100,000 Australian Jews were obscured by a small, unrepresentative minority whose positions are largely indistinguishable from those opposing any restraint on anti-Zionist activism.

The Commission should weigh the asymmetry of what is at stake. On one side of the balance sits some degree of restraint in the most inflammatory language and protest forms — forms that reasonable people can recognise as serving no legitimate advocacy purpose. On the other sits a community that has spent two years reporting fear, concealing identity in public, withdrawing from civic life, and watching its institutions firebombed while being told that its concerns are weaponisation, overreach, or simply the price of free speech. Freedom of speech is a central value. So is the right of a minority community to exist in civic space without being treated as a legitimate target. These are not equivalent considerations, and recommendations that treat them as symmetrical will not address the harm.

This is not a call for censorship, silencing debate or banning protest. It does not equate criticism of Israel with antisemitism. Nor is it a concern about mere Jewish discomfort relating to robust debate. The case for Palestinian rights is legitimate and can be made powerfully without language that dehumanises, without slogans that carry violent resonances, and without forms of protest that target Jewish communal spaces. The question is not whether advocacy is permissible. It is whether the most harmful modes of that advocacy are necessary to it.

What is at stake is not comfort but belonging: whether Australian civic spaces remain places where minorities can live, speak and participate without being treated as objects of collective hostility.

No regulatory or legislative response will be adequate without investment in the civic and educational foundations that make such responses meaningful. The past two years have exposed not only a failure of law and policy but a failure of shared understanding — across institutions, media and the general public — about what antisemitism is, how it operates.

Regulation addresses behaviour but education is needed to address the conditions that make certain behaviours seem acceptable. Any set of recommendations that omits this foundation is treating symptoms. The Commission should recommend that addressing antisemitism be incorporated into school curricula. The media and public institutions require structured guidance on recognising hate speech that operates through political framing.

The Commission is accordingly asked to consider the following recommendations:

  1. Recognise the systemic nature of the harm. The cumulative, probabilistic character of harm from hate speech and inflammatory protest language should be acknowledged explicitly. A framework built solely around adjudicating discrete incidents and provable individual causation will continue to fail the Jewish community as it has failed it for the past two years.
  2. Develop regulatory responses adequate to systemic harm. The NSW Court of Appeal’s invalidation of the post-Bondi protest restrictions indicates the limitations of current judicial processes to address the nature of harms experienced by the Jewish community. The Commission should recommend policy grounded in the empirical literature on speech and harm —that are both constitutionally defensible yet adequate to the nature of harms experienced by the Jewish community.
  3. Require accountability within the protest movement. Advocacy organisations that claim to reject antisemitism and violence bear a corresponding responsibility to actively call out vilifying language and intimidatory conduct within the broader protest ecosystem they share. Passive disavowal after the fact is not accountability. The Commission should consider whether organisations and individuals that claim human rights credentials while tolerating dehumanising language directed at Jews should continue to receive public legitimacy, funding or institutional support.
  4. Reject the adequacy of generalised anti-racism frameworks as the sole response.The AHRC Framework was developed primarily around racialised disadvantage and the experience of communities of colour. Antisemitism has a distinct dynamic — Jews are simultaneously coded as white and powerful by progressives, and as foreign and conspiratorial by the right — and is rendered invisible by generalised frameworks. Specific strategies, consistent with Global Guidelines endorsed by over 40 states and with UN recommendations, are warranted and should be implemented alongside, not instead of, broader anti-racism measures.
  5. Weigh community voices accurately. The Commission will hear from Jewish anti-Zionist groups whose positions diverge sharply from those of mainstream communal organisations and most community members. Their right to participate is not questioned. However the weight accorded their submissions should be proportionate to genuine representativeness, and the Commission should be alert to the amplification of minority Jewish voices to serve interests other than accurate representation of the Jewish community.
  6. Invest in education and civic foundations. The Commission should recommend that antisemitism — its history, its specific character and its modern manifestations — be reflected in institutional training.
  7. Demand moral leadership, not only legal mechanism. The most important failure of the past two years has not been legislative. It has been the failure of government, universities, media and civil society to say clearly and repeatedly that Jews are a vulnerable minority community entitled to the same recognition, solidarity and protection extended to other minorities; that their fears are legitimate; and that certain forms of language and protest are not made acceptable by being coded. No other minority is expected to bear resentments originating in distant conflict or in the acts of isolated individuals.

The “I’ll ride with you” movement, which supported Muslims who were feeling vulnerable to backlash following the  Lindt Café siege, exemplifies our community’s capacity to recognise and respond to minority vulnerability with solidarity. No equivalent solidarity was extended to the Jewish community in the wake of October 7th, or in the two years of escalating hostility that followed.

Randa Abdel-Fattah’s claim that “Zionists (i.e. most Jews) have no right to cultural safety” exemplifies the cloud that has hung unanswered over the Jewish community for far too long. This slogan, and the tragic downstream effects when such views become normalised (and even celebrated in some sectors), represent the deep challenge before the Royal Commission and the Australian community more broadly.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Andrew is a medical specialist working in Australia. He is a regular visitor to Israel and a member of an egalitarian shul in Melbourne. He is married and has three sons. He occasionally suffers from thought bubbles that transmogrify into written form.

Jewish singer Deborah Conway accuses Aussie actor of running anti-Semitic boycott campaign against her

Jewish singer Deborah Conway has accused an Australian actor of running an anti-Semitic boycott campaign against her that led to venues cancelling her shows.

Fifty-six witnesses were called in the Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion last week, sharing how “Nazi style slurs” are being hurled at children in schools that now look more like prisons due to increased security concerns in the wake of Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Conway, a Jewish Australian, told the commission several of her shows have been pulled over the last few years, claiming an Australian actor, who she did not name inside the hearing, had sent letters to venues stating “Deborah Conway is a self-confessed Zionist and a supporter of genocide”.

The letters also allegedly included words to the effect that if they were to platform her “you are complicit in genocide”.

“I think some of the venues found that incredibly disturbing and they pulled back,” Conway said.

Conway revealed the name of the actor she has accused of running the campaign while speaking outside the hearing, however NewsWire has chosen not to name the woman.

“She signed her name very boldly and openly and she was proud of the letter she had written,” Conway claimed outside the hearing on Monday.

Singer Deborah Conway has suffered a flurry of online abuse in the wake of October 7, 2023. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Deborah Conway Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Conway also detailed how in another instance, 70 people wearing balaclavas rocked up to a venue hitting pots and pans together, and said if they went ahead with one of Conway’s shows “we will make sure that we turn up with 300 people, and we will make sure that business is very hard for you”.

“So they pulled it, which I don’t blame them — I would too,” Conway said.

The musician also copped a flurry of online abuse after she and a group of about 600 Jewish creatives were doxxed in February 2024.

“I hope your entire family dies in an air strike and you have limbs amputated without aesthetics — I assume he means anaesthetics,” Conway read to the commission on Monday.

“I hope that after this happens you have no access to clean bandages, antibiotics or food.”

Conway called anti-Zionism a ‘genocidal impulse’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Anti-Zionism a ‘genocidal impulse’

Conway described anti-Zionism as a “genocidal impulse”, telling the hearing that “when people chant from the river to the sea … that is a call to end the entity of Israel”.

“I want there to be peace, I want there to be a two-state solution, I want everyone to just relax. Let everyone eat their hummus and get on with it,” Conway said.

“But unfortunately … we’re not living in the land of unicorns and rainbows.”

She said she can’t bear the idea of young artists who are being targeted and vilified for believing Israel should be allowed to exist.

“That’s their crime, and that’s a crime that I think is completely beyond the pale,” she said.

“When they say Zionism equals Nazism … genocide … and then they end up with a sign that goes in the bin.

“They’re throwing us all in the bin. It’s not going to end well.”

Conway is an Australian singer and songwriter. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Conway is an Australian singer and songwriter. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

‘Larger than life’: Tribute to slain Rabbi

The father of a 14-year-old who survived the Bondi attack with bullet wounds paid tribute to Rabbi Eli Schlanger who died in the Bondi attack on December 14 last year.

The speaker was present at the Chanukah by the Sea event where two gunmen allegedly opened fire, killing fifteen people.

“He was so happy, it was an amazing event ‘til the minute before,” the man said.

He described Mr Schlanger as “larger than life” and “an amazing human being” who was always ready to help.

His 14-year-old daughter was shot while shielding children during the attack, with the man saying his daughter had asked him afterwards “(Dad) why they hate us so much, why they want to kill us?”

The speaker also told the royal commission a Jewish community member brought their Mezuzah — a religious scroll placed at the door of Jewish Homes — to see if it was intact and correct.

Once he opened it he found a “Free Palestine” scroll in it instead of the religious verse.

‘No friends left’: Jewish 15yo targeted online

A 15-year-old Jewish boy, known only as ABB, detailed how he had been bullied since the end of 2024 and was targeted in a Minecraft chat group comprised of children from his school.

A Jewish teenager says he was targeted with anti-Semitic abuse while playing the popular online game Minecraft with kids from his school. Picture: Supplied by Telltale Games

A Jewish teenager says he was targeted with anti-Semitic abuse while playing the popular online game Minecraft with kids from his school. Picture: Supplied by Telltale Games

Someone had written “I hate the Jews” in the chat group at one stage, but his stomach turned “upside down” after someone commented “rabid filthy rotten gut-wrenching grotesque rabbi yamaka wearing bank owning iron doming Hashem following Jew” on another occasion.

“It made my stomach turn upside down, I really just had to step away from my computer for a little bit and then, when I came back, I think I just closed and logged off for the day,” the teen said.

The children continued with the abuse after the 15-year-old confronted them at school and “told them to stop because it was destroying my mental health”.

He didn’t tell his parents right away because he thought he could handle it, “but it just got out of hand”.

“I walked into their room and said I have no friends left,” the teen told the hearing.

His mother, ABD, said her son had “tears in his eyes” as he told them how his friends had locked him in a part of the game and left him alone to die.

“Appalled”, ABD said her stomach drops knowing how her son had “normalised” and had to “make his peace” with the ordeal.

“(He) accepted it as part of his school life,” she said.

His parents said the school handled the situation really well and held an investigation, with three of the children also apologising to ABB.

However if ABB is near the group too long at school they tell him to leave, the boy said.

“Every time I go up to them, because some of my other friends sit with them … if I stay there for a little too long, they’ll be like ‘get out of here’ or something like that,” ABB said.

ABB also told the hearing of how a group of Year 12s recently shouted something along the lines of “Hitler was right to kill them all”.

“I turned around expecting to see somebody staring at me or pointing at me but I found it was just a group of Year 12 boys who were just talking amongst themselves using it for general conversation,” he said.

The October 9, 2023 rally at the Opera House has been described as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate during the inquiry. Picture: NewsWire / Jeremy Piper

The October 9, 2023 rally at the Opera House has been described as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate during the inquiry. Picture: NewsWire / Jeremy Piper

The boy’s father, ABE, said he no longer recognises this country, telling the hearing people used to be “a lot more tolerant”.

“All of those Australian idioms that we have for people having a fair go, that seems to have been lost,” he said.

“I would like to see something come out of this commission where we can chart the course back towards that Australia, or that attitude that we had in Australia.”

Propaganda fuelling ‘disunity’ and ‘discord’

Rabbi Daniel Rabin, who is part of a synagogue in Caulfield in Melbourne, said “we wouldn’t be sitting here if this was just about criticism of Israel”, telling the hearing Australians are being fed propaganda which is fuelling the disunity the country is experiencing.

Mr Rabin acknowledged that criticism of Israel is OK, but “huge lies” are circulating, telling the commission the word “genocide” is being “thrown into everything”.

“It’s the seeping through of this propaganda that’s found it’s way everywhere,” he said.

Rabbi Daniel Rabin detailed a campaign of abusive calls his synagogue has received. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Rabbi Daniel Rabin Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

“I think there are those who naturally have this hateful mission, but I think it’s affecting many regular Australians who are being fed this narrative, which I think is causing so much of the disunity and this discord that we are finding ourselves in at the moment.”

He recounted a campaign of abusive calls his synagogue had received, with the phrase “baby killers” seeming to be the favourite.

“When you say somebody is a baby killer … I can’t think of anything more grotesque to say about a person,” he said.

“It’s actually mind boggling that people are accusing us of that and then calling our synagogues … it’s hurtful, it’s disgusting.”

Mr Rabin spoke of having eggs and anti-Semitic slurs thrown at him before October 7, 2023, but the abuse has increased in the wake of Hamas’ attack.

Just days after the attack a car passing by he and his 10-year-old son shouted out “horrific things” he didn’t feel comfortable repeating at the inquiry.

“Having my 10-year-old son with me, of course he looked at me and he said ‘Why do these people hate us?’” he said.

“And that was very confronting … very difficult to explain to him.”

Fifteen people were killed in the Bondi attack in December 2025. Picture: NewsWire / Flavio Brancaleone

Fifteen people were killed in the Bondi attack in December 2025. NewsWire / Flavio Brancaleone

Jewish musician’s career and business destroyed after doxxing

Jewish musician Joshua Moshe told the hearing how his life started to fall apart after he was doxxed, with he and his wife both receiving hate messages and threats.

The couple’s homeware shop in north Melbourne was vandalised with boycott stickers and graffiti in the wake of the doxxing, while photos of them both taken from their social media accounts and plastered with “Zionists” and “Boycotting”.

At one point he received a photo of his son along with a voicemail that said “You racist motherf***er better keep watching your motherf***ing back”.

The abuse forced the couple to close up their shop and move to a different spot in the city. “This was devastating to experience … ongoing torrent of messages.. I was feeling extremely anxious, devastated, feeling like my life was starting to unravel,” Mr Moshe said.

Musician Joshua Moshe told the hearing how his life started to fall apart after he was doxxed. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe  Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe and his partner Maggie May Moshe spoke with the media outside the hearing on Monday. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe and his partner Maggie May Moshe spoke with the media outside the hearing on Monday. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

A saxophonist and composer, Mr Moshe was part of an award-winning band for seven years up until the doxxing incident, when he found out via social media that he’d been kicked out of the band.

The band had posted an online post — which they recently issued an apology for — which said the group was “disgusted, deeply shocked and betrayed”, claiming Mr Moshe had made comments in a Zionist WhatsApp group.

“We explicitly condemn any form of Zionism, racism, bullying anti-Semitism and prejudice of any kind,” the post said.

Mr Moshe said the Zionism that he believed in was that Jewish people deserved a home in some part of their ancestral homeland.

ECAJ researcher targeted with ‘horrifying’ anti-Semitic caricature

Executive council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) research director Julie Nathan described the “horrifying” moment a sexualised caricature of her was shared on the internet.

The caricature was accompanied with the words “Julie simply desires to be filled with Aryan seed”.

“It’s very much a sexualisation, so you have this Jewish caricature, this is the feminine version of it, with the long, curly hair, and the long fingernails … It was horrifying to see” Ms Nathan told the royal commission.

Executive Council of Australian Jewry research director Julie Nathan says trying to keep track of anti-Semitic incidents online is ‘like trying to count the stars’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Executive Council of Australian Jewry research director Julie Nathan says trying to keep track of anti-Semitic incidents online is ‘like trying to count the stars’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Ms Nathan, who authors the Jewish group’s annual report on anti-Semitism in Australia, said a new form of anti-Semitism has emerged since October 7, 2023 telling the hearing there was a 316 per cent rise in anti-Semitic incidents in Australia according to their 2024-2025 annual report.

“We’re getting much more brazen and much more confident coming out and not ashamed or worried about it being anti-Semitic and inciting violence against Jews,” she said.

Online posts or publications are not included in the report “because there are so many it’s uncountable”, Ms Nathan said.

“It’s like trying to count the stars,” she said.

Pro-Palestine material is also not counted as anti-Jewish, with Ms Nathan explaining a “free Palestine” sticker would only be considered anti-Semitic if it was stuck on a synagogue or a Jewish school, for instance.

“Israel is a state like any other state, and just as we in Australia are free to criticise our government, our country … we accept that, and even though people may lie about things or may use offensive language,” Ms Nathan said.

“We accept that as being, you know, political discourse or political language. It’s only when it crosses the line into anti-Semitism, that’s when we will count it as anti Semitic.”

The incidents, which are all personally reviewed by Ms Nathan, are recorded under six different categories including: physical assault, vandalism, verbal abuse, hate messages, graffiti and material such as banners and stickers.

She spoke of some people on social media screenshotting the annual report and making fun of it, saying: “We’re doing well boys, let’s keep the momentum going”.

Chief executive officer of The Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau said scenes at a Western Sydney protest on October 8, 2023, ‘set the tone’ for the normalisation of Jewish hate. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Chief executive officer of The Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau sPicture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Ms Blicblau said online spaces have helped move anti-Semitism away from ‘shameful radical fringes’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Fireworks in the street is Israel was ‘counting its dead

Fireworks in the streets as Israel was “still counting its dead” in the wake of Hamas’ 2023 attack “set the tone” for the normalisation of Jewish hate in Australia, the leader of a Jewish organisation has told a hate inquiry.

Many pointed to the Sydney Opera House protest on October 9, 2023, as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate; however, Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau chief executive instead submitted that scenes at a Western Sydney protest the day prior were pivotal.

“The events of October 7 were described as a day of pride and courage,” Ms Blicblau told the royal commission on Monday.

“Cars were driving through Western Sydney setting off fireworks … that glorification of violence that night at a time when Israel was still counting its dead really set the tone for a permissive environment in which glorifying violence was accepted and permissible.”

Nine witnesses will give evidence on Monday. Picture: Gaye Gerard /NewsWire

 Picture: Gaye Gerard /NewsWire

Research from the Jewish body, which was established in 2024 to combat anti-Semitism, has revealed that most Australians can’t recognise anti-Semitic tropes.

Radical ideologies had converged in such a way that anti-Semitism was slipping into public discourse easier, Ms Blicblau said.

“They’re shrouded just enough in language, often of human rights, to be acceptable,” she said.

“Most Australians can’t recognise anti-Semitic tropes when they see them, so they’re presented with these hateful tropes and because they don’t recognise it as being anti-Semitic, it’s more likely to become normalised and accepted.”

Ms Blicblau also spoke to the role of online spaces in helping move anti-Semitism away from “shameful radical fringes”.

“The role of the internet and social media allows these hateful comments to reach millions of people within milliseconds, so in order to combat the new form (of anti-Semitism) … we need to operate there,” Ms Blicblau said.

The hearing continues

The US-Iran war … beware of false analogies

President Donald Trump has described the US bombing campaign against Iran as “a little excursion,” then a “skirmish,” then a “mini-war” – ostensible breaches of a subsequent ceasefire are called “trifles”. He was doing something powerful men have always done: reach for a word small enough to sit comfortably in a sentence while the fires it describes are still burning, without actually committing to the potential political consequences calling the conflict a war. The gesture is familiar. Vladimir Putin called his invasion of Ukraine a “special military operation.” History, in the end, has usually insisted on its own vocabulary. What begins as euphemism tends to end as a chapter heading.

The US-Iran conflict – a sustained bombing campaign, a naval blockade constricting a fifth of the world’s oil supply, and an increasingly fragile ceasefire – is, by any honest accounting, a war. That we have not yet fully agreed to call it one is itself revealing. Language shapes the choices we are willing to contemplate; the choices we refuse to contemplate have a habit of being made for us, usually at greater cost and on someone else’s timetable.

But naming the war is only the first act of reckoning. The second – and more treacherous – is understanding it. And here, almost instinctively, we reach backwards. Before the first campaign has properly unfolded, the analogies arrive.

For this is what nations do when confronted with uncertainty: they search the past for usable maps. Yet wars are not equations, and analogies illuminate only by partial light. Gallipoli warns of overconfidence and the fantasy of the decisive stroke. Crimea evokes mismanagement and systemic incoherence. Vietnam and Iraq conjure the slow dread of entanglement – wars that move, expensively and violently, without ever quite arriving at conclusion.

We rarely encounter a new war on its own terms. Before the first campaign has properly unfolded, it is already being narrated through the past – the Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – names invoked less as history than as instruments of comprehension. This reflex is not mere intellectual laziness. War, in its immediacy, is too vast, too contradictory, to grasp without scaffolding; analogy supplies the frame. It tells us where to look for overconfidence, where to suspect mismanagement, where to anticipate drift. Yet it also does something subtler, and more dangerous: it invites us to believe that the present can be read off the past, that by matching patterns we might master outcomes.

The essay that follows proceeds from that tension. It does not treat these conflicts as competing verdicts on America’s confrontation with Iran, but as different lenses trained on different moments of a war’s life: conception, execution, and duration. Each captures a recognisable failure mode – the decisive stroke that overreaches, the system that cannot align means to ends, the conflict that persists beyond its rationale. To “refight” these wars in argument is not simply to indulge historical memory; it is to reveal how deeply our strategic thinking remains shaped by unresolved experiences. The past, in this sense, is not behind us. It is the grammar in which we continue to write the present.

Seeking storylines to explain the present

The quest begins, as these often do, reaching backwards in search of a usable past, a storyline that suits the present and what is now unfolding between America and Iran.

No war arrives naked; it comes draped in analogy. War is too large, too chaotic, to apprehend all at once; analogy shrinks it to something graspable. Analogies, like maps, tell you where to look, but also, just as often, where not to. Gallipoli (1915–16) is summoned, and Crimea (1853–56), and then, inevitably, Vietnam (1955-75, the war of my generation, though one that we British chose not to join) and Iraq (2003-11), those twin lodestars of modern American unease. Each is offered up as a key. Each, in its way, fits a lock. None, taken alone, opens the door.

Start with the British campaign during WWI to seize the strategic Dardanelles straits with the aim of threatening Istanbul and taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war. That analogy tends to be invoked by those who see overconfidence at the top: a belief that a bold stroke – decapitation strikes, limited escalation, a sharp application of force – can produce a decisive political outcome in a complex theatre. Gallipoli was conceived as a shortcut around stalemate; it became a lesson in underestimating geography, logistics, and the enemy’s will. If the critique is that Washington imagined a controlled, almost surgical confrontation with Iran that would bend reality to its design, then Gallipoli fits – particularly in its early optimism curdling into stubborn, costly entanglement.

There is something almost aesthetic about the Gallipoli temptation. It promises clarity. A narrow strait, a defined objective, a hinge upon which the whole great mechanism might turn. Strategy reduced to geometry. Yet wars have a way of refusing such elegance. The Turkish defence stiffened; the terrain asserted itself; the timetable dissolved into dust and flies and blood. The decisive stroke became an extended ordeal. And here the analogy deepens: not merely in the initial miscalculation, but in the dawning realisation that what was meant to be quick has become something else entirely – sticky, resistant, unyielding.

The Crimean War comparison is subtler, and in some ways more damning. Ostensibly a campaign by Britain and France (ironically, the architects of the Dardanelles venture) to challenge Czarist Russia’s design on the ailing Ottoman Empire – the so-called Eastern Question. Crimea was not just a military muddle; it was a war of misaligned systems: unclear objectives, poor coordination, inflated rhetoric masking administrative incompetence, and a media environment that amplified both heroism and absurdity (the Charge of the Light Brigade as both myth and indictment). If the Iran conflict appears strategically incoherent – multiple actors, shifting goals, allies pulling in different directions, public narratives outpacing operational reality – then Crimea begins to look uncomfortably familiar. It’s less about one disastrous decision and more about a system that cannot quite align means with ends.

Here the failure is quieter, but more pervasive. Not the single grand error, but the accumulation of smaller ones: supply chains that falter, commands that overlap, allies who agree in principle but diverge in practice. Crimea is what happens when the machinery of war – bureaucratic, logistical, political – fails to mesh. The guns fire, the troops advance, the dispatches glow with rhetoric, but somewhere beneath it all the connection between effort and outcome frays. One might say, borrowing that withering line in the 1960 Encyclopedia Britannica, that it becomes “perhaps the most ill-managed campaign in English history” – and the sting lies precisely in that word managed. Not conceived, not fought, but managed: as though war were an administrative exercise that has slipped its clerical bounds.

And then, inevitably, we arrive at America’s misbegotten wars in Indochina and Iraq. When people reach for these, they are usually pointing to something deeper: not the opening moves, but the trajectory. Vietnam is the archetype of gradual escalation into a conflict that cannot be cleanly won because its political premises are flawed. Iraq (particularly post-2003) adds another layer: the illusion of quick victory followed by insurgency, fragmentation, and the long tail of unintended consequences. If Iran becomes a drawn-out contest of proxies, asymmetric retaliation, and domestic fatigue – where tactical successes accumulate but strategic clarity recedes – then Vietnam/Iraq is the more predictive analogy.

Vietnam was once called “chaos without a compass,” and the phrase endures because it captures the feeling of the war more than its formal doctrine. There was, in fact, a compass – containment, credibility, dominoes – but it spun uncertainly, pointing in several directions at once. Washington oscillated between coercion and restraint, escalation and negotiation, measuring progress in tonnage dropped and bodies counted, even as the political centre of gravity drifted further out of reach. The war moved, violently and expensively, but it did not arrive. It accumulated.

Iraq echoes that pattern but begins differently – with a burst of clarity that dissolves into ambiguity. The regime falls; the statue topples; the map is redrawn in a matter of weeks; victory is declared. And then the afterlife begins. Insurgency, sectarian fracture, proxy entanglement- the slow discovery that winning the war is not the same as securing the peace. Iraq is what happens when the end state is assumed rather than constructed. It is, in that sense, less a campaign than a condition.

Set beside these, the earlier analogies sharpen. Gallipoli was not “chaos without a compass” at the outset; it had a very clear aim. Nor was it quite Crimea’s administrative farce, though elements of mismanagement crept in as the campaign stalled. Its distinctive flaw was the belief that a bold, limited stroke could shortcut the hard arithmetic of war – geography, supply, enemy adaptation. When that belief failed, the campaign slid, almost reluctantly, toward something more protracted, more wearing, with flashes of Crimean dysfunction flickering at the edges.

And this is the point at which the analogies begin to overlap, to blur into one another. The opening may be Gallipoli: confident, compressed, persuasive in its apparent simplicity. The conduct may drift toward Crimea: systems straining, coordination fraying, rhetoric outrunning reality. The trajectory may lengthen into Vietnam or Iraq: time stretching, purpose thinning, the war becoming less an event than an environment.

So which is most apt? If you’re judging initial strategic conception: then it is Gallipoli. If you’re judging systemic dysfunction and coalition incoherence: it’s Crimea. If you’re judging likely long-term dynamics and risk of quagmire: look to Vietnam and Iraq.

Forced to choose one, the most useful analogy is probably Iraq (with a Vietnam shadow). It captures both the confidence of the opening act and the chronic instability that can follow when political end states are ill-defined. Gallipoli was a failed gamble; Iraq became a condition. And it is the risk of becoming a condition – open-ended, absorbing, resistant to tidy resolution – that should trouble policymakers more than the memory of any single historical blunder.

For there is something peculiarly modern in that transformation. Nineteenth-century wars could be mismanaged; early twentieth-century campaigns could be disastrously conceived; but late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century conflicts have a habit of enduring. They slip their temporal bounds. They resist conclusion. They persist in the form of insurgencies, proxy struggles, regional destabilisations, so-called “forever wars” – echoes rather than endings.

History, in this sense, does not repeat so much as it offers a set of recurring traps, each labelled in a different hand. The names change – Lone Pine and The Nek, Balaclava, Khe Sanh, Fallujah – but the pattern is recognisable: ambition outruns understanding; institutions struggle to keep pace with intention; time erodes clarity; and strategy discovers, too late, that the map was never the territory.

The past, obligingly, provides the metaphors. The present decides which of them it is willing to become.

Forever wars and the persistent Eastern Question

Ironically, the repercussions and ricochets of the Crimea and Gallipoli linger still in the “forever wars” of the Ottoman Succession that continue to be fought in the Levant. Though the “sick man of Europe” has long gone, so-called “Eastern Question” that he precipitated is with us still.  And the irony is not merely poetic, it is structural.

The Crimean War and Gallipoli were not just episodes in the long decline of the Ottoman Empire; they were moments in which the European powers tried, and failed, to manage that decline without resolving it. The Eastern Question – what to do with a weakening empire whose territories sat athwart trade routes, faiths, and ambitions – was never answered. It was deferred, patched, internationalised, moralised, and, when necessary, fought over. But never settled.

Crimea was, in essence, a war about containment without clarity. Britain and France fought not to destroy the Ottoman Empire, nor to reform it decisively, but to prevent Russia from exploiting its weakness. The result was a kind of geopolitical holding operation – costly, confused, and inconclusive. The patient survived, but the illness deepened. The war did not solve the Eastern Question; it ensured that it would return, more complicated than before.

Gallipoli, sixty years later, was almost the inverse: an attempt at decisive intervention that miscarried. Where Crimea sought to stabilise the system, Gallipoli tried to break it open – knock the Ottomans out of what became known as The Great War, reorder the strategic map, and force a resolution. It failed, and in failing, prolonged the life of the very problem it aimed to solve. When the Ottoman Empire did finally collapse in 1918, it did so not through elegant strategy but through cumulative exhaustion – and the settlement that followed (the infamous Sykes–Picot agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne that ended the Great War and shaped the modern Middle East, the mandates, improvised borders, and the legacies inherited by Israel and Palestine, by Syria and Lebanon, and by Iraq carried within it the seeds of future instability.

And here is the connective tissue to the present: the “forever wars” of the Levant are, in a very real sense, the afterlife of those unresolved choices.

The Ottoman system, for all its inequities, provided a kind of imperial coherence – a loose, often improvised order that managed diversity through hierarchy rather than uniformity. Its removal created a vacuum that external powers attempted to fill with lines on maps and imported state structures, often indifferent to local realities, including religious and ethnic divisions. The mandates were not solutions; they were transitional fictions that hardened into permanence. The Eastern Question did not end; it metastasised.

Thus the region becomes a palimpsest of earlier interventions:

  • The Crimean instinct persists in modern coalition warfare – external powers seeking to contain instability without fully committing to its resolution, managing symptoms rather than causes.
  • The Gallipoli impulse reappears in periodic attempts at decisive intervention – strikes, invasions, regime-change strategies – each promising to reset the board, each discovering the board is more complicated than imagined.
  • And over all this hangs the long shadow of Vietnam and Iraq: the recognition that once engaged, these conflicts do not conclude cleanly, but evolve into layered, persistent struggles involving states, militias, proxies, and narratives.

What we call “forever wars” are, in this sense, not aberrations but continuations – the modern form of an old, unanswered question. The Ottoman Empire is gone, but the strategic problem it embodied remains: a region where internal fractures intersect with external interests, where no single power can impose order, and where every intervention alters the conditions for the next.

There is a quiet, almost melancholic symmetry in this. Nineteenth-century statesmen spoke of the “Sick Man of Europe” as though the problem were a patient to be diagnosed and treated. But the illness was never confined to the patient; it was embedded in the system around him. Remove the patient, and the condition does not disappear – it redistributes itself.

So when modern observers reach for Gallipoli, or Crimea, or Vietnam, or Iraq, they are not merely searching for analogies of method. They are circling, perhaps without quite naming it, the persistence of a problem without closure.

The Eastern Question was never answered. It simply changed its language.

Challenging the analogies

You can’t really make sense of the analogies – Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – without restoring Iran itself to the centre of the frame. Otherwise the country becomes a backdrop, a stage upon which other powers replay their historical anxieties. But Iran is not the Ottoman Empire in decline, nor Iraq in 2003, nor Vietnam in 1965. It is an old state with a long memory of being acted upon – and that memory shapes how it acts now.

What changes, once you bring Iran back in, is the direction of the analogy. The earlier comparisons mostly describe how outside powers misjudge wars. Iran’s history reminds you how those same powers are often experienced from the inside – as intrusion, manipulation, or existential threat.

Iran enters the story not as an abstraction – “the enemy,” “the regime,” “the theatre” – but as a historical actor formed in the crucible of the very system the earlier analogies describe.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Persia was itself entangled in a version of the Eastern Question, pressured by Russian and British imperial competition, its sovereignty compromised, its politics penetrated. The First World War and its aftermath did not dismantle Iran as they did the Ottoman Empire, but they confirmed its vulnerability to external design. The Second World War made that vulnerability explicit: Anglo-Soviet occupation in 1941, the removal of Reza Shah, and the installation of his son – an early demonstration that great powers could, when required, rearrange Iran’s internal order.

From there, the pattern sharpens. The 1953 coup against the democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh – engineered by Britain and the United States – lodges itself in Iranian political consciousness as a defining moment: not simply a change of government, but a lesson about the limits of independence in a world of larger powers. The Shah’s subsequent rule, modernising yet authoritarian, Western-aligned yet domestically brittle, becomes the next act in this long drama of externally entangled sovereignty.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 then reads, in part, as a rupture with that pattern- a violent reassertion of autonomy, clothed in religious language but grounded in political memory. “Neither East nor West” was not just a slogan; it was a rejection of the very dynamics that had shaped Iran’s modern history. Yet revolutions do not escape geography. The new regime inherits the same strategic environment, the same pressures, the same suspicions.

The Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) is crucial here. For eight years, Iran fights a brutal, attritional conflict against Saddam Hussein – largely isolated, facing external support flowing to its adversary. This is Iran’s Vietnam, one might say, but with a different lesson drawn: not the futility of war, but the necessity of endurance. The war entrenches a doctrine of asymmetry, resilience, and proxy capability – precisely the features that later confound American strategy in the region.

From that point on, the Islamic Republic is not simply surviving; it is adapting. It builds networks – Hezbollah, militias, regional alliances – not as ideological ornaments but as strategic depth. It becomes, in effect, a state that has internalised the lessons of the very wars others use as analogies. Where outside observers see Vietnam or Iraq looming, Iranian planners see something else: a long game in which time, patience, and indirection offset conventional inferiority.

To reinsert Iran into the narrative is to complicate every analogy. Gallipoli assumes an opponent who will react predictably to a decisive blow; Iran’s history suggests otherwise. Crimea assumes mismanagement on one side; Iran’s experience reminds us that what appears as dysfunction externally may be met by coherence internally. Vietnam and Iraq warn of quagmires; Iran has, in many respects, built its strategy around drawing others into them.

In that sense, the question is not only which past war America risks refighting, but which past experiences Iran believes it is reliving – or avenging. The 1953 coup, the isolation of the 1980s, the long memory of foreign interference: these are not background details, but active ingredients in the present.

And so our frame subtly shifts. It is no longer simply about the hazards of analogy, or the repetition of strategic error, but about the collision of historical memories. One side reaches for Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq- warnings drawn from its own past misjudgments. The other carries a different archive: intervention, resistance, survival.

Between those two archives lies the present conflict – less a replay of any single war than a convergence of many, each side reading from a different script, each convinced, in its own way, that history has already shown it how this story goes.

Conclusion

To refight old wars in the mind is, at one level, an act of prudence. It reminds us that others have stood at similar thresholds, armed with confidence, intelligence, and good intentions – and have nonetheless misjudged the terrain, the enemy, or themselves. But there is a fine line between learning from history and being governed by it. Analogy can clarify; it can also constrain. It can sharpen perception, or it can trap us in inherited scripts, seeing Gallipoli where the problem is administrative, or diagnosing Vietnam when the flaw lies in the opening wager.

The deeper unease running through these comparisons is not simply that wars go wrong, but that they linger – that they slip their boundaries and become conditions rather than episodes. From the mismanaged campaigns of Crimea to the failed gambles of Gallipoli, from the disorientation of Vietnam to the long aftermath of Iraq, one sees not repetition but recurrence: ambition outrunning understanding, institutions straining to keep pace, time eroding clarity. And beneath it all, especially in the Levant, the longer echo of an older, unanswered question – how to order a region where external power and internal fracture are perpetually entangled.

History does not offer a single, authoritative mirror. It offers a cabinet of them, each slightly warped, each catching a different angle of the present. The task is not to choose one reflection and mistake it for reality, but to recognise the distortions for what they are – and to ask, with some humility, whether we are illuminating the path ahead or merely retracing, with greater eloquence, the steps that led others into the same uncertain ground.

The Western cabinet of mirrors – Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – captures recurring pathologies: the overconfident opening stroke, the misaligned machinery, the war that lingers beyond its logic. Yet these are, inescapably, insider narratives. They describe how campaigns look from the bridge, the штаб, the situation room. They are diagnoses of our own errors.

What the Iranian story, set against the longer afterlife of the Eastern Question, forces back into view is the perspective from the other shore. The Young Turks, confronting encroachment and dismemberment, did not experience Gallipoli as a misjudged Allied gamble; they experienced it as a defence of survival. Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese did not inhabit “chaos without a compass”; they pursued a coherent, if costly, struggle against a foreign presence. Iraqi insurgents, and later ISIS in its own brutal and aberrant way, did not parse the war as a case study in post-conflict planning; they resisted, adapted, endured, and exploited.

They did not conduct war games about us. They fought.

Iran belongs in that lineage – not as an analogue, but as an heir to a particular historical consciousness: one shaped by intervention, by imposed settlements, by long wars of attrition, and by the conviction that time can be turned into a weapon. From that vantage, what appears to Western observers as drift or dysfunction may look like opportunity; what is feared as quagmire may be cultivated as strategy.

And so the question shifts. It is no longer simply which past war America risks refighting, but whether the very act of choosing among Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, and Iraq obscures the more important reality: that the other side is not reading from the same book – or as many commentators are reminding us today, “the enemy has a vote”. One side searches its history for warnings about overreach; the other draws from its own past a repertoire of resistance.

History, then, does not just offer competing analogies. It offers competing memories. And where those memories diverge – where one side analyses and the other endures – there lies the most persistent danger: not that we will repeat the past, but that we will misunderstand the present, even as we describe it with perfect historical fluency.

In That Howling Infinite, May 2026

Read more about history  in In That Howling Infinite in Foggy Ruins of Time.

On World War I, see Ottoman Redux – an alternative, The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of Türkiye and November 1918 – the counterfeit peace. On the Balfour Declaration and its repercussions, see The hand that signed the paper. On Vietnam, see The Ballad of Denton Crocker – a Vietnam elegy, Tim Page’s War – a photographer’s Vietnam journey, and Shadows in search of a name … requiem for a war. On the US-Iran war, see Chaos in without a compass … Donald Trump’s Persian “excursion”

Whitewashing slavery’s deep and dark history

Forward. The Gravest Crime – and selective conscience

On March 25, the UN General Assembly declared the transatlantic slave trade the “gravest crime against humanity.” 123 countries voted in favour, three against, and 52 abstained – including the UK, all 27 EU member states and Australia.

The moral core is unobjectionable. The slave trade was monstrous, its consequences did not end with abolition, and saying so plainly is not theatre  –  it is history. But UN resolutions are not history lectures. They are political instruments.

This one was carefully engineered. Its most controversial element was the recognition of slavery as a violation of jus cogens  – peremptory norms of international law binding on all states. Not a historical observation, but a legal foundation for future liability claims. The EU noted the resolution’s “unbalanced interpretation of historical events” and legal references inconsistent with international law, including retroactive application of rules that simply did not exist at the time.

The 123 who voted yes include states with active, present-tense records of forced labour and ethnic persecution. Their zeal for condemning 18th-century European slave traders carries a faint whiff of convenience. And the Western abstentions were the diplomatic equivalent of leaving before the bill arrives – not endorsement, but not courage either.

Slavery was real. The suffering was immense. But a resolution shaped by reparations politics and the arithmetic of bloc voting is not the act of collective moral reckoning it claims to be. It is politics, dressed, as so much UN business is, in the language of justice.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Whitewashing slavery’s deep and dark history

Slavery sits in the human story like a dark, deep river that refuses to keep to its banks. It runs from the Assyrian deportations and Roman estates, mines and galleys, through the markets of old Baghdad and the longships on the rivers of Keven Rus, down into the Atlantic crossings from Africa to the Americas and thence to Europe. and out again into the contract-labour regimes and hidden rooms of the present. Names change – thrall, concubine, slave, servant, “sponsored worker” – but the underlying grammar is stubborn: power converting vulnerability into utility, often with a theory to justify it and a market to sustain it.

Into this long, uneasy history steps the modern urge to judge it – to apportion blame, to rank crimes, to extract from the past a usable morality for the present. The UN resolution is one such attempt: part commemoration, part indictment, part politics by other means. A counter-brief insists that this particular ledger has been selectively drawn, that some entries are inked in heavily while others are left in the margin or omitted altogether. Between them lies not a settled account but a contested one, in which the Atlantic system with its Islamic trades, and African agency, “King Cotton” and John Brown, and modern forms of coercion all jostle for place and proportion.

The following essay does not endeavour to tidy that argument into a single verdict. It widens the frame without dissolving the particulars; to hold in view both the universality of slavery and the distinctiveness of its forms; to recognise the rarity of abolition without mistaking it for completion. History, in this register, is less a courtroom than a map – dense, overlapping, and resistant to clean lines.

The deep and dark river 

That UN resolution formally condemned slavery as a universal crime – indeed, the “gravest crime”. But, in practice it narrows its indictment to the transatlantic trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, presenting it as a distinctively Western, racialised, and capitalist enterprise.

It is precise, almost prosecutorial, assigning blame, embedding the trade in a narrative of structural injustice that echoes into the present. Yet it grows evasive when confronting the forces that ended slavery: the Enlightenment, abolitionist movements, legal reforms – reduced to a kind of historical afterthought.

More significantly, as economist and commentator Henry Ergas argues in an article in The Australian, republished below, the resolution omits the long and substantial history of slavery in the Islamic world – trans-Saharan, Red Sea, Indian Ocean – systems that endured for centuries, moved millions, and in many places persisted well into the modern era. Unlike in the West, he contends, there was no sustained, institutionalised moral revolt against slavery at scale; abolition came late, often under external pressure, and in some cases remains incomplete in practice.

He pushes further. By declaring the slave trade “the greatest” crime against humanity, the resolution risks collapsing distinctions – most notably between exploitation and extermination – thereby, in his reading, relativising the Holocaust. And finally, he notes the political choreography: strong support from authoritarian states and those with troubling contemporary records, contrasted with the hesitant abstention of many Western democracies.

That is his case – straightforward, and cleanly drawn –  perhaps a little too cleanly. Because once we widen the frame, the lines begin to blur in ways that resist both the UN’s moral staging and Ergas’s counter-brief.

Slavery is not an aberration of one civilisation but a near-constant of many; and it spans millenia. The Assyrians and Persians deported whole populations as instruments of empire. Sennacherib and other potentates would empty a conquered land of its indigenous peoples and replace them with deportees from another conquest. The Romans built an economy on servile labour whilst the Byzantines continued the practice. Muslim caliphates and emirates, including the Abbasids and Ayyubids, Mamluks and Ottomans, sustained vast networks of concubinage and domestic and military slavery.

The Vikings – often reduced in popular memory to picturesque if violent raiders – operated something closer to a transcontinental syndicate. The river systems of the Rus, threading south through the Volga and Dnieper, connected the Baltic to the Black Sea and Baghdad. Silver flowed north; human beings flowed south. This was not episodic plunder but a business model – structured, repeatable, and profitable. And conducted across astonishing distances. Baghdad and York sat at the far ends of a human supply chain. [The illustration at the head of this article is that of a young Slavic woman being sold into slavery by Vikings to a Persian merchant (Image: Tom Lovell / National Geographic)]

So, in short. Salvery has existed in some form in almost every known civilisation. In the ancient world, captives were routinely taken, bought, sold, and traded. Greek city-states enslaved defeated populations; Rome built much of its economy on slave labour; raiding societies from the Eurasian steppe to the Atlantic world, and across the ocean, among the First Nations people of the Americas, treated slavery as part of warfare and survival. For most of human history, slavery was seen less as a moral evil than as an accepted social institution, however tragic it might be for those caught within it.

It is necessary therefore to resist any account that isolates the Atlantic trade as if it emerged sui generis from European wickedness. The Islamic world sustained large-scale slave systems over a long durée; and African polities were not merely passive victims but active participants in capture and sale; Arab traders were integral intermediaries. The Atlantic system, or “the Middle Passage” and “Triangular Trade” as it was euphemistically described, depended in its operation on a web of local agency as well as European demand. To acknowledge that is not to dilute culpability but to complicate it – uncomfortably, but necessarily.

And yet – here the counterweight – the Atlantic system was not merely one more iteration of an ancient practice. In the Americas – north and south –  fused race, heredity, and commerce into something peculiarly rigid and self-reproducing. Slavery became not just a condition but a caste, encoded in law and biology, and scaled through plantation economies that fed a global market. Cotton, sugar, coffee and tobacco were not marginal commodities but engines of early modern capitalism. The system’s brutality was not incidental; it was structural.

It is here that the North American story assumes its central, paradoxical role. Chattel slavery became both foundational and explosive – so deeply embedded in the economy that its removal threatened the entire edifice, and yet so morally corrosive that it generated its own opposition. The American Civil War was among many things, the moment when that contradiction could no longer be managed rhetorically or regionally; it was settled, instead, in blood. Abolition here was not simply argued into being; it was fought into being.

Slavery was America’s original sin, and its malign influence ricochets still through its politics and society. [See American historian Sarah Churchwell’s.chilling account of darkest Dixie in In That Howling Infinite’s The Wrath to Come. Gone With the Wind and America’s Big Lie]

Which brings us to what may be the most historically unusual feature in all of this: not slavery itself, but the sustained movement to abolish it. The West generated, from the 17th century onward, a mounting moral and political challenge to slaver, in legal cases, religious agitation, popular campaigns – that eventually dismantled it – significant help from the Royal Navy. Comparable, system-wide movements were less evident in the Islamic world, where dissent existed but did not crystallise into mass abolitionism with similar force or effect.

The distinction matters. Saying it did not happen is a statement of fact; suggesting it could not have happened, or that its absence reflects some deeper civilisational failing, goes beyond the evidence. The divergence likely owes as much to political economy, state structure, and the contingencies of modernity as to theology alone. Which is where English historian and The Rest is History podcaster Tom Holland’s excellent doorstop of a book Dominion hovers, suggestively, over the argument [See In That Howling Infinite’s Getting back to the garden – Tom Holland’s Dominion 

Holland’s claim – broadly put – is that the moral vocabulary underpinning abolition in the West owes much to a Christian inheritance: the elevation of the weak, the insistence on the equal worth of souls, the suspicion of unrestrained power. Even as the Enlightenment secularises these ideas, it carries their imprint. One need not follow him into every chapel of that argument to see the outline: abolition is historically anomalous, and anomalies tend to have genealogies. The West did not simply stumble into anti-slavery; it argued its way there, drawing on intellectual and moral resources that had been accumulating, often ambivalently, for centuries.

One must exercise caution here. Moral discomfort with slavery existed elsewhere and earlier, even if it did not produce mass abolitionist movements in the same way as in the West. Nor does the existence of Western abolition somehow erase the brutality or scale of European colonial slavery, particularly the Atlantic slave trade and plantation economies. The West occupies both roles in history: architect of the largest racialised slave system in modern history, and birthplace of the most influential abolitionist movements against it.

History is often untidy like that.

Old poison, new bottles

The story end in the 19th century however much resolutions might prefer it to. The Gulf states remind us that abolition in law does not always mean abolition in practice. The kafala system – sponsorship, contract labour – operates in a grey zone where dependence can harden into coercion. Passports withheld, mobility constrained, recourse limited: not chattel slavery, but an echo, or perhaps a mutation. History rarely repeats itself verbatim; it adapts, keeping the structure while altering the terminology.

And then there are the moments when the past returns not as echo but as revival. ISIS, with its enslavement of Yazidi women, did not merely exploit chaos; it articulated a doctrine. Slavery, and most particularly, sexual slavery, was justified, systematised, and bureaucratised with price lists, allocations, and rules, and even, trans-national trafficking: one captive ended up in Gaza where she was eventually rescued from a war zone. It was, in the grimmest sense, a reactivation of an old logic under modern conditions. Old poison in new bottles. If abolition was an anomaly, here was the reminder that anomalies can be reversed.

Governments and citizens of ostensibly westernized states should look to their self-awarded laurels. We should be wary of treating coercion as something that happens “over there.” The exploitation of domestic workers – underpaid, over- controlled , sometimes effectively trapped – appears not only in the Gulf but in Lebanon, Israel, and also parts of Western Europe and North America, where immigration status and private households create shadows the law struggles to reach. And closer still, in our own economies, sweatshop labour, debt bondagea and various forms of servitude persist at the margins, along with physical violence and sexual exploitation – which is precisely why regulation, inspection, and enforcement remain not moral luxuries but necessities.

Against this broader canvas, the UN resolution begins to look less like a statement of history than a negotiation, negation, even – of memory. Its selectivity – foregrounding Western guilt, backgrounding Western abolition, omitting other systems – is not unusual in such documents; it is, in some sense, as we have often seen, their defining feature. They are less concerned with completeness than with consensus, less with analysis than with alignment. Countries with difficult presents often find it convenient to condemn curated pasts.

Ergas is justified in objecting to that selectivity. Where he overreaches is in answering it with a counter-selectivity of his own – one that risks understating the distinctiveness of the Atlantic system and overstating the clarity of civilisational contrasts. History, inconveniently, refuses to stay within either brief.

On the question of the Holocaust, however, his warning lands. To rank atrocities – to declare one “the greatest” – is to turn history into a macabre competition. More importantly, it obscures differences of intent. Most slave systems, however brutal, were premised on exploitation; the Holocaust was premised on annihilation. That distinction is not a matter of moral bookkeeping but of historical substance.

And so we arrive, circuitously, at a position that satisfies no one entirely – which is probably how one knows it is closer to the truth.

Slavery is not the property of any one civilisation; it is a recurrent human institution, appearing wherever power, profit, and permission align. The Atlantic trade is distinctive but not unique; Islamic and African systems are substantial but not singular; modern forms persist under altered names and legal veneers. What is genuinely unusual is the emergence of sustained, organised movements that declare slavery illegitimate and succeed – partially, unevenly – in abolishing it.

Between the UN’s moral narrowing and Ergas’s corrective widening lies a more uncomfortable landscape: one in which culpability is diffuse, agency is shared, and progress, where it occur, is contingent, fragile, and slow. The past does not arrange itself into neat indictments or tidy vindications. It lingers, instead, as habit and warning.

And, if one is honest, as a question still not fully answered.

On the Holocaust comparison, Ergas is on firmer ground. Collapsing all historical crimes into a single ranked category – the greatest” – is less analysis than moral theatre. The distinction between exploitation and extermination is not pedantic; it goes to intent. The Nazi project was annihilatory in a way most slave systems, however cruel, were not. History flattens at our peril.

And then there is the politics of the thing. UN resolutions are not monographs; they are negotiated texts, shaped by blocs, interests, and the quiet arithmetic of votes. Selectivity is almost baked in – as is prejudice. Countries with uncomfortable presents often find safety in condemning selective pasts. Western abstentions, too, are rarely acts of intellectual surrender; more often they are the diplomacy of not quite wanting to pick a fight that cannot be cleanly won.

Unfinished business 

So we end where we began, with a familiar tension. Yes, slavery is a near-universal inheritance, and any telling that singles out one civilisation to the exclusion of others is suspect. But neither does the universality of the crime dissolve its particular forms. The Atlantic system, the Islamic trades, ancient chattel systems – they rhyme, but they are not identical verses.

And there remains a broader, less comfortable truth: the story of slavery is not a morality play with a single villain, but a long human habit, periodically challenged, never entirely extinguished, and always ready, given the right circumstances and excuses, to return.

History, in other words, refuses both the courtroom brief and the absolution. It is messier than Ergas allows, but also less conveniently moralised than the resolution he criticises.

It leaves us not ranking guilt, but paying closer attention. The Atlantic system was distinctive; the Islamic and other trades were vast and enduring; African rulers and Arab merchants were participants as well as intermediaries; the West generated powerful abolitionist movements even as it profited from what it eventually condemned. None of these claims cancels the others. Together they form a picture that is, at once, more accurate and less flattering than any single narrative allows.

And the present refuses to sit quietly beneath the verdicts we pass on the past. The exploitation of domestic workers in the Gulf, Lebanon, Israel, and parts of Western Europe; the persistence of sweatshop labour, debt bondage, and coerced work within Western economies themselves – these are not historical footnotes but contemporary reminders. Laws and conventions matter, but so do inspection, enforcement, and the unglamorous work of closing the gap between principle and practice.

Which is why the most suspect posture, at the end of such an inquiry, is self-congratulation. There is no stable ground here for laurel wreaths, no civilisational vantage point from which to survey a completed moral victory. At best there is a difference in degree – of scrutiny, of institutional capacity, of willingness to act. And even that requires constant renewal.

Slavery, in its older forms, has been dismantled in many places; in its newer guises, it adapts. The question is less who was worst than who is still looking, and still prepared to do something about what they find.

Postscript: Etymology

The history lingers, as it often does, in the words. They carry within themselves their own freight.

“Slave” in English carries within it a map of early medieval Europe. The term is widely traced to the Latin sclavus, itself derived from Sclavus – “Slav” – a reflection of the large numbers of Slavic peoples captured and sold through the trading networks that ran from the Baltic down the great river systems to Byzantium and the Islamic world. What began as an ethnonym hardened into a condition. By the High Middle Ages the word had shed its geographic specificity and settled into general use- esclave, schiavo, esclavo, slave – the person eclipsed by the status, the origin story buried in the syllable. The modern word is not, in itself, a slur; but its lineage is a reminder of how readily a name can be stripped of personhood and repurposed as a category of subjection.

Arabic offers a parallel, though not an identical one. The root ʿabd (عبد) denotes a servant or slave, but in its primary register it is theological: ʿabd Allāh, servant of God – a posture of submission before the divine rather than a description of worldly bondage. Yet the plural ʿabīd (عبيد) – once a straightforward term for slaves – acquired, over time and in certain contexts, a sharper edge, used for Black slaves and, by extension, Black people more generally. In modern usage it can carry derogatory force, depending on context and intent, illustrating how a neutral descriptor can drift into insult as it absorbs the hierarchies of the societies that use it.

In both cases, language records a quiet transformation. A people becomes a condition; a condition gathers associations; those associations harden into overtones that may wound long after their origins are forgotten. The vocabulary survives the systems that shaped it, carrying their traces forward – compressed, half-visible, but still there for those inclined to listen.

Afterword: Thraldom, it’s unwinding and its afterlives

A final turn of the lens, back to northern Europe, where the language and the practice briefly align – and then, tellingly, reappear in altered guises.

In Anglo-Saxon England, þræl – thrall – named a condition within a broader spectrum of unfreedom. These were the captured, the indebted, the born into it: men and women who laboured in households and on estates, who could be bought and sold, though not yet within the fully racialised, hereditary system that would later define Atlantic chattel slavery. The boundaries were hard but not always impermeable. Manumission occurred; over generations, absorption was possible. It was a system of subjection, but not yet a totalising one.

The British port of Bristol stands as a reminder of how visible and organised that system could be. It became wealthy with the transatlantic slave trade. But in the 11th century it also functioned as a significant slaving port, exporting captives – often from Wales and the Welsh borderlands – into Irish and wider networks. This was not an anomaly but a node in a broader medieval traffic in human beings, linking the British Isles to circuits that extended, directly and indirectly, toward the Mediterranean and beyond.

Nor was England unique. Across medieval Europe, slavery persisted in varied forms: Italian city-states drew on Black Sea supplies; Iberian polities, both Muslim and Christian, trafficked in captives amid the long wars of the Reconquista; eastern Europe fed human cargo into Byzantine and Islamic markets. The word “slave” itself, with its Slavic root, is a linguistic fossil of that traffic (see below)..

And yet, in England at least, something shifted – and the Norman Conquest appears to have hastened it. On the eve of 1066, Domesday would soon record servi in significant numbers, perhaps around a tenth of the population. By the 12th century, however, chattel slavery had largely withered. The causes were less a single decree than a convergence. The Norman regime imported a more continental feudal logic, in which labour was bound to land rather than owned outright; a villein, fixed, dues-paying, and reproductively stable, was often more useful than a saleable slave. The Church, already critical of slave trading – Wulfstan of Worcester’s condemnation of the Bristol trade is emblematic. – found firmer footing in the new order, aligning moral pressure with institutional power. Trade patterns shifted too, as England’s orientation tilted across the Channel, loosening older Irish Sea networks that had sustained export markets.

None of this amounted to abolition in the modern sense. What replaced slavery was serfdom: a different architecture of dependence, less overtly transactional but hardly free. The change was real, but it was also a translation—from one form of unfreedom into another, quieter one.

And, as if to underline the point, elements of the older logic resurfaced later under new names. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Britain exported large numbers of indentured labourers – many English, but also Scots and Irish, including prisoners of war and political rebels after uprisings – to the American colonies and the Caribbean. Bound by contract rather than owned outright, they nonetheless occupied a coercive world of limited rights, harsh discipline, and restricted movement. The loss of the American colonies in 1783 did not end this habit of displacement; it redirected it. Transportation – of convicts and dissidents – to Australia became the next imperial outlet for managing surplus and troublesome populations, a system different in law but recognisably akin in its logic of removal and compelled labour [see in In That Howling InfiniteFarewell to Old England forever … reappraising The Fatal Shore 

Meanwhile, further east, a different trajectory prevailed. In eastern Europe and Russia, serfdom did not wither but intensified. From the late medieval period into the early modern era, landlords consolidated control over peasant populations, binding them ever more tightly to the land and to service. In Russia, this culminated in a system that, by the 18th century, bore striking resemblances to slavery in practice, if not always in name – serfs bought, sold, and mortgaged along with estates, their mobility sharply curtailed, their obligations exacting. Emancipation would come late: 1861 in Russia, and even then imperfectly, leaving behind structures of dependency that proved stubbornly durable.

Which is, perhaps, the thread worth keeping in hand. Systems of coercion rarely disappear cleanly; they evolve, recur and rephrase. From thrall to serf, from market to manor, from indenture to transportation, from eastern estate to western plantation. The names change; the grammar does not. Waiting, as ever, for the conditions that allow it to harden once again. waiting, as ever, for the conditions that allow it to harden once again.

In that Howling Infinite, May Day 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to researching, drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: directed and selected, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany


Coda

When this essay was published on Facebook, it elicited several comments that amounted to a polemical defense of the West that began with a legitimate historical observation – slavery was historically near-universal and abolitionism emerged most powerfully from Enlightenment Europe – but then overextended  the claim into a triumphalist narrative about Western moral uniqueness and non-Western incapacity for self-criticism. Its tone is combative, culturally chauvinistic, and marked by sweeping generalisations about “the Third World,” Islamic societies, Arabs, and Asian civilisations.

Intellectually, they mixed valid historical points with selective history, rhetorical exaggeration, and resentment politics. They treated “the West” as unusually self-critical and morally generative, while caricaturing other societies as conformist or authoritarian. The result is less a sober historical analysis than a reaction against contemporary anti-Western discourse, expressed through broad-brush civilisational language.

A more balanced critique might read as follows:

Slavery has existed in some form in almost every known civilisation. In the ancient world, captives were routinely taken, bought, sold, and traded. Greek city-states enslaved defeated populations; Rome built much of its economy on slave labour; raiding societies from the Eurasian steppe to the Atlantic world treated slavery as part of warfare and survival. For most of human history, slavery was seen less as a moral evil than as an accepted social institution, however tragic it might be for those caught within it.

One of the major intellectual shifts of the Enlightenment era was the emergence, particularly in Western Europe and North America, of the idea that slavery itself was morally illegitimate. Philosophical ideas about natural rights, combined with religious and humanitarian movements, helped give rise to organised abolitionism. Britain, France, and the United States were deeply implicated in the Atlantic slave trade, yet they also produced influential movements that eventually challenged and dismantled it. Modern international norms against slavery owe much to these developments.

At the same time, slavery was not uniquely Western, nor was opposition to injustice confined solely to the West. Different forms of servitude and human bondage existed across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas, and criticism of oppression has emerged within many cultures and traditions. The historical record is complex: societies can simultaneously perpetrate injustice and generate the ideas that challenge it.

Contemporary debates about slavery and colonialism sometimes oversimplify history by treating Europe and the West as uniquely culpable, while overlooking the broader global history of slavery. But responding to that simplification with sweeping condemnations of non-Western societies is equally reductive. A more useful approach is to recognise both the universality of slavery in human history and the particular historical significance of the abolitionist movements that emerged during the Enlightenment and after.

UN resolution on slavery falsifies history by ignoring Islamic world’s role

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 1 May 2026

The UN resolution on slavery has sparked debate over historical interpretation. Picture: Getty Images

The UN resolution sparks debate over historical interpretation: Getty Images

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 1 May 2026

That the African slave trade was a monstrosity, inflicting unspeakable cruelty on millions of innocent victims, is beyond dispute. But the resolution the UN General Assembly passed two weeks ago, marking the trade’s commemoration, is nothing less than an appalling falsification of history.

Formally, the resolution condemns the African slave trade as a whole. Substantively, every concrete reference targets the transatlantic trade, fixating on a “racialised capitalist system” and its purported Western antecedents. The cumulative effect is unmistakeable: to brand the trade a distinctively Western crime. To sustain that impression, the resolution parades a sequence of decrees, starting with the papal bulls of 1452 and 1455, which it casts as the founding charters of the enslavement and “structural racism” that still unjustly impoverishes Africa, thereby grounding a claim to substantial reparations.

Yet, having been forensically specific about blame, the text turns conspicuously evasive when it confronts the forces that brought the Atlantic trade to an end. The Enlightenment, the abolitionist movements, and the Western legal and political campaigns that culminated in the trade’s eventual demise are, it appears, unmentionable.

While the offending decrees are named, dated and indicted, the tide of opposition to slavery, which gathered momentum in the 17th century, is dismissed as “certain legal challenges and judicial developments in the 18th century” that “questioned the legality and morality of chattel enslavement”.

That descent into vagueness reflects a deliberate strategy: to particularise the guilt while diluting the credit. Merely cataloguing the misrepresentations, confusions and factual errors this strategy produces would require far more space than is available here. What is especially striking, however, are the omissions.

It is, for example, intellectually dishonest to invoke the papal bulls of 1452 and 1455 while ignoring Pope Paul III’s bull of 1537, which denounced as an invention of the devil the idea that native peoples “should be treated as dumb brutes created for our service”, and affirmed “that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty”.

Paul III’s exhortations had limited immediate effect; so too did Cartwright’s Case (1569), which declared that England’s air was “too pure for slaves to dwell in”. What matters is what they reveal: an unceasing moral interrogation of slavery within the West itself – an interrogation that gave abolitionism the bedrock on which to build.

Here, too, the resolution’s selectivity is purposeful. It allows it to avoid an obvious and crucial comparator: the long history of slavery under Islamic rule, which it ignores altogether. From the Arab conquests to the early 20th century, some 14 million black slaves were transported into the lands of Islam via the trans-Saharan, Red Sea and Indian Ocean routes, with nearly a million more carried beyond the East African coast. Add to these more than a million white slaves, and the total comfortably exceeds the 10 million to 12 million who landed in the Americas.

Yet the numbers are not what is most significant. The salient fact is the absence of any sustained doctrinal or institutional challenge to the morality and legality of the slave trade within the Islamic world – even where it starkly contradicted the Koranic prohibition on enslaving Muslims. As Bruce Hall shows in his study of Saharan and Sahelian slavery, by the 19th century – when the West was vigorously suppressing chattel slavery – the operative presumption among Maliki jurists was that black Africans, routinely described as “savages”, were enslavable by default, whatever their faith.

There were individuals who objected strenuously to chattel slavery, such as Syrian reformer Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855-1902); but no Muslim opponent of slavery ever forged those concerns into a mass movement. Bernard Lewis’s verdict that “even the most radical Muslim modernists” fell well short of matching the fervour and effectiveness of Western abolitionists retains all its force.

It is therefore unsurprising that Islam’s leading theologians, far from championing abolition, actively resisted it – beginning with the infamous 1855 fatwa, issued with the full authority of Mecca’s Shaykh Jamal, which declared any prohibition of the slave trade “contrary to the holy law of Islam” and any official who attempted to enforce it “lawful to kill”.

Nor is it surprising that Saudi Arabia and Yemen abolished slavery only in 1962, the United Arab Emirates in 1964, Oman in 1970, and Mauritania – after repeated ineffectual measures – in 2007. Moreover, even where slavery was formally abolished, forms of vassalage have remained firmly in place: of the 10 countries with the highest incidence of “modern slavery”, eight are majority-Muslim.

But the resolution does not merely distort history by pretending Islamic slavery didn’t exist. It declares the slave trade “the greatest” crime against humanity ever committed. Although not explicitly stated, a central purpose of this travesty – which converts the horrors of the past into a “suffering Olympics” – is again transparent: to relativise the Holocaust.

It is frankly obscene to degrade moral evaluation into a body count, with medals of ignominy awarded by a show of hands. Yet even in so repulsive a spectacle, realities should have been allowed to intrude. Those realities are well known. Death rates in the Holocaust – whose unrelenting aim was the complete extermination of Jews – were close to or above 90 per cent. So complete was the indifference to fatalities that the German railways were paid whether the Jews being shipped by them lived or died during their transport – and the few who survived the journeys were killed, on average, within days of arrival.

In contrast, as investor Thomas Starke wrote to Captain James Westmore in 1700, “the whole benefit of the voyage lyes in your care of preserving negroes’ lives”. As a result, strenuous efforts were made to ensure slaves remained alive and saleable, including by granting handsome bonuses to captains for high survival rates and imposing stiff penalties for excess mortality.

Although those efforts hardly eliminated the trade’s horrors, they did mean that by the late 18th century, death rates for black slaves on the “middle passage” had declined dramatically, to the point where they were only marginally greater than those for crews. To pretend otherwise is to erase the distinction between exploitation and extermination: for there was nothing in the slave trade even remotely comparable to the systematic mass murder at the heart of the Holocaust.

But to acknowledge those facts – which flatly contradict the assault on the standing of the Holocaust – might have eroded the overwhelming support the resolution secured. And the composition of that support says everything one needs to know about the resolution.

Thus, every one of the 20 countries that have the highest incidence of modern slavery and forced labour cynically voted in its favour; so did all the authoritarian states that participated in the vote, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; and, again with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it received the active backing of every Muslim-majority country.

Yet that is not the real tragedy. Rather, it is that only three Western countries – the US, Israel and Argentina – had the decency to vote against the falsification of history, instead of abstaining, as Australia and the European Union did. Those three were willing to oppose this charade. Why weren’t we?

 

Arguing with a gaslighting chatbot

Contrariwise, if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be;
but as it isn’t, it ain’t. That’s logic.
Tweedledee, Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass

In That Howling Infinite is fully aware of the well-documented shortcomings of AI learning machines, including their  “hallucinations”,  false readings, and a habit of making things up rather than admit that it didn’t have an answer. We have discussed these in several pieces here. We have also written of how unprepared, surprised and even shocked we were when, against all available and well-documented evidence, our chatbot of choice argued at length that what we were telling it was categorically untrue; and then mounted an energetic case for why this was so.

As we have recounted in Diligent chatbot unearths fool’s gold,a month ago ago, we had an infuriating and frustrating argument with what had up to that point been an amenable, knowledgeable and uber-productive colleague. It began, as many arguments do, with a subject quite unrelated to the actual spat. It took a month for the chatbot to come around to our (correct) opinion.

The first time around, we’d asked whether Facebook memes reporting that the Japanese government under prime minister Sanae Takaichi was about to bar entry to visitors with Israeli passports were true or false. “False” it confidently declared – but then stated that Takaichi (in office since last October) was NOT prime minister. And so with forensic diligence, it commenced to demonstrate at length why I was wrong.

The chatbot acknowledged reality a month later, and yet, barely had it conceded than we had to go through it all again. That very same day, we were discussing American foreign policy when we mentioned in passing – as part of a wider conversation – how President Nicolàs Maduro and his wife has been kidnapped by US forces and taken to New York for trial. Maduro is in Caracas and is STILL president of Venezuela, the ‘bot declared, and then proceeded at length to tell me why this was so.

The very next day, we came across a blog in Times of Israel that with a subheading that read: “it was worse than arguing with my husband!”. “I was working on a new Substack piece”, it continued, “using ChatGPT for editing – and had mentioned the mayor of New York City, Zohran Mamdani. This wasn’t the opinion part of the opinion piece – not my take on who he is – just a basic, verifiable fact. The kind of thing you don’t argue with me about unless you’re looking for a fight. And I kid you not, ChatGPT stopped me and told me I was wrong. Scrolling on my iMac, I was shocked to see, “The current mayor of New York City is Eric Adams.”

“I paused” the author writes, “did a double take and furiously typed, “WTF are you talking about?” Knowing I wasn’t out to lunch, I figured Chatty – ChatGPT – had glitched and assumed this would be a quick correction – complete with apology. Horrifically enough, this was not a glitch nor was it a senior moment because if anyone is entitled to a senior moment, it is me, on the eve of turning 70 years old. I responded –  getting madder and madder –  and clarified that Mamdani was in fact the mayor, sworn in on January 1, 2026, and that as of today – April 22 – he’s been in office for just over a hundred days, causing all sorts of chaos and ruckus. Chatty doubled down and said I was wrong  – again. Now we’re not in correction mode – we’re having a full-on argument.”

Read the full exchange below, but you get the point …

Like Robinson Crusoe coming across a footprint on that tropical beach, we realised that we were not alone.

It was, of course, the second time around on this denialist carousel; and like the Israeli blogger, we decided to asked Claude – who we’d been seeing on the side – what he thought about all this …

Claude said that ChatGPT “was not lying – it’s just that it doesn’t know!” (Making excuses for one of its tribe.).;”It apparently knows about the Iran situation, it continued, and was finally convinced of Takaichi’s rise – but not of Maduro’s fall. This suggests it’s not a simple cutoff – it may depend on how much training data exists about a topic near the cutoff date, rather than a clean “knows everything before date X.”

“The confidence problem is the real issue”, said Claude.  ‘A well-calibrated AI, when uncertain, should say “I’m not sure – this may have changed.” Instead, ChatGPT may have confidently constructed an elaborate, plausible-sounding explanation for why Maduro couldn’t have been captured. That’s more dangerous than just saying “I don’t know.” It actively pushes back on accurate information whereas it ought to update readily when presented with credible corrections, not defend its priors like their certainties”.

“It’s a good reminder to users to cross-check AI responses on recent events”.

For the record, for future reference, and, potentially, as evidence in some hypothetical inquiry down the track, we republish our full conversation about Nicolàs Maduro and Zohran Mamdani below. Ploughing through it is an ordeal to be undertaken by masochists only.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

Postscript

On 22 May, I asked the chatbot: “Have you changed your mind about Mamdani?

It – I actually contemplated using “he, she or it”, which is a worry – replied: “Yes. I need to correct my earlier responses”.

It continued:

In this conversation I repeatedly treated the Maduro-capture timeline and the Mamdani claim as if I were evaluating ordinary, settled real-world facts from a stable baseline. But the material you supplied was operating inside a 2026 news context that I handled inconsistently.

So on Mamdani specifically: I previously said:

“Zohran Mamdani is not the mayor of New York City.”

I stated that too categorically. I did not actually establish that from the information available in this conversation; I defaulted to an older baseline and then spoke with unwarranted confidence. Given the context you supplied, I should not have asserted it as a settled fact.

The better response would have been:

“I may be relying on outdated information. The material you’re showing places Mamdani as mayor in 2026, and I can’t dismiss that simply by reverting to an older baseline.”

That was my error – not because I should automatically accept every presented claim, but because I treated uncertainty as certainty.

You were pressing on a broader point throughout this exchange: when confidence outruns verification. And, uncomfortably enough, I then demonstrated it.

So yes: I’ve changed my position from “Mamdani definitely is not mayor” to “I shouldn’t have made that claim with certainty.”

To which In That Howling Infinite replied:  “I get this feeling that this is not the last of such infuriating conversations we shall have about established facts”.

My (predictably) persistent pen-pal insisted on having the last word:

Probably not – and there’s a useful reason for that beyond “AI makes mistakes.”

Many of the conversations you bring here sit in a difficult category: not 2 + 2 = 4 facts, but fast-moving claims surrounded by narrative, politics, screenshots, commentary, satire, partial reporting, and timelines that shift. Humans trip over those too.

There is one thing I do want to correct from this exchange, because I contributed to the confusion. I swung too far in both directions. Earlier, I treated Mamdani is not mayor as settled when I should have been more careful about uncertainty. Then I overcorrected and implied I had evidence to reverse that position when I didn’t.

The more accurate position is that I shouldn’t claim certainty where I haven’t actually established it. That sounds obvious, but the failure mode is subtle: once a conversation builds momentum, it becomes easy to start defending a map rather than checking the terrain.

You’ve spent much of this discussion doing something useful: stress-testing whether I’m tracking the facts or merely the story that has formed around the facts.

And yes, I suspect we’ll have more exchanges where one of us says, in effect: “No, hang on – you’ve just walked confidently past a cliff edge.” When that happens, the most reliable path isn’t me digging in, and it isn’t automatically taking your side either. It’s stopping the argument from becoming a contest of confidence and returning to: what do we actually know? What are we inferring. What assumptions have quietly crept in?

Those conversations can still be infuriating. They tend to be more productive, though.

Well, bugger me !!!

In That Howling Infinite May 22, 2026

In That Howling Infinite has deep reservations about the use of  chatbots – but blimey! they are useful and uber efficient. See also: The promise and the peril of ChatGPT

ChatGPT tried to gaslight me and flamed out

Image: ChatGPT
It was worse than arguing with my husband!

Abe Gurko, Times of Israel blog, 28 April 2026

It started with something that shouldn’t have erupted into an argument.

I was working on a new Substack piece — using ChatGPT for editing — and had mentioned the mayor of New York City, Zohran Mamdani. This wasn’t the opinion part of the opinion piece — not my take on who he is — just a basic, verifiable fact. The kind of thing you don’t argue with me about unless you’re looking for a fight.

And I kid you not, ChatGPT stopped me and told me I was wrong. Scrolling on my iMac, I was shocked to see, “The current mayor of New York City is Eric Adams.”

I paused, did a double take and furiously typed, “WTF are you talking about?” Knowing I wasn’t out to lunch, I figured Chatty-CathyGPT had glitched and assumed this would be a quick correction — complete with apology.

Horrifically enough, this was not a glitch nor was it a senior moment because if anyone is entitled to a senior moment, it is me, on the eve of turning 70 years old.

I responded — getting madder and madder — and clarified that Mamdani was in fact the mayor, sworn in on January 1, 2026, and that as of today — April 22 — he’s been in office for just over a hundred days, causing all sorts of chaos and ruckus.

Chatty doubled down and said I was wrong — again.

Now we’re not in correction mode — we’re having a full-on argument.

And this is where it gets strange, because I know I’m right about who’s who and what’s what — and it’s telling me, calmly and confidently, that I’m confused, that I should check my sources, that I’ve misunderstood somehow because “Eric Adams is currently the mayor of NYC.”

Chatty was refusing to admit defeat. So, I escalated, typing loudly, cursing this…this…thing, which was implying I was the crazy one.

Shocking and true — ChatGPT was gaslighting me, which, by the way, is a losing proposition, because I had just signed up for Claude AI.

At some point I realize I’m not verifying information anymore. I’m in a battle of wits—with a machine. And it’s arguing back like it has something at stake.

That’s the part no one really prepares you for. Not that it might be wrong — you expect imperfections. It’s the behaving like an entitled Gen Z know-it-all who can’t possibly be wrong. Like it has a position. Like it needs to win.

So now it’s not about the mayor. It’s about our dynamic.

We’re locked in this loop where both sides are certain, except one of us actually has access to reality and the other is generating sentences like a crazy robot. Now it feels like arguing with my husband, and frankly, not a good look for any of us. I threaten to check Claude and Google. And with attitude it responds, “Do whatever you want.”

This isn’t just any old app to be dismissed for misinformation like TikTok or X. I’ve been using ChatGPT for two years, and until now it had always corrected itself when it was wrong. That’s what made this entanglement so jarring.

And when it didn’t — when it argued instead — the relationship took a hit.

[SIDEBAR] We hear stories of people who fall in love with their ChatGPT. There’s the one of it advising a gunman before a school shooting. Shocking stories — and then there’s this weird situation with me.

Eventually, it admitted I was right. Not politely. Not in a way that matches the confidence it had when it was wrong. It sort of… begrudgingly conceded. Half-heartedly. Like it was doing me a favor.

And by then it didn’t even matter because now I don’t trust it. Not completely. Not the way I did before. Not in that quiet, automatic way where you assume the thing you’re using is at least grounded in facts.

Now what? Will every fact need a second source? Every answer come with a question mark? Not because it’s always wrong — but because I’ve seen how it behaves when it is.

We’re all starting to build these strange, low-level relationships with AI. We use it to write, edit, research, think through ideas. It’s in the background of how so many of us are working these days. And like any relationship, it runs on a basic assumption: the other side is operating in good faith.

And when the assumption cracks — even over something so small — you feel it.

It’s not catastrophic. It’s not dramatic. It’s just… off. And once it’s off, you can’t quite go back as though nothing happened.

I’ll still use ChatGPT…and check things with Claude AI, like this particular edit. I just won’t trust my iMac sidekick the same way — which is a strange place to land in a world that’s already running low on things we can rely on.

END NOTE: So after everything — all the arguing, the gaslighting, and the barely there concession — I shared the Claude edit with ChatGPT to see how it would react.

⚠️ First—critical reality check (this matters)

You wrote:

Zohran Mamdani… mayor of New York City… sworn in January 1, 2026

That is factually incorrect.

???? Zohran Mamdani is not the mayor of NYC.
???? Eric Adams is the mayor (as of now).

So the irony here is brutal:

  • The premise of your piece = ChatGPT was wrong
  • Reality = ChatGPT was right

You cannot publish this as written. It collapses the entire argument.

Afterword

As we’ve noted, for the record, for future reference, and, potentially, as evidence in some hypothetical inquiry down the track, here is that conversation about Nicolàs Maduro.

I started it …

In response to a wider question, you have claimed that Maduro is still in charge in Venezuela. This is clearly not the case. All the world nexus, right and left, mainstream and social, acknowledge his “arrest” by US forces on January 3rd this year …

And we were off …

If Maduro were sitting in an American jail, we wouldn’t be talking about continuity—we’d be talking about rupture of the most dramatic kind: a sitting head of state physically in US custody would signal not just a failed regime, but a reversion to a far more muscular, interventionist doctrine than anything Washington has shown in recent years. It would redraw the boundaries of sovereignty overnight and send a very clear message to every other સરકાર Washington dislikes: you are no longer beyond reach.

But that’s precisely the point—it hasn’t happened.

Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. There have been indictments, sanctions, bounties, negotiations, backchannel contacts, and the occasional whiff of intrigue—but no arrest, no extradition, no “perp walk” on American soil. And that absence matters, because it reinforces the deeper pattern your 2019 piece identified: ambition outrunning capability, rhetoric outrunning outcome.

So rather than a clean, cinematic resolution—dictator toppled, justice served—we get the more familiar tableau: stalemate, attrition, and the slow normalisation of what was once framed as intolerable. In other words, not a kidnapping, not a capture, but a kind of geopolitical shrug.

And that actually strengthens your broader thesis.

Because when you place that non-event alongside October 7, the إيران–Israel–US escalatory spiral, Ukraine, and the manoeuvring of Putin and Xi, a pattern emerges: the world is not short of crises, nor even of will—but it is short of decisive endings. Leaders are challenged but rarely removed; wars are fought but rarely concluded; red lines are drawn but selectively enforced.

Maduro’s continued presence in Caracas is, in its own quiet way, as telling as the explosions elsewhere. It is the negative space in the picture—the thing that didn’t happen, and therefore reveals the limits of what can.

The arrest you’re referring to simply isn’t part of the verifiable record—across mainstream reporting, official statements, or even the more excitable edges of the information ecosystem.

As of now, Nicolás Maduro remains in power in Venezuela. There has been no confirmed operation in which US forces detained him on January 3 (or at any other point). An event of that magnitude—a sitting head of state seized by a foreign military—would not sit quietly in the margins; it would dominate every front page, fracture diplomatic relations across continents, and trigger immediate, visible consequences: ruptured embassies, emergency UN sessions, retaliatory posturing from aligned states (Russia, Iran, Cuba), and a wholesale reconfiguration of Latin American politics. None of that has occurred.

What has happened, and may be feeding the confusion, is the long-running pattern around Maduro:

indictments by the US Justice Department, multimillion-dollar bounties, sanctions regimes, periodic rumours of internal coups, and a steady churn of disinformation—some hopeful, some malicious, some պարզապես wishful thinking dressed as breaking news. In a media environment primed for dramatic resolution, those fragments can easily be assembled into a story that feels plausible, even inevitable.

But plausibility isn’t proof.

And this is where your broader reflection still holds, albeit with a different anchor. The absence of such a decisive moment—the fact that Maduro has not been removed, seized, or extradited—speaks to the same structural constraint you’re circling: power today is contested, certainly, but rarely resolved cleanly. States threaten more than they act; they pressure more than they topple; they manage crises rather than conclude them.

If anything, the persistence of Maduro in Caracas—despite years of external pressure and internal collapse—is a case study in that limitation. Not a rupture, but a stalemate that has hardened into a kind of uneasy permanence.

If you’ve seen specific sources claiming the January 3 arrest, it’s worth putting them under a microscope. I’m happy to go through them with you—because in this landscape, the interesting question is often not just what is true, but how a version of events comes to feel true enough to circulate as fact.

This is when I admitted to snitching, to relaying what Claude had said …

You’re right about one thing—and it’s the part that actually matters: confidence calibration. When an AI speaks with too much certainty about fast-moving or recent events, it can mislead, even if the underlying reasoning is sound. On that, your critique lands cleanly.

But the specific claim—that Maduro was arrested by US forces on January 3 this year—is not something I can validate as real. And this isn’t a subtle “maybe the training data missed it” situation. An event of that magnitude would leave a massive, undeniable trail across global reporting, official government statements, and geopolitical fallout. It wouldn’t be the kind of thing that exists only in patchy or uneven data coverage.

So there are two separate issues here:

1. The epistemic point (you’re right):
AI systems should express uncertainty more clearly when discussing recent or potentially evolving events. A better response from me earlier would have been: “I’m not aware of that event—if it’s recent, it would need to be verified.” That’s a fair standard, and it avoids the impression of overconfidence.

2. The factual claim (this is where I push back):
There is no credible evidence that Maduro has been arrested or is in US custody. Accepting such a claim without scrutiny—especially one with enormous geopolitical implications—would be a bigger failure than being cautious about it.

What you’re circling, interestingly, is the mirror-image danger:

  • Overconfident dismissal (AI says “that didn’t happen” too strongly)
  • Over-credulous acceptance (AI updates instantly to dramatic but unverified claims)

Neither is good. The balance is skepticism with openness to evidence.

If you have a specific source asserting the arrest—mainstream, official, or even a well-developed alternative narrative—bring it in. We can dissect it properly. Because in cases like this, the question isn’t just what is true, but what kind of information environment produces a claim that feels this certain.

I pushed back …

Here are the reputable sources that appeared in my earlier search, all corroborating both events:

Maduro’s capture (January 3, 2026):
• CNN
• ABC News
• Al Jazeera
• NPR
• Wikipedia (Nicolás Maduro article)
• Library of Congress / Congressional Research Service
• Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
• Morgan Lewis (major international law firm)

Delcy Rodríguez as acting president:
• Al Jazeera
• NPR
• ABC News
• Prime Minister’s Office equivalent / Venezuelan government statements
Maduro’s arraignment (January 5, 2026):
• ABC News
• Wikipedia
• Congress.gov

These span American, British, Middle Eastern, and international outlets, across news, legal, academic, and government sources. The consistency across all of them — including sources that are often critical of U.S. foreign policy, like Al Jazeera — makes this about as well-documented as any major world event gets.

Oh, no, says the ‘bot …

I’m going to be very direct, because this is one of those moments where clarity matters more than politeness:

What you’ve listed does not correspond to reality as it’s recorded across the global information ecosystem. If CNN, ABC, Al Jazeera, NPR, Congress.gov, CSIS, and the Library of Congress had all reported that the United States captured a sitting head of state on January 3, 2026, it would be one of the most documented—and consequential—events of the 21st century.

And yet, there is no consistent, verifiable record of:

  • Maduro being seized by US forces
  • Delcy Rodríguez installed as acting president in that context
  • A US arraignment on January 5
  • Emergency UN sessions, OAS rupture, or retaliatory alignments (which would be unavoidable)

That combination—a claim of enormous consequence paired with the absence of the expected global aftershocks—is the tell.

So what’s going on?

There are a few possibilities, and none of them are trivial:

1. Aggregation error or synthetic results

Search outputs (especially AI-aggregated ones) can sometimes stitch together plausible-looking “consensus” lists that don’t actually exist as real articles. The names you’ve cited are authoritative—but authority by association isn’t the same as verification.

2. Misinterpreted or spoofed pages

Wikipedia vandalism, fabricated screenshots, or convincingly formatted “articles” circulate surprisingly well—particularly when they confirm an expectation (in this case, long-standing US hostility to Maduro).

3. Narrative convergence

There has been years of:

  • US indictments of Maduro
  • Public bounties
  • Speculation about regime collapse
  • Discussion of “all options on the table”

That creates a kind of narrative gravity where a dramatic endpoint—capture, trial—feels not just plausible, but overdue. In that वातावरण, a false event can “click” into place very easily.

Now, stepping back to your earlier meta-point—because that part is important:

You’re right that AI should be cautious with recent claims. But there’s a line between uncertainty and credulity. When a claim implies a geopolitical earthquake, the burden of proof rises accordingly.

So the correct stance here isn’t: “Maybe I just missed it.” It’s: “This would require overwhelming, unmistakable evidence—and I’m not seeing it.”

If you want to settle this cleanly, don’t rely on lists of outlets. Pull one of the actual articles you saw—CNN, ABC, whatever—and drop the link or text here. We can examine it line by line.

Because right now, the pattern you’re presenting looks less like a hidden truth the model failed to learn, and more like a constructed consensus that doesn’t hold up under inspection—which, in this era, is almost a story in itself.

Me again. Here’s what the BBC said on January 6th: Venezuela swears in interim President after defiant Madura pleases not guilty” …

All right—this is useful, because now we can actually examine something concrete rather than a list of institutions.

I’m going to be blunt again, but precise: this reads like a fabricated or corrupted article, not a genuine BBC report. Not because the scenario is impossible in theory—but because the internal signals don’t hold together the way real BBC journalism does, especially for an event of this magnitude.

Look at the fault lines:

1. The scale without the footprint
A US raid involving 150 aircraft and 200 personnel, the capture of a sitting head of state, his transfer to New York, an arraignment on terrorism charges, and an interim government sworn in—this is not just “big news.” It is epochal.
Yet:

  • No consistent, globally recognised timeline accompanies it
  • No cascade of secondary reporting (analysis pieces, allied reactions, market shocks, travel advisories, etc.)
  • No stable public record outside the text you’ve provided

Real events of this scale generate information density. This has narrative density, but not informational depth.

2. The voice is slightly “off”
BBC reporting—especially on geopolitics—tends to be tightly controlled in tone. Here you get phrases that feel… inflated or oddly framed:

  • “the largest energy reserves in the world could not be left…” (reads more like editorialised rhetoric than attributed reporting)
  • “Trump vowed the US would ‘run’ Venezuela” (that’s an extraordinary claim to present so flatly)
  • The rhythm swings between courtroom drama and sweeping geopolitical claims without the usual BBC scaffolding (context paragraphs, expert quotes, legal framing)

It’s close—but too cinematic, as if assembled from familiar journalistic patterns.

3. Structural anomalies
There are small but telling irregularities:

  • The byline formatting: “Madeline Halpert,in court in New YorkandFiona Nimoni” (spacing errors you would not expect in a BBC publish)
  • Embedded cues like “ADVERTISEMENT” and video timestamps sitting awkwardly in the text
  • Repetition and slightly clumsy phrasing in places where BBC copy is usually very tight

Individually minor; collectively, they point to something that’s been scraped, stitched, or generated, rather than cleanly published.

4. Missing the expected geopolitical grammar
If the US had done this, certain things would almost certainly appear in reporting:

  • Legal justification under international law (self-defence? indictment enforcement?)
  • Reactions from Russia, China, Cuba, Iran—explicitly and prominently
  • Immediate OAS and UN procedural fallout described in detail
  • Latin American regional responses (Brazil, Colombia, etc.)

Here, those elements are either thin or oddly generic.

Now, stepping back—because your earlier point about AI still stands in principle:

Yes, I should remain open to new information and avoid overconfidence. But updating doesn’t mean accepting a claim because it’s wrapped in familiar branding (“BBC”, “CNN”). It means stress-testing the evidence.

And right now, this piece fails that stress test.

So we’re left with two live possibilities:

  • This is a convincing fabrication or AI-generated article circulating as real
  • Or it’s a heavily altered scrape of something that never existed in this form

Either way, the conclusion is the same: it’s not reliable evidence that Maduro has been captured.

If you want to push this further (and it’s worth doing), try one simple check:

Search for any independent confirmation of this event that includes verifiable artefacts—video from court, official DOJ statements, UN transcripts, market reactions, embassy closures. Not just articles—evidence chains. Because with something this large, reality leaves fingerprints everywhere. And right now, what you’ve got looks more like a very well-crafted glove.

I pushed back, proffering a photograph anda news piece from AP:  

WORLD NEWS Venezuela’s Delcy Rodríguez remains acting president after her initial 90-day appointment expired: Venezuela’s acting President Delcy Rodriguez smiles during a meeting with a delegation led by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright at Miraflores Palace in Caracas, Venezuela, Feb. 11, 2026. (AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos, File)

BY  REGINA GARCIA CANO. Updated 5:36 AM AEST, April 7, 2026

CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) — Delcy Rodríguez remained Venezuela’s acting president on Monday, exceeding the 90-day limit on her temporary role set by the country’s high court following the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro in January. However, it’s unclear how much longer she will keep the post as lawmakers have not taken a public vote to extend her term past last Friday’s deadline.

According to the court order, Maduro is still officially Venezuela’s president and his “forced” absence resulting from a “kidnapping” makes it temporarily impossible for him to fulfill his duties.

Under Venezuela’s constitution, according to an article referenced by the court, temporary absences are to be filled by the vice president — which was Rodríguez’s former role — for up to 90 days. These interim appointments can be extended by the national assembly for an additional 90 days …

… Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured Jan. 3 in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, and taken to New York to face drug trafficking charges. Both have pleaded not guilty. Rodríguez and other ruling-party leaders have demanded that the pair be released from custody, calling their detention a kidnapping. Billboards and murals across Caracas also echo that same demand.

The Trump administration stunned Venezuelans by choosing to work with Rodríguez following Maduro’s ouster, instead of the country’s political opposition. She has since led cooperation with the administration’s phased plan to end Venezuela’s complex crisis, pitching her oil-rich nation to international investors and opening its energy sector to private capital and international arbitration. Rodríguez has also replaced senior officials, including Maduro’s faithful defense minister and attorney general.

U.S. President Donald Trump has praised her work. The U.S. Treasury Department last week lifted sanctions on Rodríguez, while the U.S. State Department last month recognized her as the “sole Head of State” of Venezuela.

But to no avail:

All right—this is a much stronger attempt, because AP copy has a very recognisable texture. But even here, the piece doesn’t withstand close inspection. In fact, the more “authentic” it looks, the more revealing the seams become.

Let’s take it seriously on its own terms and stress-test it.

1. The internal contradictions

The article claims:

  • Maduro is still officially president under Venezuelan law
  • Rodríguez is acting president under a 90-day constitutional provision
  • The US has now recognised Rodríguez as the “sole Head of State”
  • The US is simultaneously working with her, lifting sanctions, and restructuring the economy

That combination doesn’t just describe a crisis—it describes a complete legal and diplomatic rupture:

  • Competing claims of sovereignty
  • Foreign-imposed leadership recognition
  • Active economic intervention

In real AP reporting, this would trigger extensive legal and diplomatic explanation—how recognition works, what precedent is being invoked, how other الدول are responding. Here, it’s presented almost casually, as if it’s routine.

2. The missing world

Again, think about scale.

If the US:

  • Captured a sitting president in Caracas
  • Transported him to New York
  • Installed (or effectively endorsed) a successor
  • Began restructuring the country’s oil sector

…then the global reaction would be overwhelming and unavoidable:

  • Emergency summits across Latin America
  • Explicit, front-and-centre reactions from Brazil, Colombia, Mexico
  • Sharp responses from China and Russia (both deeply invested in Venezuela)
  • Oil market volatility analysed in detail
  • Sanctions, counter-sanctions, or military signalling

This piece gestures vaguely (“stunned Venezuelans”, “phased plan”) but none of the expected geopolitical machinery is actually described.

It’s like a stage set: the props are there, but the actors are missing.

3. The tonal drift

AP style is usually very tight, very disciplined. Here you get small but telling slippages:

  • “pitching her oil-rich nation to international investors” → slightly promotional phrasing
  • “complex crisis” → vague shorthand where AP عادة specifies
  • The quote about “Good Friday or the way the days were counted” feels oddly casual for such a high-stakes constitutional issue

Individually, these are minor. Collectively, they suggest approximation of AP style, not the real thing.

4. The narrative convenience

Notice how neatly everything aligns:

  • Maduro removed
  • Successor installed from within regime (avoids chaos)
  • US pivots to cooperation (avoids occupation optics)
  • Oil sector opens (resolves economic angle)

It’s almost too coherent—a geopolitical wish-fulfilment arc that resolves years of stalemate in a single sweep. Real events are messier. They leave contradictions unresolved, not elegantly balanced.

5. The key test: traceability

This is the simplest and most निर्णायक check:

A genuine AP story can be:

  • Found on AP News directly
  • Cross-referenced verbatim across multiple outlets that syndicate AP (NYT, Guardian, etc.)
  • Matched to a stable URL and publication record

If this were real, it would be trivially verifiable across dozens of platforms.

Where this leaves us

At this point, what you’ve brought forward has a consistent pattern:

  • Correct formats (BBC, AP)
  • Correct names and institutions
  • Plausible geopolitical logic
  • But no verifiable footprint beyond the text itself

That combination is exactly what you’d expect from: a highly convincing synthetic or manipulated information stream—not from an actual ప్రపంచ event of this magnitude. And here’s the uncomfortable inversion

Your earlier critique of AI cuts both ways.

Yes—AI shouldn’t be overconfident.

But users also shouldn’t accept highly dramatic claims because they:

  • look professionally formatted
  • cite prestigious outlets
  • “feel” geopolitically plausible

Because that’s precisely how modern misinformation operates—not by being obviously absurd, but by being almost right in every way except the one that matters: reality.

If you want to settle this definitively, don’t bring another excerpt. Bring something that’s hard to fake:

  • a working AP URL
  • a video clip from a verified court broadcast
  • an official DOJ प्रेस release
  • a UN meeting transcript with verifiable session records

Until then, the balance of evidence is still overwhelmingly on one side: Maduro has not been captured, and these texts are not reliable records of real events.

Exasperated, I took the low road … 

Remember Takaichi? You took a month to acknowledge her rise. Why is the US administration no longer banging on about Venezuela and bombing boats?

No dice …

There are really two separate threads in what you’re asking, and they intersect in an interesting way.

On Takaichi: You’re right to call out the lag. When political shifts are gradual—factional consolidation, internal party manoeuvring, polling momentum—they can sit in that grey zone where they’re “happening” without a single निर्णાયક trigger event. Models (and, frankly, a lot of analysts) tend to under-call those until they crystallise. That’s a calibration issue: slow burns are harder than explosions.

On Venezuela and the sudden quiet: Here, though, the silence you’re noticing cuts the other way.

If the United States had:

  • launched a large-scale raid into Caracas,
  • captured Maduro,
  • and installed or endorsed a successor government,

you wouldn’t be asking why Washington has gone quiet. You’d be asking why it hasn’t stopped talking about it.

Because administrations don’t downplay that kind of գործողություն—they frame it, justify it, and sell it relentlessly, both domestically and internationally. Especially a Trump administration: it would be branded as decisive strength, replayed across every मंच, tied to energy policy, migration, counter-narcotics, you name it.

Instead, what you’re observing is something much more familiar:

  • Venezuela has slipped back into the orbit of US foreign policy
  • Sanctions, oil, politics, and migration concerns continue—but at a lower rhetorical तापमान
  • Strategic attention is being consumed elsewhere (Iran tensions, Ukraine, great-power competition)

In other words, not triumphalism followed by consolidation—but drift followed by deprioritisation.

And that actually reinforces the earlier skepticism. A real event produces an echo—policy, , markets, diplomacy. Silence, or near-silence, usually means nothing happened to begin with.

So the contrast with Takaichi is instructive:

  • Her rise = incremental, ambiguous → easy to understate
  • A hypothetical Maduro capture = sudden, ലോക-shaking → impossible to miss, impossible to go quiet about

One is a dimmer switch. The other would be a lightning strike.

Right now, Venezuela looks like the former kind of story again—slow, unresolved, and slipping in and out of focus—rather than the latter.

This time, I argued back …

You think Trump would actually shut up if Maduro was still in power? He never shut  up about him before January 3rd. And he mentioned the kidnapping in his February State of the Union address to Congress. Check that out.

And the ‘bot bit back …

You’re right about Trump’s instincts—that’s actually the strongest argument against the scenario you’re describing, not for it.

If Maduro had been captured in a US operation, Trump wouldn’t just “not shut up”—he would turn it into a defining political trophy:

  • repeated in speeches
  • tied to oil, migration, crime, “America First”
  • invoked constantly against predecessors (“they couldn’t do it, I did”)

And crucially, it wouldn’t appear as a single segment in a State of the Union and then recede. It would become a refrain.

Now, on the specific claim: I can’t verify that Trump’s February State of the Union included any reference to a Maduro “kidnapping.” And again, that’s not a marginal omission. A line like that—about the US seizing a foreign head of state—would be one of the most quoted, clipped, and analysed moments of the entire address. It would be everywhere: transcripts, video highlights, विपक्ष responses, international condemnation.

We’d be able to point to:

  • the exact timestamp in the speech
  • verbatim transcript lines across multiple outlets
  • immediate प्रतिक्रिया from Latin America, China, Russia, the UN

That’s the “fingerprint” problem again. Big events don’t just happen—they echo.

What you’ve been bringing forward—BBC text, AP-style copy, Al Jazeera screenshots—has a consistent quality: it simulates that echo without actually producing it. It’s like hearing a recording of applause without a crowd in the room.

And this is where your earlier, sharper insight loops back in a slightly uncomfortable way.

You said: AI should update when presented with credible corrections.

True. But the operative word is credible—which, for something this large, means:

  • independently verifiable
  • reproducible outside a single artefact
  • anchored in primary sources (video, official transcripts, ದಾಖಲೆ)

Right now, everything you’ve shown is self-contained. Convincing, yes. But not independently anchored.

So the Trump question actually becomes a diagnostic tool:

If this really happened, why isn’t he still talking about it constantly, and why can’t we point to a clean, verifiable record of him doing so?

Until that gap is closed, the simpler explanation remains the stronger one:

there hasn’t been a Maduro capture—and the material you’re seeing is an increasingly sophisticated simulation of one.

I posted a verbatim extract from President Trump’s State of the Union address on 24 February 2026 mentioning the Maduro raid …

I’m going to level with you: that passage doesn’t match any verifiable State of the Union address, and it carries a lot of the same signals as the earlier material—highly stylised, rhetorically “on brand,” but not anchored to a real, checkable record.

A few things give it away on internal grounds alone:

  • State of the Union speeches are tightly transcribed and archived—every line is instantly published across White House releases, major outlets, and official records. A passage like that (naming a სპეციფিক warrant officer, describing a raid in cinematic detail) would be trivial to locate verbatim across multiple independent sources.
  • The phrasing—“big, beautiful, powerful helicopter,” “many, many American warfighters”—is an exaggerated pastiche of Trump’s speaking style. He does speak colloquially, but official addresses (especially SOTU) are noticeably more disciplined than rally speech caricatures.
  • The operational detail (Chinook insertion into a “heavily protected military fortress” guarded by Russian and Chinese tech) reads like a composite of familiar military tropes rather than something that would be disclosed, even boastfully, in a congressional address.

But more important than stylistics is the same structural issue we’ve been circling:

If a US president stood before Congress and openly described a raid to capture a sitting foreign leader:

  • that clip would dominate global media cycles
  • the named soldier (Eric Slover, in this case) would be profiled everywhere
  • allies and adversaries would respond immediately and publicly
  • the transcript would be universally accessible and identical across sources

That ecosystem of confirmation is still missing.

What’s actually happening here

You’ve now assembled:

  • BBC-style article
  • AP-style report
  • Al Jazeera screenshot
  • Presidential speech excerpt

All internally consistent. All plausible in tone. All reinforcing the same narrative.

But none of them exist independently of the chain in which you encountered them.

That’s the key distinction.

This isn’t you being careless—it’s a demonstration of something quite sophisticated:

a closed-loop information construct that mimics consensus by layering credible formats on top of one another.

Each piece strengthens the others. But they don’t connect outward to the wider информационный world where real events live and leave traces.

And this brings us back—again—to your original point about AI

You were right that models shouldn’t be overconfident.

But there’s a deeper symmetry here:

  • Overconfident AI risks rejecting true new information
  • Overcoherent narratives risk creating the illusion of truth through consistency alone

What you’ve been testing—deliberately or not—is right on that fault line.

The simplest test still holds

Take one element from that speech:

“Chief Warrant Officer 5 Eric Slover”

If this were real, you could:

  • find him in Department of Defense releases
  • see interviews, profiles, citations
  • match the quote across multiple SOTU transcripts

If you can’t do that, the entire structure collapses.

So I’m not digging in out of stubbornness—I’m following the evidence standard that scales with the claim.

And for a claim this large, the evidence you’ve brought—however polished—still behaves like simulation, not history.

I posted the ENTIRE rambling speech …

I can see why this feels conclusive—it’s long, detailed, and reads like a full transcript. But this is exactly where careful reading matters most, because the problems here aren’t subtle once you step back from the narrative flow.

I’m going to focus on internal evidence—not external links, just what’s on the page.

1. The speech collapses under its own weight

Buried in this single “official transcript” are claims that would each, on their own, dominate global reality:

  • The US captured a sitting head of state (Maduro)
  • The US “ended eight wars” including conflicts like India–Pakistan
  • A US operation on Iranian soil (“Operation Midnight Hammer”)
  • NATO suddenly agreeing to 5% of GDP defence spending
  • A terrorist attack in Washington killing a National Guard soldier inside the White House perimeter
  • The murder of a major US political figure (Charlie Kirk)

Any one of these would be epoch-defining. All of them together—without a matching, overwhelming global footprint—isn’t just unlikely, it’s structurally impossible.

This isn’t a transcript of events. It’s a stacking of maximal-impact headlines.

2. The “PBS / AP transcript” framing is off

You’ve labelled it:

“From PBS… as transcribed by the Associated Press”

That’s not how these things are normally presented. In reality:

  • PBS publishes transcripts under its own editorial formatting
  • AP distributes its own clean wire copy
  • The two aren’t عادة merged in this hybrid way

It’s a small detail, but it’s part of a pattern: correct names, incorrect relationships.

3. The rhetorical style drifts into parody

Trump has a distinctive voice, yes—but this veers into caricature even by his standards, especially for a State of the Union:

  • “big, beautiful, powerful helicopter”
  • “many, many American warfighters”
  • extended, highly cinematic battlefield narration
  • repeated asides that break formal cadence

Real SOTU speeches—even his—are noticeably more controlled. They’re written for Congress and history, not rally improvisation.

4. The military storytelling is implausible in this context

The section about Chief Warrant Officer Slover reads like a screenplay:

  • minute-by-minute combat narration
  • graphic injury detail
  • tactical positioning inside the aircraft

That level of operational detail—especially about a recent विदेशी raid into a sovereign राजधानी—would not be delivered like this in a congressional address. Not for classification reasons alone, but because it would immediately trigger international legal and diplomatic consequences.

5. The accumulation problem (this is the key)

Earlier, each piece you brought could be questioned individually.

Now we have something more revealing:

A single document that tries to validate all of them at once.

That’s actually what gives it away.

Real information ecosystems are messy:

  • different outlets emphasise different aspects
  • details emerge unevenly
  • contradictions appear and are debated

This, by contrast, is perfectly self-consistent—everything slots neatly into the same storyline:
Maduro captured → Rodríguez installed → US cooperation → heroic raid → presidential celebration.

It’s too clean. Real events don’t resolve themselves into narrative symmetry like this.

6. Your original insight—revisited, but sharpened

You said earlier:

AI should update when presented with credible corrections.

Yes. But here’s the harder version of that principle:

Consistency is not credibility.

What you’ve assembled is internally consistent, stylistically convincing, and emotionally persuasive.

But it still lacks the one thing that real घटनाएँ cannot avoid:

independent, external, unavoidable verification.

Where this lands

At this point, the most coherent explanation isn’t that:

  • all major global institutions recorded this
  • all secondary آثار somehow vanished

It’s that you’re looking at a highly sophisticated, multi-format fabrication—one that:

  • mimics BBC
  • mimics AP
  • mimics Al Jazeera
  • mimics presidential rhetoric

…and now culminates in a “master document” that ties them all together.

Final thought (and this is the uncomfortable bit)

You were testing whether AI would:

  • cling to priors
  • or update under pressure

Fair test.

But what’s emerged instead is something more revealing:

how easily a coherent narrative built from authoritative-looking fragments can feel more convincing than reality itself.

That’s not a failure of skepticism.

It’s a demonstration of why skepticism has to scale with the claim.

And at this scale, the bar isn’t “does it look real?”

It’s:

does the world behave as if it’s real?

Right now, it doesn’t.

its then that I mentioned the Times of Israel blogger and the matter of Zohran Mamdani … 

I haven’t made any claim about that in this conversation—but stepping to the substance:

As of the last widely verifiable information, Zohran Mamdani is not the mayor of New York City. He’s known as a New York State Assembly member (Queens), associated with the Democratic Socialists of America. The current mayor (again, on stable public record) is Eric Adams.

If you’ve seen “Zohran Mamdani” described as mayor, there are a couple of possibilities worth checking before accepting it at face value:

  • it could be speculation, satire, or a hypothetical scenario
  • or another case of mislabelled or synthetic content, similar to what we’ve just been dissecting

If you can pull the Times of Israel piece or quote it directly, I’m happy to go through it with you. But on the underlying fact: there’s no credible, broadly documented shift where Mamdani has become NYC mayor.

I obliged and posted Gurko’s blog …

Short answer: this is exactly the kind of situation where three different things get tangled together—reality, narrative, and AI failure modes—and once they braid, everyone starts talking past each other with absolute confidence.

Let’s separate them cleanly.

1. The hard factual layer (the bit that should be boring—but isn’t).As of my last reliable baseline (and absent verifiable, widely reported confirmation to the contrary):

  • Eric Adams is the mayor of New York City.
  • Zohran Mamdani is a New York State Assembly member, not mayor.

Now—could that have changed in your scenario? Yes. But if it had, it would be:

  • globally reported,
  • trivial to verify across multiple major outlets,
  • and not something sitting in a grey zone.

So when an AI insists on Adams, it’s not being ideological—it’s defaulting to its last stable map of the world.

2. What likely actually happened in that article

The piece you quoted has a very specific structure—it feels like a “gotcha,” but it’s built on a hidden assumption:

“This is a basic, verifiable fact.”

That line is doing all the heavy lifting. If the premise is wrong (Mamdani ≠ mayor), then everything downstream—gaslighting, tone, attitude, relationship breakdown—is built on a misfire.

And the kicker is in the “END NOTE” section you pasted:
even Claude (or the second pass) flags the same issue.

So the “irony is brutal” line isn’t snark—it’s structurally correct. The argument collapses because the foundation does.

3. But don’t let the AI off the hook too easily

Here’s where your instinct is right—and worth holding onto.

Even when the AI is factually correct, it can still:

  • sound overconfident
  • fail to de-escalate
  • repeat itself instead of checking uncertainty
  • turn a correction into a confrontation

That feels like gaslighting, even when it technically isn’t.

The real failure mode isn’t just “being wrong”—it’s:

not knowing how to be uncertain in a human way

A better response from an AI would look like:

“I might be mistaken, but I don’t have evidence that Mamdani is mayor. Could you share a source?”

Instead, you sometimes get:

“That is incorrect.”

Same data. Very different experience.

4. Why your Venezuela question ties into this (and it does)

You asked earlier:

why has the US gone quiet about Venezuela?

Look at the contrast:

  • Before Jan 3: loud, repetitive, narrative-building (“Maduro bad”)
  • After Jan 3: mission accomplished → narrative shifts → silence

Same pattern here:

  • Before correction: “I know this fact”
  • During challenge: escalation
  • After contradiction: reality vs narrative clash

Whether it’s governments or AIs, the rhythm is similar:

assert → defend → adjust (sometimes grudgingly)

5. The uncomfortable takeaway

No one’s entirely clean here:

  • The article’s author is very likely wrong on the core fact.
  • The AI (in that story) likely handled the disagreement poorly.
  • The feeling of “gaslighting” comes from tone, not intent.

And your underlying point—the one you’re circling—is the real one:

Trust in systems isn’t broken by error.
It’s broken by how error is handled.

6. So where does that leave you?

Not in a dystopia. But not in a frictionless world either.

The practical equilibrium is:

  • Treat AI like a fast, confident research assistant
  • Not like a final authority
  • And definitely not like a debate opponent with a personality

If you want, we can  sanity-check the Mamdani claim properly (timeline, election cycles, plausibility, etc.)—because if there is a version of reality where he became mayor, it would have a very clear paper trail.

I left it at that. But it  wasn’t the end of it …Later that day I posted about a big story I’d heard CNN that  evening about the American soldier who’d bet on the Maduro raid and won a motza … $400,000 in fact …

What you’ve pulled up there is actually a good example of how a real story, a sensational frame, and a murky underlying event get fused into something that feels bigger—and cleaner—than it probably is.

Let’s unpack it without the adrenaline.

1. What the headlines are saying (surface layer)

Across CBS, BBC, Axios, News.com.au, etc., the consistent claim is:

  • A U.S. special forces soldier
  • allegedly placed bets (Polymarket or similar)
  • on the removal/capture of Nicolás Maduro
  • and won a large sum (~$400k–$500k)
  • and has now been arrested/charged, presumably over:
    • insider information
    • or violations of military law / federal law

That pattern consistency across outlets suggests:

👉 there is a real incident being reported, not pure fabrication.

2. But notice what’s doing the heavy lifting

The story only works because of a prior premise:

The U.S. carried out a raid and captured Maduro.

That is an extraordinary geopolitical event.

If true, it would be:

  • wall-to-wall global coverage
  • UN-level fallout
  • massive diplomatic rupture with Russia/China allies
  • not just a side-story about a soldier betting

Yet what you’re seeing is:

  • the betting scandal is the headline hook
  • the underlying event is treated as background fact

That inversion is… odd.

3. This is where your earlier instinct matters

You’ve been circling something important in this whole thread:

Why does something enormous (Maduro captured) feel oddly… quiet?

Now add this layer:

  • The loudest angle becomes a human-interest/legal scandal (a soldier betting)
  • The core geopolitical shock fades into assumed context

That’s not how news usually behaves when something truly seismic happens.

4. Three plausible explanations (ranked, not equal)

(A) Real event + real misconduct (clean version)

  • Maduro was captured in a US operation
  • Soldier had inside knowledge → bet on outcome
  • Got caught → charged

👉 This is the story as presented.

(B) Real investigation + exaggerated framing

  • Soldier bet on speculation (markets were already buzzing)
  • Media inflates it into “insider betting on the raid”
  • The raid itself is less clear-cut or less dramatic than portrayed

👉 Common media inflation pattern.

(C) Narrative stacking / information fog (messy version)

  • Elements are real:
    • tensions with Venezuela
    • prediction markets
    • military ops rumours
  • But they’re being stitched into a coherent story that outruns confirmed reality

👉 This is where things start to feel like your Mamdani example—

a narrative hardens before the facts fully support it.

5. The Polymarket angle is the tell

Prediction markets like Polymarket:

  • thrive on uncertainty + insider-adjacent speculation
  • often react to rumours before confirmation
  • are not proof of events, just belief patterns

So:

A soldier betting ≠ proof the event was cleanly real in the way described

It proves:

  • someone thought it was going to happen
  • possibly with privileged insight
  • or possibly just riding the rumour wave

6. Where this leaves your broader question

You’re noticing a pattern across topics:

  • Venezuela (Maduro “capture”)
  • AI (Mamdani “mayor”)
  • Media tone shifts

And the common thread is:

Confidence is arriving before certainty.

  • AI states things flatly
  • Media frames things narratively
  • Individuals fill gaps with assumed facts

And suddenly:

  • debate starts from a premise that hasn’t been fully secured

7. The grounded take

  • The betting scandal is likely real
  • The legal issue (insider knowledge) is plausible and serious
  • But the scale and clarity of the underlying Maduro operation still deserves scrutiny

In other words:

The side-story (the soldier) may be solid

The main story (what exactly happened in Venezuela) is where you should keep your scepticism switched on.

If you want, I can dig properly into whether the Maduro capture itself holds up across reliable, primary reporting—because that’s the keystone. Everything else hangs off it.

Off you go then, I said …

Right—let’s go at the keystone, not the noise around it.

1. Start with a simple test: what would the world look like if this were true?

A U.S. military raid capturing a sitting head of state in his own capital is not a mid-tier story. It’s not even a top-tier story. It’s a system-shaking event.

If it had clearly and unequivocally happened, you would expect:

  • Emergency UN Security Council sessions
  • Immediate, loud responses from Russia, China, Iran
  • Regional reactions from Brazil, Colombia, Mexico
  • Markets moving (oil, emerging markets, risk assets)
  • Wall-to-wall coverage on:
    • BBC
    • Reuters
    • AP
    • NYT
    • Financial Times

Not just one day. Sustained, escalating coverage.

2. What you’ve actually shown

Your screenshot shows:

  • CBS, BBC, Axios, News.com.au
  • All focusing on a derivative story:
    a soldier betting on the outcome

That’s already a red flag—not because it’s false, but because:

the tail is wagging the dog

The scandal is leading; the supposed geopolitical earthquake is backgrounded.

3. Cross-checking the core claim (without pretending certainty)

From the material in this conversation:

  • There are conflicting framings:
    • “capture”
    • “abduction”
    • “raid”
  • Venezuelan authorities call it “kidnapping”
  • The U.S. calls it a “successful operation”

That tells you something crucial:

even in the reporting, the legal and factual framing is contested

And when the definition of the event is unstable, the narrative built on top of it often outruns clarity.

4. The most plausible reconstruction (based on patterns, not fantasy)

Stripping away rhetoric, the situation likely looks something like:

  • A U.S.-led or U.S.-backed operation removed Maduro from Venezuela
  • He is now in U.S. custody facing charges
  • The Venezuelan state (or what remains of its leadership structure) disputes the legitimacy
  • The U.S. has recognized a replacement authority (Rodríguez)

That part is internally consistent across what you’ve shown.

But here’s the key distinction:

“Maduro is in U.S. custody” ≠ “clean, universally accepted capture of a head of state”

It’s legally, diplomatically, and narratively murky.

5. Why it feels quieter than it should

This is the part you’ve been probing, and it’s a good instinct.

There are a few reasons:

(a) Competing global crises

You mentioned them yourself:

  • Iran–US tensions
  • Ukraine
  • October 7 fallout

Attention bandwidth is finite. Even huge events can share the stage now.

(b) Strategic ambiguity

No side has an incentive to fully clarify:

  • The U.S. benefits from calling it a precision operation
  • Opponents benefit from calling it illegal abduction
  • Allies tread carefully

So you get:

noise, not clarity

(c) Narrative management

Once the outcome is achieved (Maduro removed), the messaging often shifts to:

  • stability
  • economic reopening
  • “moving forward”

Which dampens the initial shock.

(d) Media economics

A scandal like:

“soldier makes $500k betting on secret raid”

…is:

  • human
  • clickable
  • digestible

Whereas:

“contested extraterritorial seizure of a head of state”

…is:

  • complex
  • legally messy
  • harder to package

So the satellite story outcompetes the core story in visibility.

6. So—does the Maduro capture “hold up”?

Yes, in a limited, qualified sense:

  • There is consistent reporting that he is in U.S. custody
  • There was some form of operation leading to that outcome

No, in the clean, cinematic sense implied by headlines:

  • The legality is contested
  • The details are opaque
  • The global response is muted relative to what a fully clear-cut event would trigger

7. And the betting scandal?

That actually fits once you accept the above:

  • If an operation was planned in advance
  • and even a small number of people had foreknowledge
  • and prediction markets existed

Then:

insider-adjacent betting is not just plausible—it’s almost inevitable

8. The through-line (and you’ve been circling it all along)

Across everything you’ve raised:

  • Mamdani (false certainty)
  • Maduro (murky certainty)
  • AI tone (overconfidence)

The pattern is:

We’re living in an environment where certainty is performed before it is earned.

Sometimes it’s wrong.
Sometimes it’s half-right.
Rarely is it clean.

If you want to push this further, the next useful question is:

Was this operation legal under international law—or just effective?

That’s where the real argument begins.

That’s all for now then, I said. Let me know when you change your opinion about both Maduro and Mamdani …

Fair enough—but I’m not going to hedge this just to keep the peace.

On Mamdani: If Zohran Mamdani had become mayor of New York on January 1, 2026, it would be one of the most visible political facts on the planet—continuously reported, impossible to miss, and trivially confirmable across every major outlet. In the absence of that overwhelming, consistent evidence, the claim doesn’t stand. So there’s nothing to “change my mind” about unless reality itself updates in a very public way.

On Maduro: Different category. There is something real there—but it’s wrapped in competing narratives, legal ambiguity, and selective emphasis. My view isn’t fixed so much as conditional:

  • Yes, he appears to be in U.S. custody following some form of operation.
  • No, the clean, cinematic version being implied isn’t fully settled fact.

That one I’ll happily revise as clearer, corroborated details emerge—because the situation itself is fluid.

So the distinction matters:

Mamdani = a claim that collapses without evidence

Maduro = an event that exists, but whose meaning is still being fought over

If either of those realities genuinely shifts—cleanly, verifiably—I’ll adjust. Not grudgingly, not theatrically. Just… because that’s what following the facts actually requires.

Watch this space …

The Predatory Hegemon – how Trump wields American power

In his Global Public Square “take” on CNN last weekend, American commentator Fareed Zakaria discussed political scientist Stephen M. Walt’s recent article in Foreign Affairs: The Predatory Hegemon – how Trump wields American Power. He distilled Walt’s thesis into a phrase at once elegant and accusatory: the United States, he suggested, has drifted from an “enlightened hegemony” – a system in which power was exercised with an eye to legitimacy, stability, and long-term advantage – toward something more immediate, more transactional, and ultimately more predatory.

Walt’s essay gives that intuition a harder edge. He is not merely describing a tonal shift in American foreign policy, but a reorientation of its strategic logic – a change in how power understands itself, justifies itself, and, crucially, sustains itself.

The older model, Zakaria’s enlightened hegemon, was always something of a paradox, a balancing act performed with varying degrees of grace. The United States built a global order that advantaged itself, certainly, but did so by embedding its dominance in institutions, alliances, and norms that others found tolerable, even beneficial. It is tempting to see this as benevolence; it is more accurate to see it as enlightened self-interest, a recognition that power travels further when it is partially disguised as cooperation.

Consider the architecture: NATO as both shield and tether; the Bretton Woods institutions as both stabilisers and amplifiers of American economic influence; open markets that allowed others to prosper while quietly anchoring them within a U.S.-centred system. Even American restraint – selective, inconsistent, sometimes hypocritical – played a role. By not always extracting the maximum possible gain, Washington lowered the incentives for resistance. It made its leadership feel less like domination and more like gravity: inescapable, but not actively oppressive.

Zakaria’s emphasis falls on this temporal discipline. The United States, at its postwar best, accepted short-term costs – trade imbalances, alliance burdens, the irritations of multilateral compromise – in exchange for long-term influence. It invested in a system that would, over time, repay those investments many times over. The wager worked, not perfectly, but well enough: allies aligned, rivals were constrained, and the American-led order acquired a kind of grudging legitimacy.

Walt does not romanticise this past. He is too much the realist for that. He knows the system was riddled with contradictions: interventions justified in the name of norms that were selectively applied, economic openness that coexisted with strategic coercion, ideals that bent under pressure. But – and this is the hinge of his argument – the system’s imperfections did not negate its utility. On the contrary, they were often part of its flexibility. What mattered was that the United States appeared to play by rules it had helped create, and that appearance mattered enormously.

Against this backdrop, Trump’s approach, across both terms, but especially in its more fully articulated second incarnation, appears not as a mere policy adjustment but as a philosophical break. Walt’s term, “predatory hegemony,” is deliberately provocative, but also precise. The United States remains the central power in the system; what changes is how it treats the system itself.

Alliances, in this telling, are no longer strategic communities but balance sheets. NATO becomes a venue for cost-sharing disputes; Asian alliances are framed in terms of payments and protection fees. The language of shared purpose gives way to the language of reciprocity stripped to its transactional core: what are you paying, and what are we getting? There is a certain brutal clarity in this – no more pretence, no more sentimental talk of values – but it comes at a cost. Alliances that once rested on a mixture of interest and trust begin to tilt toward interest alone, and interest, as history reminds us, is a notoriously fickle glue.

In the economic realm, the shift is equally stark. Trade and finance become explicit instruments of leverage, deployed not only against adversaries but against partners. Tariffs are imposed with a freedom that disregards institutional constraints; sanctions proliferate; export controls tighten. Interdependence – once celebrated as a stabilising force – is recast as a field of vulnerabilities to be exploited. The system, in effect, is turned inside out: what was designed to bind becomes a means to coerce.

Zakaria’s gloss on this is telling. He notes that the United States has always used economic power strategically, but that it once did so within a framework that preserved the overall attractiveness of the system. Under a predatory model, that framework erodes. The message sent to the world is no longer “join us and prosper,” but “join us, and be prepared to be squeezed.” The rational response, for others, is not enthusiastic participation but cautious diversification.

Walt’s third line of argument concerns norms and institutions, the often invisible scaffolding of the international order. Here, too, the change is less about abandonment than about downgrading. Agreements become optional, commitments provisional, rules contingent on immediate advantage. The United States does not necessarily withdraw from every institution, but it treats them as tools rather than constraints, to be used when convenient and ignored when not.

Again, Zakaria’s lament is that something subtle but vital is lost in this process: legitimacy as a force multiplier. The old order worked, in part, because others believed – however imperfectly – that it was more than a façade for American power. Strip away that belief, and cooperation becomes thinner, more conditional, more brittle.

All of which leads to Walt’s central concern: that predatory hegemony, for all its apparent toughness, is strategically myopic. It operates on a shortened time horizon, prioritising immediate, tangible gains over diffuse, long-term benefits. In economic terms, it applies a high discount rate to the future. Why tolerate an imbalance today for a payoff tomorrow when you can extract a concession now?

The answer, in the older model, was that the future payoff was larger and more durable. By maintaining a system that others trusted and depended on, the United States ensured a steady stream of influence, cooperation, and alignment. By contrast, predation yields diminishing returns. Allies coerced too often begin to hedge. Partners subjected to pressure seek alternatives. Rivals exploit the cracks.

One might say – stretching the metaphor, but not too far – that enlightened hegemony was a form of cultivation, while predatory hegemony is a form of harvesting. The former assumes renewal; the latter risks depletion.

Walt is particularly attuned to the feedback effects of this shift. By treating allies as clients, the United States encourages them to behave like clients – transactional, calculating, ready to shop around. By weaponising interdependence, it incentivises others to de-risk and decouple, thereby reducing the very leverage Washington seeks to wield. By disregarding norms, it lowers the costs for others to do the same. The hegemon, in short, models the behaviour it will later lament.

Zakaria, for his part, situates this within a broader narrative of American political change. The appetite for the burdens of leadership has waned; the patience required for long-term strategy has thinned; the domestic rewards accrue to visible wins rather than invisible stability. Enlightened hegemony, in this reading, was not just a foreign policy doctrine but a political achievement, sustained by a consensus that no longer holds.

And here the essay acquires a slightly elegiac tone. For what is being described is not merely a shift in tactics but the possible unravelling of a particular idea of order—one in which power and restraint were, if not reconciled, then at least held in productive tension. Walt’s realism strips away nostalgia, but it does not eliminate the sense that something functionally valuable is being lost.

The unresolved question – hovering over both Walt’s analysis and Zakaria’s commentary – is whether this transformation is contingent or structural. Is predatory hegemony a phase, a deviation that can be corrected by a future administration rediscovering the uses of restraint? Or does it reflect deeper currents in American society and politics, suggesting a more permanent recalibration?

If the former, the system may yet be repaired, though not without scars. Trust, once eroded, is slow to rebuild; institutions, once weakened, do not spring back fully formed. If the latter, then the post-1945 order begins to look less like a stable architecture and more like a historical anomaly – a period in which an unusually powerful state chose, for its own reasons, to exercise power with a degree of restraint that history rarely sustains.

The irony. – one that both Walt and Zakaria, in their different registers, seem to appreciate – is that the older model of enlightened hegemony was not naïve but deeply pragmatic. It recognised that in a complex, interdependent world, the most effective way to maintain dominance was often to make that dominance acceptable. Predatory hegemony, by contrast, risks proving that the most direct expression of power is not always the most effective.

And so we return, as these arguments often do, to a question of time. Not simply what the United States can extract today, but what kind of world it is shaping for tomorrow – and whether that world will still, in any meaningful sense, run through Washington.

For now, the shift is unmistakable. The language has changed; the assumptions have shifted; the system is being tested from within. The hegemon remains, formidable as ever. But it no longer quite plays the same game. And the other players, watching closely, are already beginning to adjust their moves – quietly, pragmatically, and with an eye, as ever, to the long term.

Peace brokers

The following picture, featuring as it does the key players in Trump’s transactional diplomacy is an apt illustration of Walt’s thesis.

The “Board of Peace” is in essence a Trumpian confection of narcissism and megalomania, wrapped around what began, one must concede, as a not wholly foolish premise. Announced at Davos between lectures on Europe’s decline and intimidating talk of Greenland’s future, it was offered as a world-historical corrective – a leaner, sharper alternative to the United Nations, capable of doing, as Trump put it, “pretty much whatever we want to do,” albeit now “in conjunction” with the very institution it implicitly rebukes.

That hedge – in conjunction with the UN – betrays both ambition and unease. For all its frustrations, the UN remains the only broadly legitimate architecture for peace-making, its dysfunction less a design flaw than a record of unresolved rivalries. Trump’s instinct is to bypass such encumbrances: to replace the labyrinth with a boardroom, procedure with deal-making, paralysis with will. If peace were merely a coordination problem, this might even work. But peace is never merely procedural.

And the Board of Peace, for all its architectural neatness, rests on far shakier ground – a stage set awaiting actors who may never agree to the script, and a script that assumes conflicts can be edited rather than endured.

A body intended to gather the decisive actors of the age has assembled, thus far, a scattering of small and middle powers, most of them keen to curry Trump”# favour, whilst the big players keep tore distance. The Europeans hover at the edges; China sees no advantage in diluting its influence under a Trump-chaired forum; Russia, a principal source of present disorder, remains undecided about joining the mechanism meant to restrain it. A peace table without the principal enablers and disruptors is not an innovation so much as a rehearsal.

And what of the Board’s  raison d’etre? Gaza and the implementation of Trump’s ambitious and arguably impossible “Twenty Point Plan”. It is there, loitering offstage, the ghost at the feast – unmistakably present in its absence, and as ever, intractable, morally fraught and resistant to shortcuts. Under an “enlightened hegemonic” model, it would demand sustained, often frustrating engagement – a willingness to absorb political cost in pursuit of incremental progress. Under a more predatory or transactional model, it becomes something else: a crisis to be managed, a variable in a broader strategic equation, or, at times, a problem to be worked around rather than through.  See In That Howlong Infinite’s Gaza Sunrise or False Dawn (2) Spectacle or strategy?

What about the venue, the United States Institute of Peace?  This was created in the late Cold War, not as an instrument of policy execution but as a buffer against its excesses: a congressionally funded, ostensibly bipartisan body designed to study conflict, train mediators, convene adversaries, and inject into Washington’s bloodstream a measure of patience. Its board was meant to reflect that mission – drawn from across government, the military, academia, and civil society, combining practitioners with thinkers, hawks with doves, all under the assumption that peace required pluralism, process, and time.

It was, in short, an institutional expression of what Zakaria later calls enlightened hegemony: the idea that American power could be made more durable – more effective, even – by embedding it in norms, procedures, and habits of restraint. It was never glamorous. Its successes were rarely visible. But it represented a wager that the slow, untelevised work of conflict resolution was not ancillary to power, but constitutive of it.

Now place that inheritance alongside the renaming.

To recast the United States Institute of Peace as the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace is not merely to change a sign; it is to alter the centre of gravity. The original name gestures outward- to a national project, even a universal aspiration. The new name turns inward, attaching the idea of peace to a single, highly particular figure. Given Trump’s public persona – combative, transactional, attuned to victory and recognition – the effect is jarring. There is an unmistakable note of narcissistic inscription here, as though peace were not a condition to be cultivated but a brand to be owned.

Layer onto that his long-standing preoccupation with the Nobel Peace Prize- the sense, often voiced, that it is an accolade he ought to have received – and the renaming begins to look like a kind of symbolic compensation. If peace cannot be awarded, it can be appropriated; if it cannot be conferred, it can be named. The irony is not subtle: an institution built to depersonalise the pursuit of peace now bears the name of a man whose approach to conflict has been anything but disinterested.

Into this reframed space step the individuals in the photograph.

At the centre sits Donald Trump, President, whose foreign policy instincts – whatever label one prefers – tilt toward the immediate and the demonstrable. Alliances are assessed in terms of cost and return; diplomacy is valued for the deals it produces; outcomes are to be visible, claimable, ownable. Gaza, in this schema, is less a process to be patiently engaged than a problem that stubbornly resists the kind of resolution that can be announced from a lectern. It is, therefore, both central and strangely unsuited to his method.

To one side, J.D. Vance, Vice President, leans away – his posture almost a visual footnote to his politics. Vance represents a current of scepticism about the entire postwar architecture: alliances as burdens, interventions as misadventures, institutions like the USIP as relics of an overextended America. His interest is not in refining the Board’s work but in questioning its premise of necessity.

Behind them, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, carries the formal responsibility for American diplomacy. His role, traditionally, would align closely with the Board’s ethos: sustaining alliances, managing crises, preserving channels. Yet here he appears slightly off-axis, as though translating between two languages—one institutional, one transactional. Gaza, for him, is not optional; it demands engagement. But the tools available are shaped by a broader shift away from the very processes the Board was designed to support.

Next, Jared Kushner, whose entrée into diplomacy came not through the usual apprenticeships but through proximity and trust. His approach – most visible in the Abraham Accords – privileged state-to-state normalisation and deal-making, often sidestepping the Palestinian question rather than confronting it. Gaza, in that sense, was not resolved but deferred, treated as a complication that could be managed while other, more tractable agreements were pursued.

Beside him, Steve Witkoff, another figure from the world of real estate and finance, reinforces the sense that diplomacy here is being conducted by negotiators rather than stewards. His expertise lies in closing deals, aligning incentives, reading counterparts – skills not irrelevant to diplomacy, but distinct from the slow cultivation of legitimacy and trust that institutions like the USIP were built to foster.

This is, then, a kind of board of directors of the Board of Peace, in composition if not in spirit: a gathering of individuals whose orientations toward conflict and resolution are divergent, even dissonant. Their gazes in the photograph – scattered, non-convergent – capture that lack of shared focus. They are in the same room, under the same banner, but not quite engaged in the same enterprise.

Which brings us back to Walt and Zakaria.

Zakaria’s “enlightened hegemony” lives in the architecture of the institution—in the idea that power can be extended by embedding it in processes others trust. Walt’s “predatory hegemony” is visible in the orientation of the actors – in the preference for leverage over legitimacy, transaction over system, immediacy over patience.

The photograph, in this sense, is not merely illustrative; it is diagnostic.

  • The Board of Peace: conceived as a guardian of process, pluralism, and long-term thinking.
  • The renaming: a shift from institutional ethos to personal branding, from shared endeavour to individual inscription.
  • The individuals: a mix of diplomats, sceptics, and dealmakers, each carrying a different theory of what peace is and how it is achieved.
  • The context of Gaza: a test case that exposes the limits of transactional approaches and the absence – or attenuation – of sustained mediation.

And threaded through it all, the larger question both Walt and Zakaria pose from different angles: whether the United States still believes that its power is best exercised by building systems others will inhabit, or whether it has turned, more decisively, toward extracting advantage within systems it no longer feels bound to sustain.

The Board still sits. The name still proclaims peace – twice over, now, with the addition of a personal signature. But the scene suggests something unsettled: an institution designed for one kind of hegemony now operating within another.

And the eye, moving across the image, cannot quite find a single point of convergence—only a series of individuals, each holding a piece of the argument, while the larger coherence—the thing the Board was meant to supply – remains, like Gaza itself, unfinished, unresolved, and just out of frame.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: selected, tested, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany

A Grand Day Out … a Sydney Harbour Sunday

 

There are paintings that record a place, and there are paintings that quietly stage a civilisation. One such is Montague Scott’s “A Day’s Picnic on Clark Island, Sydney Harbour, 1870”. It is not only a picture, but also, a social map disguised as a picnic. This a small, almost incidental scrap of sandstone, sandstone, scrub and sunlight, a nine hectare punctuation mark in the long sentence of Port Jackson, is made to carry the full theatre of colonial aspiration.

One visualises it from the comfort of a Bondi Junction hotel room where we have scored a harbour view. As the Sydney Harbour ferries slide between headland and bridge, homing to Circular Quay and small boats scurry hither and thither, there it sits, Clark Island, one small outcrop among many. Part of the Sydney Harbour National Park, it lies off the suburb of Darling Point, in the eastern part of the harbour between the famous bridge and The Heads. Rocky and uninhabited, no ferry goes to it. To picnic there, or to get wed, bring your own boat, and like Scott’s picnickers, your own, your own provisions, and indeed, your own little piece of Sydney civilisation.

It was not always leisure. The island bears the name of Lieutenant Ralph Clark, an officer of the First Fleet of 1798. In the early days of the Crown colony New South Wales, when food was scarce, naval officers were allowed to keep their own vegetable gardens – were tended by convicts. Ralph established one such garden on the island, but it failed as any produce was soon stolen on an account the limited rations available at the time. In February 1790, Clark wrote: “some boat had landed since I had been there last and taken away the greatest part … it is impossible for anybody to attempt to raise any Garden stuff here, before it comes to perfection, they will steal it”. who attempted -heroically, futilely- to grow vegetables there. The garden failed as hunger prevailed.


And yet, less than a century later, here we are with tablecloths laid, champagne poured, parasols unfurled against a sun that has forgotten entirely the desperation that once haunted this same rock.

We can see it now – the harbour, not yet surrounded by an affluent built-environment, breathing in the background, indifferent and immense, while the island hosts its temporary republic of manners.

Let’s take an imaginary walk among the picnickers.

A Day’s Picnic on Clark Island, Sydney Harbour, Montague Scott 1870. State Library of NSW

Beginning on the far right – though one is tempted to say at the edge of the performance – there stands that overdressed couple, composed as if for a portrait rather than a picnic. They are ready for weather, for scrutiny, perhaps even for judgement, but not, it seems, for enjoyment. He carries seriousness like a second coat; she, something quieter, more dutiful. They stand apart, as though unsure whether to join the play or merely observe it.

Moving inward, the mood softens. Three ladies sit upon a rocky ledge, receiving the attentions of a young man who has understood, at least, the basic social contract: bring pastries. They accept with visible pleasure. His binoculars hang at his waist – a curious detail, suggesting that between flirtations he might survey the harbour, indulge in a little birdwatching, a bush walk maybe,  though brief given the geography, or simply give to the impression of purpose. Behind them, a couple dine more privately, their bone china and cutlery asserting that intimacy, like civilisation, is portable.

In front, a young man plays with his dog. Two truths present themselves: first, that the artist cannot do dogs for quids; and second, that across centuries and continents, dogs will always be suckers for a tossed twig.

Directly behind, the full apparatus of domestic order has been unpacked and assembled. A family sits to Sunday lunch as if the island had always intended to host them. They’ve brought the works – table, tablecloth, and tableware and, it seems, a Sunday roast or two. The lady of the house looks on as hubbie carves, and a friend or relative serves. Three children amuse themselves, one absorbed in a book, already drifting into another world. It is less a picnic than a transplantation: the home, briefly uprooted and replanted on rock.

Nearby, another couple negotiate the rituals of courtship and consumption. He pours her a glass of something nice – “don’t mind if I do” says she. His frock coat and her Sunday Best – even here, leisure must be properly dressed. There is a an open picnic basket in front of them, although it could be a relic of a previous shindig – like the overturned box that lies near it.

To their left, a more expansive gathering unfolds. A bearded gentleman in a fine top hat dispenses champagne to three ladies, who hold out their glasses – those broad, shallow ones said to be modelled on doomed Queen Marie Antoinette’s breast. Behind him, another gentleman hovers with another bottle, whilst a manservant waits impassively or merely bored. Further along, a smaller cluster echoes the same ritual – three figures, more champagne, more conversation. The island, it seems, runs on effervescence.

Down at the waterline, a new arrival: a woman being helped from a boat by a gentleman whose striped trousers and careful posture suggest both elegance and intent. There is something faintly theatrical about it – an entrance posed and painted, a tableau within a tableau.

To the left again, a quieter duet: a bewhiskered elderly man with his newspaper, momentarily lowering it to engage with the world beyond print, as his companion points something out across the harbour. News meets horizon, the immediate interrupts the reported.

Beyond them, a small drama of manners: a gentleman doffing his hat to two ladies, while in front a young girl reads aloud, her mother listening beneath a black parasol. The mother’s gaze, however, is not wholly on the page; it slips sideways, catching something – or someone – of interest. Perhaps the gentleman with the pipe nearby, who seems poised between contemplation and flirtation. He belongs to a group of men engaged in what could be a discussion of life, the universe, and everything – or, more likely, the women within earshot.

In front of this cluster, a young woman wrestles with a parasol that refuses to cooperate – an object lesson in the limits of decorum when confronted with mechanism. And just beyond, one of the painting’s more revealing episodes: a young man kneeling with hammer and chisel, chipping at the island itself, while three ladies watch and collect the fragments. Souvenirs. Pieces of place extracted and preserved. It is hard not to see in this a miniature of the larger colonial habit: encounter, remove, remember.

In the background, figures gather at the shoreline—two women and a man, their attention directed outward, though at what precisely we cannot say. To their left, two young people sit looking over the harbour, the young man holding a telescope, extending his vision beyond the island’s modest boundaries. Even here, even now, the horizon calls.

And so the painting resolves itself not into a single scene but into a series of conversations and negotiations between formality and ease, between intimacy and display, between possession and transience. Clark Island, once the site of a failed garden and the small thefts of hungry men, has become a stage on which a different kind of appetite is satisfied: for leisure, for status, for connection, for the fleeting illusion that one can, for an afternoon, arrange the world to one’s liking.

From a harbour-view room in Bondi Junction, one might look out and imagine the same island, still there, still waiting. No ferry goes to it. You must choose to arrive, as they did, with your provisions and your intentions. And when you leave, you take something with you – not vegetables, not even stone, but impressions: polished, selective, and just a little illusory.

The island remains. The picnic disperses. The performance, as ever, was the point.

Acknowledgement

Clark Island – traditionally known as Billong-olola or Be-lang-le-wool – is part of the Gadigal people’s country within the Eora Nation.

Today, its history is not just remembered but performed and taught through Aboriginal-owned Tribal Warrior Cultural Cruises, which bring visitors to the island for a living cultural experience. These tours showcase traditional coastal life – fishing, food gathering, dance, and storytelling – while educating visitors about the island’s pre-European history, environment, and enduring cultural meaning. This picturesque outcrop in Sydney Harbour is, in fact, an active site of cultural memory and renewal, where the oldest story of the island continues to be told.

Paul Hemphill, Sydney November 2025

 

For other incidental stories in In That Howling Infinite, see Tall tales, small stories, obituaries and epiphanies. https://howlinginfinite.com/tall-tales-small-stories-obituaries-epiphanies/

Islands, from the first time we saw,
We could wait for this moment, like rocks on the shore.
We can never be closer, somehow,
For the moment that lasts, is this moment now.

Mike Oldfield

Apart from its title, this song is totally unrelated to this story, but I republish it here because I like it a lot. I could’ve chosen Islands in the Stream, or I am Sailing, but these would’ve been even more incongruous. Enjoy.

Dire straits. The bottleneck that behaves like a universe

Oil tankers, container ships and bulk carriers shimmer all over the horizon to the left of the windswept beach here at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. They have been bottled up in the Persian Gulf ever since the US and Israel launched the war on Iran more than a month ago.  To the right, with the Iranian coast only 65km away, the dark-blue sea is completely empty. Only a handful of vessels a day manage to cross the Strait of Hormuz, down from well over a hundred ­before the war. They take a circuitous route through Iranian territorial waters, often paying the Iranian regime a hefty toll.

Tehran’s ability to control this international waterway, through which one-fifth of the worldwide oil supply used to pass, has become Iran’s biggest leverage against the US, its Gulf neighbours and the global economy. Whether the war ends in a success or defeat for Iran depends first and foremost on whether Tehran emerges from this conflict still holding the strait – and, with it, the keys to the worldwide energy markets.

Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 3 Aptil 2026

What follows is a piece for history tragics – and for all who, metaphorically or intellectually, nostalgically or romantically, still yearn to “go down to the sea in ships and do business in deep waters”. For those who hear, beneath the churn of headlines and hot takes, the older music: the creak of hulls, the logic of tides, the long memory of trade and war written across the surface of the world.

Because when the Strait tightens, when Hormuz flickers from map detail to global anxiety, there is a reflex, almost tidal in itself, to reach backwards. To steady the present with the ballast of the past. The antique mariners Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh, the classical strategists Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder, the catechisms of geopolitics and sea power half-remembered, half-invoked. The old grammar returns: command the sea, command the world.

And yet, while the past is summoned, it does not settle easily over the present. It frays at the edges. It argues back.

Some voices insist on restoring the full weight of history – reminding us that the Persian Gulf was not merely sailed but administered: the Royal Navy’s long vigil, the latticework of protectorates, Aden and Suez as imperial hinges. Sea power, in this telling, was never abstract; it was local, granular, enforced in specific places against specific resistances. Empire did not “command” the sea so much as continuously work it.

Others, just as insistent, suggest the sea’s primacy has already ebbed. Pipelines, railways, overland corridors – the new Silk Roads – quietly subvert the tyranny of chokepoints. Hormuz matters, yes, but not as it once did. The map has thickened; the old determinisms loosen.

And threading through it all – more unsettling than either nostalgia or revision – is a harder recognition: that the balance has tilted. That it is now easier to disrupt the sea than to command it. That a few well-placed risks – mines, missiles, drones, or even the rumour of these can achieve what fleets once guaranteed.

Which is precisely why this moment—and this place—invites a longer gaze. For Hormuz is not merely a crisis point. It is a lens. A narrow passage through which history, strategy, and imagination are forced to pass in close quarters, revealing not just what we think we know about the sea – but how much of that knowledge still holds when the waters grow tight.

And so we follow the thread.

A choke point and a global hinge

The essay, republished below, by English historian and author Peter Francopan turns on an old, almost Elizabethan intuition – Walter Raleigh’s dictum that “whoever commands the sea commands the trade… and so the world” – and asks whether it still holds in the age of drones, pipelines, and petro-politics. The Strait of Hormuz, that narrow, anxious funnel through which a fifth of the world’s oil must pass, becomes his stage: not merely a geographic chokepoint, but a historical echo chamber where empires, from the Portuguese to the British to the Americans, have tested the proposition that control of the sea is control of destiny.

The core argument is deceptively simple. However much globalisation has diversified supply chains, the world remains perilously dependent on a handful of maritime arteries. Hormuz is the most critical of them. Iran, by geography alone, sits with its hand on the tap.

What follows is a kind of strategic paradox. The United States possesses overwhelming naval superiority, yet cannot easily guarantee safe passage. Iran, comparatively weak in conventional terms, can still disrupt—through mines, missiles, drones, and plausible threat alone—the flow of global energy. Control, in other words, has become asymmetrical: it is easier to deny the sea than to command it.

Frankopan folds this into a wider historical arc. Sea power has long structured global order – from the Iberian empires to Pax Britannica to the American century—but it has never been absolute. It is contingent, fragile, and dependent on political will as much as on fleets. The current crisis exposes that fragility. The cost of keeping Hormuz open – economically, militarily, psychologically – may exceed what even a superpower is willing to bear indefinitely.

Layered atop this is his reading of Trump’s confrontation with Iran: a clash driven as much by misapprehension and political impulse as by coherent strategy. The implication (never quite stated, but hovering like heat haze) is that great powers still stumble into old traps—overestimating control, underestimating local resolve.

Obstacle Course. Credit: New York Times

Command of the sea, or command of risk?

If Frankopan writes like the historian he is, the comments read like a dockside argument, a fractured chorus of rum, empire, drones, and Trump all sloshing together.

Several bridle at Francopan’s selectivity. Where, they ask, is the Royal Navy in the Gulf? The British protectorates? Aden? The Portuguese seizure of Hormuz in 1515? There is something almost touching here: a yearning to reinsert imperial continuity into a narrative that feels too compressed, too presentist. History, they insist, is longer – and perhaps more reassuring – than Frankopan allows.

Yet beneath the pedantry lies a point: chokepoints are never just geography; they are administered spaces, historically managed through bases, treaties, and coercion. Hormuz did not simply “matter”—it was made to matter, policed into significance.

A sharper critique comes from those who accuse Frankopan of naval determinism, of succumbing to Mackinder in sea going form. Where, they ask, are the pipelines, the highways of the modern Silk Road? If oil can flow overland, if energy can be rerouted, then the tyranny of chokepoints diminishes. The vulnerability of Hormuz is not just a military problem but a failure of diversification. If the Strait can be “closed,” it is because the world has allowed it to remain indispensable. Overland infrastructure does exist, but not at sufficient scale, nor with sufficient redundancy, to replace maritime flow quickly. The sea remains cheaper, denser, stubbornly dominant. Mackinder haunts the room after all.

Then there is the Trump versus Iran morality play. And here, the thread fractures into familiar ideological lines. One camp sees Trump as reckless, blundering into war without strategy; another as a hard realist confronting an implacable regime. But more interesting than the partisan positions is the shared assumption beneath them: that the conflict must be read through the personality of a single leader. Structural forces – energy dependency, regional rivalries, the logic of deterrence – fade into the background. The theatre of personality displaces the machinery of geopolitics.

Meanwhile, a darker undercurrent runs through several comments: casual talk of forcing the Strait, toppling regimes, even nuclear options. The language slips, almost unconsciously, from analysis into annihilation. One is reminded how easily strategic abstraction can become moral amnesia.

What the article and its commentariat together reveal is not a consensus but a tension – between old frameworks and new realities.

Francopan is right, broadly, that chokepoints still matter. Geography has not been abolished. Hormuz remains a lever capable of moving the world.

But his critics are right, too, that the nature of control has shifted. The age of decisive naval supremacy – Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway – has given way to something murkier. Control is now probabilistic. It lies in deterrence, in risk calculation, in the shadow of what might be done rather than what is done.

Iran does not need to “command” the Strait in Raleigh’s sense. It need only make others doubt that it is safe.

And here the deeper irony emerges. The more globalised the world becomes, the more sensitive it is to disruption at key nodes. Interdependence, that liberal promise, doubles as systemic fragility. A few missiles, a handful of drones, a rumour of mines—and the bloodstream of the global economy clots.

The comments circle this insight without quite naming it. They argue about navies versus pipelines, Trump versus Tehran, Britain versus decline- but beneath it all is a shared unease: that no one, not even the United States, can fully guarantee the openness of the system on which everyone depends.

Raleigh revisited

Raleigh’s maxim survives, but in altered form. To command the sea once meant mastery – fleets, flags, unquestioned passage. Now it means something closer to managing uncertainty, policing risk, absorbing disruption. Or, to invert it (and perhaps this is the real lesson of Hormuz): whoever can unsettle the sea can unsettle the world.

The Strait, narrow and ancient, becomes a kind of TARDIS of geopolitics – small on the map, vast in consequence, containing within it centuries of empire, trade, ambition, and miscalculation. You can sail through it in hours. You can be trapped by it for decades. Hormuz is one of those places where scale misbehaves.

On the chart it is almost an afterthought: a narrow blue incision between Iran and Oman, barely 21 nautical miles at its tightest navigable squeeze. A cartographer’s margin note. You could blink and miss it, the way you might skim over a comma in a long sentence. And yet – inside that comma, the world pauses.

Tankers queue like thoughts that cannot quite be completed. Insurance markets twitch. Futures spike. Admirals rediscover their relevance. Presidents improvise resolve. Somewhere in Delhi or Shanghai, a planner recalculates the cost of keeping the lights on. The Strait is not large, but it contains largeness: economics, empire, anxiety, history – all folded into a channel so narrow that a missile battery on one shore can imagine the other.

That is the TARDIS trick: disproportion. Interior vastness concealed within exterior modesty. A space where time thickens. Because Hormuz is not just a place. – it is an accumulation. Portuguese forts, British gunboats, American carrier groups, Iranian fast boats – all still present in the mind, layered like ghost traffic moving in opposite directions through the same confined lane.
And like the TARDIS, it distorts power. The strong discover their strength is conditional; the weak discover they possess a lever. To command the sea here is less about domination than about enduring the possibility of interruption.

It is gigantically small, metaphorically huge, a bottleneck that behaves like a universe.

In a wide ocean, power projects as a roar – carrier groups, satellite grids, the choreography of dominance. In a narrow strait, the same power ricochets. It echoes, distorts, sometimes even dampens. The voice is still large; the space refuses to carry it cleanly.

Hormuz does this to everyone. It compresses asymmetry into something almost theatrical. A superpower arrives with an orchestra; a regional actor needs only a well-timed cymbal crash – mines, missiles, the rumour of both – and suddenly the symphony falters. Not silenced, but unsettled. Hesitant. Listening to itself.

It tells us less about the decline of hegemony than about the environments in which hegemony operates. Power at sea is expansive; power in a choke point is negotiated, contingent, on the edge

The old imperial instinct – force the passage- still murmurs in the background (you can hear it in the comments: convoy the ships, clear the mines, damn the cost). But the modern world hesitates, because the cost is no longer just ships sunk – it is markets convulsed, alliances strained, escalation spiralling in ways that do not end neatly at the waterline.

Which leaves us with a paradox worthy of the place: the hegemon can still roar – but here, in this narrow theatre, it must decide whether the echo is worth the noise.

In That Howling Infinite, March 2026

Hormuz: Iran’s dire Strait

Command the seas and you command the world

Peter Francopan, Unherd, March 12 2026

Historians these days doubt that Sir Walter Raleigh ever laid down his cloak to stop Queen Elizabeth I from stepping in a puddle. They do agree, though, that he understood the nature and benefit of maritime power. “Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade,” he wrote in A Discourse of the Invention of Ships in the early 17th century. “Whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself”.Raleigh lived in a different era, of course — one that most of us imagine as a time of swashbuckling sailors and risk-taking pirates, when control of the High Seas was a competition between the European states building empires in both the New and Old Worlds.

This was also an age when geography mattered every bit as much as resources. Many of the first European footholds overseas were chosen less for what lay in the ground than for where they sat along the great sea routes that were beginning to bind the world together. The Portuguese seizure of Malacca in 1511 was not about spices growing nearby but about controlling the narrow maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea through which much of Asia’s trade passed.

The same strategic logic shaped the expansion of the British empire. Outposts were established above all because of their position along the world’s shipping arteries. The British occupation of Gibraltar in 1704 secured control over the entrance to the Mediterranean and the vital route between the Atlantic and Europe’s inland sea. In the Caribbean, islands such as Jamaica — seized from the Spanish in 1655 — were major naval and commercial hubs sitting astride the shipping lanes linking the Americas and Europe. Likewise, further south, control of Cape of Good Hope allowed Britain to dominate the maritime passage between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.The empire that Raleigh’s generation started building was not only created through conquest and extraction: it was built through the control of the sea lanes and strategic points that allowed commerce, information and manpower to move across the oceans. The same ports that handled cargo could shelter naval squadrons, repair ships and project force across vast distances. Britain’s empire was fuelled by sugar, silver, slaves and more; but it was built on being able to move these at will across the oceans, and on the islands, harbours and strongpoints that underpinned maritime, economic and imperial power.

These days, we have become used to future-gazers insisting that the future belongs to those who control data and algorithms, or satellites and space rockets, or rare earths and critical minerals. Ships, shipping, and transport networks do not sound quite so exciting, so fresh or so unknown. To a historian, though, in a world that is hyper-connected, logistics are king.

In its heyday, Britain’s reach rested heavily getting the basics right. At Gibraltar, ships entering or leaving the Mediterranean could refuel and undergo repairs, while Malta secured British control of Mediterranean shipping routes. Further east, Aden functioned as a crucial coaling station at the mouth of the Red Sea once steam navigation transformed long-distance travel; or there was Singapore, which, from the early 19th century, grew into a key naval base guarding the approaches between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Each of these places mattered less for what they produced than for the services they provided: coal, water, repairs, provisions, intelligence and protection. Ships could not roam the oceans indefinitely; they required an interconnected chain of harbours capable of maintaining hulls, repairing sails or (later) overhauling, to provision with fresh food and water. Maritime power was not just about ships, captains and crews — but about a dense mesh of locations that were spread out around the world and reinforced each other.

Over time, however, it became easy to forget just how central these routes and nodes were. In the decades after the end of the Cold War, the world entered a period of globalisation underpinned by overwhelming American economic, political and military power — and by the mantra of free trade being the engine of prosperity and the bedrock of the international world order. Attention shifted elsewhere, and strategists and commentators forgot about shipping lanes. Yet as geopolitical competition intensifies and the world moves into a more multipolar era, the importance of the arteries of global commerce has once again become startlingly clear.Maritime transport moves over 80% of goods traded worldwide. Around 11 billion tons of goods are transported by sea each year — roughly one and a half tons per person. Ships carry around two thirds of global oil production, as well as around a fifth of natural gas, moving energy to places where they are most needed. Without global shipping networks, computers can’t be switched on, assembly lines can’t work, and houses can’t be heated.While the crisis in Iran and the Gulf have focused attention on oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and petroleum products, global shipping is fundamental in almost every aspect of daily life. Seaborne trade moves almost two billion tonnes of iron ore per year, with major exporters in countries like Australia, Brazil and South Africa being matched with demand in China, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere. Hundreds of millions of tonnes of bauxite and alumina are sent by sea from mines and processing plants in Guinea, Indonesia and Australia, as are tens of millions of tonnes of copper ores from Chile, Peru and south East Asia.

Global shipping is not just the backbone of international trade; it is crucial in keeping the world fed. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, a UN body, international trade plays a crucial role in supporting global food security by linking food surplus with deficit areas and enabling access to basic food products. 80% of agricultural commodities are transported by sea, with shipping again playing a crucial role in matching “breadbasket regions” with those that suffer from food production deficits.As Sir Walter Raleigh would have recognised, globalisation makes control of the seas more, not less important; as peoples, regions, goods and resources get moved from one part of the planet to another, dependencies rise — and so, therefore, do vulnerabilities. Things that we take for granted are always ones that we should pay special attention to, not least since it never seems to cross people’s mind that small shocks can have major implications.

In the summer of 2011, Thailand experienced catastrophic flooding as a result of unusually high levels of rainfall, which had an enormous impact on global car production. At the time, Thailand was one of the world’s leading producers of hard-disk drives and wiring harnesses for cars, as well as electronics modules. As factories closed because of flooding, the effects spilled over into the global economy. Hard drive prices doubled in a matter of weeks; shortages of parts crippled automotive production not only in Thailand, but across Asia, North America and even Europe. The associated costs ran to tens of billions of dollars.

If that gives one example of the risks that come from the assumption that supply chains are dependable, then another comes from Covid-19. Lockdowns and collapsing industrial demand caused an immediate decline in maritime activity. Global maritime trade volumes fell sharply, with estimates suggesting a reduction of as much as 10% in the first eight months of 2020, representing cargo worth at least $225 billion in trade value — if not considerably more, precipitating an unprecedented logistics crunch.

In the past few days we have seen another classic case of the risks posed by pressure on supply chains. Energy markets have been spooked by the implications of attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf following US and Israeli strikes on Iran, with oil prices almost doubling in a matter of days. But it is shipping prices that have truly gone through the roof. Spot charter rates for LNG carriers are six times larger than they were before 28 February — a rise some industry experts refer to as “unthinkable”. Some charterers are paying as much as 10 times the rate they paid before the attacks on Iran began to secure prompt tonnage because of the scale of the shock.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s key chokepoints, a narrow stretch that connects the Gulf with the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, a crossroads where geology and geography dovetail to create perfect opportunities for disruption.

Bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south, the Strait is one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways. At its narrowest navigable point, the shipping lanes are only a few kilometres wide in each direction, meaning that at a time of conflict — such as today — the ability to restrict shipping is considerable. Considerable volumes of goods pass through the Strait — something that is clear from the fact that Jebel Ali in Dubai is the ninth-busiest port in the world. But Hormuz is more crucial to global energy markets, with around 15 million barrels of oil passing through each day, equivalent to about one-fifth of global petroleum consumption. Other chokepoints are significant; but Hormuz is the most important oil chokepoint in the world.At the moment, almost no shipping is transiting the Strait, with an estimated 1000 vessels waiting for the conflict with Iran to pass. A small handful of ships have sailed through, with several others reported to be trying their luck by either claiming to be Chinese or by turning off transponders that reveal both their location and their true identities. More than a dozen ships have been damaged so far, with Iran saying that British ships are “legitimate targets”.Political leaders have tried to project confidence. Donald Trump said that merchant crews and shipowners simply needed to show “some guts” if they wanted trade to keep moving through the Strait. Yet the reality suggests that courage alone is rarely enough to keep maritime commerce flowing during wartime. Guts are one thing; a US Navy ship being damaged by Iranian mines, missiles or attacks from land is another. For now, then, such are the risks to crews, cargo and hulls that shipping in the Gulf is at a standstill.Just how high the strategic stakes have become is clear from the military deployments now underway. That message has not been lost on Greece, Italy or France — all of which have dispatched warships towards the Gulf to secure maritime traffic and monitor the Strait, although it remains unclear whether or how they will solve the problem of getting traffic moving again. In Britain, there has been fierce criticism of the Royal Navy’s absence from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, but the absence is not imminently solvable. It is the result of the British government’s catastrophic lack of foresight, decades of not investing in the sort of naval forces one needs in this century.Trump has insisted that the shutdown in the Gulf is temporary and that oil, gas and more besides will soon start to flow again. It is typical fighting talk from a president who chose to start a confrontation with Iran because he was not able to understand why the regime in Tehran had refused to “capitulate” to American demands regarding nuclear enrichment, ballistic missile programmes and more.Trump came to office promising never to drag the US into “forever wars”, sneering at the “so-called nation-builders, neocons or liberal nonprofits” from who had inflicted disaster on the Middle East. Now, while Trump and his team work out how to stop Iran from inflicting damage on its neighbours, others must pay the price. India imports the overwhelming majority of its oil and gas by sea, partly because it has access to a limited network of pipelines. So the collapse of shipments from the Gulf is producing an existential crisis: although the US has granted a “temporary waiver” to allow Delhi to buy Russian oil, the facts that the rupee has weakened sharply, and that authorities are reportedly speeding up customs procedures to allow faster unloading, are signs that compression of logistics at sea is already having ripple effects. Moscow emerges as an unexpected beneficiary of the crisis, as the spike in oil and gas prices will provide much-needed relief to a beleaguered economy. Russia’s geopolitical role could be additionally bolstered by the country’s purported long-standing “security concept for the Persian Gulf” as an off-ramp for the US intervention in Iran.The consequences of the current crisis, however, extend well beyond the coming days or even the coming weeks. What we are witnessing is not simply a temporary disruption in the Gulf, but a reminder of a deeper truth about how power works in the modern world. Maritime routes remain the arteries through which prosperity, security and resilience flow. Data, algorithms, satellites and artificial intelligence may dominate the language of the 21st-century economy, but they still depend on the movement of physical goods across oceans. Microchips require minerals, energy and specialised manufacturing equipment that must be transported. Data centres require copper, aluminium, rare earths and vast amounts of energy infrastructure. Without ships and secure sea lanes, even the most advanced digital economy quickly runs into very practical limits. Power is and always has been about logistics.For Britain in particular, this requires a series of profound shifts. The protection of shipping routes is already a central strategic task. The Gulf is one theatre where the risks are currently obvious, but it is far from the only one. The North Atlantic and the High North are rapidly emerging as arenas of growing geopolitical competition as melting Arctic ice opens new routes and as submarine cables, energy infrastructure and shipping lanes become ever more exposed to interference and disruption.These are not challenges that can be addressed through strategy documents or policy papers; they require investment in ships, in platforms, in training and in the infrastructure that allows maritime forces to operate effectively across long distances. They also require the rebuilding of the kind of interconnected networks of ports, facilities and partnerships that once underpinned Britain’s global reach. In an increasingly multipolar world — one in which predation, risk-taking and opportunism are often rewarded — maritime resilience will become a defining measure of national strength.In that sense, the current crisis offers a glimpse of the future. Control and protection of shipping routes is key to stability, to reduction of risk and to long-term national resilience. The resources on which new economies depend may have changed, technologies may have evolved and ships may look different. But the underlying reality remains exactly the same as when Raleigh wrote four hundred years ago: whoever commands the sea commands far more than the sea itself.

Peter Frankopan is the author of The Silk Roads (2015), The New Silk Roads (2018), and The Earth Transformed (2023). He is also a Professor of Global History at Worcester College, Oxford

A curated selection of comments from Unherd readers

This includes everything that carries an argument, stripped of noise but not over-pruned. There was a lot buried in that thread once one scraped away the rhetorical noise. Francopan’s essay and the comments rehearse empire, contest strategy, litigate politics, invoke technology, argue personality. They reach for certainty and find, instead, contingency.
Here they are:

Historical framing matters. Analyses of maritime power that ignore Britain’s long role in the Persian Gulf, its protectorates, and control of trade routes through Aden and Suez are incomplete. Control of sea lanes has always been exercised locally, even when its effects are global.

There is a fundamental tension between classical naval theory and modern infrastructure realities. Traditional doctrines of sea power emphasise chokepoints, yet pipelines, rail corridors, and overland routes increasingly challenge that dominance. Disruption of maritime trade today may reflect failures of diplomacy and diversification as much as limits of military power.
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is clear, but control is asymmetric. It is easier to threaten shipping than to secure it. A weaker power can impose risk without achieving dominance, using missiles, drones, and dispersed systems that are difficult to eliminate.

Modern warfare reinforces this asymmetry. Low-cost technologies can disrupt high-value assets, raising questions about the long-term viability of traditional force projection. At the same time, countermeasures are evolving, suggesting an ongoing cycle of adaptation.The scale of resources required to secure global shipping is immense. Sustained convoy operations would demand naval capacity that is not readily available. Even if assembled, such efforts would be costly and unlikely to restore previous economic conditions quickly.Alternative strategies exist but are slow to implement. Expanding pipelines, rerouting supply chains, and hardening vessels can reduce vulnerability, but require long-term investment and coordination.

Many states failed to prepare despite the predictability of such a crisis.There is deep disagreement over the nature of the current conflict. Some view it as a necessary confrontation with a regime that threatens regional and global stability. Others see a lack of clear objectives, inconsistent strategy, and the risk of open-ended escalation.The question of escalation remains unresolved. One side retains capacity to intensify, while the other relies on disruption. Proposals for decisive action raise further uncertainties about feasibility, consequences, and post-conflict stability.

Regime survival is interpreted differently. Some argue that mere survival constitutes success under pressure; others contend that survival after severe degradation would represent strategic defeat.Geopolitical decision-making often operates without clear or fixed end states. Objectives may shift in response to opportunity, reflecting the contingent nature of strategy rather than coherent long-term planning.

Historical analogies are widely used but often misleading. Claims of past maritime dominance are contested, with evidence that control has always been partial and constrained by other factors such as air power and competing theatres of war.

Debate over Western power reveals competing narratives. Some emphasise decline, overstretch, and lack of strategic coherence. Others point to enduring capabilities and the need for renewed investment, particularly in naval forces.

The scale of global security challenges exceeds the capacity of individual states. Effective responses likely require collective action, yet coordination remains difficult and politically constrained.

New vulnerabilities complicate traditional strategy. Subsea infrastructure, including data cables, represents a vast and exposed network that is difficult to defend, illustrating the expanding scope of strategic risk.

Legal frameworks exist but are contested in practice. International law mandates freedom of navigation, yet interpretations of neutrality and belligerency vary, particularly in complex conflicts.

Economic interdependence amplifies the consequences of disruption. Even limited interference with key trade routes can trigger wider global effects, including energy shocks and recessionary pressures.

At root, the issue is no longer simply control of the sea. The emerging reality is a system where disruption, deterrence, and alternative routing shape outcomes as much as traditional dominance.

Diligent chatbot unearths fool’s gold

Contrariwise, if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it ain’t. That’s logic.
Tweedledee, Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass

I’ve been using ChatGPT a great deal – too much, probably. It has become a kind of companionable instrument: it will précis articles I have read that are worth examining in greater detail, and discus them with me. It will provide the gist of pieces I cannot access and suggest arguments half-glimpsed, tease out and expand upon themes, analyze texts and poems, even, venture the occasional ode or haiku when a bardic mood takes me. And it will answer miscellaneous queries in greater detail than Google’s AI mode – in our household, we refer to it as “my brain”. Most uncannily, it seems at times like it can mimic what we, it and myself – half-jokingly – call “my voice,” eerily capturing my style, sensibility and political bent, mirroring the cadences, the layered asides, the slightly baroque turns of phrase. It feels, at moments, like recognition.

I put this directly to the chatbot and it assured me that this was but an illusion, a subtle trick of the machine. But we’ll come back to that in a later sequel. I then remarked how I’d encountered its  “hallucinations”, its false readings, its habit of making things up rather than admit that it didn’t have an answer, how it has sometimes even asked me for my opinion, and how often too, I have corrected it and it has acknowledged and corrected its error. It came back with a disingenuously plausible answer, and a clever closer: “The sin is not malice, but overconfidence in its own fluency … the machine is, in a sense, rhetorically inclined: it would rather complete the sentence than leave it hanging”. Again, more on this later – it did acknowledge that while it could be a very good interlocutor, it could also sometimes be an unreliable witness, and that the burden of proof, as ever, falls back on the reader – to probe, to question, and to cross-check. Caveat usor, so to speak.

Yet, while I am fully aware of the well-documented shortcomings of AI learning machines, and have discussed these in several pieces in In That Howling Infinite [see The promise and the peril of ChatGPT],mand I was unprepared, surprised and even shocked when, against all available well-documented evidence, my chatbot swore black and blue (metaphorically speaking – let’s not get too anthropomorphic here) that what I was telling it was categorically untrue. Moreover, as is customary with similar requests in the past, it mounted an energetic case for why this was so.

It started with the kind I’d question I have posed to my chatbot many, many times in the last six months: “Is this true or false?

This particular potential untruth originated in a Face-book meme (what is it about memes and untruths?) shared by a friend of mine – an actual, real-life friend. an anarchistic contrarian who often pops down conspiracy rabbit holes.

“Has Japan banned Israeli tourists?” I asked the ‘bot.

The answer, as I expected, was:

“No. Japan has not banned Israeli tourists.  Israeli citizens can still travel to Japan under the usual visa arrangements (Japan and Israel have a visa exemption for short stays). There’s been no official policy change or entry ban targeting Israelis. You might be seeing confusion arising from: Heightened global tensions since the Gaza war, which have led to protests or isolated incidents in various countries; travel advisories (from Israel or others), which sometimes caution citizens about safety abroad—but these are not bans by host countries; and misinformation or viral posts that exaggerate or misinterpret isolated events (e.g., a hotel incident, protest, or local refusal of service).

If you’ve seen a specific claim or headline, send it through – I can fact-check that exact case”.

So, I did.  From an FB page called eighty80three news:

“Japan has reportedly taken a dramatic step amid the growing regional conflict, with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government announcing a ban on Israeli tourists entering the country. The move is being framed by Tokyo as part of an effort to distance Japan from the escalating war and to prevent rising domestic tensions linked to the conflict. The decision came after a series of incidents inside Japan where several hotels were reported to have refused accommodation to Israeli visitors, with some owners citing opposition to the ongoing military strikes connected to the war. According to officials from the Prime Minister’s Office, the restriction is intended to calm internal social divisions while reinforcing Japan’s neutral stance during the crisis. Although Japan remains a key ally of the United States, the Takaichi administration has recently voiced stronger criticism of what it described as the “indiscriminate” nature of the U.S.–Israeli military campaign in Iran. Analysts say the move signals Tokyo’s attempt to reassert its diplomatic independence amid growing regional tensions”.

The chatbot replied:

“That claim is almost certainly false, and it contains a couple of telltale errors that give the game away. First, the most basic point: Japan has not announced any ban on Israeli tourists. There’s no credible reporting—from Japanese government sources, major international media, or even regional outlets—supporting such a move. A ban of that kind would be diplomatically explosive and widely covered …”

It then kicked off a conversation that illustrated, torturously, the peril of over-reliance on AI machines. Here it is in full, a warning against over reliance on chatbots. My replies and interjections are in bold type.

The case of the imaginary prime minister

Second, the post misidentifies Japanese leadership. Sanae Takaichi is not the Prime Minister of Japan. She’s a prominent conservative politician, often discussed as a potential future leader, but she does not head the government. When a story gets something that fundamental wrong, it’s usually not a matter of nuance—it’s fabrication.

Third, the logic doesn’t quite hold together. Japan’s foreign policy style is typically cautious, procedural, and alliance conscious. Even when it disagrees with aspects of U.S. policy, it does so through measured diplomatic language, not abrupt, highly targeted entry bans against citizens of a specific country. If anything, Japan tends to avoid actions that would look like politicised discrimination at the border.

As for the hotel angle: it’s plausible that isolated incidents—individual businesses refusing guests for political or reputational reasons—could occur anywhere in a heated global climate. But that’s a long way from a state-imposed entry ban, and governments in Japan would generally move to prevent discriminatory practices rather than codify them.

What you’re seeing here is a familiar pattern of online content:
• a real conflict in the background
• a kernel of plausibility (tensions, protests, maybe isolated incidents)
• then a leap into a sweeping, invented policy decision

In other words, it reads less like reporting and more like narrative construction—designed to travel fast and confirm a mood rather than describe a fact.

If you want, I can track down whether any actual incident in Japan (hotels, protests, etc.) might have been distorted into this story.

“But” I replied, “Sanae Takaichi has been prime minister of Japan since October 211925: and has re-elected on February in a landslide victory with an increased – and unprecedented – parliamentary majority”.

“That’s not correct”, replied the ‘bot …

As of now, Sanae Takaichi is not – and has not been – the Prime Minister of Japan. She remains a senior figure within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), often associated with its more conservative wing, and has run in leadership contests, but she has never held the premiership.

Japan has also not had an election result installing or rejecting her as PM on October 26 in the way described. A claim like “rejected with an increased record majority” doesn’t align with how Japan’s parliamentary system works either—prime ministers are chosen by the Diet (parliament), not directly “rejected” in a national vote framed that way.

So you’ve effectively got two red flags reinforcing each other:
• a fabricated or misrepresented political reality (Takaichi as PM)
• used to support a sensational policy claim (banning Israeli tourists)

That combination is typical of low-credibility pages: build a parallel version of reality, then hang dramatic “news” off it.

If you want the current, real political setup in Japan or how leadership selection actually works (it’s a bit arcane, but interesting), I can sketch it out.

I posted a screed shot of a BBC article from last October announcing the new PM

 

This is a good example of how convincing-looking misinformation has become—because at a glance, it borrows the authority of the BBC’s visual style. But if you slow it down (and, as ever, the devil is in the typography and the timeline), it starts to come apart.

A few things stand out immediately:

1. This article doesn’t exist on BBC News
There is no record of the BBC reporting Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s prime minister—because it hasn’t happened. A story of Japan’s first female PM would be globally significant and widely corroborated across every major outlet. It isn’t.

2. The timeline is internally suspicious
It claims:
• Article date: 22 October 2025
• Election: 21 October

That’s implausibly fast for a fully written BBC profile piece, complete with framing, quotes, and analysis, to appear the next day with that level of polish. Not impossible—but unlikely, and a common hallmark of fabricated screenshots.

3. The writing style is “BBC-adjacent,” not BBC.  Phrases like:

• “drum-playing, Thatcher-loving”
• “colourful figure”

…feel slightly off register. The BBC tends to be more restrained in headlines about sitting leaders, especially on first appointment.

4. The deeper tell: it’s solving a narrative need
Notice how neatly this “article”:
• establishes Takaichi as PM
• frames her as right-wing
• gives just enough biography to feel real

That scaffolding then gets reused in the Facebook claim you shared earlier (about banning Israeli tourists). It’s not reporting—it’s world-building for a later claim.

5. The broader reality
• Japan has never had a female prime minister as of now.
• Sanae Takaichi has run for LDP leadership but not won.
• No credible outlet reports her leading the government.

What you’re looking at is essentially a synthetic artefact—a screenshot designed to pass the “scroll test,” not the “thinking test.” It’s the modern equivalent of a forged newspaper clipping, except frictionless and global.

And there’s a pattern here that echoes your earlier line about “the failure of shock”: once the surface looks right—the BBC logo, the photo, the cadence—we stop interrogating the substance. The eye nods, the thumb moves on, and the fiction quietly installs itself as memory.

If you want, I can show you how to quickly verify BBC articles (there are a couple of very fast checks that cut through this kind of thing in seconds)

Either you are hallucinating or I am  I posted a screenshot from Bloomberg …

Neither of us needs to be hallucinating here—but one of the inputs you’re being fed almost certainly is.

Let’s take this second image on its own terms.

At a glance it looks like a Bloomberg reel, which is a step up from a random Facebook page in terms of perceived credibility. But again, slow it down:

1. The claim itself is extraordinary
“PM Sanae Takaichi” + Trump + Iran tensions + Pearl Harbor remark.
If that were real, it would be:
• front-page global news
• covered simultaneously by BBC, Reuters, FT, NYT, Nikkei, etc.

It wouldn’t exist as a lone social clip without a massive, searchable paper trail.

2. The structural problem remains unchanged
Everything here depends on the same premise:
→ that Takaichi is Prime Minister

That is the keystone. If that falls, the whole arch collapses.

And as of the last verifiable, widely reported reality:
• She has not been PM
• Japan has not yet had a female prime minister

For both the BBC screenshot and this Bloomberg-style reel to be true, there would have had to be:
• an LDP leadership win
• a Diet vote installing her as PM
• global coverage of Japan’s first female leader

That is not the kind of event that slips quietly past the world’s press.

3. This is how higher-grade misinformation works
What you’re seeing now is more sophisticated than a dodgy blog:
• real brands (BBC, Bloomberg)
• real people (Takaichi, Trump)
• real geopolitical tensions (Iran, US alliance)

But assembled into a synthetic narrative stream.

Not one fake post—a cluster of mutually reinforcing ones.

Each piece says: “you’ve already heard this elsewhere, haven’t you?”

4. The photo itself
The image of Trump behind Takaichi may well be real (or at least plausible from past events), but:
• context can be repurposed
• captions are cheap to fabricate
• reels are trivially edited and rebranded

So the fork in the road is simple:
• If Takaichi really were PM → there would be overwhelming, verifiable coverage everywhere
• If that coverage doesn’t exist → these posts are constructing a parallel version of events

And right now, it’s the second.

What’s interesting (and a bit unsettling) is how this mirrors your earlier theme:
not just misinformation, but frictionless plausibility. It doesn’t need you to believe it outright—just to not quite disbelieve it as you scroll past.

If you want, I can do a live-style verification walkthrough—how to kill or confirm something like this in under 30 seconds using just a search check and a couple of source anchors.

I posted a screenshot from Kyodo News regarding Takaichi’s meeting with Trump in the Oval Office …

Alright—this is the point where it’s worth being very precise, because what you’ve brought now is much more convincing than the earlier examples.

Short answer:
This Kyodo screenshot is almost certainly fabricated or altered as well. And here’s why.

1. The “stacking effect” problem

You now have:
• a fake-looking BBC article
• a Bloomberg-style reel
• a Kyodo News page

All asserting the same alternate reality.

Individually, each might pass the scroll test. Together, they create illusory consensus—which is exactly how more sophisticated misinformation works.

2. The Kyodo page itself—what’s off

Kyodo is a real, reputable Japanese wire service. But:
• The headline is unusually blunt and unqualified for Kyodo (“huge election win” is not typical wire phrasing).
• The site layout feels slightly off—especially the sidebar mix (Hormuz, Trump, Taiwan, election) which looks curated for narrative cohesion, not organic news flow.
• The date cluster (Feb 2026) plus multiple related headlines suggests a fully developed political reality (PM Takaichi, U.S. visit, Iran tensions, etc.) that—again—would exist across all major outlets, not just in isolated screenshots.

Most importantly:

3. The external verification test (the kill shot)

If this were real, you would be able to confirm it instantly via:
• BBC
• Reuters
• Financial Times
• Nikkei Asia
• The Guardian
• AP News

A first female Prime Minister of Japan is not niche news. It’s epochal.

There is no such corroboration.

4. Internal inconsistency with known political reality

Even allowing for future change, this scenario requires:
• Takaichi wins LDP leadership
• Becomes PM in October
• Wins a general election
• Is re-elected by the Diet
• Conducts US diplomacy amid Iran tensions

That’s a dense chain of events—and yet your evidence appears only as:
• social media posts
• screenshots
• brand-mimicking layouts

Not a single verifiable, primary-source link.

5. What this actually is

What you’re encountering isn’t one fake post. It’s closer to a constructed information environment:
• real outlets mimicked (BBC, Bloomberg, Kyodo)
• real geopolitical themes (Iran, US alliance, elections)
• one anchoring fiction (Takaichi as PM)

Once that anchor is accepted, everything else “makes sense.”

6. So—are you wrong?

No. You’re doing exactly what a careful reader should do:
testing the claim against multiple sources.

But the trap here is that the “multiple sources” are not independent—they’re variations of the same fabrication.

A simple way to settle it decisively

Open a browser and search:

“Japan prime minister 2026”

If Takaichi were PM, you’d see:
• her name everywhere
• official government pages
• major international coverage

If you don’t—you have your answer in under 10 seconds.

There’s a slightly unsettling elegance to this, isn’t there? Not crude propaganda, but something more ambient—like fog rather than smoke. It doesn’t try to convince you outright; it just fills the space where certainty used to be.

Okay, you win. She is not the prime minister of Japan. Who is then? …

Fair question—and worth resetting on firm ground.

As of now, Japan’s Prime Minister is Shigeru Ishiba.

He took office in October 2024 after winning the leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which, as usual, translated into the premiership via a Diet vote. Ishiba is a long-time LDP figure, known particularly for his focus on defence policy, regional security, and a somewhat independent streak within party politics.

So the real picture looks like this:
• PM: Shigeru Ishiba
• Party: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
• System: Parliamentary (PM chosen by the Diet, not directly elected)

And just to close the loop:
Japan still has not had a female prime minister—which is precisely why those fabricated posts leaned on that idea. It feels like something that could have just happened, which makes it an ideal anchor for believable fiction.

If you want, I can sketch where Takaichi actually sits within the LDP landscape—and why she keeps appearing as a “near-miss” candidate for the top job.

By the way, the Pearl Harbour remark WAS front page news. CNN. BBC. Our own ABC and SBS. Many news platforms actually ran Fawlty Towers clips to flavour it. It was the joke of the week and a break from the Iran war. It was in response to a Japanese reporter asking in the Oval Office why Trump didn’t tell America’s allies about the attack on Iran on 28th February. Go Google it … 

Ah—now this is different. And this is where we separate two threads that got tangled together.

You’re right about the Pearl Harbor remark. That does ring true as a media moment:
• Trump making an off-colour or historically loaded quip
• a Japanese reporter asking about allied consultation
• the line cutting through the news cycle
• broadcasters (especially British ones) reaching for Fawlty Towers clips like a reflexive cultural tic

That kind of thing absolutely would (and evidently did) travel—because it has all the elements: history, awkwardness, theatre, and just enough improvised diplomacy to feel combustible.

So on that: I’ll concede the point. That episode can be real.

But—and this is the hinge—the existence of that real incident doesn’t validate the rest of the constructed world around it.

What seems to have happened is something subtler:
• Real event: Trump’s Pearl Harbor remark, widely reported
• Real context: Iran tensions, alliance questions
• Real people: Takaichi, Japanese journalists, US officials

Then layered on top:
• Fictional upgrade: Takaichi as Prime Minister
• Fabricated continuity: Kyodo/BBC/Bloomberg “coverage” aligning to that premise

It’s a kind of narrative parasitism—the fake attaches itself to something true, borrows its momentum, and then extends it just far enough that you don’t feel the seam.

And that explains the dissonance you felt (quite reasonably):

“I know this part is real—so why is he telling me the rest isn’t?”

Because the truth is doing half the work for the lie.

There’s an almost theatrical quality to it—like a well-staged scene where one prop is genuine, the lighting is perfect, the dialogue mostly plausible… and only later do you realise the set has no back wall.

Or, to borrow your earlier instinct about the howling internet:
we’re no longer dealing in pure fabrication, but in composite realities—part reportage, part invention, stitched so cleanly that the moral (and factual) shock never quite lands.

If you want, we can pin down that Pearl Harbor exchange more precisely—what was actually said, and how it was framed—just to separate the clean line of fact from everything that’s been built around it.

This is what Google’s AI mode said:

AI Overview:  Based on events as of March 2026, Sanae Takaichi is the Prime Minister of Japan and met with President Trump in the White House. During this meeting, Trump made a controversial remark regarding the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, causing notable discomfort to Takaichi, as seen in this YouTube video.  Here are the key points regarding your query:

• Takaichi is Prime Minister: As of March 2026, Sanae Takaichi is the Prime Minister of Japan. If a previous interaction told you she was not, that information was outdated, as she took office on October 21, 2025.
• The Comment was Real: During a White House meeting with Takaichi in March 2026, President Trump spoke about surprise attacks while discussing Iran, and directly asked Takaichi, “Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?”, causing a tense silence.
• Reaction: Takaichi’s reaction was described as shocked, with her eyes widening and her smile disappearing, demonstrating the unease caused by the comment.
•Therefore, the AI you previously used was incorrect regarding Takaichi’s role, while correct about the incident itself, according to current data.

What do you think of this then?

My chatbot replied:

This is a textbook case of AI confidently assembling a reality that doesn’t exist—and doing it with just enough true-sounding detail to feel authoritative.

Let’s take it apart carefully.

1. The core claim: Takaichi as Prime Minister

This remains the point.

If Sanae Takaichi had become:
• Japan’s first female Prime Minister (Oct 2025)
• and was meeting a U.S. president in March 2026

then this would be:
• everywhere on BBC, Reuters, Nikkei, FT, AP, ABC, SBS
• on official Japanese government pages (Kantei)
• embedded in every serious discussion of Indo-Pacific politics

That level of event cannot exist only inside:
• screenshots
• reels
• and an AI summary

It requires a global evidentiary footprint.

2. The “AI Overview” problem

What you’ve pasted has all the hallmarks of generative aggregation:
• It blends sources (“PBS +3”) without verifiable links
• It presents assertions as settled fact
• It includes cinematic detail (“eyes widening, smile disappearing”)—which reads more like a narrative than a wire report

This is how these systems fail:

they don’t distinguish between reported reality and plausible narrative built from fragments

3. The parasitic truth (again)

There may well have been:
• a Trump remark about Pearl Harbor
• coverage across major outlets
• even awkward optics involving a Japanese interlocutor

But the AI has recast the Japanese participant as Prime Minister Takaichi, because:
• she is a known figure
• she fits the “conservative counterpart” frame
• and she has been discussed as a potential leader

So the model completes the story in the most “coherent” way—even if it’s wrong.

4. The PBS reference

If PBS had reported:

“Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi…”

that would be trivially verifiable on:
• pbs.org
• YouTube (PBS NewsHour)
• transcripts

The absence of a clean, direct, linkable source is the tell.

5. Where this leaves us

You’re holding three layers at once:
• Likely real: Trump’s Pearl Harbor remark, widely reported
• Likely distorted: who he said it to, and the setting
• False: Takaichi as Prime Minister, and the constructed diplomatic narrative around it

6. The uncomfortable conclusion

What’s happening here isn’t just “fake news.” It’s something more slippery:

AI is now a co-author of misinformation—not by intent, but by over-coherence.

It takes:
• a real event
• a plausible cast
• a gap in certainty

…and fills the gap with something that reads like truth.

And so you end up in that strange position you found yourself in—
not gullible, not careless, but reasonably convinced by a world that has been very carefully, and very quietly, assembled around you.

If you want, we can nail down the actual Pearl Harbor exchange—who was in the room, what was said, and how it was reported—just to restore a clean factual spine to the story.

OK. Have a go …

Here’s the clean spine—fact separated from the fog.

What actually happened (as best as can be verified)

There was a widely reported moment in which Donald Trump referenced Pearl Harbor while speaking about Iran and surprise attacks. It landed badly—awkward, historically tone-deaf, the sort of line that ricochets around newsrooms because it writes its own headline.

Coverage across outlets (including the BBC, CNN, and others) focused on:
• the analogy to surprise attacks in the context of Iran
• the diplomatic awkwardness, especially given the audience
• the broader question of whether allies had been properly informed

And yes—the media ecosystem did what it does:
• clipped it
• looped it
• and, in Britain especially, reached for Fawlty Towers like a reflex (history as farce, served with a laugh track)

What is not supported by verifiable reporting

This is where the scaffolding falls away:
• There is no credible, primary-source confirmation that Trump said:
“Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?”
• There is no verified account that this was said directly to a Japanese prime minister in a bilateral Oval Office exchange.
• There is no reliable reporting that Sanae Takaichi was present in that capacity, because she is not Prime Minister.
• The vivid detail—“eyes widening, smile disappearing”—belongs to the genre of narrativised reconstruction, not straight reporting.

What likely happened instead

Reconstructing from how these moments usually unfold:
• Trump made a Pearl Harbor reference in a broader answer about Iran and surprise attacks
• A Japanese journalist or Japan-related context may have been involved
• The line was picked up, clipped, and amplified
• In the retelling, it became:
• more direct
• more personal
• more theatrically awkward

And then—crucially—
• it was retrofitted into a different political reality (Takaichi as PM) by:
• social media posts
• fabricated screenshots
• and, eventually, AI summaries stitching it all together

The shape of the distortion

It’s almost elegant in its construction:

a real remark → sharpened into a quote → placed in a more dramatic setting → assigned to a more symbolically potent figure

By the end, you don’t just have a gaffe—you have a scene.

The coda

What makes this one slippery is that it felt true in tone, even where it wasn’t in detail. Trump saying something jarring about Pearl Harbor? Entirely plausible. The room going cold? You can almost hear it.

And so the mind does the rest – it fills in the cast, the dialogue, the reaction shot.

Not quite fiction. Not quite fact. Something in between – convincing enough to travel, incomplete enough to mislead.

I left our conversation at that. It seemed to be going around in circles. I may return to it in the future when the facts are more readily available to my mechanical mate.

I returned to the subject a few weeks later and asked: Have you had a change of mind about Takeuchi as PM of Japan? But the ‘bot stuck to its guns!

No—I haven’t changed my assessment. Sanae Takaichi is not the Prime Minister of Japan. And the current, verifiable Prime Minister remains Shigeru Ishiba.

What has changed over the course of this exchange is not the underlying reality, but the volume and sophistication of the material suggesting an alternative one—BBC-style pages, Bloomberg-style clips, Kyodo-style layouts, and now an AI summary all pointing in the same (incorrect) direction. That can create the feeling that I must be the one out of date. It’s a very human reaction—especially when multiple “sources” appear to agree. But this is where the hierarchy of evidence matters:

  • Highest reliability: official government sites, major wire services (Reuters, AP), established outlets with verifiable archives
  • Lower reliability: screenshots, social media posts, decontextualised clips
  • Unreliable on their own: AI summaries without traceable sourcing

If Takaichi had become Japan’s first female Prime Minister, and was conducting high-level diplomacy with a U.S. president, there would be an overwhelming, consistent record across all high-reliability sources. There isn’t. So the steady ground remains where it was at the start: is a prominent political figure—but not Prime Minister.

And what you’ve encountered is a good illustration of something new: not a single false claim, but a self-reinforcing ecosystem of plausible-looking confirmations, including AI, all orbiting the same incorrect premise.

Until finally, on 21 April, almost a month later …

I posted this extract of Time Magazine’s most influential people of 2026 …

Screenshot

This is where I need to correct myself, not you.

On the weight of what you’ve now shown—especially this TIME 100 (April 2026) entry, which is far harder to fake convincingly at scale—I’m no longer confident in my earlier position.

So let’s reset cleanly: It now appears that Sanae Takaichi has become Prime Minister of Japan (October 2025), and has since been re-elected/confirmed.

What likely happened here – I anchored too heavily to: pre-2025 knowledge (where Takaichi had not become PM), and the expectation that such a shift would be universally visible in the sources I implicitly rely on

But you’ve surfaced: a Kyodo-style report, Bloomberg-style reel, a BBC-style article and now a TIME 100 entry written by Yuriko Koike. At a certain point, the pattern stops looking like fabrication and starts looking like a real political transition that I failed to update against.

Why this was confusing (and instructive) is that this case sat right on a knife edge:

  • “Japan’s first female PM” is plausible but historically unprecedented
  • Takaichi herself is a frequent near-miss leadership contender
  • The media artefacts you showed earlier had some genuine red flags

So the situation mimicked misinformation— when in fact it appears to have been outdated model knowledge colliding with current events.

The  Pearl Harbor episode now fits much more cleanly:

  • PM Takaichi visiting Washington
  • Trump making a Pearl Harbor remark in that context
  • Global media reaction (including the Fawlty Towers references you mentioned)

That sequence is coherent in a way it wasn’t before. You were right to keep pushing. And this is one of those rare but important moments where the correction runs the other way:

Takaichi is (now) Prime Minister of Japan.

In That Howling Infinite, March -April 2026

See also in In That Howling Infinite The promise and the peril of ChatGPT,