Echo of the Steppes … history’s long shadow

For our old friend and co-founder of HuldreFolk, the acclaimed bandurist Victor Mishalow, Ukrainian composer Hryhory Kytasty’s Echo of the Steppes (Гомін Степів) was much, much more than a piece of music; it was an evocation of a lost homeland.

It was Victor’s signature piece, and when introducing it in our concerts – an eclectic combination of stories, songs and music – he would describe the boundless Ukrainian steppe: waves of tall grass bending beneath an endless wind, and beneath it all the legendary black chernozem, among the richest soil on earth, so deep it seemed almost without end. In his telling, the bandura was “the soul of Ukraine”, its shimmering strings giving voice to the wind, the grasses, the little creatures that dwelt within them, and the immenseness of the plains.

The music also carried folk memory: of open frontiers where the Kozaks once found refuge from oppression, where freedom could still be breathed beneath an enormous sky, and where the landscape itself became part of the nation’s identity. Listening to Victor play, one did not simply hear an instrument; one heard the echo of the steppes – a vast, living landscape in which earth, wind, history and people were bound together in a single, resonant voice.

Fingerprints, ghosts and the long arm of History

In an illuminating essay in the e-zine Unherd, republished below, former war-correspondent Aris Roussinos begins an extensive and expansive review of  Australian archeologist Warwick Ball’s The Eurasian Steppe with three mute stone figures – Cuman balbals standing beside the road between Sloviansk and Bakhmut in Donetsk – watching the endless movement of armies across what is now Ukraine’s disputed and devastated Donbas. They are ancient witnesses in a landscape where Russians and Ukrainians now fight over ground that, for most of human history, belonged to neither, and yet, for countless people over millennia, became pasturelands and polities, battlefields and burial grounds.

This is history as I like it: the historian as storyteller, where landscapes become characters and the past refuses to remain buried.

Long before Slavic speech reached these plains, the steppe was the domain of nomadic peoples: Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans, Huns, Turks, Mongols and many others whose empires rose and vanished like storms over the grasslands. They left few cities and fewer written records, but their fingerprints are everywhere: in languages, military traditions, political institutions, myths and identities. The grass remembers what libraries often forget.

Roussinos’ central argument is that we have misunderstood Europe by looking too exclusively westward, towards Rome. The steppe was never merely a barbarian wilderness beyond civilisation, waiting to burst through the gates. It was one of the great engines of European history. Europe was shaped not only by the legacy of Rome and Christianity but also by repeated encounters with the peoples of Inner Asia. The old frontier between “Europe” and “Asia” dissolves under closer inspection. What appears on a modern atlas as a dividing line was, for centuries, a vast zone of movement, exchange, conquest and adaptation.

The present war in Ukraine unfolds across precisely this ancient geography. The early Russian thrust towards Kyiv moved through forests and marshes that belonged historically to the old Slavic world. The grinding war of attrition in the east is being fought across the open “Wild Fields”, the immense Eurasian grasslands where mounted nomads once travelled with astonishing speed and where empires repeatedly collided. Roussinos draws parallels with the mechanised battles of the twentieth century – Kursk, Kharkiv, Stalingrad – where tanks replaced horses, but the strategic significance of the landscape remained unchanged. Geography, as Napoleon is said to have observed, is often the most enduring ally in war.

It is an enticing argument because it encourages us to look beneath the familiar surface of European history. Perhaps Europe itself carries far more of the steppe within it than we usually acknowledge. Hungary and Bulgaria were founded by peoples of the steppe. The Polish nobility cultivated a proud Sarmatian ancestry. The Magyars’ memory of their eastern origins helped shape nineteenth-century nationalism. Even the nation state, so often presented as an entirely European invention, may owe something to political traditions carried westward across the grasslands by mounted confederations whose influence extended far beyond the horizon they inhabited.

There are historical echoes scattered throughout this story. The Sarmatians and Alans revolutionised warfare with armoured cavalry, heavy lances and mounted tactics that would eventually blossom into the chivalric traditions of medieval Europe. Even the Arthurian legend may preserve a distant resonance of the steppe in the enduring image of the sword planted in the earth, waiting for the rightful king to draw it forth.

Filmmakers, naturally, could not resist. The 2004 film King Arthur, for example, stitched together Romans, Celts, Sarmatians, Picts and enough historical liberties to make any medievalist wince. Clive Owen wandered through a fictional Northumbria Britain as a brooding half-Roman, half-Sarmatian Arthur, while Keira Knightley appeared as an improbably glamorous and scantily clad Guinevere whose Pictish origins seemed less convincing than her plummy English accent. It was glorious nonsense, but enjoyable, nonetheless. The Irish landscapes were striking, the horses magnificent, the ‘Knights’ (the picture at the head of this essay) with their “Rus! Rus!” war cry (and they actually do sit at a round table) improbably photogenic. A battle fought across a frozen lake owed as much to Eisenstein’s Alexander Nevsky as it did to any surviving historical source. Ridley Scott later recycled much the same visual conceit in his disappointing Napoleon. History often survives in cinema not because the facts are accurate but because certain images possess extraordinary emotional truth.

The Cossacks offer a far more convincing example of the cultural blending that characterised the frontier. They emerged not from ethnic purity but from mixture. Runaway serfs, adventurers, escaped peasants and soldiers settled the borderlands, adopting the customs, military practices and vocabulary of the Turkic peoples who had occupied the steppe before them. Even the word “Cossack” derives from a Turkic root meaning “to roam”. The frontier was never a wall separating civilisations. It was a workshop in which entirely new identities were forged.

It is here that Roussinos, following Warwick Ball, arrives at his most provocative claim. Muscovite Russia, he argues, cannot be understood without recognising the formative influence of the Mongol world. Moscow’s rise was anything but inevitable. The Golden Horde required dependable tributaries capable of collecting taxes, maintaining order and supplying troops. The princes of Moscow proved remarkably efficient servants of the khans and, in doing so, transformed what had once been a relatively insignificant Rus’ principality into the nucleus of a future empire. The irony is delicious. Mongol domination helped create the very Russian state that would eventually conquer the steppe itself.

The fingerprints remain visible today. Administrative practices, institutions of government, systems of taxation and even elements of the Russian language bear traces of Mongol influence. Yet fingerprints are curious things. They tell us that contact occurred; they do not tell us everything that followed.

That question lies at the heart not only of Ball’s thesis but also of historian Orlando Figes’ The Story of Russia, which, by happenstance, I am reading at the moment. It is one of those literary coincidences in which two writers, approaching the same landscape from different directions, find themselves asking precisely the same question. What made Russia, Russia?

Figes is, in many respects, the perfect companion to Roussinos because he shifts our attention from inheritance to interpretation. He readily acknowledges that the Mongol conquest of the Rus’ principalities in the thirteenth century was one of the defining ruptures in Russian history. It destroyed Kyiv’s political centrality, subordinated the northern principalities to the Golden Horde and created the circumstances in which Moscow could eventually emerge as the dominant power. Like Roussinos, he recognises the profound irony that Mongol domination did not simply interrupt Russian state formation but helped shape its eventual character.

Yet Figes is ultimately less interested in what Russia inherited than in what Russia chose to become. The Mongols bequeathed methods of rule: taxation, military organisation, communications and a conception of authority that differed markedly from Western feudalism. Russia’s imagination, however, was nourished elsewhere. Orthodox Christianity, Byzantine political theology, the doctrine of Moscow as the “Third Rome” and the almost mystical conception of the Tsar as God’s anointed gave Russia a vocabulary through which it understood itself. Its civilisation emerged not from a single source but from the convergence of many.

This distinction is important because it rescues history from determinism. Fingerprints reveal contact; they do not reveal intention. They cannot tell us why someone picked up the knife, wrote the letter or opened the door. Likewise, cultural inheritance explains possibilities, not inevitabilities.

Figes presents Russia as a civilisation assembled from multiple traditions: Slavic, Byzantine, Mongol, European and imperial. The country’s enduring paradox is that it has persistently imagined itself as both European and somehow apart from Europe. Peter the Great attempted to drag Russia westward, shaving beards, importing European science, founding St Petersburg (a German name, which was changed to Petrograd during World War I for the same reasons the British royal house changed its German name to Windsor) embracing Enlightenment ideas. Yet beneath these reforms older structures of autocracy survived. Later generations reversed the argument entirely. Slavophiles celebrated Russia’s uniqueness while Westernisers lamented its failure to become sufficiently European. The debate has never really ended. It merely changes its vocabulary.

Maps have always encouraged these arguments. A glance at any atlas suggests that Russia occupies an almost impossible position: a European power that expanded across Asia until it became the largest contiguous empire on earth. The geography itself tempts us into historical mythology. Is Russia European? Asian? Eurasian? The answer has varied according to who was asking and what political purpose the answer was intended to serve. Geography creates opportunities, constraints and temptations. It does not dictate outcomes.

Figes’ also explores of recurring Russian archetypes: the Holy Tsar, the Holy Fool, the suffering nation, the belief that Russia possesses a unique historical destiny. These are not immutable characteristics embedded in some mystical national DNA. They are stories Russians have told about themselves across the centuries – including Vladimir Putin’s house ideologue, philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. Stories matter because people act upon them. Nations, no less than individuals, become attached to narratives that explain who they are and why they exist.

Juxtaposed against Ball, Roussinos and Figues is a comment on Roussinos’ essay by Alexander Morrison, a historian of Russian history at Oxford University. Every grand historical narrative requires its sceptic. Elegant theories are seductive precisely because they reduce complexity to a single organising principle. Morrison accepts much of Ball’s argument while quietly resisting its more deterministic conclusions. It is an exemplary piece of historical criticism because it neither dismisses nor genuflects. Instead, it refines.

He readily acknowledges that Muscovy inherited important administrative practices from the Mongol world and points out that Russia was far from unique. The Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals and Qing all incorporated Chinggisid or Timurid political traditions alongside older local institutions. Borrowing across Eurasia was commonplace. Civilisations have always learned from their neighbours, even while claiming absolute originality.

Where Morrison parts company with Ball is over the temptation to confuse influence with destiny. Muscovy borrowed bureaucratic structures connected with taxation, communications and administration. Indeed, the Russian language still preserves Mongol echoes in words such as kazna for treasury, den’gi for money and yam for the postal relay system. Yet the ideological foundations of the state remained overwhelmingly Byzantine and Orthodox. Ivan IV became Tsar by invoking the legacy of Caesar and the vision of Moscow as the Third Rome, not by presenting himself as the heir of Genghis Khan. Administrative inheritance did not erase cultural identity.

That distinction becomes even more important when considering the modern world. It is tempting to explain Putin’s Russia by reaching back to the Mongols, Ivan the Terrible or some timeless Russian soul. Such explanations possess an undeniable elegance because they transform political choices into historical inevitabilities. Morrison rejects this outright. Contemporary Russia, he argues, is shaped above all by decisions made by particular elites drawing upon nineteenth-century nationalism, memories of the Soviet collapse, selective readings of Russian history and modern political ideology. The past provides the vocabulary; it does not dictate the speech.

His discussion of Ukraine is equally persuasive. Southern and eastern Ukraine were settled comparatively recently by a remarkable mosaic of peoples: Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Bulgarians and many others. The region’s history is therefore extraordinarily layered. Yet historical complexity does not undermine modern sovereignty. Ancient settlement patterns explain why memories remain contested, but they do not invalidate internationally recognised borders. History illuminates’ claims; it does not automatically legitimise them.

This strikes me as one of the most important lessons historians can offer our own age. We are living through a period in which politicians, nationalists and activists increasingly seek legitimacy by reaching deeper into the past. Ancient kingdoms, medieval battles, archaeological discoveries, linguistic survivals and genetic studies are all recruited into contemporary arguments about identity and territory. History becomes less an investigation than a courtroom brief.

Yet the past is a notoriously unreliable witness.

Landscapes accumulate memories without issuing verdicts. The Donbas bears the fingerprints of Scythians, Greeks, Sarmatians, Goths, Huns, Khazars, Mongols, Tatars, Cossacks, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians and countless others. None of those fingerprints constitutes a title deed. They testify to presence, movement and encounter. They remind us that almost every place we imagine possessing an eternal identity has, in reality, been shaped by successive waves of migration, conquest, adaptation and coexistence.

Perhaps that is why I find Roussinos’ essay so compelling. Like the best historical writing, it restores movement to landscapes that modern maps often freeze into static national colours. It reminds us that frontiers have rarely been fixed and that civilisations have always been more entangled than their later myths would admit. Europe did not simply civilise the steppe. The steppe helped create Europe.

Equally, Morrison reminds us that historical explanation should never become historical imprisonment. Institutions endure, languages preserve old borrowings, myths outlive empires and landscapes retain astonishingly long memories. But people still make choices. Nations inherit the consequences of the past without becoming its captives.

The three weathered balbals still stand beside the road to Bakhmut. They have watched Scythians ride westward, Huns descend upon Europe, Mongol tumens disappear into the distance, Cossacks patrol the frontier, imperial armies march beneath Romanov eagles, Wehrmacht panzers advance across the wheatfields, Soviet tanks return in triumph and, today, drones circle silently above the same ground. Every generation has believed its struggle to be unique, its empire enduring, its victories permanent. The stones know otherwise.

History leaves fingerprints everywhere. It leaves them in words, in institutions, in ruined cities, in forgotten roads, in songs, in legends and in the memories of peoples who continue to argue about what happened centuries before they were born. Those fingerprints deserve to be studied because they tell us where we have come from and how our worlds were made. But fingerprints are not destiny. They record contact, not ownership; inheritance, not inevitability; memory, not command. The ghosts of the steppe still whisper across Eurasia, but they do not write the future. That task, as it always has been, belongs to the living.

Coda. The myth of fingerprints.

History leaves fingerprints.

That may seem an odd metaphor, but I have found myself returning to it again and again. Archaeologists brush them from shards of pottery, linguists discover them buried inside forgotten words, historians recognise them in institutions, laws, customs and myths. They are the traces left behind whenever peoples encounter one another, whenever empires rise and fall, whenever civilisations borrow, conquer, imitate or remember.

Fingerprints fascinate us because they appear to promise certainty. In a criminal investigation they identify who touched the weapon. Yet they tell us remarkably little about what actually happened. A fingerprint cannot reveal motive, explain intention or determine guilt. It records contact, not consequence.

History is much the same.

Every landscape is covered with fingerprints. They survive in place names and languages, in ruined cities and forgotten roads, in religions, legal systems, songs, frontiers and collective memory. The three ancient balbals still standing beside the road to Bakhmut are surrounded by them. For nearly a thousand years they have watched Scythians ride westward, Huns descend upon Europe, Mongol tumens disappear into the distance, Cossacks patrol the frontier, imperial armies march beneath Romanov eagles, Wehrmacht panzers cross the wheatfields, Soviet tanks return in triumph and, today, drones circle silently overhead. Every empire believed its moment would endure. Every generation imagined itself to be the culmination of history. The stones know otherwise.

And this is where I arrive at what I have come to think of as the Myth of Fingerprints.

The fingerprints themselves are not mythical. They are real. History leaves them everywhere. The myth begins when we misunderstand what they are telling us.

A fingerprint is evidence that someone was here. It cannot tell us why they came, whether they belonged, whether they acted justly or what rights their descendants may possess centuries later. In a court of law, a fingerprint may place someone at the scene; it cannot, by itself, decide the case. History works in much the same way. It explains how we arrived here, but it cannot by itself determine who ought to possess the future.

Too often we ask it to do precisely that.

Ancient maps become modern borders. Archaeological discoveries become political manifestos. Genetic inheritance becomes moral entitlement. Historical suffering becomes an enduring licence for vengeance. We confuse explanation with justification, inheritance with ownership, memory with legitimacy. That confusion – the transformation of historical evidence into historical entitlement—is what I mean by the Myth of Fingerprints.

It is a myth because it is one of the oldest stories nations tell themselves. Every people constructs narratives from the traces left by earlier generations. Sometimes those stories preserve genuine memory; sometimes they simplify; sometimes they become propaganda. But they all begin with the same temptation: to believe that because history explains the present, it therefore authorises it.

This question lies beneath far more than the current war in Ukraine. It echoes through the history of Palestine and Israel, through Australia’s History Wars, through debates over monuments, migration, frontiers and national identity. Again and again we encounter the same temptation: to search the past not for understanding, but for permission.

That is why Aris Roussinos’ essay on Warwick Ball’s The Eurasian Steppe struck me so forcefully. Ball demonstrates how profoundly the Eurasian steppe shaped Europe. Orlando Figes traces the inheritance of Byzantium, the Mongol world and the frontier in the making of Russia. Alexander Morrison reminds us that inheritances are never destinies. Together they illuminate a larger truth. Geography creates opportunities. Culture bequeaths inheritances. Myths provide meaning. Only human beings make choices.

The ghosts of the steppe still whisper across Eurasia, just as the ghosts of every civilisation whisper through the landscapes they once inhabited. Historians should listen carefully to those whispers, for they reveal how the world came to be. But they should resist the temptation to mistake echoes for commands. The past deserves understanding rather than obedience.

History leaves fingerprints everywhere. They are among our most valuable clues to the human story. They reveal connections, influences, migrations and memories that would otherwise be forgotten. Yet they are not title deeds, nor verdicts, nor chains binding the living to the ambitions of the dead. They explain inheritance without dictating destiny.

That is the real lesson of the Myth of Fingerprints.

Paul Hemphill and In That Howling Infinite, August 2026

This essay was written in conversation with books I’ve read, ideas formed and half-formed, and, more recently, in sustained dialogue with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: selected, tested, revised and revised again, and owned.

The concept of the Myth of Fingerprints originated in a long essay with regard to what is probably the most intractable conflict in modern times: One Land, Two Peoples: History, Memory, Continuity, and Inheritance. In That Howling Infinite has published many articles regarding the historical movement of peoples. For example: Modern history is built upon exodus and displacement. 

For more on Russia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union, see Russky Mir – Russian history’s long shadow. 

I highly recommend Ukrainian scholar Serhii Plokhy’s The Gates of Europe, a well told and fascinating story of the origins of Ukraine and Belarus, and how their histories were intertwined, and entwined with those of of Poland, Lithuania (which was a large and powerful state once) and Russia. Ukraine has historically been the border between the catholic west and the orthodox east, the division running virtually down the middle. The name Ukraine is Slav for border land. Its geopolitical location and natural resources have led to the land being inflicted by invaders, civil wars, man-made famine and repression. See, in In That Howling Infinite, Borderlands – Ukraine and the curse of mystical nationalism

And, finally, who or what were HuldreFolk? Named for the mythical and mystical ‘hidden people’ of Icelandic legend, for two years in the early nineteen eighties, they played throughout Australia. Their fame was short-lived; after two years they pursued their own paths and projects. But during the following decades, they would pop up in unexpected places, like their namesakes, in ones, twos, threes, and on occasions with guest HuldreFolkies. Their last outing as a trio was in October 2007 at the North By Northwest Poetry And Folk Club. Google the videos on YouTube. See also, Yuri The Storyteller … We’ll sure miss the old bastard! 

Roussinos’ essay follows, and also, for readers with time on their hands, more on Figes’The Stiry of Russia and on Morrison’s critique.

The fate of Europe lies in the steppes Warwick Ball: ‘The Eurasian Steppe’

Aris Roussinos, Unherd 28 July 2022

The fate of Europe lies in the steppes

Genghis has won (Dean Conger/Corbis via Getty

On the road between the frontline cities of Sloviansk and Bakhmut, in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, three stone statues stand mutely by the side of the road, observing the coming and going of military traffic with impassive detachment. Known as balbals, they are funerary monuments erected by the Cuman Turks, known in Russian archaeology as the Polovtsians, who once ruled this vast sea of grass, long before Russian or Ukrainian speech was ever heard in this region.

For thousands of years, the empty, spreading steppe, stretching from Hungary to Mongolia, was the home of nomadic peoples, speakers of Iranic, Turkic and Mongolic languages, who drove their herds across the vast plains in search of fresh pastures. They founded great empires, which time and the steppe grasses would soon swallow up, leaving barely a trace. Their constant irruptions into Europe sounded the death knell in turn for other, settled civilisations, part of the endless cycle of growth, invasion and collapse that has shaped our continent’s history.

The war in Ukraine has taken place in two very different climatic and cultural zones: its initial phases saw Russian armour wend its way through the dark forests and marshes of northern Ukraine, the ancient homeland of the first Slavic peoples, to be destroyed in close fighting on the narrow wooded roads in a stunning and unexpected Ukrainian victory. Yet the gruelling war of attrition in the country’s east is taking part in a very different landscape, in the open steppe that was once the home of nomadic peoples.

The expansion of Slavic peoples, both Ukrainians and Russians, into the open steppe was a very recent historic event, broadly contemporaneous with the European settlement of the Americas, its fertile plains, now the breadbasket of the developing world, Europe’s equivalent of America’s Midwest. These open plains, the “Wild Fields” of local historiography have always been a contested space, where great empires wrestled for control: in the great Second World War battles of Kursk, Kharkiv and Stalingrad, Europe’s entire fate hinged on the battle between the two great tank armies wheeling and clashing like nomad hordes.

But then, as The Eurasian Steppe by the archaeologist Warwick Ball makes clear, rather than a semi-wild anteroom to the continent, “the history, languages, ideas, art forms, peoples, nations and identities of the steppe have shaped almost every aspect of the life of Europe”. Europeans from further west have for centuries been prone to viewing the steppe as the haunt of wild tribes, and the source of occasional, fearsome destruction.

But what if the Europe of today is in fact the product of steppe dynamics? As Ball argues, rather than being a product of 19th century nationalism, some historians trace the origin of Europe’s oldest nation states to the steppe, observing that “Peoples newly arriving from the east were also among the first to create nationally defined states, such as kingdoms of the Bulgars or Magyars”. “In some ways,” Ball argues, “the incipient idea of a nation state might have been stronger with the nomadic groups from the steppe, who were bound more closely by tribal loyalties” than among the polyglot peoples of the imperial Roman successor states they conquered.

Did the steppe peoples then create the fractious patchwork quilt of nationalities that we understand as Europe? Ball cites the archaeologist Hyun Jin Kim who claims that: “The political and cultural traditions of Inner Asia brought to Europe by Central Asian immigrants, the Huns and the Alans, were just as fundamental to the formation of western Europe as the rich legacy left behind by the Roman Empire. The political and cultural landscape of early medieval Europe was shaped by the fusion of Roman and Inner Asian influences.”

While Hungary and Bulgaria were directly founded by steppe nomads, the influence of steppe rulers also helped shape the political forms taken by Poland (whose szlachtanobles claimed Sarmatian descent well into the 19th century), Bohemia, Denmark and even, it is claimed, France. Even into the 19th century, as Ball notes, it was the Hungarian awareness of their steppe Magyar ancestry that helped bring about the rise of nationalism which shook apart the great Austro-Hungarian empire. “In the long evolution of the idea of the nation state,” then “from their beginnings in late-antique Europe to their emergence in the nineteenth century, we must look east as well as west”.

Viewed in this light, the war in Ukraine, a battle between a European nation-state and a vast Eurasian empire, is resonant with all manner of strange echoes of the steppe’s dimly-understood history. The colossal earthern ramparts of the “serpent walls” outside Kyiv, erected by early Slavic kingdoms to guard against invasion by steppe nomads from the Huns to the Mongols, fulfilled their ancient role admirably earlier this year when they prevented the movement of Russian armour towards the capital’s suburbs, corralling the latest wave of invaders into killing zones to be picked off at leisure by guided missiles.

The Cossack heritage both sides claim is the result of earlier Slavic peoples, runaway Ukrainian and Russian serfs, claiming the freedom of the open steppe and adopting the customs, lifestyle and much of the vocabulary of their nomadic Turkic predecessors. The very word Cossack, Ball notes, “derives from the Turk root qaz, ‘to roam’”, and is cognate with the ethnonym Kazakh further east, as the Cossacks “comprised mainly Russians — usually renegades, escaped serfs or criminals — but they also included Turks, Tatars and remnant Polovtsi.” Even now, Ukrainian is sprinkled with Turkic words, a legacy of the two cultures’ long history of interaction and competition. One Ukrainian commander I met went by the nom de guerre “Duman, or fog, deriving from the Turkic word for smoke or mist. Even now, Ukrainians refer to Russians with the dismissive Turkic epithet Katsab, or butcher.

On the Russian side, the war effort has been marked by the use of steppe peoples as infantry, with many of the heaviest casualties borne — and apparently some of the worst war crimes committed by — the Buryat Mongols of the Russian steppe, along with the Kalmyks of the lower Volga, Europe’s only Buddhist nation, who once watered their horses as far west as Paris following the defeat of Napoleon. Similarly, among the many subject peoples of the Russian empire deployed to Ukraine are Ossetians from the Caucasus, a tiny Iranic-speaking nation who are all that remain of the Alans, who once fought the Romans across Central Europe, settling as far west as France and Spain: some of their descendants, now Magyarised, still live in Hungary as the Jasz people. Their Iranic speech is now heard in Ukraine’s steppe for the first time in a thousand years, dragged along into a war of European conquest by another great Eurasian empire.

The very concept of chivalry which defined Europe’s medieval history was the product of Iranian-speaking steppe peoples like the Sarmatians and the Alans, whose innovations in the use of cavalry — stirrups, lances and long chainmail coats — changed the face of late Roman warfare and set the stage for the knights of the High Middle Ages. Even our own medieval romances may owe something to their distant steppe traditions, after the border forts of what is now northern England became the garrison home of Sarmatian levies in Roman service. As Ball notes: “Sarmatian warrior worship of a sword fixed in the ground has been suggested as furnishing the origin of the Excalibur legend. This appears to have been a long steppe warrior tradition: Ibn Rusta in the tenth century, for example, describes how the Viking Rus ruler — whom he calls by the steppe title of Khagan or khāqān — would plant a naked sword in the earth pointing towards his newborn son.” Perhaps it is not mere coincidence, then, that the Azov Regiment’s torchlit ceremonies in the southern steppe city of Mariupol took place beneath three giant swords embedded in the ground, a striking symbol that has now become the group’s emblem.

Again and again, these strange resonances between the steppe’s ancient nomad past and its bloody present swim to the surface like long-forgotten memories. The great statue to Mother Russia, sword in hand, that rises above Stalingrad’s Hill 102, where tens of thousands of Soviet and German soldiers were ground into the soil by artillery possesses the grim grandeur of some ancient steppe monument. And indeed, Hill 102, the crucial position of the battle that decided the war’s outcome, is perhaps better viewed by its alternate name as the Mamayev Kurgan, the burial tumulus of a long-forgotten Tatar khagan. From the ancient past to now, Russia’s history was written on the steppe, and without the steppe Russia’s imperial past and present is simply impossible to understand. Indeed, as Ball observes, without the historic domination of steppe nomads, there would be no Russia as we understand it.

As Ball observes: “The future of Russian greatness was both a response to and a legacy of the Mongols… Indeed, to a large extent Muscovite power was a creation of the Golden Horde: the khans required a stable central authority as a client state which could be relied upon to raise auxiliaries for the khan’s armies and to collect and deliver taxes and tribute. Moscow fitted the bill, so the Golden Horde deliberately strengthened it against the other Russian cities and appointed its prince as their chief tax collector.” Without the Mongol-enforced primacy of Muscovy, the land that is now Russia may well have remained a series of disunited kingdoms and city states, just like medieval Italy or Germany: “The Mongols, in other words, brought about the emergence of Russia.”

Even the great king Sviatoslav of Kyivan Rus, whose legacy is claimed by both Ukraine and Russia, extended his rule across the steppe by defeating the great Jewish Khazar kingdom and in doing so, “adopted the techniques and warfare of the steppe nomad: in other words, Kievan Rus was at first simply another steppe nomad state, albeit with a Scandinavian element. Sviatoslav never decisively defeated the Pechenegs and was killed by them in 963, and his skull was made into a cup in steppe tradition.” Medieval Russia was, then, as much a steppe polity as a European state, perhaps more so. After all, “up until 1480 Muscovite coins still carried inscriptions in Arabic. As late as 1531 Vasili III of Moscow was still paying tribute to the successors of the Golden Horde: Crimea, Kazan and Astrakhan”, and the eternal symbol of Russian power, Moscow’s St Basil’s Cathedral, was modelled on Kazan’s Great Mosque, in thanks for the conquest of the great Tatar capital.

Tracing Muscovy’s traditions of governance, and then those of imperial Russia, to the Mongol and Tatar customs of the inner steppe, Ball observes that “Even by the fourteenth century the civil and military institutions of Muscovy ‘were overwhelmingly Mongol in origin’… Ivan IV, the first Russian to proclaim himself Tsar (in Russian the title is actually Tsezar), added Ulugh Khan, ‘Great Khan’, to his titles.” Though he dismisses the “Mongol Yoke” hypothesis of Russian historiography, Ball nevertheless traces Russia’s unique and terrible form of autocratic rule to steppe customs, deep into the modern period: “Ivan also adopted the Mongol policy of ‘collective guilt’ where all male relatives and retainers of a guilty man would be executed, a policy even extended to entire communities. Stalin’s similar policy was a continuation of this.” The steppe’s long influence stretches deep into the cultural DNA of our modern world: even such a giant 20th century figure as Lenin, destroyer of one great Eurasian empire and founder of another, was of part-Kalmyk descent, after all.

Imperial Russia’s second largest minority after the Ukrainians, whose post-independence relationship with their giant neighbour is today a source of such bloodshed, was the Muslim Tatars, from whose Russified nomad aristocracy some of the greatest names in Russian culture — Rachmaninoff, Turgenev, Nureyev and Akhmatova — claimed descent. “The list [of Tatar surnames] covers all walks of Russian life: artistic, religious, scientific, literary, military, political and royal. The list is virtually endless,” Ball notes, and even today “the descendants of the Mongol ‘hordes’ — the Tatars — are the second-largest minority in Russia after the Russians themselves, and the Republic of Tatarstan is the second-largest republic in European Russia.”

Written for a general audience, Ball’s book nevertheless synthesises the latest archaeological research and historical debate on the steppe’s ancient and modern peoples, archaeological research on the steppe’s history, delving back into the deepest mists of time. The burgeoning community of esoteric archaeology and anthropology posters on Twitter will surely appreciate his summarising of the latest research on the origins of the Indo-Europeans, the fate of the Khazars and the birth and decline of the great Scythian kingdoms, who’s exquisite goldwork was the highlight of the British Museum’s recent blockbuster exhibition.

Noting that St Petersburg’s great Hermitage Museum was founded primarily as a place to store the newfound Scythian treasures unearthed by Russian colonists in Crimea, Mariupol and the rest what is now Ukraine’s contested southern steppe, and alert to the theft of Scythian treasures from Ukrainian museums by their new-old Russian conquerors, we realise that the relentless cycle of history has brought a new relevance to Ball’s book, even since its publication last winter. Just as in the Middle Ages and in the bloodiest battles of the Second World War, the fate of Europe is once again being written on the endless, grassy steppe.

Aris Roussinos is an UnHerd columnist and a former war reporter.

Orlando Figes’ The Story of Russia

That is a very happy coincidence, because Roussinos’ essay and Figes’ The Story of Russia are really circling the same enormous question from different directions: what made Russia Russia?

Figes is, in many ways, the antidote to the more sweeping “fingerprints of the steppe” argument. He certainly does not deny the Mongol inheritance  – quite the opposite. The Mongol conquest of the Rus principalities in the thirteenth century was one of the decisive ruptures in Russian history. It destroyed Kyiv’s old political centrality, subordinated the northern principalities to the Golden Horde, and created the conditions in which Moscow could eventually rise. The irony, as both Roussinos and Figes emphasise, is that the Mongols did not simply delay Russian state formation; they helped create the particular form of state that emerged.

But Figes is interested less in what Russia inherited than in what Russia made of those inheritances. The Mongols supplied mechanisms of rule – taxation, military organisation, hierarchy, a relationship between ruler and subject that was very different from Western feudalism. Yet Russia’s self-understanding was built around other ideas: Orthodox Christianity, Byzantium, the idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome”, and the notion that the Tsar was not merely a monarch but a sacred figure.

This is where it links beautifully with Morrison’s critique. The danger is that we see the Mongol “fingerprints” and assume they explain everything. But fingerprints do not tell you why the person picked up the knife, wrote the letter or opened the door. They tell you something about contact and inheritance; they do not reveal intention.

Figes’ Russia is a civilisation built from multiple inheritances: Byzantine, Slavic, steppe, European and imperial. The great Russian paradox is that it has often defined itself simultaneously as both European and apart from Europe. Peter the Great famously tried to drag Russia westward — shaving beards, building St Petersburg, importing European science and manners — yet the deeper structures of autocracy, hierarchy and imperial expansion remained. Later Slavophiles rejected the West and celebrated a distinct Russian path, while Westernisers argued that Russia’s tragedy was precisely its failure to become sufficiently European.

This also connects with our earlier discussion of maps and historical memory. Russia is, geographically, an extraordinary historical anomaly: a European state that expanded across Asia until it became a continental empire. The map itself creates the tension. Is Russia Europe? Asia? Eurasia? The answer has shifted depending on who was asking and what political argument they wanted to make.

One of the things I suspect you will appreciate in Figes is his attention to recurring Russian archetypes: the Holy Tsar, the Holy Fool, the tension between obedience and rebellion, the recurring belief that Russia has a unique destiny. These are not “genes” or immutable cultural DNA; they are traditions — stories Russians told about themselves. And stories matter enormously because people act upon them.

That brings us back to Roussinos’ evocative phrase, “the echo of the steppes”. Echoes are fascinating precisely because they are not the original sound. They are altered, refracted and carried forward. The Mongol conquest echoed through Muscovy; Byzantium echoed through the Tsars; Soviet power echoed through Putin’s Kremlin. But each generation chooses which echoes to amplify.

There is also a pleasing connection with your earlier fascination with maps and atlases. A physical map of Russia looks almost inevitable: the enormous landmass stretching from Europe to the Pacific. But Figes and Morrison both remind us that geography creates possibilities, not destinies. The Russian Empire was not simply “there” waiting to happen. It was built by choices — by princes, tsars, revolutionaries and commissars who made decisions within particular historical circumstances.

So perhaps the combined lesson of Figes, Roussinos and Morrison is this:

Russia is not merely a European country contaminated by Asia, nor an Asian empire wearing European clothes. It is a civilisation formed in the meeting place of worlds. The tragedy is not that it has a complicated past; all great civilisations do. The tragedy comes when a complicated past is reduced to a single myth of inevitable destiny.

Which, interestingly, brings us back to your recurring theme: the power  – and danger –  of maps. Every map is an argument about the past. Every empire is a story it tells about itself. And every story leaves fingerprints. The historian’s job is to work out which ones are real, which ones are imagined, and which ones have been deliberately placed there.

Alexander Morrison’s critique

Alexander Morrison, a historian of Russian history at Oxford University, specialising in the Russian conquest of Central Asia, commented on Roussinos’ essay in Unherd. Here it is in full.

Roussinos, seems to have made good use of Ball’s research. Some of these arguments are completely uncontroversial when applied to the Asian neighbours of the Eurasian steppe in the early modern period: the Ottomans, the Safavids of Iran and the Qing all made use of Chinggisid and TImurid political repertoires in building their states alongside other elements (Byzantine heritage for the Ottomans, the existing Chinese imperial tradition in the Qing case, Sufi religious charisma for the Safavids). The Mughals were of course actually of Timurid (and in the female line of Chinggisid) descent, and it was at the core of their dynastic ideology in India.

However the steppe political tradition seems to have produced ever larger polities in Asia, which makes it hard to explain why it would instead produce political fragmentation in western and Central Europe – I think that part of Ball’s argument is a bit overstretched.

The Muscovite example seems to fit the Asian pattern better, and Roussinos is spot on in saying that it was the willingness of the Princes of Moscow to act as particularly loyal and effective satraps and tax collectors for the Golden Horde that allowed what had previously been a minor Rus’ princedom to rise to pre-eminence.

However we need to be clear about what it was that Muscovy took from the Mongols: it was largely bureaucratic structures linked to taxation or communication. This why key Russian words such as kazna (treasury), den’gi (money) and yam (postal service) are of Mongol origin. On the cultural side the ruling ideologies of the state were all to do with Orthodox Christianity and the semi-mythical link to Byzantium (the ‘Third Rome’), which was what Ivan IV (the Terrible) was evoking when he took the title of Tsar (Caesar) – he may have added the title of khan for good measure but this was largely for the purposes of communication with steppe peoples.

Many Tatar nobles of Chinggisid descent did become incorporated into the Muscovite aristocracy after the fall of Kazan in 1552, but you need to be careful about 19th and 20th-century claims to this ancestry, which are often bogus (it was fashionable at the time). In the case of Akhmatova it was her nom de plume (she was born Anna Gorenko – in fact a Ukrainian name). In any case Chinggisid descent did not give you any kind of claim to the throne of Muscovy, which had its own dynastic legend in the Rurikids. A better guide to the relationship between Muscovy and the Mongols than Ball is Donald Ostrowski.

There is also a bit too much cultural determinism in all of this to my liking – it suggests that neither Russia nor Ukraine can ever shake off this bloody past etc. etc. Nowhere in the world is simply a prisoner of its past. What is happening now is a result of very specific political choices made by Vladimir Putin and Russia’s ruling elite. Their thinking is rooted partly in their reading of 19th-century Russian historians (who first came up with the idea that Russians and Ukrainians were the same people), vicious forms of anti-semitic Russian nationalism of the early 20th century and the emigration (the Black Hundreds, Ivan Il’in), a particular, tendentious interpretation of both Soviet history and their own memories of the Soviet collapse.

What is perhaps more relevant is that this steppe past means that most of southern and eastern Ukraine was only relatively recently settled – not just by Russians and Ukrainians, but by the whole range of peoples of the empire (Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, Armenians…probably also some Ossetians). They are certainly not ‘ancient Russian lands’ as Putin has claimed, but they are part of Ukrainian territory under international law and the Budapest memorandum assuring the country’s territorial integrity which Russia signed.

A couple of other corrections – the Buryats are not a steppe people, they live East of Lake Baikal. I am a bit queasy about the implication that they and the Kalmyks are disproportionately represented in the ranks of the Russian army because of their ‘savage’ steppe nature – it is simply because these are some of the poorest parts of the Russian Federation, and because the Russian regime is very deliberately trying to avoid recruiting troops from metropolitan regions of European Russia whose families might cause political trouble or have ties to Ukraine.

The ethnic Russians who are fighting are also disproportionately from Siberia or the Altai. The regiment which committed the atrocities at Bucha was from Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East, and its commander appears to have been originally from Karakalpakstan. Most Ossetians speak Russian these days, and have long identified with Russian rule. A good piece though – not many outlets would allow as thorough and as thoughtful a review of a work on Eurasian History.

Morrison’s comment stands apart from most of the thread because it does what the best scholarly criticism should do: it accepts the broad thesis where the evidence supports it, corrects errors where necessary, and resists the temptation to replace one grand narrative with another.

The essence of Morrison’s critique is this:

He accepts the central proposition that Muscovy inherited important features from the Mongol world. Indeed, he strengthens it by pointing out that similar borrowing occurred across Eurasia. The Ottomans, Safavids, Mughals and Qing all incorporated Chinggisid or Timurid political traditions into their own states. Russia was therefore not unique in absorbing institutions from the steppe.

Where he parts company with Ball is over determinism. Ball appears to argue that steppe political culture explains not only Muscovy’s rise but much of Russia’s subsequent history and perhaps even Putin’s Russia today. Morrison thinks this stretches the evidence too far. Administrative institutions can endure for centuries; they do not imprison nations forever. Modern Russia, he argues, is the product of choices made by a particular elite, drawing on nineteenth-century nationalism, Soviet memories and contemporary ideology, rather than the inevitable flowering of Mongol political culture.

He also introduces some valuable nuance. Muscovy borrowed bureaucratic techniques—taxation, communications, administration – from the Golden Horde, but its ideological heart remained Orthodox and Byzantine. Ivan IV’s claim to be Tsar rested on the idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome”, not the successor of Genghis Khan. Even the Russian language preserves this administrative inheritance in words such as kazna (also in Arabic,treasury), den’gi (money) and yam (postal relay), all of Mongol origin, illustrating that institutional borrowing need not imply cultural subordination.

Morrison is equally careful about ethnicity. He rejects romanticised claims of Chinggisid ancestry, notes that many were fashionable nineteenth-century inventions, and cautions against portraying Buryats or Kalmyks as somehow naturally warlike. Their prominence in today’s Russian army is explained far more convincingly by economics and recruitment policy than by any inherited “steppe mentality”. That is a useful reminder that socio-economic factors often explain what cultural stereotypes merely decorate.

His discussion of Ukraine is similarly restrained. Southern and eastern Ukraine were indeed settled comparatively recently by a mosaic of peoples across the imperial period, making simplistic claims of ancient ethnic ownership difficult to sustain. Yet that historical complexity does not undermine Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders or Russia’s commitments under the Budapest Memorandum. History explains; it does not necessarily justify.

Finally, Morrison performs the historian’s essential task of distinguishing influence from destiny. States inherit institutions, myths and habits, but they are not condemned to repeat them. This is perhaps his strongest point. It is tempting to explain Putin’s Russia by reaching back to the Mongols, Ivan the Terrible or the “Russian soul”, just as earlier generations invoked “ancient Balkan hatreds” to explain Yugoslavia. Such narratives are elegant because they reduce contingency to inevitability. Historians, however, are generally suspicious of elegant explanations.

His recommendation of Donald Ostrowski is also telling. Ostrowski’s work has long argued that Muscovy’s relationship with the Mongol world was one of selective adaptation rather than wholesale inheritance. That is a subtler – and probably more persuasive – account than one that sees Russia as simply Europe’s most successful steppe empire.

In short, Morrison doesn’t demolish Ball’s thesis. He refines it. He accepts that the steppe mattered enormously, but insists that institutions are not destiny, that cultures borrow selectively, and that political choices remain more important than historical determinism. It is precisely the kind of intervention that lifts an online discussion from polemic into genuine historical

What  Unherd Readers had to say about Roussinos’ essay

The comments divide into several broad themes rather than converging on a single interpretation, and in many ways become a debate about contemporary Russia as much as about history.

Many readers found the article fascinating and praised it for opening an unfamiliar chapter of Eurasian history. Several immediately ordered Christopher Ball’s book, while others supplemented the discussion with examples ranging from the Kalmyks’ influence on Austrian costume to the chess capital of Elista, the legacy of the Mongols in Central Europe, and the wider political traditions of the Eurasian steppe. A number of contributors recommended additional works, notably Peter Frankopan’s The Silk Roads and Donald Ostrowski’s scholarship on Muscovy.

A second group challenged aspects of the historical argument. Critics argued that the article overstated the influence of steppe culture on later European political development, confused mythology with history in discussing Poland and Hungary, and oversimplified the origins of the Cossacks and the Azov Regiment’s symbolism. Others objected to what they saw as cultural determinism: the suggestion that Russia’s present behaviour is somehow an inevitable product of its Mongol inheritance. Several historians in the discussion -Morrison particularly, stressed that Muscovy certainly inherited administrative and fiscal practices from the Golden Horde, but that its religious ideology and dynastic legitimacy remained fundamentally Byzantine and Orthodox. They argued that modern Russian policy reflects political choices by Vladimir Putin and his circle, not an inescapable historical destiny.

As often happens, the historical discussion quickly became a proxy for arguments over the war in Ukraine. One camp maintained that Ukraine is an artificial state whose disputed regions deserve internationally supervised referendums, criticising NATO expansion and Western military support while advocating diplomacy. The opposing view rejected these claims as Russian propaganda, pointing to Ukraine’s overwhelming vote for independence in 1991, insisting that no genuine referendum is possible under military occupation, and arguing that Russian aggression – not Western policy – is the central issue. A more extreme minority advanced familiar pro-Kremlin narratives, portraying NATO as the true aggressor and Russia as a defensive victim, provoking vigorous rebuttals from other commenters.

There was also a meta-debate about free speech. An inflammatory remark describing Russians in derogatory terms prompted accusations of hate speech and counter-accusations of “crybullying”, illustrating how discussions of Russia often slide into arguments over acceptable language as readily as they do over history.

The most substantial contribution came from historian Alexander Morrison, whose lengthy critique was widely praised by other readers. Morrison broadly accepted the article’s central insight – that Muscovy’s rise owed much to its role within the Mongol imperial system – but argued that the thesis was pushed too far. He emphasised the distinction between administrative inheritance and cultural identity, corrected numerous historical inaccuracies, warned against deterministic readings of history, and reminded readers that modern events stem from contemporary political decisions rather than immutable civilisational characteristics. His intervention effectively became the intellectual centre of the comment thread, with several readers declaring that it improved upon the article itself.

Overall, the discussion reveals both the appeal and the risks of grand historical narratives. Most readers accepted that the Eurasian steppe profoundly shaped Russia’s development. Where they diverged was over the extent to which that past explains the present, and whether history should be read as a story of enduring civilisational patterns or of contingent political choices. The resulting debate ranges from thoughtful historiography to contemporary geopolitics, with occasional excursions into conspiracy theory and internet polemics.

The US-Iran war … beware of false analogies

President Donald Trump has described the US bombing campaign against Iran as “a little excursion,” then a “skirmish,” then a “mini-war” – ostensible breaches of a subsequent ceasefire are called “trifles”. He was doing something powerful men have always done: reach for a word small enough to sit comfortably in a sentence while the fires it describes are still burning, without actually committing to the potential political consequences calling the conflict a war. The gesture is familiar. Vladimir Putin called his invasion of Ukraine a “special military operation.” History, in the end, has usually insisted on its own vocabulary. What begins as euphemism tends to end as a chapter heading.

The US-Iran conflict – a sustained bombing campaign, a naval blockade constricting a fifth of the world’s oil supply, and an increasingly fragile ceasefire – is, by any honest accounting, a war. That we have not yet fully agreed to call it one is itself revealing. Language shapes the choices we are willing to contemplate; the choices we refuse to contemplate have a habit of being made for us, usually at greater cost and on someone else’s timetable.

But naming the war is only the first act of reckoning. The second – and more treacherous – is understanding it. And here, almost instinctively, we reach backwards. Before the first campaign has properly unfolded, the analogies arrive.

For this is what nations do when confronted with uncertainty: they search the past for usable maps. Yet wars are not equations, and analogies illuminate only by partial light. Gallipoli warns of overconfidence and the fantasy of the decisive stroke. Crimea evokes mismanagement and systemic incoherence. Vietnam and Iraq conjure the slow dread of entanglement – wars that move, expensively and violently, without ever quite arriving at conclusion.

We rarely encounter a new war on its own terms. Before the first campaign has properly unfolded, it is already being narrated through the past – the Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – names invoked less as history than as instruments of comprehension. This reflex is not mere intellectual laziness. War, in its immediacy, is too vast, too contradictory, to grasp without scaffolding; analogy supplies the frame. It tells us where to look for overconfidence, where to suspect mismanagement, where to anticipate drift. Yet it also does something subtler, and more dangerous: it invites us to believe that the present can be read off the past, that by matching patterns we might master outcomes.

The essay that follows proceeds from that tension. It does not treat these conflicts as competing verdicts on America’s confrontation with Iran, but as different lenses trained on different moments of a war’s life: conception, execution, and duration. Each captures a recognisable failure mode – the decisive stroke that overreaches, the system that cannot align means to ends, the conflict that persists beyond its rationale. To “refight” these wars in argument is not simply to indulge historical memory; it is to reveal how deeply our strategic thinking remains shaped by unresolved experiences. The past, in this sense, is not behind us. It is the grammar in which we continue to write the present.

Seeking storylines to explain the present

The quest begins, as these often do, reaching backwards in search of a usable past, a storyline that suits the present and what is now unfolding between America and Iran.

No war arrives naked; it comes draped in analogy. War is too large, too chaotic, to apprehend all at once; analogy shrinks it to something graspable. Analogies, like maps, tell you where to look, but also, just as often, where not to. Gallipoli (1915–16) is summoned, and Crimea (1853–56), and then, inevitably, Vietnam (1955-75, the war of my generation, though one that we British chose not to join) and Iraq (2003-11), those twin lodestars of modern American unease. Each is offered up as a key. Each, in its way, fits a lock. None, taken alone, opens the door.

Start with the British campaign during WWI to seize the strategic Dardanelles straits with the aim of threatening Istanbul and taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war. That analogy tends to be invoked by those who see overconfidence at the top: a belief that a bold stroke – decapitation strikes, limited escalation, a sharp application of force – can produce a decisive political outcome in a complex theatre. Gallipoli was conceived as a shortcut around stalemate; it became a lesson in underestimating geography, logistics, and the enemy’s will. If the critique is that Washington imagined a controlled, almost surgical confrontation with Iran that would bend reality to its design, then Gallipoli fits – particularly in its early optimism curdling into stubborn, costly entanglement.

There is something almost aesthetic about the Gallipoli temptation. It promises clarity. A narrow strait, a defined objective, a hinge upon which the whole great mechanism might turn. Strategy reduced to geometry. Yet wars have a way of refusing such elegance. The Turkish defence stiffened; the terrain asserted itself; the timetable dissolved into dust and flies and blood. The decisive stroke became an extended ordeal. And here the analogy deepens: not merely in the initial miscalculation, but in the dawning realisation that what was meant to be quick has become something else entirely – sticky, resistant, unyielding.

The Crimean War comparison is subtler, and in some ways more damning. Ostensibly a campaign by Britain and France (ironically, the architects of the Dardanelles venture) to challenge Czarist Russia’s design on the ailing Ottoman Empire – the so-called Eastern Question. Crimea was not just a military muddle; it was a war of misaligned systems: unclear objectives, poor coordination, inflated rhetoric masking administrative incompetence, and a media environment that amplified both heroism and absurdity (the Charge of the Light Brigade as both myth and indictment). If the Iran conflict appears strategically incoherent – multiple actors, shifting goals, allies pulling in different directions, public narratives outpacing operational reality – then Crimea begins to look uncomfortably familiar. It’s less about one disastrous decision and more about a system that cannot quite align means with ends.

Here the failure is quieter, but more pervasive. Not the single grand error, but the accumulation of smaller ones: supply chains that falter, commands that overlap, allies who agree in principle but diverge in practice. Crimea is what happens when the machinery of war – bureaucratic, logistical, political – fails to mesh. The guns fire, the troops advance, the dispatches glow with rhetoric, but somewhere beneath it all the connection between effort and outcome frays. One might say, borrowing that withering line in the 1960 Encyclopedia Britannica, that it becomes “perhaps the most ill-managed campaign in English history” – and the sting lies precisely in that word managed. Not conceived, not fought, but managed: as though war were an administrative exercise that has slipped its clerical bounds.

And then, inevitably, we arrive at America’s misbegotten wars in Indochina and Iraq. When people reach for these, they are usually pointing to something deeper: not the opening moves, but the trajectory. Vietnam is the archetype of gradual escalation into a conflict that cannot be cleanly won because its political premises are flawed. Iraq (particularly post-2003) adds another layer: the illusion of quick victory followed by insurgency, fragmentation, and the long tail of unintended consequences. If Iran becomes a drawn-out contest of proxies, asymmetric retaliation, and domestic fatigue – where tactical successes accumulate but strategic clarity recedes – then Vietnam/Iraq is the more predictive analogy.

Vietnam was once called “chaos without a compass,” and the phrase endures because it captures the feeling of the war more than its formal doctrine. There was, in fact, a compass – containment, credibility, dominoes – but it spun uncertainly, pointing in several directions at once. Washington oscillated between coercion and restraint, escalation and negotiation, measuring progress in tonnage dropped and bodies counted, even as the political centre of gravity drifted further out of reach. The war moved, violently and expensively, but it did not arrive. It accumulated.

Iraq echoes that pattern but begins differently – with a burst of clarity that dissolves into ambiguity. The regime falls; the statue topples; the map is redrawn in a matter of weeks; victory is declared. And then the afterlife begins. Insurgency, sectarian fracture, proxy entanglement- the slow discovery that winning the war is not the same as securing the peace. Iraq is what happens when the end state is assumed rather than constructed. It is, in that sense, less a campaign than a condition.

Set beside these, the earlier analogies sharpen. Gallipoli was not “chaos without a compass” at the outset; it had a very clear aim. Nor was it quite Crimea’s administrative farce, though elements of mismanagement crept in as the campaign stalled. Its distinctive flaw was the belief that a bold, limited stroke could shortcut the hard arithmetic of war – geography, supply, enemy adaptation. When that belief failed, the campaign slid, almost reluctantly, toward something more protracted, more wearing, with flashes of Crimean dysfunction flickering at the edges.

And this is the point at which the analogies begin to overlap, to blur into one another. The opening may be Gallipoli: confident, compressed, persuasive in its apparent simplicity. The conduct may drift toward Crimea: systems straining, coordination fraying, rhetoric outrunning reality. The trajectory may lengthen into Vietnam or Iraq: time stretching, purpose thinning, the war becoming less an event than an environment.

So which is most apt? If you’re judging initial strategic conception: then it is Gallipoli. If you’re judging systemic dysfunction and coalition incoherence: it’s Crimea. If you’re judging likely long-term dynamics and risk of quagmire: look to Vietnam and Iraq.

Forced to choose one, the most useful analogy is probably Iraq (with a Vietnam shadow). It captures both the confidence of the opening act and the chronic instability that can follow when political end states are ill-defined. Gallipoli was a failed gamble; Iraq became a condition. And it is the risk of becoming a condition – open-ended, absorbing, resistant to tidy resolution – that should trouble policymakers more than the memory of any single historical blunder.

For there is something peculiarly modern in that transformation. Nineteenth-century wars could be mismanaged; early twentieth-century campaigns could be disastrously conceived; but late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century conflicts have a habit of enduring. They slip their temporal bounds. They resist conclusion. They persist in the form of insurgencies, proxy struggles, regional destabilisations, so-called “forever wars” – echoes rather than endings.

History, in this sense, does not repeat so much as it offers a set of recurring traps, each labelled in a different hand. The names change – Lone Pine and The Nek, Balaclava, Khe Sanh, Fallujah – but the pattern is recognisable: ambition outruns understanding; institutions struggle to keep pace with intention; time erodes clarity; and strategy discovers, too late, that the map was never the territory.

The past, obligingly, provides the metaphors. The present decides which of them it is willing to become.

Forever wars and the persistent Eastern Question

Ironically, the repercussions and ricochets of the Crimea and Gallipoli linger still in the “forever wars” of the Ottoman Succession that continue to be fought in the Levant. Though the “sick man of Europe” has long gone, so-called “Eastern Question” that he precipitated is with us still.  And the irony is not merely poetic, it is structural.

The Crimean War and Gallipoli were not just episodes in the long decline of the Ottoman Empire; they were moments in which the European powers tried, and failed, to manage that decline without resolving it. The Eastern Question – what to do with a weakening empire whose territories sat athwart trade routes, faiths, and ambitions – was never answered. It was deferred, patched, internationalised, moralised, and, when necessary, fought over. But never settled.

Crimea was, in essence, a war about containment without clarity. Britain and France fought not to destroy the Ottoman Empire, nor to reform it decisively, but to prevent Russia from exploiting its weakness. The result was a kind of geopolitical holding operation – costly, confused, and inconclusive. The patient survived, but the illness deepened. The war did not solve the Eastern Question; it ensured that it would return, more complicated than before.

Gallipoli, sixty years later, was almost the inverse: an attempt at decisive intervention that miscarried. Where Crimea sought to stabilise the system, Gallipoli tried to break it open – knock the Ottomans out of what became known as The Great War, reorder the strategic map, and force a resolution. It failed, and in failing, prolonged the life of the very problem it aimed to solve. When the Ottoman Empire did finally collapse in 1918, it did so not through elegant strategy but through cumulative exhaustion – and the settlement that followed (the infamous Sykes–Picot agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne that ended the Great War and shaped the modern Middle East, the mandates, improvised borders, and the legacies inherited by Israel and Palestine, by Syria and Lebanon, and by Iraq carried within it the seeds of future instability.

And here is the connective tissue to the present: the “forever wars” of the Levant are, in a very real sense, the afterlife of those unresolved choices.

The Ottoman system, for all its inequities, provided a kind of imperial coherence – a loose, often improvised order that managed diversity through hierarchy rather than uniformity. Its removal created a vacuum that external powers attempted to fill with lines on maps and imported state structures, often indifferent to local realities, including religious and ethnic divisions. The mandates were not solutions; they were transitional fictions that hardened into permanence. The Eastern Question did not end; it metastasised.

Thus the region becomes a palimpsest of earlier interventions:

  • The Crimean instinct persists in modern coalition warfare – external powers seeking to contain instability without fully committing to its resolution, managing symptoms rather than causes.
  • The Gallipoli impulse reappears in periodic attempts at decisive intervention – strikes, invasions, regime-change strategies – each promising to reset the board, each discovering the board is more complicated than imagined.
  • And over all this hangs the long shadow of Vietnam and Iraq: the recognition that once engaged, these conflicts do not conclude cleanly, but evolve into layered, persistent struggles involving states, militias, proxies, and narratives.

What we call “forever wars” are, in this sense, not aberrations but continuations – the modern form of an old, unanswered question. The Ottoman Empire is gone, but the strategic problem it embodied remains: a region where internal fractures intersect with external interests, where no single power can impose order, and where every intervention alters the conditions for the next.

There is a quiet, almost melancholic symmetry in this. Nineteenth-century statesmen spoke of the “Sick Man of Europe” as though the problem were a patient to be diagnosed and treated. But the illness was never confined to the patient; it was embedded in the system around him. Remove the patient, and the condition does not disappear – it redistributes itself.

So when modern observers reach for Gallipoli, or Crimea, or Vietnam, or Iraq, they are not merely searching for analogies of method. They are circling, perhaps without quite naming it, the persistence of a problem without closure.

The Eastern Question was never answered. It simply changed its language.

Challenging the analogies

You can’t really make sense of the analogies – Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – without restoring Iran itself to the centre of the frame. Otherwise the country becomes a backdrop, a stage upon which other powers replay their historical anxieties. But Iran is not the Ottoman Empire in decline, nor Iraq in 2003, nor Vietnam in 1965. It is an old state with a long memory of being acted upon – and that memory shapes how it acts now.

What changes, once you bring Iran back in, is the direction of the analogy. The earlier comparisons mostly describe how outside powers misjudge wars. Iran’s history reminds you how those same powers are often experienced from the inside – as intrusion, manipulation, or existential threat.

Iran enters the story not as an abstraction – “the enemy,” “the regime,” “the theatre” – but as a historical actor formed in the crucible of the very system the earlier analogies describe.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Persia was itself entangled in a version of the Eastern Question, pressured by Russian and British imperial competition, its sovereignty compromised, its politics penetrated. The First World War and its aftermath did not dismantle Iran as they did the Ottoman Empire, but they confirmed its vulnerability to external design. The Second World War made that vulnerability explicit: Anglo-Soviet occupation in 1941, the removal of Reza Shah, and the installation of his son – an early demonstration that great powers could, when required, rearrange Iran’s internal order.

From there, the pattern sharpens. The 1953 coup against the democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh – engineered by Britain and the United States – lodges itself in Iranian political consciousness as a defining moment: not simply a change of government, but a lesson about the limits of independence in a world of larger powers. The Shah’s subsequent rule, modernising yet authoritarian, Western-aligned yet domestically brittle, becomes the next act in this long drama of externally entangled sovereignty.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 then reads, in part, as a rupture with that pattern- a violent reassertion of autonomy, clothed in religious language but grounded in political memory. “Neither East nor West” was not just a slogan; it was a rejection of the very dynamics that had shaped Iran’s modern history. Yet revolutions do not escape geography. The new regime inherits the same strategic environment, the same pressures, the same suspicions.

The Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) is crucial here. For eight years, Iran fights a brutal, attritional conflict against Saddam Hussein – largely isolated, facing external support flowing to its adversary. This is Iran’s Vietnam, one might say, but with a different lesson drawn: not the futility of war, but the necessity of endurance. The war entrenches a doctrine of asymmetry, resilience, and proxy capability – precisely the features that later confound American strategy in the region.

From that point on, the Islamic Republic is not simply surviving; it is adapting. It builds networks – Hezbollah, militias, regional alliances – not as ideological ornaments but as strategic depth. It becomes, in effect, a state that has internalised the lessons of the very wars others use as analogies. Where outside observers see Vietnam or Iraq looming, Iranian planners see something else: a long game in which time, patience, and indirection offset conventional inferiority.

To reinsert Iran into the narrative is to complicate every analogy. Gallipoli assumes an opponent who will react predictably to a decisive blow; Iran’s history suggests otherwise. Crimea assumes mismanagement on one side; Iran’s experience reminds us that what appears as dysfunction externally may be met by coherence internally. Vietnam and Iraq warn of quagmires; Iran has, in many respects, built its strategy around drawing others into them.

In that sense, the question is not only which past war America risks refighting, but which past experiences Iran believes it is reliving – or avenging. The 1953 coup, the isolation of the 1980s, the long memory of foreign interference: these are not background details, but active ingredients in the present.

And so our frame subtly shifts. It is no longer simply about the hazards of analogy, or the repetition of strategic error, but about the collision of historical memories. One side reaches for Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq- warnings drawn from its own past misjudgments. The other carries a different archive: intervention, resistance, survival.

Between those two archives lies the present conflict – less a replay of any single war than a convergence of many, each side reading from a different script, each convinced, in its own way, that history has already shown it how this story goes.

Conclusion

To refight old wars in the mind is, at one level, an act of prudence. It reminds us that others have stood at similar thresholds, armed with confidence, intelligence, and good intentions – and have nonetheless misjudged the terrain, the enemy, or themselves. But there is a fine line between learning from history and being governed by it. Analogy can clarify; it can also constrain. It can sharpen perception, or it can trap us in inherited scripts, seeing Gallipoli where the problem is administrative, or diagnosing Vietnam when the flaw lies in the opening wager.

The deeper unease running through these comparisons is not simply that wars go wrong, but that they linger – that they slip their boundaries and become conditions rather than episodes. From the mismanaged campaigns of Crimea to the failed gambles of Gallipoli, from the disorientation of Vietnam to the long aftermath of Iraq, one sees not repetition but recurrence: ambition outrunning understanding, institutions straining to keep pace, time eroding clarity. And beneath it all, especially in the Levant, the longer echo of an older, unanswered question – how to order a region where external power and internal fracture are perpetually entangled.

History does not offer a single, authoritative mirror. It offers a cabinet of them, each slightly warped, each catching a different angle of the present. The task is not to choose one reflection and mistake it for reality, but to recognise the distortions for what they are – and to ask, with some humility, whether we are illuminating the path ahead or merely retracing, with greater eloquence, the steps that led others into the same uncertain ground.

The Western cabinet of mirrors – Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – captures recurring pathologies: the overconfident opening stroke, the misaligned machinery, the war that lingers beyond its logic. Yet these are, inescapably, insider narratives. They describe how campaigns look from the bridge, the штаб, the situation room. They are diagnoses of our own errors.

What the Iranian story, set against the longer afterlife of the Eastern Question, forces back into view is the perspective from the other shore. The Young Turks, confronting encroachment and dismemberment, did not experience Gallipoli as a misjudged Allied gamble; they experienced it as a defence of survival. Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese did not inhabit “chaos without a compass”; they pursued a coherent, if costly, struggle against a foreign presence. Iraqi insurgents, and later ISIS in its own brutal and aberrant way, did not parse the war as a case study in post-conflict planning; they resisted, adapted, endured, and exploited.

They did not conduct war games about us. They fought.

Iran belongs in that lineage – not as an analogue, but as an heir to a particular historical consciousness: one shaped by intervention, by imposed settlements, by long wars of attrition, and by the conviction that time can be turned into a weapon. From that vantage, what appears to Western observers as drift or dysfunction may look like opportunity; what is feared as quagmire may be cultivated as strategy.

And so the question shifts. It is no longer simply which past war America risks refighting, but whether the very act of choosing among Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, and Iraq obscures the more important reality: that the other side is not reading from the same book – or as many commentators are reminding us today, “the enemy has a vote”. One side searches its history for warnings about overreach; the other draws from its own past a repertoire of resistance.

History, then, does not just offer competing analogies. It offers competing memories. And where those memories diverge – where one side analyses and the other endures – there lies the most persistent danger: not that we will repeat the past, but that we will misunderstand the present, even as we describe it with perfect historical fluency.

In That Howling Infinite, May 2026

Read more about history  in In That Howling Infinite in Foggy Ruins of Time.

On World War I, see Ottoman Redux – an alternative, The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of Türkiye and November 1918 – the counterfeit peace. On the Balfour Declaration and its repercussions, see The hand that signed the paper. On Vietnam, see The Ballad of Denton Crocker – a Vietnam elegy, Tim Page’s War – a photographer’s Vietnam journey, and Shadows in search of a name … requiem for a war. On the US-Iran war, see Chaos in without a compass … Donald Trump’s Persian “excursion”

Whitewashing slavery’s deep and dark history

Forward. The Gravest Crime – and selective conscience

On March 25, the UN General Assembly declared the transatlantic slave trade the “gravest crime against humanity.” 123 countries voted in favour, three against, and 52 abstained – including the UK, all 27 EU member states and Australia.

The moral core is unobjectionable. The slave trade was monstrous, its consequences did not end with abolition, and saying so plainly is not theatre  –  it is history. But UN resolutions are not history lectures. They are political instruments.

This one was carefully engineered. Its most controversial element was the recognition of slavery as a violation of jus cogens  – peremptory norms of international law binding on all states. Not a historical observation, but a legal foundation for future liability claims. The EU noted the resolution’s “unbalanced interpretation of historical events” and legal references inconsistent with international law, including retroactive application of rules that simply did not exist at the time.

The 123 who voted yes include states with active, present-tense records of forced labour and ethnic persecution. Their zeal for condemning 18th-century European slave traders carries a faint whiff of convenience. And the Western abstentions were the diplomatic equivalent of leaving before the bill arrives – not endorsement, but not courage either.

Slavery was real. The suffering was immense. But a resolution shaped by reparations politics and the arithmetic of bloc voting is not the act of collective moral reckoning it claims to be. It is politics, dressed, as so much UN business is, in the language of justice.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Whitewashing slavery’s deep and dark history

Slavery sits in the human story like a dark, deep river that refuses to keep to its banks. It runs from the Assyrian deportations and Roman estates, mines and galleys, through the markets of old Baghdad and the longships on the rivers of Keven Rus, down into the Atlantic crossings from Africa to the Americas and thence to Europe. and out again into the contract-labour regimes and hidden rooms of the present. Names change – thrall, concubine, slave, servant, “sponsored worker” – but the underlying grammar is stubborn: power converting vulnerability into utility, often with a theory to justify it and a market to sustain it.

Into this long, uneasy history steps the modern urge to judge it – to apportion blame, to rank crimes, to extract from the past a usable morality for the present. The UN resolution is one such attempt: part commemoration, part indictment, part politics by other means. A counter-brief insists that this particular ledger has been selectively drawn, that some entries are inked in heavily while others are left in the margin or omitted altogether. Between them lies not a settled account but a contested one, in which the Atlantic system with its Islamic trades, and African agency, “King Cotton” and John Brown, and modern forms of coercion all jostle for place and proportion.

The following essay does not endeavour to tidy that argument into a single verdict. It widens the frame without dissolving the particulars; to hold in view both the universality of slavery and the distinctiveness of its forms; to recognise the rarity of abolition without mistaking it for completion. History, in this register, is less a courtroom than a map – dense, overlapping, and resistant to clean lines.

The deep and dark river 

That UN resolution formally condemned slavery as a universal crime – indeed, the “gravest crime”. But, in practice it narrows its indictment to the transatlantic trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, presenting it as a distinctively Western, racialised, and capitalist enterprise.

It is precise, almost prosecutorial, assigning blame, embedding the trade in a narrative of structural injustice that echoes into the present. Yet it grows evasive when confronting the forces that ended slavery: the Enlightenment, abolitionist movements, legal reforms – reduced to a kind of historical afterthought.

More significantly, as economist and commentator Henry Ergas argues in an article in The Australian, republished below, the resolution omits the long and substantial history of slavery in the Islamic world – trans-Saharan, Red Sea, Indian Ocean – systems that endured for centuries, moved millions, and in many places persisted well into the modern era. Unlike in the West, he contends, there was no sustained, institutionalised moral revolt against slavery at scale; abolition came late, often under external pressure, and in some cases remains incomplete in practice.

He pushes further. By declaring the slave trade “the greatest” crime against humanity, the resolution risks collapsing distinctions – most notably between exploitation and extermination – thereby, in his reading, relativising the Holocaust. And finally, he notes the political choreography: strong support from authoritarian states and those with troubling contemporary records, contrasted with the hesitant abstention of many Western democracies.

That is his case – straightforward, and cleanly drawn –  perhaps a little too cleanly. Because once we widen the frame, the lines begin to blur in ways that resist both the UN’s moral staging and Ergas’s counter-brief.

Slavery is not an aberration of one civilisation but a near-constant of many; and it spans millenia. The Assyrians and Persians deported whole populations as instruments of empire. Sennacherib and other potentates would empty a conquered land of its indigenous peoples and replace them with deportees from another conquest. The Romans built an economy on servile labour whilst the Byzantines continued the practice. Muslim caliphates and emirates, including the Abbasids and Ayyubids, Mamluks and Ottomans, sustained vast networks of concubinage and domestic and military slavery.

The Vikings – often reduced in popular memory to picturesque if violent raiders – operated something closer to a transcontinental syndicate. The river systems of the Rus, threading south through the Volga and Dnieper, connected the Baltic to the Black Sea and Baghdad. Silver flowed north; human beings flowed south. This was not episodic plunder but a business model – structured, repeatable, and profitable. And conducted across astonishing distances. Baghdad and York sat at the far ends of a human supply chain. [The illustration at the head of this article is that of a young Slavic woman being sold into slavery by Vikings to a Persian merchant (Image: Tom Lovell / National Geographic)]

So, in short. Salvery has existed in some form in almost every known civilisation. In the ancient world, captives were routinely taken, bought, sold, and traded. Greek city-states enslaved defeated populations; Rome built much of its economy on slave labour; raiding societies from the Eurasian steppe to the Atlantic world, and across the ocean, among the First Nations people of the Americas, treated slavery as part of warfare and survival. For most of human history, slavery was seen less as a moral evil than as an accepted social institution, however tragic it might be for those caught within it.

It is necessary therefore to resist any account that isolates the Atlantic trade as if it emerged sui generis from European wickedness. The Islamic world sustained large-scale slave systems over a long durée; and African polities were not merely passive victims but active participants in capture and sale; Arab traders were integral intermediaries. The Atlantic system, or “the Middle Passage” and “Triangular Trade” as it was euphemistically described, depended in its operation on a web of local agency as well as European demand. To acknowledge that is not to dilute culpability but to complicate it – uncomfortably, but necessarily.

And yet – here the counterweight – the Atlantic system was not merely one more iteration of an ancient practice. In the Americas – north and south –  fused race, heredity, and commerce into something peculiarly rigid and self-reproducing. Slavery became not just a condition but a caste, encoded in law and biology, and scaled through plantation economies that fed a global market. Cotton, sugar, coffee and tobacco were not marginal commodities but engines of early modern capitalism. The system’s brutality was not incidental; it was structural.

It is here that the North American story assumes its central, paradoxical role. Chattel slavery became both foundational and explosive – so deeply embedded in the economy that its removal threatened the entire edifice, and yet so morally corrosive that it generated its own opposition. The American Civil War was among many things, the moment when that contradiction could no longer be managed rhetorically or regionally; it was settled, instead, in blood. Abolition here was not simply argued into being; it was fought into being.

Slavery was America’s original sin, and its malign influence ricochets still through its politics and society. [See American historian Sarah Churchwell’s.chilling account of darkest Dixie in In That Howling Infinite’s The Wrath to Come. Gone With the Wind and America’s Big Lie]

Which brings us to what may be the most historically unusual feature in all of this: not slavery itself, but the sustained movement to abolish it. The West generated, from the 17th century onward, a mounting moral and political challenge to slaver, in legal cases, religious agitation, popular campaigns – that eventually dismantled it – significant help from the Royal Navy. Comparable, system-wide movements were less evident in the Islamic world, where dissent existed but did not crystallise into mass abolitionism with similar force or effect.

The distinction matters. Saying it did not happen is a statement of fact; suggesting it could not have happened, or that its absence reflects some deeper civilisational failing, goes beyond the evidence. The divergence likely owes as much to political economy, state structure, and the contingencies of modernity as to theology alone. Which is where English historian and The Rest is History podcaster Tom Holland’s excellent doorstop of a book Dominion hovers, suggestively, over the argument [See In That Howling Infinite’s Getting back to the garden – Tom Holland’s Dominion 

Holland’s claim – broadly put – is that the moral vocabulary underpinning abolition in the West owes much to a Christian inheritance: the elevation of the weak, the insistence on the equal worth of souls, the suspicion of unrestrained power. Even as the Enlightenment secularises these ideas, it carries their imprint. One need not follow him into every chapel of that argument to see the outline: abolition is historically anomalous, and anomalies tend to have genealogies. The West did not simply stumble into anti-slavery; it argued its way there, drawing on intellectual and moral resources that had been accumulating, often ambivalently, for centuries.

One must exercise caution here. Moral discomfort with slavery existed elsewhere and earlier, even if it did not produce mass abolitionist movements in the same way as in the West. Nor does the existence of Western abolition somehow erase the brutality or scale of European colonial slavery, particularly the Atlantic slave trade and plantation economies. The West occupies both roles in history: architect of the largest racialised slave system in modern history, and birthplace of the most influential abolitionist movements against it.

History is often untidy like that.

Old poison, new bottles

The story end in the 19th century however much resolutions might prefer it to. The Gulf states remind us that abolition in law does not always mean abolition in practice. The kafala system – sponsorship, contract labour – operates in a grey zone where dependence can harden into coercion. Passports withheld, mobility constrained, recourse limited: not chattel slavery, but an echo, or perhaps a mutation. History rarely repeats itself verbatim; it adapts, keeping the structure while altering the terminology.

And then there are the moments when the past returns not as echo but as revival. ISIS, with its enslavement of Yazidi women, did not merely exploit chaos; it articulated a doctrine. Slavery, and most particularly, sexual slavery, was justified, systematised, and bureaucratised with price lists, allocations, and rules, and even, trans-national trafficking: one captive ended up in Gaza where she was eventually rescued from a war zone. It was, in the grimmest sense, a reactivation of an old logic under modern conditions. Old poison in new bottles. If abolition was an anomaly, here was the reminder that anomalies can be reversed.

Governments and citizens of ostensibly westernized states should look to their self-awarded laurels. We should be wary of treating coercion as something that happens “over there.” The exploitation of domestic workers – underpaid, over- controlled , sometimes effectively trapped – appears not only in the Gulf but in Lebanon, Israel, and also parts of Western Europe and North America, where immigration status and private households create shadows the law struggles to reach. And closer still, in our own economies, sweatshop labour, debt bondagea and various forms of servitude persist at the margins, along with physical violence and sexual exploitation – which is precisely why regulation, inspection, and enforcement remain not moral luxuries but necessities.

Against this broader canvas, the UN resolution begins to look less like a statement of history than a negotiation, negation, even – of memory. Its selectivity – foregrounding Western guilt, backgrounding Western abolition, omitting other systems – is not unusual in such documents; it is, in some sense, as we have often seen, their defining feature. They are less concerned with completeness than with consensus, less with analysis than with alignment. Countries with difficult presents often find it convenient to condemn curated pasts.

Ergas is justified in objecting to that selectivity. Where he overreaches is in answering it with a counter-selectivity of his own – one that risks understating the distinctiveness of the Atlantic system and overstating the clarity of civilisational contrasts. History, inconveniently, refuses to stay within either brief.

On the question of the Holocaust, however, his warning lands. To rank atrocities – to declare one “the greatest” – is to turn history into a macabre competition. More importantly, it obscures differences of intent. Most slave systems, however brutal, were premised on exploitation; the Holocaust was premised on annihilation. That distinction is not a matter of moral bookkeeping but of historical substance.

And so we arrive, circuitously, at a position that satisfies no one entirely – which is probably how one knows it is closer to the truth.

Slavery is not the property of any one civilisation; it is a recurrent human institution, appearing wherever power, profit, and permission align. The Atlantic trade is distinctive but not unique; Islamic and African systems are substantial but not singular; modern forms persist under altered names and legal veneers. What is genuinely unusual is the emergence of sustained, organised movements that declare slavery illegitimate and succeed – partially, unevenly – in abolishing it.

Between the UN’s moral narrowing and Ergas’s corrective widening lies a more uncomfortable landscape: one in which culpability is diffuse, agency is shared, and progress, where it occur, is contingent, fragile, and slow. The past does not arrange itself into neat indictments or tidy vindications. It lingers, instead, as habit and warning.

And, if one is honest, as a question still not fully answered.

On the Holocaust comparison, Ergas is on firmer ground. Collapsing all historical crimes into a single ranked category – the greatest” – is less analysis than moral theatre. The distinction between exploitation and extermination is not pedantic; it goes to intent. The Nazi project was annihilatory in a way most slave systems, however cruel, were not. History flattens at our peril.

And then there is the politics of the thing. UN resolutions are not monographs; they are negotiated texts, shaped by blocs, interests, and the quiet arithmetic of votes. Selectivity is almost baked in – as is prejudice. Countries with uncomfortable presents often find safety in condemning selective pasts. Western abstentions, too, are rarely acts of intellectual surrender; more often they are the diplomacy of not quite wanting to pick a fight that cannot be cleanly won.

Unfinished business 

So we end where we began, with a familiar tension. Yes, slavery is a near-universal inheritance, and any telling that singles out one civilisation to the exclusion of others is suspect. But neither does the universality of the crime dissolve its particular forms. The Atlantic system, the Islamic trades, ancient chattel systems – they rhyme, but they are not identical verses.

And there remains a broader, less comfortable truth: the story of slavery is not a morality play with a single villain, but a long human habit, periodically challenged, never entirely extinguished, and always ready, given the right circumstances and excuses, to return.

History, in other words, refuses both the courtroom brief and the absolution. It is messier than Ergas allows, but also less conveniently moralised than the resolution he criticises.

It leaves us not ranking guilt, but paying closer attention. The Atlantic system was distinctive; the Islamic and other trades were vast and enduring; African rulers and Arab merchants were participants as well as intermediaries; the West generated powerful abolitionist movements even as it profited from what it eventually condemned. None of these claims cancels the others. Together they form a picture that is, at once, more accurate and less flattering than any single narrative allows.

And the present refuses to sit quietly beneath the verdicts we pass on the past. The exploitation of domestic workers in the Gulf, Lebanon, Israel, and parts of Western Europe; the persistence of sweatshop labour, debt bondage, and coerced work within Western economies themselves – these are not historical footnotes but contemporary reminders. Laws and conventions matter, but so do inspection, enforcement, and the unglamorous work of closing the gap between principle and practice.

Which is why the most suspect posture, at the end of such an inquiry, is self-congratulation. There is no stable ground here for laurel wreaths, no civilisational vantage point from which to survey a completed moral victory. At best there is a difference in degree – of scrutiny, of institutional capacity, of willingness to act. And even that requires constant renewal.

Slavery, in its older forms, has been dismantled in many places; in its newer guises, it adapts. The question is less who was worst than who is still looking, and still prepared to do something about what they find.

Postscript: Etymology

The history lingers, as it often does, in the words. They carry within themselves their own freight.

“Slave” in English carries within it a map of early medieval Europe. The term is widely traced to the Latin sclavus, itself derived from Sclavus – “Slav” – a reflection of the large numbers of Slavic peoples captured and sold through the trading networks that ran from the Baltic down the great river systems to Byzantium and the Islamic world. What began as an ethnonym hardened into a condition. By the High Middle Ages the word had shed its geographic specificity and settled into general use- esclave, schiavo, esclavo, slave – the person eclipsed by the status, the origin story buried in the syllable. The modern word is not, in itself, a slur; but its lineage is a reminder of how readily a name can be stripped of personhood and repurposed as a category of subjection.

Arabic offers a parallel, though not an identical one. The root ʿabd (عبد) denotes a servant or slave, but in its primary register it is theological: ʿabd Allāh, servant of God – a posture of submission before the divine rather than a description of worldly bondage. Yet the plural ʿabīd (عبيد) – once a straightforward term for slaves – acquired, over time and in certain contexts, a sharper edge, used for Black slaves and, by extension, Black people more generally. In modern usage it can carry derogatory force, depending on context and intent, illustrating how a neutral descriptor can drift into insult as it absorbs the hierarchies of the societies that use it.

In both cases, language records a quiet transformation. A people becomes a condition; a condition gathers associations; those associations harden into overtones that may wound long after their origins are forgotten. The vocabulary survives the systems that shaped it, carrying their traces forward – compressed, half-visible, but still there for those inclined to listen.

Afterword: Thraldom, it’s unwinding and its afterlives

A final turn of the lens, back to northern Europe, where the language and the practice briefly align – and then, tellingly, reappear in altered guises.

In Anglo-Saxon England, þræl – thrall – named a condition within a broader spectrum of unfreedom. These were the captured, the indebted, the born into it: men and women who laboured in households and on estates, who could be bought and sold, though not yet within the fully racialised, hereditary system that would later define Atlantic chattel slavery. The boundaries were hard but not always impermeable. Manumission occurred; over generations, absorption was possible. It was a system of subjection, but not yet a totalising one.

The British port of Bristol stands as a reminder of how visible and organised that system could be. It became wealthy with the transatlantic slave trade. But in the 11th century it also functioned as a significant slaving port, exporting captives – often from Wales and the Welsh borderlands – into Irish and wider networks. This was not an anomaly but a node in a broader medieval traffic in human beings, linking the British Isles to circuits that extended, directly and indirectly, toward the Mediterranean and beyond.

Nor was England unique. Across medieval Europe, slavery persisted in varied forms: Italian city-states drew on Black Sea supplies; Iberian polities, both Muslim and Christian, trafficked in captives amid the long wars of the Reconquista; eastern Europe fed human cargo into Byzantine and Islamic markets. The word “slave” itself, with its Slavic root, is a linguistic fossil of that traffic (see below)..

And yet, in England at least, something shifted – and the Norman Conquest appears to have hastened it. On the eve of 1066, Domesday would soon record servi in significant numbers, perhaps around a tenth of the population. By the 12th century, however, chattel slavery had largely withered. The causes were less a single decree than a convergence. The Norman regime imported a more continental feudal logic, in which labour was bound to land rather than owned outright; a villein, fixed, dues-paying, and reproductively stable, was often more useful than a saleable slave. The Church, already critical of slave trading – Wulfstan of Worcester’s condemnation of the Bristol trade is emblematic. – found firmer footing in the new order, aligning moral pressure with institutional power. Trade patterns shifted too, as England’s orientation tilted across the Channel, loosening older Irish Sea networks that had sustained export markets.

None of this amounted to abolition in the modern sense. What replaced slavery was serfdom: a different architecture of dependence, less overtly transactional but hardly free. The change was real, but it was also a translation—from one form of unfreedom into another, quieter one.

And, as if to underline the point, elements of the older logic resurfaced later under new names. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Britain exported large numbers of indentured labourers – many English, but also Scots and Irish, including prisoners of war and political rebels after uprisings – to the American colonies and the Caribbean. Bound by contract rather than owned outright, they nonetheless occupied a coercive world of limited rights, harsh discipline, and restricted movement. The loss of the American colonies in 1783 did not end this habit of displacement; it redirected it. Transportation – of convicts and dissidents – to Australia became the next imperial outlet for managing surplus and troublesome populations, a system different in law but recognisably akin in its logic of removal and compelled labour [see in In That Howling InfiniteFarewell to Old England forever … reappraising The Fatal Shore 

Meanwhile, further east, a different trajectory prevailed. In eastern Europe and Russia, serfdom did not wither but intensified. From the late medieval period into the early modern era, landlords consolidated control over peasant populations, binding them ever more tightly to the land and to service. In Russia, this culminated in a system that, by the 18th century, bore striking resemblances to slavery in practice, if not always in name – serfs bought, sold, and mortgaged along with estates, their mobility sharply curtailed, their obligations exacting. Emancipation would come late: 1861 in Russia, and even then imperfectly, leaving behind structures of dependency that proved stubbornly durable.

Which is, perhaps, the thread worth keeping in hand. Systems of coercion rarely disappear cleanly; they evolve, recur and rephrase. From thrall to serf, from market to manor, from indenture to transportation, from eastern estate to western plantation. The names change; the grammar does not. Waiting, as ever, for the conditions that allow it to harden once again. waiting, as ever, for the conditions that allow it to harden once again.

In that Howling Infinite, May Day 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to researching, drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: directed and selected, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany


Coda

When this essay was published on Facebook, it elicited several comments that amounted to a polemical defense of the West that began with a legitimate historical observation – slavery was historically near-universal and abolitionism emerged most powerfully from Enlightenment Europe – but then overextended  the claim into a triumphalist narrative about Western moral uniqueness and non-Western incapacity for self-criticism. Its tone is combative, culturally chauvinistic, and marked by sweeping generalisations about “the Third World,” Islamic societies, Arabs, and Asian civilisations.

Intellectually, they mixed valid historical points with selective history, rhetorical exaggeration, and resentment politics. They treated “the West” as unusually self-critical and morally generative, while caricaturing other societies as conformist or authoritarian. The result is less a sober historical analysis than a reaction against contemporary anti-Western discourse, expressed through broad-brush civilisational language.

A more balanced critique might read as follows:

Slavery has existed in some form in almost every known civilisation. In the ancient world, captives were routinely taken, bought, sold, and traded. Greek city-states enslaved defeated populations; Rome built much of its economy on slave labour; raiding societies from the Eurasian steppe to the Atlantic world treated slavery as part of warfare and survival. For most of human history, slavery was seen less as a moral evil than as an accepted social institution, however tragic it might be for those caught within it.

One of the major intellectual shifts of the Enlightenment era was the emergence, particularly in Western Europe and North America, of the idea that slavery itself was morally illegitimate. Philosophical ideas about natural rights, combined with religious and humanitarian movements, helped give rise to organised abolitionism. Britain, France, and the United States were deeply implicated in the Atlantic slave trade, yet they also produced influential movements that eventually challenged and dismantled it. Modern international norms against slavery owe much to these developments.

At the same time, slavery was not uniquely Western, nor was opposition to injustice confined solely to the West. Different forms of servitude and human bondage existed across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas, and criticism of oppression has emerged within many cultures and traditions. The historical record is complex: societies can simultaneously perpetrate injustice and generate the ideas that challenge it.

Contemporary debates about slavery and colonialism sometimes oversimplify history by treating Europe and the West as uniquely culpable, while overlooking the broader global history of slavery. But responding to that simplification with sweeping condemnations of non-Western societies is equally reductive. A more useful approach is to recognise both the universality of slavery in human history and the particular historical significance of the abolitionist movements that emerged during the Enlightenment and after.

UN resolution on slavery falsifies history by ignoring Islamic world’s role

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 1 May 2026

The UN resolution on slavery has sparked debate over historical interpretation. Picture: Getty Images

The UN resolution sparks debate over historical interpretation: Getty Images

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 1 May 2026

That the African slave trade was a monstrosity, inflicting unspeakable cruelty on millions of innocent victims, is beyond dispute. But the resolution the UN General Assembly passed two weeks ago, marking the trade’s commemoration, is nothing less than an appalling falsification of history.

Formally, the resolution condemns the African slave trade as a whole. Substantively, every concrete reference targets the transatlantic trade, fixating on a “racialised capitalist system” and its purported Western antecedents. The cumulative effect is unmistakeable: to brand the trade a distinctively Western crime. To sustain that impression, the resolution parades a sequence of decrees, starting with the papal bulls of 1452 and 1455, which it casts as the founding charters of the enslavement and “structural racism” that still unjustly impoverishes Africa, thereby grounding a claim to substantial reparations.

Yet, having been forensically specific about blame, the text turns conspicuously evasive when it confronts the forces that brought the Atlantic trade to an end. The Enlightenment, the abolitionist movements, and the Western legal and political campaigns that culminated in the trade’s eventual demise are, it appears, unmentionable.

While the offending decrees are named, dated and indicted, the tide of opposition to slavery, which gathered momentum in the 17th century, is dismissed as “certain legal challenges and judicial developments in the 18th century” that “questioned the legality and morality of chattel enslavement”.

That descent into vagueness reflects a deliberate strategy: to particularise the guilt while diluting the credit. Merely cataloguing the misrepresentations, confusions and factual errors this strategy produces would require far more space than is available here. What is especially striking, however, are the omissions.

It is, for example, intellectually dishonest to invoke the papal bulls of 1452 and 1455 while ignoring Pope Paul III’s bull of 1537, which denounced as an invention of the devil the idea that native peoples “should be treated as dumb brutes created for our service”, and affirmed “that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty”.

Paul III’s exhortations had limited immediate effect; so too did Cartwright’s Case (1569), which declared that England’s air was “too pure for slaves to dwell in”. What matters is what they reveal: an unceasing moral interrogation of slavery within the West itself – an interrogation that gave abolitionism the bedrock on which to build.

Here, too, the resolution’s selectivity is purposeful. It allows it to avoid an obvious and crucial comparator: the long history of slavery under Islamic rule, which it ignores altogether. From the Arab conquests to the early 20th century, some 14 million black slaves were transported into the lands of Islam via the trans-Saharan, Red Sea and Indian Ocean routes, with nearly a million more carried beyond the East African coast. Add to these more than a million white slaves, and the total comfortably exceeds the 10 million to 12 million who landed in the Americas.

Yet the numbers are not what is most significant. The salient fact is the absence of any sustained doctrinal or institutional challenge to the morality and legality of the slave trade within the Islamic world – even where it starkly contradicted the Koranic prohibition on enslaving Muslims. As Bruce Hall shows in his study of Saharan and Sahelian slavery, by the 19th century – when the West was vigorously suppressing chattel slavery – the operative presumption among Maliki jurists was that black Africans, routinely described as “savages”, were enslavable by default, whatever their faith.

There were individuals who objected strenuously to chattel slavery, such as Syrian reformer Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855-1902); but no Muslim opponent of slavery ever forged those concerns into a mass movement. Bernard Lewis’s verdict that “even the most radical Muslim modernists” fell well short of matching the fervour and effectiveness of Western abolitionists retains all its force.

It is therefore unsurprising that Islam’s leading theologians, far from championing abolition, actively resisted it – beginning with the infamous 1855 fatwa, issued with the full authority of Mecca’s Shaykh Jamal, which declared any prohibition of the slave trade “contrary to the holy law of Islam” and any official who attempted to enforce it “lawful to kill”.

Nor is it surprising that Saudi Arabia and Yemen abolished slavery only in 1962, the United Arab Emirates in 1964, Oman in 1970, and Mauritania – after repeated ineffectual measures – in 2007. Moreover, even where slavery was formally abolished, forms of vassalage have remained firmly in place: of the 10 countries with the highest incidence of “modern slavery”, eight are majority-Muslim.

But the resolution does not merely distort history by pretending Islamic slavery didn’t exist. It declares the slave trade “the greatest” crime against humanity ever committed. Although not explicitly stated, a central purpose of this travesty – which converts the horrors of the past into a “suffering Olympics” – is again transparent: to relativise the Holocaust.

It is frankly obscene to degrade moral evaluation into a body count, with medals of ignominy awarded by a show of hands. Yet even in so repulsive a spectacle, realities should have been allowed to intrude. Those realities are well known. Death rates in the Holocaust – whose unrelenting aim was the complete extermination of Jews – were close to or above 90 per cent. So complete was the indifference to fatalities that the German railways were paid whether the Jews being shipped by them lived or died during their transport – and the few who survived the journeys were killed, on average, within days of arrival.

In contrast, as investor Thomas Starke wrote to Captain James Westmore in 1700, “the whole benefit of the voyage lyes in your care of preserving negroes’ lives”. As a result, strenuous efforts were made to ensure slaves remained alive and saleable, including by granting handsome bonuses to captains for high survival rates and imposing stiff penalties for excess mortality.

Although those efforts hardly eliminated the trade’s horrors, they did mean that by the late 18th century, death rates for black slaves on the “middle passage” had declined dramatically, to the point where they were only marginally greater than those for crews. To pretend otherwise is to erase the distinction between exploitation and extermination: for there was nothing in the slave trade even remotely comparable to the systematic mass murder at the heart of the Holocaust.

But to acknowledge those facts – which flatly contradict the assault on the standing of the Holocaust – might have eroded the overwhelming support the resolution secured. And the composition of that support says everything one needs to know about the resolution.

Thus, every one of the 20 countries that have the highest incidence of modern slavery and forced labour cynically voted in its favour; so did all the authoritarian states that participated in the vote, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; and, again with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it received the active backing of every Muslim-majority country.

Yet that is not the real tragedy. Rather, it is that only three Western countries – the US, Israel and Argentina – had the decency to vote against the falsification of history, instead of abstaining, as Australia and the European Union did. Those three were willing to oppose this charade. Why weren’t we?

 

The Predatory Hegemon – how Trump wields American power

In his Global Public Square “take” on CNN last weekend, American commentator Fareed Zakaria discussed political scientist Stephen M. Walt’s recent article in Foreign Affairs: The Predatory Hegemon – how Trump wields American Power. He distilled Walt’s thesis into a phrase at once elegant and accusatory: the United States, he suggested, has drifted from an “enlightened hegemony” – a system in which power was exercised with an eye to legitimacy, stability, and long-term advantage – toward something more immediate, more transactional, and ultimately more predatory.

Walt’s essay gives that intuition a harder edge. He is not merely describing a tonal shift in American foreign policy, but a reorientation of its strategic logic – a change in how power understands itself, justifies itself, and, crucially, sustains itself.

The older model, Zakaria’s enlightened hegemon, was always something of a paradox, a balancing act performed with varying degrees of grace. The United States built a global order that advantaged itself, certainly, but did so by embedding its dominance in institutions, alliances, and norms that others found tolerable, even beneficial. It is tempting to see this as benevolence; it is more accurate to see it as enlightened self-interest, a recognition that power travels further when it is partially disguised as cooperation.

Consider the architecture: NATO as both shield and tether; the Bretton Woods institutions as both stabilisers and amplifiers of American economic influence; open markets that allowed others to prosper while quietly anchoring them within a U.S.-centred system. Even American restraint – selective, inconsistent, sometimes hypocritical – played a role. By not always extracting the maximum possible gain, Washington lowered the incentives for resistance. It made its leadership feel less like domination and more like gravity: inescapable, but not actively oppressive.

Zakaria’s emphasis falls on this temporal discipline. The United States, at its postwar best, accepted short-term costs – trade imbalances, alliance burdens, the irritations of multilateral compromise – in exchange for long-term influence. It invested in a system that would, over time, repay those investments many times over. The wager worked, not perfectly, but well enough: allies aligned, rivals were constrained, and the American-led order acquired a kind of grudging legitimacy.

Walt does not romanticise this past. He is too much the realist for that. He knows the system was riddled with contradictions: interventions justified in the name of norms that were selectively applied, economic openness that coexisted with strategic coercion, ideals that bent under pressure. But – and this is the hinge of his argument – the system’s imperfections did not negate its utility. On the contrary, they were often part of its flexibility. What mattered was that the United States appeared to play by rules it had helped create, and that appearance mattered enormously.

Against this backdrop, Trump’s approach, across both terms, but especially in its more fully articulated second incarnation, appears not as a mere policy adjustment but as a philosophical break. Walt’s term, “predatory hegemony,” is deliberately provocative, but also precise. The United States remains the central power in the system; what changes is how it treats the system itself.

Alliances, in this telling, are no longer strategic communities but balance sheets. NATO becomes a venue for cost-sharing disputes; Asian alliances are framed in terms of payments and protection fees. The language of shared purpose gives way to the language of reciprocity stripped to its transactional core: what are you paying, and what are we getting? There is a certain brutal clarity in this – no more pretence, no more sentimental talk of values – but it comes at a cost. Alliances that once rested on a mixture of interest and trust begin to tilt toward interest alone, and interest, as history reminds us, is a notoriously fickle glue.

In the economic realm, the shift is equally stark. Trade and finance become explicit instruments of leverage, deployed not only against adversaries but against partners. Tariffs are imposed with a freedom that disregards institutional constraints; sanctions proliferate; export controls tighten. Interdependence – once celebrated as a stabilising force – is recast as a field of vulnerabilities to be exploited. The system, in effect, is turned inside out: what was designed to bind becomes a means to coerce.

Zakaria’s gloss on this is telling. He notes that the United States has always used economic power strategically, but that it once did so within a framework that preserved the overall attractiveness of the system. Under a predatory model, that framework erodes. The message sent to the world is no longer “join us and prosper,” but “join us, and be prepared to be squeezed.” The rational response, for others, is not enthusiastic participation but cautious diversification.

Walt’s third line of argument concerns norms and institutions, the often invisible scaffolding of the international order. Here, too, the change is less about abandonment than about downgrading. Agreements become optional, commitments provisional, rules contingent on immediate advantage. The United States does not necessarily withdraw from every institution, but it treats them as tools rather than constraints, to be used when convenient and ignored when not.

Again, Zakaria’s lament is that something subtle but vital is lost in this process: legitimacy as a force multiplier. The old order worked, in part, because others believed – however imperfectly – that it was more than a façade for American power. Strip away that belief, and cooperation becomes thinner, more conditional, more brittle.

All of which leads to Walt’s central concern: that predatory hegemony, for all its apparent toughness, is strategically myopic. It operates on a shortened time horizon, prioritising immediate, tangible gains over diffuse, long-term benefits. In economic terms, it applies a high discount rate to the future. Why tolerate an imbalance today for a payoff tomorrow when you can extract a concession now?

The answer, in the older model, was that the future payoff was larger and more durable. By maintaining a system that others trusted and depended on, the United States ensured a steady stream of influence, cooperation, and alignment. By contrast, predation yields diminishing returns. Allies coerced too often begin to hedge. Partners subjected to pressure seek alternatives. Rivals exploit the cracks.

One might say – stretching the metaphor, but not too far – that enlightened hegemony was a form of cultivation, while predatory hegemony is a form of harvesting. The former assumes renewal; the latter risks depletion.

Walt is particularly attuned to the feedback effects of this shift. By treating allies as clients, the United States encourages them to behave like clients – transactional, calculating, ready to shop around. By weaponising interdependence, it incentivises others to de-risk and decouple, thereby reducing the very leverage Washington seeks to wield. By disregarding norms, it lowers the costs for others to do the same. The hegemon, in short, models the behaviour it will later lament.

Zakaria, for his part, situates this within a broader narrative of American political change. The appetite for the burdens of leadership has waned; the patience required for long-term strategy has thinned; the domestic rewards accrue to visible wins rather than invisible stability. Enlightened hegemony, in this reading, was not just a foreign policy doctrine but a political achievement, sustained by a consensus that no longer holds.

And here the essay acquires a slightly elegiac tone. For what is being described is not merely a shift in tactics but the possible unravelling of a particular idea of order—one in which power and restraint were, if not reconciled, then at least held in productive tension. Walt’s realism strips away nostalgia, but it does not eliminate the sense that something functionally valuable is being lost.

The unresolved question – hovering over both Walt’s analysis and Zakaria’s commentary – is whether this transformation is contingent or structural. Is predatory hegemony a phase, a deviation that can be corrected by a future administration rediscovering the uses of restraint? Or does it reflect deeper currents in American society and politics, suggesting a more permanent recalibration?

If the former, the system may yet be repaired, though not without scars. Trust, once eroded, is slow to rebuild; institutions, once weakened, do not spring back fully formed. If the latter, then the post-1945 order begins to look less like a stable architecture and more like a historical anomaly – a period in which an unusually powerful state chose, for its own reasons, to exercise power with a degree of restraint that history rarely sustains.

The irony. – one that both Walt and Zakaria, in their different registers, seem to appreciate – is that the older model of enlightened hegemony was not naïve but deeply pragmatic. It recognised that in a complex, interdependent world, the most effective way to maintain dominance was often to make that dominance acceptable. Predatory hegemony, by contrast, risks proving that the most direct expression of power is not always the most effective.

And so we return, as these arguments often do, to a question of time. Not simply what the United States can extract today, but what kind of world it is shaping for tomorrow – and whether that world will still, in any meaningful sense, run through Washington.

For now, the shift is unmistakable. The language has changed; the assumptions have shifted; the system is being tested from within. The hegemon remains, formidable as ever. But it no longer quite plays the same game. And the other players, watching closely, are already beginning to adjust their moves – quietly, pragmatically, and with an eye, as ever, to the long term.

Peace brokers

The following picture, featuring as it does the key players in Trump’s transactional diplomacy is an apt illustration of Walt’s thesis.

The “Board of Peace” is in essence a Trumpian confection of narcissism and megalomania, wrapped around what began, one must concede, as a not wholly foolish premise. Announced at Davos between lectures on Europe’s decline and intimidating talk of Greenland’s future, it was offered as a world-historical corrective – a leaner, sharper alternative to the United Nations, capable of doing, as Trump put it, “pretty much whatever we want to do,” albeit now “in conjunction” with the very institution it implicitly rebukes.

That hedge – in conjunction with the UN – betrays both ambition and unease. For all its frustrations, the UN remains the only broadly legitimate architecture for peace-making, its dysfunction less a design flaw than a record of unresolved rivalries. Trump’s instinct is to bypass such encumbrances: to replace the labyrinth with a boardroom, procedure with deal-making, paralysis with will. If peace were merely a coordination problem, this might even work. But peace is never merely procedural.

And the Board of Peace, for all its architectural neatness, rests on far shakier ground – a stage set awaiting actors who may never agree to the script, and a script that assumes conflicts can be edited rather than endured.

A body intended to gather the decisive actors of the age has assembled, thus far, a scattering of small and middle powers, most of them keen to curry Trump”# favour, whilst the big players keep tore distance. The Europeans hover at the edges; China sees no advantage in diluting its influence under a Trump-chaired forum; Russia, a principal source of present disorder, remains undecided about joining the mechanism meant to restrain it. A peace table without the principal enablers and disruptors is not an innovation so much as a rehearsal.

And what of the Board’s  raison d’etre? Gaza and the implementation of Trump’s ambitious and arguably impossible “Twenty Point Plan”. It is there, loitering offstage, the ghost at the feast – unmistakably present in its absence, and as ever, intractable, morally fraught and resistant to shortcuts. Under an “enlightened hegemonic” model, it would demand sustained, often frustrating engagement – a willingness to absorb political cost in pursuit of incremental progress. Under a more predatory or transactional model, it becomes something else: a crisis to be managed, a variable in a broader strategic equation, or, at times, a problem to be worked around rather than through.  See In That Howlong Infinite’s Gaza Sunrise or False Dawn (2) Spectacle or strategy?

What about the venue, the United States Institute of Peace?  This was created in the late Cold War, not as an instrument of policy execution but as a buffer against its excesses: a congressionally funded, ostensibly bipartisan body designed to study conflict, train mediators, convene adversaries, and inject into Washington’s bloodstream a measure of patience. Its board was meant to reflect that mission – drawn from across government, the military, academia, and civil society, combining practitioners with thinkers, hawks with doves, all under the assumption that peace required pluralism, process, and time.

It was, in short, an institutional expression of what Zakaria later calls enlightened hegemony: the idea that American power could be made more durable – more effective, even – by embedding it in norms, procedures, and habits of restraint. It was never glamorous. Its successes were rarely visible. But it represented a wager that the slow, untelevised work of conflict resolution was not ancillary to power, but constitutive of it.

Now place that inheritance alongside the renaming.

To recast the United States Institute of Peace as the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace is not merely to change a sign; it is to alter the centre of gravity. The original name gestures outward- to a national project, even a universal aspiration. The new name turns inward, attaching the idea of peace to a single, highly particular figure. Given Trump’s public persona – combative, transactional, attuned to victory and recognition – the effect is jarring. There is an unmistakable note of narcissistic inscription here, as though peace were not a condition to be cultivated but a brand to be owned.

Layer onto that his long-standing preoccupation with the Nobel Peace Prize- the sense, often voiced, that it is an accolade he ought to have received – and the renaming begins to look like a kind of symbolic compensation. If peace cannot be awarded, it can be appropriated; if it cannot be conferred, it can be named. The irony is not subtle: an institution built to depersonalise the pursuit of peace now bears the name of a man whose approach to conflict has been anything but disinterested.

Into this reframed space step the individuals in the photograph.

At the centre sits Donald Trump, President, whose foreign policy instincts – whatever label one prefers – tilt toward the immediate and the demonstrable. Alliances are assessed in terms of cost and return; diplomacy is valued for the deals it produces; outcomes are to be visible, claimable, ownable. Gaza, in this schema, is less a process to be patiently engaged than a problem that stubbornly resists the kind of resolution that can be announced from a lectern. It is, therefore, both central and strangely unsuited to his method.

To one side, J.D. Vance, Vice President, leans away – his posture almost a visual footnote to his politics. Vance represents a current of scepticism about the entire postwar architecture: alliances as burdens, interventions as misadventures, institutions like the USIP as relics of an overextended America. His interest is not in refining the Board’s work but in questioning its premise of necessity.

Behind them, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, carries the formal responsibility for American diplomacy. His role, traditionally, would align closely with the Board’s ethos: sustaining alliances, managing crises, preserving channels. Yet here he appears slightly off-axis, as though translating between two languages—one institutional, one transactional. Gaza, for him, is not optional; it demands engagement. But the tools available are shaped by a broader shift away from the very processes the Board was designed to support.

Next, Jared Kushner, whose entrée into diplomacy came not through the usual apprenticeships but through proximity and trust. His approach – most visible in the Abraham Accords – privileged state-to-state normalisation and deal-making, often sidestepping the Palestinian question rather than confronting it. Gaza, in that sense, was not resolved but deferred, treated as a complication that could be managed while other, more tractable agreements were pursued.

Beside him, Steve Witkoff, another figure from the world of real estate and finance, reinforces the sense that diplomacy here is being conducted by negotiators rather than stewards. His expertise lies in closing deals, aligning incentives, reading counterparts – skills not irrelevant to diplomacy, but distinct from the slow cultivation of legitimacy and trust that institutions like the USIP were built to foster.

This is, then, a kind of board of directors of the Board of Peace, in composition if not in spirit: a gathering of individuals whose orientations toward conflict and resolution are divergent, even dissonant. Their gazes in the photograph – scattered, non-convergent – capture that lack of shared focus. They are in the same room, under the same banner, but not quite engaged in the same enterprise.

Which brings us back to Walt and Zakaria.

Zakaria’s “enlightened hegemony” lives in the architecture of the institution—in the idea that power can be extended by embedding it in processes others trust. Walt’s “predatory hegemony” is visible in the orientation of the actors – in the preference for leverage over legitimacy, transaction over system, immediacy over patience.

The photograph, in this sense, is not merely illustrative; it is diagnostic.

  • The Board of Peace: conceived as a guardian of process, pluralism, and long-term thinking.
  • The renaming: a shift from institutional ethos to personal branding, from shared endeavour to individual inscription.
  • The individuals: a mix of diplomats, sceptics, and dealmakers, each carrying a different theory of what peace is and how it is achieved.
  • The context of Gaza: a test case that exposes the limits of transactional approaches and the absence – or attenuation – of sustained mediation.

And threaded through it all, the larger question both Walt and Zakaria pose from different angles: whether the United States still believes that its power is best exercised by building systems others will inhabit, or whether it has turned, more decisively, toward extracting advantage within systems it no longer feels bound to sustain.

The Board still sits. The name still proclaims peace – twice over, now, with the addition of a personal signature. But the scene suggests something unsettled: an institution designed for one kind of hegemony now operating within another.

And the eye, moving across the image, cannot quite find a single point of convergence—only a series of individuals, each holding a piece of the argument, while the larger coherence—the thing the Board was meant to supply – remains, like Gaza itself, unfinished, unresolved, and just out of frame.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: selected, tested, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany

Dire straits. The bottleneck that behaves like a universe

Oil tankers, container ships and bulk carriers shimmer all over the horizon to the left of the windswept beach here at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. They have been bottled up in the Persian Gulf ever since the US and Israel launched the war on Iran more than a month ago.  To the right, with the Iranian coast only 65km away, the dark-blue sea is completely empty. Only a handful of vessels a day manage to cross the Strait of Hormuz, down from well over a hundred ­before the war. They take a circuitous route through Iranian territorial waters, often paying the Iranian regime a hefty toll.

Tehran’s ability to control this international waterway, through which one-fifth of the worldwide oil supply used to pass, has become Iran’s biggest leverage against the US, its Gulf neighbours and the global economy. Whether the war ends in a success or defeat for Iran depends first and foremost on whether Tehran emerges from this conflict still holding the strait – and, with it, the keys to the worldwide energy markets.

Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 3 Aptil 2026

What follows is a piece for history tragics – and for all who, metaphorically or intellectually, nostalgically or romantically, still yearn to “go down to the sea in ships and do business in deep waters”. For those who hear, beneath the churn of headlines and hot takes, the older music: the creak of hulls, the logic of tides, the long memory of trade and war written across the surface of the world.

Because when the Strait tightens, when Hormuz flickers from map detail to global anxiety, there is a reflex, almost tidal in itself, to reach backwards. To steady the present with the ballast of the past. The antique mariners Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh, the classical strategists Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder, the catechisms of geopolitics and sea power half-remembered, half-invoked. The old grammar returns: command the sea, command the world.

And yet, while the past is summoned, it does not settle easily over the present. It frays at the edges. It argues back.

Some voices insist on restoring the full weight of history – reminding us that the Persian Gulf was not merely sailed but administered: the Royal Navy’s long vigil, the latticework of protectorates, Aden and Suez as imperial hinges. Sea power, in this telling, was never abstract; it was local, granular, enforced in specific places against specific resistances. Empire did not “command” the sea so much as continuously work it.

Others, just as insistent, suggest the sea’s primacy has already ebbed. Pipelines, railways, overland corridors – the new Silk Roads – quietly subvert the tyranny of chokepoints. Hormuz matters, yes, but not as it once did. The map has thickened; the old determinisms loosen.

And threading through it all – more unsettling than either nostalgia or revision – is a harder recognition: that the balance has tilted. That it is now easier to disrupt the sea than to command it. That a few well-placed risks – mines, missiles, drones, or even the rumour of these can achieve what fleets once guaranteed.

Which is precisely why this moment—and this place—invites a longer gaze. For Hormuz is not merely a crisis point. It is a lens. A narrow passage through which history, strategy, and imagination are forced to pass in close quarters, revealing not just what we think we know about the sea – but how much of that knowledge still holds when the waters grow tight.

And so we follow the thread.

A choke point and a global hinge

The essay, republished below, by English historian and author Peter Francopan turns on an old, almost Elizabethan intuition – Walter Raleigh’s dictum that “whoever commands the sea commands the trade… and so the world” – and asks whether it still holds in the age of drones, pipelines, and petro-politics. The Strait of Hormuz, that narrow, anxious funnel through which a fifth of the world’s oil must pass, becomes his stage: not merely a geographic chokepoint, but a historical echo chamber where empires, from the Portuguese to the British to the Americans, have tested the proposition that control of the sea is control of destiny.

The core argument is deceptively simple. However much globalisation has diversified supply chains, the world remains perilously dependent on a handful of maritime arteries. Hormuz is the most critical of them. Iran, by geography alone, sits with its hand on the tap.

What follows is a kind of strategic paradox. The United States possesses overwhelming naval superiority, yet cannot easily guarantee safe passage. Iran, comparatively weak in conventional terms, can still disrupt—through mines, missiles, drones, and plausible threat alone—the flow of global energy. Control, in other words, has become asymmetrical: it is easier to deny the sea than to command it.

Frankopan folds this into a wider historical arc. Sea power has long structured global order – from the Iberian empires to Pax Britannica to the American century—but it has never been absolute. It is contingent, fragile, and dependent on political will as much as on fleets. The current crisis exposes that fragility. The cost of keeping Hormuz open – economically, militarily, psychologically – may exceed what even a superpower is willing to bear indefinitely.

Layered atop this is his reading of Trump’s confrontation with Iran: a clash driven as much by misapprehension and political impulse as by coherent strategy. The implication (never quite stated, but hovering like heat haze) is that great powers still stumble into old traps—overestimating control, underestimating local resolve.

Obstacle Course. Credit: New York Times

Command of the sea, or command of risk?

If Frankopan writes like the historian he is, the comments read like a dockside argument, a fractured chorus of rum, empire, drones, and Trump all sloshing together.

Several bridle at Francopan’s selectivity. Where, they ask, is the Royal Navy in the Gulf? The British protectorates? Aden? The Portuguese seizure of Hormuz in 1515? There is something almost touching here: a yearning to reinsert imperial continuity into a narrative that feels too compressed, too presentist. History, they insist, is longer – and perhaps more reassuring – than Frankopan allows.

Yet beneath the pedantry lies a point: chokepoints are never just geography; they are administered spaces, historically managed through bases, treaties, and coercion. Hormuz did not simply “matter”—it was made to matter, policed into significance.

A sharper critique comes from those who accuse Frankopan of naval determinism, of succumbing to Mackinder in sea going form. Where, they ask, are the pipelines, the highways of the modern Silk Road? If oil can flow overland, if energy can be rerouted, then the tyranny of chokepoints diminishes. The vulnerability of Hormuz is not just a military problem but a failure of diversification. If the Strait can be “closed,” it is because the world has allowed it to remain indispensable. Overland infrastructure does exist, but not at sufficient scale, nor with sufficient redundancy, to replace maritime flow quickly. The sea remains cheaper, denser, stubbornly dominant. Mackinder haunts the room after all.

Then there is the Trump versus Iran morality play. And here, the thread fractures into familiar ideological lines. One camp sees Trump as reckless, blundering into war without strategy; another as a hard realist confronting an implacable regime. But more interesting than the partisan positions is the shared assumption beneath them: that the conflict must be read through the personality of a single leader. Structural forces – energy dependency, regional rivalries, the logic of deterrence – fade into the background. The theatre of personality displaces the machinery of geopolitics.

Meanwhile, a darker undercurrent runs through several comments: casual talk of forcing the Strait, toppling regimes, even nuclear options. The language slips, almost unconsciously, from analysis into annihilation. One is reminded how easily strategic abstraction can become moral amnesia.

What the article and its commentariat together reveal is not a consensus but a tension – between old frameworks and new realities.

Francopan is right, broadly, that chokepoints still matter. Geography has not been abolished. Hormuz remains a lever capable of moving the world.

But his critics are right, too, that the nature of control has shifted. The age of decisive naval supremacy – Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway – has given way to something murkier. Control is now probabilistic. It lies in deterrence, in risk calculation, in the shadow of what might be done rather than what is done.

Iran does not need to “command” the Strait in Raleigh’s sense. It need only make others doubt that it is safe.

And here the deeper irony emerges. The more globalised the world becomes, the more sensitive it is to disruption at key nodes. Interdependence, that liberal promise, doubles as systemic fragility. A few missiles, a handful of drones, a rumour of mines—and the bloodstream of the global economy clots.

The comments circle this insight without quite naming it. They argue about navies versus pipelines, Trump versus Tehran, Britain versus decline- but beneath it all is a shared unease: that no one, not even the United States, can fully guarantee the openness of the system on which everyone depends.

Raleigh revisited

Raleigh’s maxim survives, but in altered form. To command the sea once meant mastery – fleets, flags, unquestioned passage. Now it means something closer to managing uncertainty, policing risk, absorbing disruption. Or, to invert it (and perhaps this is the real lesson of Hormuz): whoever can unsettle the sea can unsettle the world.

The Strait, narrow and ancient, becomes a kind of TARDIS of geopolitics – small on the map, vast in consequence, containing within it centuries of empire, trade, ambition, and miscalculation. You can sail through it in hours. You can be trapped by it for decades. Hormuz is one of those places where scale misbehaves.

On the chart it is almost an afterthought: a narrow blue incision between Iran and Oman, barely 21 nautical miles at its tightest navigable squeeze. A cartographer’s margin note. You could blink and miss it, the way you might skim over a comma in a long sentence. And yet – inside that comma, the world pauses.

Tankers queue like thoughts that cannot quite be completed. Insurance markets twitch. Futures spike. Admirals rediscover their relevance. Presidents improvise resolve. Somewhere in Delhi or Shanghai, a planner recalculates the cost of keeping the lights on. The Strait is not large, but it contains largeness: economics, empire, anxiety, history – all folded into a channel so narrow that a missile battery on one shore can imagine the other.

That is the TARDIS trick: disproportion. Interior vastness concealed within exterior modesty. A space where time thickens. Because Hormuz is not just a place. – it is an accumulation. Portuguese forts, British gunboats, American carrier groups, Iranian fast boats – all still present in the mind, layered like ghost traffic moving in opposite directions through the same confined lane.
And like the TARDIS, it distorts power. The strong discover their strength is conditional; the weak discover they possess a lever. To command the sea here is less about domination than about enduring the possibility of interruption.

It is gigantically small, metaphorically huge, a bottleneck that behaves like a universe.

In a wide ocean, power projects as a roar – carrier groups, satellite grids, the choreography of dominance. In a narrow strait, the same power ricochets. It echoes, distorts, sometimes even dampens. The voice is still large; the space refuses to carry it cleanly.

Hormuz does this to everyone. It compresses asymmetry into something almost theatrical. A superpower arrives with an orchestra; a regional actor needs only a well-timed cymbal crash – mines, missiles, the rumour of both – and suddenly the symphony falters. Not silenced, but unsettled. Hesitant. Listening to itself.

It tells us less about the decline of hegemony than about the environments in which hegemony operates. Power at sea is expansive; power in a choke point is negotiated, contingent, on the edge

The old imperial instinct – force the passage- still murmurs in the background (you can hear it in the comments: convoy the ships, clear the mines, damn the cost). But the modern world hesitates, because the cost is no longer just ships sunk – it is markets convulsed, alliances strained, escalation spiralling in ways that do not end neatly at the waterline.

Which leaves us with a paradox worthy of the place: the hegemon can still roar – but here, in this narrow theatre, it must decide whether the echo is worth the noise.

In That Howling Infinite, March 2026

Hormuz: Iran’s dire Strait

Command the seas and you command the world

Peter Francopan, Unherd, March 12 2026

Historians these days doubt that Sir Walter Raleigh ever laid down his cloak to stop Queen Elizabeth I from stepping in a puddle. They do agree, though, that he understood the nature and benefit of maritime power. “Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade,” he wrote in A Discourse of the Invention of Ships in the early 17th century. “Whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself”.Raleigh lived in a different era, of course — one that most of us imagine as a time of swashbuckling sailors and risk-taking pirates, when control of the High Seas was a competition between the European states building empires in both the New and Old Worlds.

This was also an age when geography mattered every bit as much as resources. Many of the first European footholds overseas were chosen less for what lay in the ground than for where they sat along the great sea routes that were beginning to bind the world together. The Portuguese seizure of Malacca in 1511 was not about spices growing nearby but about controlling the narrow maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea through which much of Asia’s trade passed.

The same strategic logic shaped the expansion of the British empire. Outposts were established above all because of their position along the world’s shipping arteries. The British occupation of Gibraltar in 1704 secured control over the entrance to the Mediterranean and the vital route between the Atlantic and Europe’s inland sea. In the Caribbean, islands such as Jamaica — seized from the Spanish in 1655 — were major naval and commercial hubs sitting astride the shipping lanes linking the Americas and Europe. Likewise, further south, control of Cape of Good Hope allowed Britain to dominate the maritime passage between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.The empire that Raleigh’s generation started building was not only created through conquest and extraction: it was built through the control of the sea lanes and strategic points that allowed commerce, information and manpower to move across the oceans. The same ports that handled cargo could shelter naval squadrons, repair ships and project force across vast distances. Britain’s empire was fuelled by sugar, silver, slaves and more; but it was built on being able to move these at will across the oceans, and on the islands, harbours and strongpoints that underpinned maritime, economic and imperial power.

These days, we have become used to future-gazers insisting that the future belongs to those who control data and algorithms, or satellites and space rockets, or rare earths and critical minerals. Ships, shipping, and transport networks do not sound quite so exciting, so fresh or so unknown. To a historian, though, in a world that is hyper-connected, logistics are king.

In its heyday, Britain’s reach rested heavily getting the basics right. At Gibraltar, ships entering or leaving the Mediterranean could refuel and undergo repairs, while Malta secured British control of Mediterranean shipping routes. Further east, Aden functioned as a crucial coaling station at the mouth of the Red Sea once steam navigation transformed long-distance travel; or there was Singapore, which, from the early 19th century, grew into a key naval base guarding the approaches between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Each of these places mattered less for what they produced than for the services they provided: coal, water, repairs, provisions, intelligence and protection. Ships could not roam the oceans indefinitely; they required an interconnected chain of harbours capable of maintaining hulls, repairing sails or (later) overhauling, to provision with fresh food and water. Maritime power was not just about ships, captains and crews — but about a dense mesh of locations that were spread out around the world and reinforced each other.

Over time, however, it became easy to forget just how central these routes and nodes were. In the decades after the end of the Cold War, the world entered a period of globalisation underpinned by overwhelming American economic, political and military power — and by the mantra of free trade being the engine of prosperity and the bedrock of the international world order. Attention shifted elsewhere, and strategists and commentators forgot about shipping lanes. Yet as geopolitical competition intensifies and the world moves into a more multipolar era, the importance of the arteries of global commerce has once again become startlingly clear.Maritime transport moves over 80% of goods traded worldwide. Around 11 billion tons of goods are transported by sea each year — roughly one and a half tons per person. Ships carry around two thirds of global oil production, as well as around a fifth of natural gas, moving energy to places where they are most needed. Without global shipping networks, computers can’t be switched on, assembly lines can’t work, and houses can’t be heated.While the crisis in Iran and the Gulf have focused attention on oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and petroleum products, global shipping is fundamental in almost every aspect of daily life. Seaborne trade moves almost two billion tonnes of iron ore per year, with major exporters in countries like Australia, Brazil and South Africa being matched with demand in China, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere. Hundreds of millions of tonnes of bauxite and alumina are sent by sea from mines and processing plants in Guinea, Indonesia and Australia, as are tens of millions of tonnes of copper ores from Chile, Peru and south East Asia.

Global shipping is not just the backbone of international trade; it is crucial in keeping the world fed. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, a UN body, international trade plays a crucial role in supporting global food security by linking food surplus with deficit areas and enabling access to basic food products. 80% of agricultural commodities are transported by sea, with shipping again playing a crucial role in matching “breadbasket regions” with those that suffer from food production deficits.As Sir Walter Raleigh would have recognised, globalisation makes control of the seas more, not less important; as peoples, regions, goods and resources get moved from one part of the planet to another, dependencies rise — and so, therefore, do vulnerabilities. Things that we take for granted are always ones that we should pay special attention to, not least since it never seems to cross people’s mind that small shocks can have major implications.

In the summer of 2011, Thailand experienced catastrophic flooding as a result of unusually high levels of rainfall, which had an enormous impact on global car production. At the time, Thailand was one of the world’s leading producers of hard-disk drives and wiring harnesses for cars, as well as electronics modules. As factories closed because of flooding, the effects spilled over into the global economy. Hard drive prices doubled in a matter of weeks; shortages of parts crippled automotive production not only in Thailand, but across Asia, North America and even Europe. The associated costs ran to tens of billions of dollars.

If that gives one example of the risks that come from the assumption that supply chains are dependable, then another comes from Covid-19. Lockdowns and collapsing industrial demand caused an immediate decline in maritime activity. Global maritime trade volumes fell sharply, with estimates suggesting a reduction of as much as 10% in the first eight months of 2020, representing cargo worth at least $225 billion in trade value — if not considerably more, precipitating an unprecedented logistics crunch.

In the past few days we have seen another classic case of the risks posed by pressure on supply chains. Energy markets have been spooked by the implications of attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf following US and Israeli strikes on Iran, with oil prices almost doubling in a matter of days. But it is shipping prices that have truly gone through the roof. Spot charter rates for LNG carriers are six times larger than they were before 28 February — a rise some industry experts refer to as “unthinkable”. Some charterers are paying as much as 10 times the rate they paid before the attacks on Iran began to secure prompt tonnage because of the scale of the shock.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s key chokepoints, a narrow stretch that connects the Gulf with the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, a crossroads where geology and geography dovetail to create perfect opportunities for disruption.

Bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south, the Strait is one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways. At its narrowest navigable point, the shipping lanes are only a few kilometres wide in each direction, meaning that at a time of conflict — such as today — the ability to restrict shipping is considerable. Considerable volumes of goods pass through the Strait — something that is clear from the fact that Jebel Ali in Dubai is the ninth-busiest port in the world. But Hormuz is more crucial to global energy markets, with around 15 million barrels of oil passing through each day, equivalent to about one-fifth of global petroleum consumption. Other chokepoints are significant; but Hormuz is the most important oil chokepoint in the world.At the moment, almost no shipping is transiting the Strait, with an estimated 1000 vessels waiting for the conflict with Iran to pass. A small handful of ships have sailed through, with several others reported to be trying their luck by either claiming to be Chinese or by turning off transponders that reveal both their location and their true identities. More than a dozen ships have been damaged so far, with Iran saying that British ships are “legitimate targets”.Political leaders have tried to project confidence. Donald Trump said that merchant crews and shipowners simply needed to show “some guts” if they wanted trade to keep moving through the Strait. Yet the reality suggests that courage alone is rarely enough to keep maritime commerce flowing during wartime. Guts are one thing; a US Navy ship being damaged by Iranian mines, missiles or attacks from land is another. For now, then, such are the risks to crews, cargo and hulls that shipping in the Gulf is at a standstill.Just how high the strategic stakes have become is clear from the military deployments now underway. That message has not been lost on Greece, Italy or France — all of which have dispatched warships towards the Gulf to secure maritime traffic and monitor the Strait, although it remains unclear whether or how they will solve the problem of getting traffic moving again. In Britain, there has been fierce criticism of the Royal Navy’s absence from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, but the absence is not imminently solvable. It is the result of the British government’s catastrophic lack of foresight, decades of not investing in the sort of naval forces one needs in this century.Trump has insisted that the shutdown in the Gulf is temporary and that oil, gas and more besides will soon start to flow again. It is typical fighting talk from a president who chose to start a confrontation with Iran because he was not able to understand why the regime in Tehran had refused to “capitulate” to American demands regarding nuclear enrichment, ballistic missile programmes and more.Trump came to office promising never to drag the US into “forever wars”, sneering at the “so-called nation-builders, neocons or liberal nonprofits” from who had inflicted disaster on the Middle East. Now, while Trump and his team work out how to stop Iran from inflicting damage on its neighbours, others must pay the price. India imports the overwhelming majority of its oil and gas by sea, partly because it has access to a limited network of pipelines. So the collapse of shipments from the Gulf is producing an existential crisis: although the US has granted a “temporary waiver” to allow Delhi to buy Russian oil, the facts that the rupee has weakened sharply, and that authorities are reportedly speeding up customs procedures to allow faster unloading, are signs that compression of logistics at sea is already having ripple effects. Moscow emerges as an unexpected beneficiary of the crisis, as the spike in oil and gas prices will provide much-needed relief to a beleaguered economy. Russia’s geopolitical role could be additionally bolstered by the country’s purported long-standing “security concept for the Persian Gulf” as an off-ramp for the US intervention in Iran.The consequences of the current crisis, however, extend well beyond the coming days or even the coming weeks. What we are witnessing is not simply a temporary disruption in the Gulf, but a reminder of a deeper truth about how power works in the modern world. Maritime routes remain the arteries through which prosperity, security and resilience flow. Data, algorithms, satellites and artificial intelligence may dominate the language of the 21st-century economy, but they still depend on the movement of physical goods across oceans. Microchips require minerals, energy and specialised manufacturing equipment that must be transported. Data centres require copper, aluminium, rare earths and vast amounts of energy infrastructure. Without ships and secure sea lanes, even the most advanced digital economy quickly runs into very practical limits. Power is and always has been about logistics.For Britain in particular, this requires a series of profound shifts. The protection of shipping routes is already a central strategic task. The Gulf is one theatre where the risks are currently obvious, but it is far from the only one. The North Atlantic and the High North are rapidly emerging as arenas of growing geopolitical competition as melting Arctic ice opens new routes and as submarine cables, energy infrastructure and shipping lanes become ever more exposed to interference and disruption.These are not challenges that can be addressed through strategy documents or policy papers; they require investment in ships, in platforms, in training and in the infrastructure that allows maritime forces to operate effectively across long distances. They also require the rebuilding of the kind of interconnected networks of ports, facilities and partnerships that once underpinned Britain’s global reach. In an increasingly multipolar world — one in which predation, risk-taking and opportunism are often rewarded — maritime resilience will become a defining measure of national strength.In that sense, the current crisis offers a glimpse of the future. Control and protection of shipping routes is key to stability, to reduction of risk and to long-term national resilience. The resources on which new economies depend may have changed, technologies may have evolved and ships may look different. But the underlying reality remains exactly the same as when Raleigh wrote four hundred years ago: whoever commands the sea commands far more than the sea itself.

Peter Frankopan is the author of The Silk Roads (2015), The New Silk Roads (2018), and The Earth Transformed (2023). He is also a Professor of Global History at Worcester College, Oxford

A curated selection of comments from Unherd readers

This includes everything that carries an argument, stripped of noise but not over-pruned. There was a lot buried in that thread once one scraped away the rhetorical noise. Francopan’s essay and the comments rehearse empire, contest strategy, litigate politics, invoke technology, argue personality. They reach for certainty and find, instead, contingency.
Here they are:

Historical framing matters. Analyses of maritime power that ignore Britain’s long role in the Persian Gulf, its protectorates, and control of trade routes through Aden and Suez are incomplete. Control of sea lanes has always been exercised locally, even when its effects are global.

There is a fundamental tension between classical naval theory and modern infrastructure realities. Traditional doctrines of sea power emphasise chokepoints, yet pipelines, rail corridors, and overland routes increasingly challenge that dominance. Disruption of maritime trade today may reflect failures of diplomacy and diversification as much as limits of military power.
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is clear, but control is asymmetric. It is easier to threaten shipping than to secure it. A weaker power can impose risk without achieving dominance, using missiles, drones, and dispersed systems that are difficult to eliminate.

Modern warfare reinforces this asymmetry. Low-cost technologies can disrupt high-value assets, raising questions about the long-term viability of traditional force projection. At the same time, countermeasures are evolving, suggesting an ongoing cycle of adaptation.The scale of resources required to secure global shipping is immense. Sustained convoy operations would demand naval capacity that is not readily available. Even if assembled, such efforts would be costly and unlikely to restore previous economic conditions quickly.Alternative strategies exist but are slow to implement. Expanding pipelines, rerouting supply chains, and hardening vessels can reduce vulnerability, but require long-term investment and coordination.

Many states failed to prepare despite the predictability of such a crisis.There is deep disagreement over the nature of the current conflict. Some view it as a necessary confrontation with a regime that threatens regional and global stability. Others see a lack of clear objectives, inconsistent strategy, and the risk of open-ended escalation.The question of escalation remains unresolved. One side retains capacity to intensify, while the other relies on disruption. Proposals for decisive action raise further uncertainties about feasibility, consequences, and post-conflict stability.

Regime survival is interpreted differently. Some argue that mere survival constitutes success under pressure; others contend that survival after severe degradation would represent strategic defeat.Geopolitical decision-making often operates without clear or fixed end states. Objectives may shift in response to opportunity, reflecting the contingent nature of strategy rather than coherent long-term planning.

Historical analogies are widely used but often misleading. Claims of past maritime dominance are contested, with evidence that control has always been partial and constrained by other factors such as air power and competing theatres of war.

Debate over Western power reveals competing narratives. Some emphasise decline, overstretch, and lack of strategic coherence. Others point to enduring capabilities and the need for renewed investment, particularly in naval forces.

The scale of global security challenges exceeds the capacity of individual states. Effective responses likely require collective action, yet coordination remains difficult and politically constrained.

New vulnerabilities complicate traditional strategy. Subsea infrastructure, including data cables, represents a vast and exposed network that is difficult to defend, illustrating the expanding scope of strategic risk.

Legal frameworks exist but are contested in practice. International law mandates freedom of navigation, yet interpretations of neutrality and belligerency vary, particularly in complex conflicts.

Economic interdependence amplifies the consequences of disruption. Even limited interference with key trade routes can trigger wider global effects, including energy shocks and recessionary pressures.

At root, the issue is no longer simply control of the sea. The emerging reality is a system where disruption, deterrence, and alternative routing shape outcomes as much as traditional dominance.

What’s in a word? A world of meaning and of pain

And the words that are used for to get the ship confused
Will not be understood as they’re spoken
Bob Dylan, When the Ship Comes in

When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty tells Alice, with the serene arrogance of the ideologue, “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

State governments weigh the prohibition of potentially inflammatory phrases; lawyers parse syllables; activists insist that what is heard is not what is meant, and what is meant is not what is said. The words hover, untethered from consequence, yet curiously heavy with it. And this is where Lewis Carroll, with his disarming Edwardian whimsy, begins to feel less like a children’s author and more like a diagnostician. Alice, still tethered to an older moral physics, asks the only sensible question: whether words can, in fact, be made to mean so many different things. The answer – never quite resolved in Wonderland is being tested here and now on our streets, in own legislatures, and on our social media  feeds. For if words can be made infinitely flexible, then meaning itself becomes negotiable; and if meaning is negotiable, then so too are responsibility and harm.

More than words can say …

We like to imagine that words live quietly in dictionaries, disciplined by etymology and tamed by definition. But they do not live there. They live in history. And history leaves fingerprints.

So, what’s in a word? A root, yes. A history. A memory. A strategy. Sometimes a slur. Sometimes a lament. Often, a rhetorical shortcut. Occasionally a doorway into understanding. We pretend words are neutral. They are not. They are histories. They are wounds. They are strategies. They are prayers. They are threats. They are pleas.

What’s in a word? Enough to start a war. Enough to end a conversation. Enough, if handled carefully, to begin one. The question is not simply what a word means. It is what it does. Does it illuminate complexity, or obscure it? Does it invite argument, or pre-empt it? Does it name suffering without erasing another’s?

Words are fall differentially upon the tongue and the ears; words which some see only as incitement and which the others see only resistance. And yet, these words did not come out of nothing. They arose from lived experience. Palestinians do experience dispossession. Israelis do experience existential threat. Jews carry a historical memory of annihilation that makes the word genocide resonate differently in their ears. Palestinians carry a memory of erasure that makes Nakba less metaphor than inheritance. Each community carries memory as identity. To police to and sanction vocabulary without acknowledging origin and memory is to misunderstand both.

To study a language is to develop a kind of double hearing. You recognise when metaphor shades into innuendo—and when it darkens further into menace.

To study a language is to learn when freedom names a horizon – and when it licenses the powerful to act without restraint. To notice when peace is an aspiration – and when it is a performance designed to defer justice. To recognise when security protects life – and when it expands to govern it; when it names legitimate protection – and when it justifies suffocating control. To feel when homeland gathers memory and when it redraws the map to exclude others. To understand when return is a longing—and when it becomes an argument that displaces those already there.

To study a language is to hear when muqamawwa – resistance – signals dignity – and when it becomes a script that traps a people inside permanent defiance. To know that sumud – steadfastness—can describe dignified endurance and also calcify into the romanticisation of endless struggle. To detect when tadhāmon solidarity – binds people together—and when it flattens complexity into slogan. To recognise when itishhad – martyrdom – honours loss – and when it recruits the living into the service of the dead. To hear when terror names violence—and when it is stretched to delegitimise any form of opposition.

To study a language is to hear when history explains—and when it is curated to absolve.

For years I have studied Arabic – and its roots and patterns: how three consonants generate a constellation of meanings. And I have studied Middle Eastern history with more than academic curiosity – not as spectator sport but with what I would called metaphorical “skin in the game.” Words like jihad, intifada, nakba, aliyah, ‘awda, sumud, words that now ricochet across social media feeds and protest placards, are not abstractions or exotic imports to me. They are layered. Sedimented. They carry centuries in their syntax and sentiment. They are lived terms, argued over, felt in the mouth. And so when someone asks “What’s in a word?” I cannot pretend the answer is neutral.

Intifada. From nafada – to shake off, to shake free. Dust from a cloak. Subjugation from a people. The metaphor is physical, almost domestic. Yet in common Arabic usage, it implies resistance and uprising, and neither are peaceful or passive. In Israeli memory the word is fused to sirens, shrapnel, blown-out windows. It is impossible to hear it without recalling the Second Intifada’s exploding buses and cafés, bloody streets and scattered body parts. So when someone chants “globalise the intifada,” they may imagine solidarity with resistance; others hear a call that premises funerals. The dictionary definition is technically correct. It is also profoundly incomplete. It does not arrive alone; it brings its dead with it.

Or al Nakba. In ordinary Arabic, a misfortune. A bad year. But in Palestinian consciousness it has fossilised into 1948 – villages depopulated, olive groves left untended, families scattered, deeds and keys preserved like heirlooms. It is no longer a generic calamity; it is The Catastrophe. Say it in Ramallah and you evoke dispossession. Say it in western Jerusalem and you may hear, in reply, the memory of a war launched to strangle a newborn state. 1967 is referred to as al Naksa, the setback.

And then there is jihad — perhaps the most mistranslated word in modern political discourse. Its root, jahada, means to strive, to exert oneself. Classical Islamic thought distinguishes between inner moral striving and outward struggle that can be intellectual, and yes, armed defence under defined conditions. Yet modern movements – from anti-colonial insurgencies to nihilistic terror groups – have narrowed and weaponised it. The word has travelled. It has acquired passengers it did not originally carry. To deny that is to be naïve. To reduce it solely to “holy war” is equally ignorant.

Al ‘Awda – the return – carries a weight for Palestinians comparable to the resonance of intifada or nakba. It is not a mere political slogan; it is a moral, legal, and emotional claim bound up with exile, memory, and inheritance and the enduring hope, however fraught, of returning to one’s ancestral land. For Israelis, the concept often triggers apprehension, a fear that the abstract ideal of return could translate into demographic and existential challenge, potentially threatening the state itself. Like intifada or nakba, the word carries histories and futures simultaneously: one side sees longing and justice, the other sees danger.

Hebrew political vocabulary is no less charged. Aliyah – ascent – frames immigration as spiritual elevation. Ge’ulah -redemption – maps theology onto statehood. Am Yisrael Chai – Let Israel Live – evokes covenant, not population. Political vocabulary hums with biblical resonance. It is impossible to excise theology from nationalism in a land where scripture is mapped onto soil.

The power of these words lies not in dictionary meaning, but in the lived and imagined consequences each community projects onto them. So when commentators insist that “intifada just means struggle,” or that “Zionism just means Jewish self-determination,” they are not wrong linguistically. They are incomplete historically. Words do not live in morphology alone. They live in memory.

Let’s cast our etymological web wider and delve deeper in our dictionary and examine words that ricochet across the howling internet in these troubled times. Genocide. Ethnic cleaning. Apartheid. Settler-colonialist. Terrorist. Resistance. Each carries not only denotation but detonation and accusation. Each holds an argument inside a noun. Each is more than description; but also a moral verdict disguised as vocabulary. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck called such terms Kampfbegriffe – battle-words. Words of iron forged in particular historical furnaces, hardened by trauma, and redeployed not merely to describe reality but to shape it.

The same dynamic now saturates discussion of Israel–Palestine. Let’s not pretend that careful language will resolve a conflict this old, this layered, this saturated with grief. But careless language can only make things worse.

Call Israel a “settler-colonial state or an apartheid state” and you situate it in the moral lineage of Algeria, Rhodesia and Pretoria. Call Hamas’ October 7 assault “resistance” and you shift the frame from massacre – to revolt, or to shift the timeframe, to pogrom, the Russian word for destruction, now interpreted as referring to the organised massacres of a particular ethnic group – which, ironically, precipitated the first settlement of European Jews in what was to become Palestine. Call Gaza “genocide” and you summon Auschwitz – whether you intend to or not. Call protesters “terror sympathisers” and you evacuate the possibility of grief motivating them at all. Each move does moral work before the evidence is even considered.

It is here, amid the discourse of colonialism and statehood, that the word genocide warrants careful attention. Unlike settler-colonial or apartheid, which describe systems of domination and segregation, genocide describes intent – the deliberate aim to destroy a people as such. It is not simply a scale of death; it is a moral calculus applied to the machinery of annihilation. To deploy it is to summon not only bodies but histories, to conjure not only numbers but the moral shadow cast by deliberate erasure. In debates over land, displacement, and occupation, it is tempting to apply the term as an ethical accelerant, to compress outrage into a noun. Yet to do so responsibly requires rigor: assessment of intent, systematic targeting, and legal definition. Without that, the word risks inflation, becoming a rhetorical hammer rather than a precise lens. Each word narrows the moral aperture.

And yet, Genocide” now circulates online as hashtag and chant. It trends. It compresses argument into a single, morally incandescent noun. For many who use it in the Gaza context, it is less a legal claim than an expression of horror at the scale of devastation. It is a cry. But cries, once repeated often enough, harden into verdicts.

In Australia, we are hardly innocent of this. We live in a country still wrestling with its own founding vocabulary: terra nullius, invasion, genocide, reconciliation, Voice. These are still contested. We know – or should know – that words can both clarify and inflame. To call Australia “founded on genocide” may be defensible within certain scholarly frameworks; it is also rhetorically maximalist. It shocks the moral nerve. That shock may awaken conscience – or entrench defensiveness. Language is never inert. Words do not merely describe history; they frame it. They allocate blame. They assign virtue. They shape identity.

In That Howling Infinite has spent months untangling these labels. Is Israel a settler-colonial state? Does apartheid apply, and if so, where? Does genocide cross the threshold from metaphor into actionable accusation? Each term compresses arguments into a noun. It performs moral work before the debate even begins.

That compression is seductive. We prefer our tragedies simple: one culprit, one origin story, one clean fingerprint. Words that arrive pre-loaded with moral clarity spare us the labour of nuance. They allow passion and empathy to outrun reason and understanding – which, in an age of instant reaction, they reliably do.

Historical illiteracy compounds the problem. The conflict is older than most of its loudest commentators. Its history is layered with Ottoman legacies, British mandates, partition plans, UN resolutions, wars declared and undeclared, refugees, intifadas, failed peace processes, withdrawals, rockets, settlement blocs, religious revivals, and fractured leaderships on both sides. Yet online discourse flattens this into memes, and to pretend this can be reduced to a meme is historical illiteracy A map. A slogan. A 30-second clip untethered from context. Algorithms reward the sharpest edges. The most incendiary noun travels furthest. Nuance, by contrast, is penalised. It does not trend. It does not fit neatly into a caption. I worry about the generational shift in how these debates unfold. Previous eras had gatekeepers – flawed, certainly – but also editors who demanded sourcing, historians who insisted on chronology. Now discourse is democratised and accelerated. A meme outruns a monograph. A slogan outruns a syllabus.

The language used evolves accordingly. Rhetorical shortcuts proliferate. “From the river to the sea.” “Open-air prison.” “Terror state.” “Colonial entity.” “Death cult.” These phrases are not random; they are engineered for virality. Each word comes preloaded, historical analogies that compress decades into chantable cadences. But chants and slogans compress complexity. They must; that is their function. And that compression distorts: two national movements, two historical traumas, two competing narratives of return and belonging, reduced to a rhyme shouted through a megaphone.

And then there are the slurs: the truncations and code-words. For example, “Zio.” A syllable masquerading as political shorthand yet unmistakably functioning as ethnic hostility. Its power lies partly in deniability. It skirts the boundary of explicit antisemitism while retaining its charge. Deniable enough to evade sanction, sharp enough to wound. But we should be intellectually honest: this phenomenon is not one-directional. The same phenomenon occurs in reverse when “Islamist” becomes a catch-all smear for Muslim political expression, or when “pro-Palestinian” is lazily equated with antisemitic intent. The grammar of dehumanisation is bipartisan: collapsing an entire spectrum of political and religious identity into a caricature designed to foreclose engagement.

So, what, finally, is in a word?

Not merely meaning, but momentum. Not simply definition, but direction. Words do not sit still; they lean. They incline us toward certain conclusions before we have done the work of thinking. They smuggle history into the present tense and call it common sense. They arrive already freighted—with grief, with fear, with memory, with accusation—and we, often unwittingly, become their couriers.

The temptation, always, is to choose the word that does the most work for us—the one that collapses ambiguity, that secures the moral high ground in a single utterance. But that is precisely where language becomes most dangerous: when it relieves us of the burden of holding two truths at once; when it permits us to name one suffering in a way that erases another; when it transforms description into verdict before evidence has even entered the room.

What we do when we misuse words is not trivial. We erode precision. We inflame passions. We collapse law into slogan. We substitute moral theatre for argument. And perhaps most dangerously, we teach ourselves that the loudest noun is the truest one.

History suggests otherwise. It is rarely the loudest words that endure, but the most exacting; not the most incendiary, but the most honest about complexity. The archive is not kind to slogans. It remembers, instead, where language clarified—and where it concealed.

To speak about Israel and Palestine—indeed, to speak about any conflict so saturated with history—is to enter a linguistic minefield in which every term has a past and every past has its partisans. There is no neutral vocabulary here. Only more or less careful usage. Only degrees of awareness. Only the choice, conscious or otherwise, between illumination and incitement.

The task, then, is not to purify language—that is impossible—but to discipline ourselves in its use. To resist the seduction of the Kampfbegriff when it outpaces our understanding. To ask, each time we reach for a word: what history does it carry? What work is it doing? What—and who—does it leave out?

Because if words can start wars, they can also foreclose the possibility of ending them. And if they are capable, at their best, of opening a space for understanding, then that space is narrow, fragile, and easily collapsed by carelessness.

Language will not resolve this conflict. But without care in language, we will not even be able to speak about it honestly.

Coda

To study a language, in the end, is not simply to acquire vocabulary. It is to acquire conscience. It is to hear the echo behind the utterance—the ghost in the grammar. To recognise that every word, especially here, is a small archive: of exile and return, of fear and defiance, of prayer and propaganda. To speak, then, is to handle those archives with a certain humility, aware that one is always, in some sense, trespassing on someone else’s memory.

History suggests otherwise than our instincts: the loudest noun is rarely the truest one. The archive keeps its own counsel. It remembers where language clarified – and where it concealed.

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the shadow.

Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow

And in that shadow – linguistic, historical, human – words do their quiet, consequential work.

Postscript

While writing this essay – contemplating the slipperiness of words and widening the lens to the long weather system that has carried them into our mouths – I found myself returning to a simple, disquieting observation: it is no coincidence that so many of the words we have been parsing are Arabic.

It is not that Arabic words per se have become uniquely prone to distortion, nor that there is anything intrinsic to the language that invites what might loosely be called “gaslighting.” What I was circling, rather, is something more historically contingent – and more revealing.

Many of the most contested political ideas of the present moment – intifada, shahid, muqawama, even place-bound words and phrases that travel into English unchanged – are being transmitted untranslated, or only half-translated, into Western discourse. They arrive carrying dense, layered meanings shaped by decades (sometimes centuries) of conflict, theology, nationalism, and lived experience. And then, almost immediately, they are flattened, reframed, or strategically reinterpreted within a different moral and political vocabulary.

In other words, the instability I am sensing is not linguistic but translational – and beyond that, political.

There is, of course, a history to this. One thinks of how words like jihad were narrowed in Western usage to mean “holy war,” their broader theological and ethical dimensions quietly stripped away; or conversely, how certain terms are defended as benign by appeal to their most anodyne, etymological meanings, while bracketing how they are actually heard in context. The same word may present itself as metaphor, slogan, prayer, or threat – depending on who is speaking, who is listening, and what work the word is being made to do.

It is here that the instinct about Wonderland clicks back into place. The move is not uniquely Arabic; it is Humpty Dumpty’s move: control the meaning, and you control the moral frame. But the reason Arabic terms are so prominent in this moment is that the conflicts which have globalised our discourse – Israel–Palestine above all, but also Iraq, Syria, and the wider post-9/11 landscape – have carried those words into English without fully carrying their context with them. They become, in effect, linguistic migrants: visible, charged, and often unmoored.

So yes, it does say something about the modern world. Not that Arabic is uniquely problematic, but that we are living in an age where conflicts travel faster than comprehension, and where words – lifted from one history and dropped into another – become sites of struggle in their own right.

These words have crossed worlds. And in crossing, they have become unmoored enough to be contested, claimed, and weaponised. That unmooring creates opportunity: for some, to soften; for others, to sharpen; for many, to obscure.

It says something, too, about our times – about the way the Middle East has not merely intruded upon but come to dominate political, and indeed social, discourse for more than half a century; at least for as long as I have been paying attention, which is to say, for as long as I have been trying to make sense of the world and finding the same landscape returning, again and again, like a half-remembered refrain.

Let us take June 1967 as a point of departure. For a few brief weeks, the world’s gaze lifted from the humid, grinding quagmire of Indochina and fixed instead upon the sudden, almost biblical drama unfolding in the not-so-Holy Land – a war measured in days but reverberating in decades. Territory shifted, certainly; but something else shifted too: attention, imagination, the sense that this small, overburdened strip of earth had become a stage upon which the modern world would repeatedly rehearse its anxieties.

The focus has waxed and waned since, but it has never truly moved on. 1973 Oil Crisis and the realisation that the region’s tremors could rattle the global economy. The long, theatre-of-the-absurd years of hijackings and televised terror. Camp David’s fragile choreography. The Iranian Revolution, bending time backward and forward at once. The Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan. Lebanon’s fracturing. The attritional horror of the Iran–Iraq War. Kuwait and the return of great-power spectacle. Oslo’s brief, luminous promise. Then 9/11, collapsing distance altogether, followed by Afghanistan again, Iraq again – the sense of recursion, of history caught in a tightening loop.

Then the Arab Spring – hope flickering, briefly, before giving way to Syria’s abyss, to ISIS and its grotesque theatre, to the multiplication rather than the resolution of fault lines. And through it all – before it, beneath it, after it – Israel and Palestine remain: a permanent fixture in the taxonomy of torment, sans pareil, the conflict that resists conclusion, that absorbs language and returns it sharpened, refracted, or hollowed out.

It is from this long saturation – this decades-long immersion in images, slogans, translations, and retranslations – that our present arguments about words emerge. They are not sudden. They are sedimentary. Each phrase we now parse carries within it the residue of these moments, these crises, these unfinished stories.

Which is to say: when we argue about what a word means, we are never only arguing about language. We are arguing about history – compressed, contested, and still very much alive.

In That Howling Infinite, March 2026

For more on the Middle East in in That Howling Infinite, see A Middle East Miscellany.

See also, Moral capture, conditional empathy and the failure of shock, Standing on the high moral ground is hard work! ‘ Same old stone, different rock. What’s in a word?, Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty

A Lexicon of Disturbing Language

(words that travel intact, and arrive with their weather still clinging to them)

What follows is not a neutral glossary – if such a thing were even possible here – but a kind of field manual for words that arrive already aflame, freighted with history, sharpened by use, carrying within them entire arguments about the world. They are not merely descriptive; they are performative. To utter them is to place a piece on the board, to tilt the frame, to summon histories that do not politely remain in the past.

Some are legal terms that have slipped their moorings and now drift through polemic. Some are borrowed intact from Arabic or Hebrew, carrying their original cadence like an echo that translation cannot quite still. Others are modern coinages – hybrids, sometimes ungainly – that try to compress entire arguments into a single, breathless label. And a few are names – of places, of movements – that have become arguments simply by being spoken.

What unites them is not agreement but charge. They are contested, elastic, often weaponised. They do not just describe reality; they compete to define it. They do not behave like ordinary vocabulary. They travel across languages without quite translating; they narrow, expand, harden, or blur as they move. They do not simply describe events; they encode perspectives on those events. To use them is not merely to speak—it is to situate oneself, however unconsciously, within a contested moral and historical landscape.

I. Catastrophe & Historical Singularity

  • Nakba (النكبة) – literally “catastrophe.” In Arabic it could name any disaster; in English it has hardened into the disaster—1948—fixed, immovable, dense with exile and keys kept as heirlooms. It no longer describes; it declares.
  • Naksa (النكسة) – “the setback,” 1967. A softer word for a different kind of loss—diminution rather than rupture. Its retention signals an internal Arab chronology, slightly askew from the familiar “Six-Day War.”
  • Shoah (שואה) – “catastrophe” or “destruction,” used specifically for the Holocaust. Left untranslated in part to preserve reverence, in part to resist the easy metaphorisation that “Holocaust” sometimes invites.
  • Holocaust – from the Greek “burnt offering” to the Nazi genocide of the Jews, and then outward into broader usage. Its expansion has given it reach—and thinned its edges.
  • Pogrom (погром) – a Russian word meaning violent devastation, carried into English with the memory of anti-Jewish attacks in Tsarist lands. “Riot” feels too incidental; pogrom carries its own geography.

II. Legal Terms, Moral Weapons

  • Genocide – a word forged in law (Lemkin, 1944), precise in definition—intent to destroy a group. In public discourse, however, it often arrives as accusation before judgment, its moral force outrunning its legal threshold.
  • Ethnic Cleansing – deliberately imprecise, emerging particularly from the Balkan Wars of the Nineties, but predating that in Türkiye after WWI,  Eastern Europe at the end of WWII, and I dia and Pakistan in 1948. Its vagueness is its power: suggestive, elastic, difficult to refute without seeming to concede.
  • Apartheid – Afrikaans for “apartness,” rooted in South Africa but now globally mobile. Once invoked, it frames the system under discussion—analogy and indictment in a single stroke.
  • Colonialism / Settler-Colonialism – analytic frameworks that, once applied, tend to fix the narrative: indigenous and invader, permanence and removal. Illuminating, but often closing off alternative readings.

III. Resistance, Struggle, Sanctification

  • Intifada (انتفاضة) – “shaking off,” like dust from a sleeve. In English it is no longer generic; it points almost unavoidably to the Palestinian uprisings of 1987 and 2000. The word carries images—stones, tyres, and checkpoints—and a moral ambiguity that shifts with the speaker.
  • Muqāwama (مقاومة) – “resistance,” yet left untranslated to avoid the bland universality of the English. Muqāwama signals a particular ideological and regional framing—Hezbollah, Hamas, dignity under pressure.
  • Ṣumūd (صمود) – “steadfastness,” though the translation feels thin. Not an event but a posture: staying, enduring, tending olive trees under threat. Translate it, and it risks becoming sentiment; leave it, and it remains an ethic.
  • Jihad (جهاد) – “struggle,” spanning the inner and the outer. In English, that range has narrowed sharply; the word arrives intact, its semantic field diminished, sharpened toward violence.
  • Shahid (شهيد) – “witness” or “martyr.” It does not merely describe death; it consecrates it. In English, its retention often signals an attempt to preserve that sacred charge.

IV. Faith, Doctrine, and Internal Tensions

  • Kāfir (كافر) – “unbeliever,” literally one who “covers” truth. A theological category that, in polemical use, hardens into insult—a boundary drawn sharply between inside and out.
  • Fitna (فتنة) – “discord,” “trial,” “temptation.” Historically tied to early Islamic civil strife, it carries a deep anxiety about internal fracture. To invoke it is often to warn: this way lies chaos.
  • Taqiyya (تقية) – a specific Shi’a doctrine allowing concealment of belief under threat. In English polemic, however, it has been stretched well beyond its doctrinal bounds—transformed into a generalised suspicion of deception.
  • Hudna (هدنة) – “truce.” Yet when retained in Arabic, it often implies something tactical, provisional—a pause rather than a peace.
  • Fatwa (فتوى) – a legal opinion within Islamic jurisprudence, part of everyday religious life. In English, especially post-Rushdie, it has narrowed into something darker—almost synonymous with a death sentence.

V. Identity, Ideology, and the Politics of Naming

  • Zionism – a 19th-century movement for Jewish self-determination. In English today, it rarely sits neutrally: liberation for some, colonialism for others. The word refracts entirely different histories.
  • Zionist – once descriptive, now often accusatory. Its meaning depends less on definition than on tone.
  • “Zio” – a clipped, abrasive form that has shed any descriptive function. It lands as insult, not argument.
  • Aliyah (עלייה) – “ascent.” More than immigration; a movement upward, spiritually and historically. The English equivalent feels earthbound by comparison.
  • Al-‘Awda (العودة) – “the return.” In ordinary Arabic, a simple going back; in Palestinian discourse, the Right of Return—dense with memory, law, and longing. It sits beside the mafteah (مفتاح, the key), object turned symbol, continuity held in the hand.
  • Settler – on its face neutral; in contested زمین, it hardens into accusation. Biography collapses into ideology.
  • Hilltop Youth – a specific Israeli subculture that has become shorthand for a certain strain of ideological extremity and violence – detail turned symbol.

VI. Totalising Labels & Historical Echoes

  • Nazi – historically precise, rhetorically promiscuous. Now shorthand for absolute evil, its overuse both amplifying and diluting its meaning.
  • Fascist – from Mussolini’s doctrine to a generalised insult; elasticity has eroded precision.
  • “Islamo-fascist” – a hybrid, polemical term attempting to map European categories onto Islamist movements. It says as much about the speaker’s framework as the subject.

VII. Organisations as Symbols

  • Hamas (حماس) – “zeal,” and acronym for Ḥarakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya. In English, it does not settle: government, militia, resistance, terrorism – meanings shift with the voice that utters it.
  • Hezbollah (حزب الله) – “Party of God.” Political party, armed movement, regional proxy; the name itself already contains a claim to divine alignment.
  • Da’ish (داعش) – acronym for al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-‘Irāq wa al-Shām (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). Its use, rather than “ISIS,” often signals rejection; the group dislikes the term, so naming becomes a small act of defiance.

VIII. Circulating & Mediated Words

  • Fawda (فوضى) – “chaos,” but after its journey through Hebrew and global television (Fauda), it now carries a particular aesthetic: kinetic, morally ambiguous, intelligence-driven disorder. Chaos, but stylised.
  • Blitz – from Blitzkrieg, lightning war. In English, softened into metaphor—“media blitz”—yet still faintly haunted by sirens over London.

IX. Place as Argument

  • Al-Aqsa (الأقصى) – “the farthest.” Rarely translated, because the Arabic name carries sanctity, geography, and sovereignty in one breath.
  • Al-Quds (القدس) – “the holy,” the Arabic name for Jerusalem. Its use signals perspective: a city not just inhabited, but claimed, sanctified, contested.
  • Gaza (غزة) – a place-name that has become a metonym: war, siege, suffering, المقاومة. Geography turned symbol.
  • Sabra and Shatila (صبرا وشاتيلا) – no longer merely locations; the names themselves are the event. To say them is to accuse.

Coda: The Grammar of Conflict

What began as a request to a Chat GPT – to gather, sort, define – ends, rather predictably, in something the machine cannot quite resolve. Because the instability is not in the definitions; it is in us. In the way we reach for these words, load them, deploy them, defend them. In the way a term like genocide or Zionist or shahid can close down conversation as quickly as it opens it.

These are not just words. They are positions. Each one carries a shadow text: a history remembered, a grievance asserted, a legitimacy claimed or denied. They compress time, flatten complexity, and yet—paradoxically—expand into entire moral universes the moment they are spoken.

And so the lexicon does not settle the argument; it reveals its terrain.

Between the word and the world, as ever, falls the shadow. And it is in that shadow—where meaning slips, hardens, fractures, reforms—that these battle words continue to do their work, long after they have left the mouth that uttered them.

Lay these words out like this and a pattern emerges. Some words narrow as they travel (jihad, intifada). Some harden into proper nouns (Nakba, Shoah). Some expand until they blur (fascist, genocide). Some are left untranslated to preserve their charge (ṣumūd, muqāwama, al-‘awda).MNone of them are innocent.

They do not simply describe the world; they position the speaker within it. Each word a small act of alignment, a quiet declaration of where one stands. Between what a word once held, and what it is now made to carry, between language as description, and language as argument, there falls that same, shifting shadow. And it is there, in that narrow space, that these words continue to live, and to do their work.

These words do not behave like ordinary vocabulary. They are anchored in place but mobile in use, precise in origin but elastic in deployment. They compress centuries into syllables, turning speech into stance.

To speak them is rarely innocent. Each carries a shadow text- unspoken assumptions, moral alignments, historical claims. They do not simply describe reality; they compete to author it.

And so the disturbance lies here: between what a word once meant, what it now does, and what we need it to prove. In that gap – narrow, shifting, and charged – language itself becomes a kind of battleground, where meaning is not fixed but fought over, again and again.

In That Howling Infinite, March 2026

The following is an essay published in The Australian by economist and commentator Henry Ergas, whom we have republished often in In That Howling Infinite.

Henry Ergas’s essay is essentially an argument about language, memory, and the way slogans prepare the emotional ground for violence long before violence itself occurs. His central claim is that chanting “Globalise the intifada” cannot be dismissed as harmless political speech or reduced to a neutral dictionary definition of intifada as merely “struggle” or “shaking off”. Words, he argues, accumulate historical meaning, and by now intifada is inseparable in the public imagination from the Palestinian uprisings associated with suicide bombings, bus attacks, café massacres, and the Second Intifada’s civilian bloodshed.

Many charged words once had ordinary meanings — holocaust once referred to a burnt offering, pogrom to devastation, nakba to catastrophe. But history hardens language. Certain events become so dominant that they permanently colonise a word’s emotional and moral resonance. Linguists call this “prototype entrenchment”: when people hear “Holocaust”, they do not think of ritual sacrifice; when they hear “intifada”, they do not think of generic resistance. They think of televised violence, bombings, and dead civilians. To insist otherwise is effectively to demand that language forget history.

From there he moves into the philosophy of slogans. A slogan, he argues, is not a precise sentence but a compressed moral universe: heroes, enemies, threats, permissions, identities. He argues that slogans often function through deliberate ambiguity. Their literal wording provides plausible deniability, while their implied meaning carries the emotional force. “Globalise the intifada” can be defended in polite settings as meaning “internationalise the Palestinian struggle”, yet in the street — shouted rhythmically in crowds — it evokes something far darker. The deniability is not a flaw in the slogan; it is part of its design.

The essay’s second movement is about repetition and crowds. Here Ergas draws heavily on Victor Klemperer, the Jewish diarist and philologist who documented how Nazi language gradually normalised extremism. Repetition, he argues, changes moral atmosphere. The first time a slogan shocks; the hundredth time it becomes ordinary. What was once unsayable becomes ambient, then accepted, then difficult to challenge without seeming hysterical or repressive. Language shifts incrementally until society adjusts itself around ideas it would once have recoiled from.

He then turns to crowd psychology, arguing that chants synchronise people emotionally and suppress individual hesitation. In a crowd, slogans cease merely to communicate ideas; they generate collective identity and emotional fusion. The chant creates an “us” and a “them”, and in doing so hardens moral boundaries. Chants such as “Globalise the intifada” are therefore not simply political expressions but mechanisms for creating an atmosphere in which violence becomes imaginable, permissible, even inevitable.

The essay culminates in the claim that the historical relationship between inflammatory slogans and violence is not accidental. Once a society becomes accustomed to rhetoric associated with past massacres, the gap between speech and action narrows. Ergas is careful not to claim that chanting directly causes violence in a mechanical sense; rather, he argues that it conditions people emotionally and morally to accept or rationalise it when it arrives.

Underlying the piece is a broader warning against what Ergas sees as liberal complacency about language — the comforting belief that “they’re only words”. He rejects that entirely. Words, especially ritualised and repeated words, shape moral perception. They define enemies, normalise hostility, and gradually acclimatise societies to what once seemed intolerable. His conclusion is that pretending not to hear the violent historical echoes within “Globalise the intifada” is not tolerance or sophistication, but a dangerous refusal to confront what language is doing in public life.

Chanting ‘intifada’ is a dangerous act that shortens the distance to violence

It took scarcely a moment, once “Globalise the intifada” began to be chanted on our streets and campuses, for its champions to insist the phrase meant nothing of the sort. Intifada, they patiently explained, simply meant struggle; the slogan was no more than a plea to “internationalise the cause”. According to the Palestine Action Group and its Islamist allies, who rallied in Sydney earlier this week, to claim otherwise is to misread the Arabic.

The defence is not merely intellectually dishonest; it reveals why “it is only words” is among the most dangerous sentences people permit themselves to believe.

As an Arabic noun, intifada does indeed possess an old, generic sense: a shaking, a dusting off. That is hardly unusual: holocaust once meant nothing more than a burnt offering; pogrom, in Russian, mere devastation; nakba, in Arabic, a misfortune ranging from mishap to calamity.

Words such as these begin life as ordinary common nouns. But each was claimed by a particular event: from 1945, the Holocaust; from 1987, the intifada. After that, the generic sense survives only in the dictionaries. It does not survive in the public mind.

Linguists call the process “prototype entrenchment”. The mind, hearing a word, reaches for the most vivid, most repeated, most emotionally charged instance and treats that as what the word stands for. Once the historical event has acquired that role, the bare definition recorded in the dictionary can no longer be peeled away from the moral, emotional and political charge the word has come to convey. To hear “Globalise the Holocaust” in 2026 and think “proliferate the supply of burnt offerings” is to misunderstand spoken English.

Asking language to forget history

Exactly the same is true with intifada. Its prototype, in the global imagination, is not struggle in the abstract: it is two uprisings whose iconography, indelibly embedded by the violence that broke out in September 2000, includes suicide bombings of buses, restaurants and a Passover Seder. That is what the word now carries, not at its margins but as its core. The defender of “Globalise the intifada” is in effect asking language itself to forget history. But human communication does not work that way.

The point is more general: a slogan is not a sentence, and the test of whether one has understood it is not whether one can render it in a dictionary gloss. It compresses an entire moral world – heroes, villains, demands, threats – into a phrase made for chanting and succeeds by being two things at once: precise enough to be grasped, ambiguous enough to be denied.

Paul Grice, one of the 20th century’s most important linguistic philosophers, gave the manoeuvre its name: implicature, the part of communication that travels not by what one says but by what one obviously means. To remark “I am not going to call him corrupt” is to inform the room that he is corrupt.

The structure is double-jointed: tested under cross-examination, the speaker retreats to what was literally uttered and accuses the critic of putting words in his mouth. The implicature does the work; the deniability provides the shelter. “Globalise the intifada” provides a textbook case.

A public forum, called “Why it’s right to say: globalise the intifada”, at a park in the Sydney suburb of Redfern, after City of Sydney lord mayor Clover Moore announced council had revoked the organisers’ booking of City of Sydney-owned venue.

A public forum, called “Why it’s right to say: globalise the intifada”, at a park in the Sydney suburb of Redfern, after City of Sydney lord mayor Clover Moore announced council had revoked the organisers’ booking of City of Sydney-owned venue.

Pressed in a courtroom, the chant is glossed away as “internationalise the struggle”. Chanted from a stage on a Saturday afternoon, it means burnt buses, bombed cafes, murdered children.

The audiences who hear it – on both sides – hear that second meaning with perfect clarity. A slogan that everyone really took to mean only “internationalise the struggle” would hardly stir emotions; what does the stirring is precisely the violent imagery the speaker can also deny.

The genuinely dangerous moment, however, is not the slogan in isolation; it comes once the slogan begins to repeat.

The genuinely dangerous moment, however, is not the slogan in isolation; it comes once the slogan begins to repeat.

Repetition is normalisation

Victor Klemperer, the Jewish philologist who retained his sanity during the Third Reich by recording its language in his diary, observed that the regime’s most powerful instrument was its vocabulary, not its decrees: a handful of words, drilled into daily life, did more to remake ordinary Germans than any speech. “Fanatisch”, once unambiguously pejorative, became under repetition a term of praise. “Aktion” became the bureaucratic veil behind which mass shootings disappeared – to incite an aktion was to incite the slaughter of millions of Jews, without actually saying so. Those shifts required no argument, only iteration.

Repetition is, in short, normalisation: hear a phrase once and it can shock; hear it for the 200th time and it has become part of the air we breathe. The extreme becomes ambient; the ambient, obvious; the obvious, embarrassing to question. Thus, each repetition of “Globalise the intifada” wears the menace in rather than out. The cost of saying it falls while the cost of objecting rises. What was once unsayable becomes ever easier to say.

Repetition does its most lethal work, however, not on the solitary newspaper reader but on bodies in a crowd. Slogans are designed not to be murmured but to be chanted rhythmically in unison. Once a phrase enters a crowd, it ceases to function as communication and begins to function as synchronisation. Voices align, breath aligns, sometimes feet align. Individuals shed the small frictions of doubt and hesitation that, in private, would have given them pause.

Anti-zionism group protest at Town Hall with a sign reading

Anti-zionism group protest at Town Hall with a sign reading “Globalise the Intifada”.

Sociologists call this “collective effervescence” and anyone who has been in a stadium at the right moment has felt it. What was an idea in a single skull becomes a felt fact across thousands. Disagreement is not refuted; in the passion of the moment it simply ceases to be available.

The tool that drills the hatred

This is what the pioneering scholars of mass behaviour – Gustave Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Elias Canetti – meant by a crowd “having a kind of mind”. Not a mind in the literal sense but something far more dangerous: a temporarily uniform attention, a uniform emotion and – crucially – a uniform sense of who is “us” and who is “them”. Slogans are the instrument that does the tuning: and they are, as Canetti observed in the rise of Nazi antisemitism, the tool that drills in the hatred.

Put these mechanisms together and the result is not innocent speech but the manufacture of an atmosphere. A word historically captured by a violent prototype, dressed up in a deniable paraphrase and chanted by bodies whose private hesitations have been switched off – that is the recipe by which a society talks itself into permission.

It tells one group who it is by telling it who its mortal enemy is. And it tells “the other” – nowadays “the Zios” – that they are no longer part of the moral community. It hardens the shouters against dialogue and compromise. And it thickens the air with the sense that violence, when it comes, will have been only the natural conclusion of what everyone already knew.

The historical record is unambiguous: where crowds are taught to chant a word that already names a massacre, the distance between word and violence, speech and act, never grows it shortens.

The claim that slogans are innocent has always been a flattering one because it relieves us of the duty to attend to what is being said. It allows us to continue repeating comforting platitudes about freedom of expression. But words are not inert, and chanted words least of all.

Whatever else “Globalise the intifada” may mean in the dictionary, what it means in the street is what we must be willing to hear. Pretending otherwise is not tolerance. It is how societies learn, slowly and without noticing, to live with the unforgivable.

Chaos without a compass … Donald Trump’s Persian “excursion”

Without seeming to realise what he has done, Trump has exposed the raw fact that the US is no longer a full-spectrum military hegemon able to project power simultaneously in multiple theatres across the planet. It has superb armed forces and technology – but that is not the same thing.                                Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, The Telegraph, 11 March 2026

The Twentieth Century’s “Thirty Years War”, the war of my generation, was waged in South East Asia initially by the colonialist France, and then by neo-imperialist America. France’s war ended in defeat and ignominy for French arms and prestige, and a partition that was but a prelude to America’s Vietnam quagmire. [In In That Howling Infinite, see Tim Page’s War – a photographer’s Vietnam journey]

America’s War has since been defined as chaos without compass. It was inevitable that acclaimed historian Barbara Tuchman would chose it as one of her vignettes in The March of Folly, her celebrated study of débacles through the ages characterised by what would appear to be a single-minded determination amounting to tunnel vision that is akin to stupidity.

As Tuchman saw it, exceptionalism and manifest destiny are historically proven folly. Self-belief in American power and righteousness has historically created delusions of grandeur, obstinate attachment to unserviceable goals, stubbornness, and an inability to learn from past mistakes or even admitting error – a wooden-headedness that often sees the US persisting on erroneous paths that lead to loss of blood, treasure, reputation and moral standing.

Why did the US’ experience of backing the wrong horse in China in the forties not provide an analogy and warning in Vietnam in the fifties? Why did the experience in Vietnam not inform it with respect to Iran right up to the fall of the Shah in 1978? And why hadn’t it learned anything when it stumbled into Salvador in the eighties? And then, of course, we arrive in the 21st century with no-exit, never-ending wars in Afghanistan and Middle East that end in retreat and betrayal with the ‘freedom-loving’ USA still backing the wrong horses by supporting autocrats and tyrants against their own people.

Tuchman was describing a particular pathology of statecraft-  the spectacle of governments pursuing policies visibly contrary to their own interests while possessing the intelligence, experience and evidence to know better. Power, in such circumstances, is not lacking. Direction is.

In the American case, she saw something close to a recurring pattern. Self-belief in American power and virtue could generate a peculiar strategic blindness – delusions of grandeur, obstinate attachment to unserviceable goals, and a refusal to learn from past mistakes or even admit error. The result was a form of national tunnel vision: the conviction that sufficient determination and force must eventually bend reality to American purposes. Too often the outcome was the opposite — the expenditure of blood, treasure, prestige and moral authority in pursuit of objectives that proved unattainable.

It is difficult not to hear the echo of Tuchman’s diagnosis when considering the widening conflict now unfolding between Israel, the United States and Iran. The scale of the military campaign alone is remarkable. Australian commentator and security expert David David Kilcullen’s description in an article in The Australian, republished below, reads almost like a catalogue of twenty-first-century warfare: thousands of sorties in the first hundred hours, stealth fighters dismantling air defences, B-2 bombers opening corridors through Iranian airspace, naval engagements stretching from the Persian Gulf toward the Indian Ocean, tankers burning in the Strait of Hormuz while drones and missiles ripple across the wider region. Cyberattacks strike data centres, satellite navigation systems are jammed, and the conflict unfolds simultaneously across air, sea, cyberspace and orbit.

In strictly operational terms the campaign appears formidable. Iranian air defences have been degraded, missile launchers and command networks methodically targeted, naval assets hunted down. Western air power increasingly operates across Iranian skies with relative freedom. In the narrow military sense, success seems plausible.

Yet wars are not judged by tactical success but by political outcome. And here the picture grows strangely indistinct.

The most striking criticism of the conflict — articulated most clearly by Aris Roussinos in an article in Unherd republished below –  is that no one appears able to define what victory would mean. Possible objectives multiply: regime change in Tehran; destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme; the degradation of Iranian military capabilities; or a wider strategic aim of constraining Chinese influence across Eurasia. Each implies a different war. Regime change requires internal collapse or occupation. Nuclear disarmament ultimately requires diplomacy and verification. Strategic competition with China belongs largely to another theatre altogether.

The result is a peculiar strategic ambiguity: immense military force applied in pursuit of ends that remain fluid, sometimes contradictory, occasionally improvised after the fact.

Roussinos therefore invokes an earlier historical analogy: the Suez crisis of 1956 – as have other commentators. That operation was militarily successful yet politically disastrous. British and French forces seized the canal zone quickly and efficiently, only to discover that the political objective — preserving imperial influence — collapsed under international pressure. Today’s conflict, he suggests, may represent a kind of reverse Suez: a large military campaign unfolding before the political objective has even been clearly articulated.

Hovering behind this debate is another and more recent ghost: Iraq. Kilcullen’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan informs his caution. Removing regimes, he notes in an article in The Australian, is often easier than replacing them. The Taliban returned after twenty years of war. Iraq descended into sectarian violence after Saddam’s fall. Libya’s regime collapsed quickly but left behind a fractured state.

Iran, however, is not Libya. It is a nation of ninety million people with a deep historical identity and a political culture shaped by both imperial memory and the Shiite narratives of martyrdom that animate the Islamic Republic. Foreign attack may weaken the regime — but it may also strengthen the nationalist solidarity on which that regime depends.

Here the shadow of Iraq becomes unavoidable. The question that haunted that war returns once more: what happens the day after victory?

Supporters of the campaign insist that what appears chaotic may in fact be the culmination of long-term strategy. Israeli intelligence has spent years penetrating Iranian networks, sabotaging nuclear infrastructure and eliminating key figures. Others place the conflict within the larger geopolitical contest with China, arguing that weakening Iran constrains Beijing’s long-term influence across Eurasia.

Yet even these arguments leave uncertainty intact. If the central contest lies with China, the Middle East becomes a dangerous diversion. If nuclear disarmament is the aim, diplomacy will eventually be unavoidable. If regime collapse is the goal, history suggests that air power alone rarely produces it.

Meanwhile the war itself expands. Hezbollah strikes from Lebanon. Houthi forces threaten shipping in the Red Sea. Missiles fall across Gulf states. Cyberattacks ripple outward through global infrastructure. Modern conflicts rarely remain geographically contained; the networks of trade, alliances and proxy forces ensure that violence spreads outward in widening circles.

Kilcullen’s observation, delivered with the weary clarity of experience, captures the problem succinctly: war is inherently complex and non-linear, unleashing forces that no strategist can fully predict or control.

Old phrases return easily in such circumstances. One of them comes from Cicero: Inter arma silent leges — among arms the laws fall silent. Yet when law falls silent, prudence often follows. The machinery of war — alliances, domestic politics, military planning — acquires its own momentum. Decisions initially framed as temporary expedients become permanent commitments. Vietnam began with advisers; Afghanistan with a punitive expedition; Iraq with inspections and resolutions. History rarely begins with the word “quagmire.”

What is most striking in the debate surrounding the present war is not the intensity of disagreement but the depth of uncertainty. Some believe the Iranian regime is brittle and nearing collapse; others believe foreign attack will strengthen it. Both views rely on historical analogy; neither fits perfectly.

Which brings us back, inevitably, to Tuchman. Her great theme was not that governments make mistakes — that is the normal condition of politics — but that they sometimes continue down dangerous paths even after the warning signs become visible.

Whether the present conflict will prove another example of such folly remains to be seen. It may yet reveal a coherent strategy whose logic becomes clear only with time. Or it may confirm once again Tuchman’s darker insight about the persistence of wooden-headedness in the councils of power.

For the moment the war continues: vast in scale, impressive in its technology, uncertain in its purpose. And somewhere in the background, like an echo from another era, the old phrase lingers once again – chaos without a compass.

And then, of course, there’s Trump. To return to Ambrose-Pritchard, who opened this essay: “So which will prevail in the tug of war within Trump’s personality: his fear of losing the US midterm election? Or his injured vanity and his psychological need to command “escalation dominance”, always and everywhere?

For other articles on Iran in In That Howling Infinite, see: Messing with the Mullahs – America’s phoney war? The quality of mercy … looking beyond Iran’s ghost republic and “Because of …” Iran’s voice of freedom, and The end of the line … an epitaph for a tyrant

Trump’s reverse Suez

Starmer should beware another quagmire

Aris Roussinos, Unherd,  March 7 2026 

As we approach the 70th anniversary of the Suez Crisis, from which France’s political class learned to never again let their country’s security become subject to America’s veto, and Britain’s to never again distinguish between its own national interests and Washington’s whims, it is worth remembering that — judged purely as a military operation — the seizure of the Canal Zone was highly successful. The Canal itself, and a buffer zone around it, were captured within days, with limited casualties; the operation’s technical proficiency was praised by the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten, even as he twice attempted to resign in protest at the political folly of it all.

Yet success or failure will be a harder judgment to make for historians of Trump’s own latest Middle East adventure, which is already starting to look like a reverse Suez: its exposure of the limitations of pure military power; the domestic and international hostility; the fragility of alliance systems lazily assumed to be solid; and the wider overtones of an empire wildly overreaching in an attempt to stave off terminal decline. The difficulty in ascertaining, when this ends, whether or not Trump has achieved his war aims rests simply in the fact that the aims so far put forward have differed wildly, and are often mutually contradictory. The Suez Operation possessed a clearly defined military goal which succeeded, and a wider political one, which failed. As it stands, the Trump administration appears in possession of neither.

The broader arguments against the current conflict were most memorably made by Trump himself, campaigning as an anti-war candidate who would keep the United States out of costly and unmanageable Middle Eastern entanglements. His Vice-President, JD Vance, once articulately made the case against this very war. Having successfully demolished his own policy platform, it is difficult to determine what would now count as victory for Trump. The desired outcomes given, at the time of writing, have ranged from the maximalist deliverance of “freedom” to the Iranian people through full regime change in Tehran, through to inspiring an ideal “Venezuela solution” in which more amenable military figures launch an internal coup, then perhaps installing a Shah, ruling Iran remotely from the more stable comfort of Maryland. Or else simply destroying Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity (which Trump claimed to have “obliterated” in June last year). This scrambling for post facto rationales appears to derive from the fact that Iran did not immediately fold, as Trump apparently assumed it would, with the assassination of its leadership: unlike today’s America, it is not a personalist regime.

Yet if America’s war aims are nebulous from a lack of preparation, Israel’s appear haphazard by design. Summing up Netanyahu’s goals, the Israeli strategic analyst Danny Citrinowicz observes that “If we can have a coup, great. If we can have people on the streets, great. If we can have a civil war, great. Israel couldn’t care less about the future [or] the stability of Iran.” Whatever Netanyahu’s aspirations, a heavily armed but leaderless Iran, engulfed in chaos, represents a strategic threat rather than a victory for the wider West. In this, it appears that America has launched a war alongside, and at the behest of, a notionally junior partner with wildly divergent goals, and which Washington has already admitted it is unable to rein in. For British politicians, all the warning lights should now be blinking red: even the Iraq War, a historic disaster, was vastly better conceived, planned and resourced than this.

“Even the Iraq War, a historic disaster, was vastly better conceived, planned and resourced than this.”

And if America’s war aims are vague and contradictory, their proposed means of achieving these desired outcomes are too — including Iranian submission through aerial bombing alone — a result which has never yet been obtained in the century-long history of air power — through launching a peripheral revolt in which Kurdish and perhaps Baluchi separatists act as America and Israel’s boots on the ground. The best that can currently be said for Trump’s gamble is that the desired end-state is so nebulous in its imagining, and the approach so scattergun, that almost any off-ramp can be spun as a victory by his imperial court and its attendant sycophants. With no single, coherent outcome proposed, Trump can claim, as he already has, that the war has already succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of planners. This is even as he is warning his base that victory may yet take some weeks, and cautioning Congress that “it is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that may be necessary”.

The war was, it seems, resourced for a few days of intensive bombing, with little anticipation of Iran striking back against Gulf states, and American early-warning facilities, with its arsenal of low-cost drones. Policy is now being made on the hoof, with senior administration officials “at each other’s throats” on the need for ground troops. CENTCOM, overseeing the war, has requested an increase in military intelligence analysts “to support operations against Iran for at least 100 days but likely through September”. The spectacle of a days-long special military operation, entered into with an over-confident faith in hard power achieving a swift political solution, then dragging on interminably, is all too familiar. For Vladimir Putin, certainly, America’s unforced error of embroiling itself in a quagmire US presidents have spent a half-century studiously avoiding is a godsend, depleting Western munitions stocks, replenishing the Kremlin’s coffers through rising oil and gas prices, and weakening Europe’s negotiating power.

Judged on strict military terms, though, the operation has chalked up notable successes. Iranian ballistic missile launches have slowed, and no doubt the aerial onslaught is depleting Iran’s arsenal of both munitions and launchers. The looming switch from stand-off munitions to less sophisticated bombs implies that air superiority has already been achieved, as Israel declared last weekend, or will soon be achieved, as the White House more cautiously claims. Whether or not Israel, the US and the Gulf states will run out of interceptor munitions before Iran runs out of missiles is a matter of speculation for even the best-informed analysts. Even as Pentagon sources brief concern over their dwindling arsenal, the Trump administration, for what it is worth, claims that it possesses “unlimited” stocks of munitions for a war that could last “forever” — while simultaneously blaming Ukraine for running down its weapons stockpile.

The most recent American attempt to exert its will in the region through air power alone, against Yemen’s Houthis, who are vastly weaker than Iran, entirely failed. The Houthis have not yet joined the war, as Hezbollah now has in response to Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon: the prospects for escalation grow wider by the day. As for boots on the ground, the much-briefed claims that Iran’s Kurds are willing to join in the war against Tehran remains debatable. The Kurdish Regional Government of Northern Iraq, which hosts exiled Iranian Kurdish militias, has been warned by Iran that their entry into the war will invite an Iranian response, and has stressed its neutrality as a result. It has not even been a month since Washington abandoned its last Kurdish partners: they must now judge whether this time round America will prove a more dependable ally.

For all the military risks involved, it is very possible, though far from certain, that US and Israeli bombing can bring about the collapse of the Iranian state, though what happens next is anyone’s guess. The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dan Caine, reportedly cautioned before the strikes began “about the potential downsides of launching a major military operation targeting Iran”, citing “the scale, complexity and potential for US casualties of such a mission”, and asserting he was “​​unable to predict what the result of a regime change operation would be”. Both the Iranians and the Americans have already claimed to have received, and rejected, the other’s request for a ceasefire, with Israel reportedly seeking assurances Washington is not already seeking private talks. In any case, the Iranians have good cause to be wary of negotiating with Trump, given that their previous rounds of negotiations ended in American and Israeli bombing. Indeed, the current war began with Israel’s aerial assassination of the country’s political leadership in the middle of negotiations which, the Trump administration later boasted, were merely a ruse. Some of America’s intended new rulers of Iran, Trump has claimed, have already been killed by Israel. Having launched a war of choice, at a time convenient to him, Trump may now find ending it a far less simple affair.

As it stands, it is in Iran’s interest to drag out the war for as long as possible, expanding it across the wider region, increasing the economic disruption to American allies, and capitalising on the widespread hostility to the war. As both Trump’s anti-interventionist base and the Democrat opposition rightly proclaim, this war has been entered into without any coherent plan, seemingly through Israel’s chain-ganging of the United States into military action it would not otherwise have chosen, an observation claimed as antisemitic by Israel’s advocates in the United States yet which has nevertheless also — bafflingly — been offered as proof of the war’s necessity by America’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the House Speaker Mike Johnson, Senate Intelligence Committee chair Tom Cotton, and most recently by Trump himself.

As for Netanyahu, he exultantly claims that bringing America into the war is something he has “yearned to do for 40 years”. The Democrats, repeatedly briefingthe attack line that Trump was “the first president stupid enough” to be cajoled by Netanyahu into war with Iran, have now been gifted a path to success in midterm elections which may yet overlap with the conflict itself. When as cynical a politician as Gavin Newsom feels safe questioning future military support to the “apartheid state” Israel, demanding from the podium “Why did we help Israel kill little girls?”, we see the cracks in America’s only true special relationship widening into a gulf. This war was, most probably, Netanyahu’s last chance to enlist the fading superpower against his decades-long foe. Whether it improves Israel’s long-term strategic position is doubtful in the extreme  — but none of this is Britain’s problem.

It goes against instinct to praise the Prime Minister for his lawyerly prevarication. Yet given all the risks and uncertainties inherent to this war the arguments against joining America and Israel’s wild gamble are as strong as can be imagined. Just weeks ago, the same Trump administration which now chides us for our caution was threatening to annex European territory, and mocking our participation in its previous disastrous wars. Even if we exclude, as the Prime Minister does not, the moral factors, Starmer is entirely correct to say that this is a war with “no viable plan”. It appears that the Prime Minister, through his twin flaws of excessive deference to both European opinion and international law, may yet be dragged, unwillingly, towards the national interest. We already have our own war to worry about, in which the desire or ability of the United States to negotiate a satisfactory conclusion looks as doubtful from London as Washington’s reliability as a negotiating partner must look from Moscow. American realists may be correct in stating that the Ukraine war, in which Britain is already dangerously over-exposed, is not a core Washington interest — but neither is Netanyahu’s latest war of choice a British or European interest. Simply put, there is no advantage for Britain in joining this distant conflict, and the national interest, as in the Gaza War of which this is a vast escalation, remains in staying out of the affair as far as possible.

It is absurd, then, to watch Reform politicians, so recently bemoaning Britain’s political enmeshment with distant Middle Eastern conflicts and diaspora grievances, caper onstage with Israeli and Iranian monarchist flags, demanding our involvement in this mess. Farage’s hiring as foreign policy adviser of the neoconservative lobbyist Alan Mendoza, who has never yet seen a disastrous war he did not wish to join, was a rare deviation from his sharp political instincts, and a warning of the major strategic risks inherent in a Reform government, however much their domestic agenda may appeal. The Greens will rightly benefit from this misstep, as will, on Reform’s Right, Restore, edging towards a Powellite indifference to distant wars. If he holds his course, so will Starmer too.

The dilemma now for the Prime Minister is whether or not to join the emergent European policy of defensive neutrality, protecting national and continental interests while refusing involvement in the wider campaign. Yet the almost wholesale capture of the British security establishment by an Atlanticist ethos indistinguishable from vassalage, along with the looming American usage of British bases for offensive purposes, will complicate this. Starmer initially refused to permit offensive raids to launch from British territory, a policy which, in Spain’s case, has seen Trump threaten to use its bases anyway. Such threats would appear less stark, no doubt, if Britain had not already placed the sovereignty of Diego Garcia under question, but we cannot all boast the strategic wisdom of David Lammy’s formerbrain. If allowing British bases to be used cannot be prevented, Starmer can either explain why, or — politically more likely — spin a plausible rationale for active involvement, attempting to make a virtue out of compulsion.

Yet there is another path, the one shown by Emmanuel Macron, now expanding across the continent the French-led defence axis initially trialled with Greece. At the same time, Macron is drawing a sharp dividing line between the interests of Europe and her many nation states, and of the erratic empire which alternately threatens and cajoles us. Seventy years ago, a misadventure in the Middle East saw Britain and France adopt opposing positions on American domination, which led us to this impasse. Through an accident of British politics, it falls to as unlikely a figure as Starmer to make just such another historic choice

Israel’s first air-to-air combat kill signals what it has planned.

Israel’s first air-to-air combat kill signals what it has planned.

On the first night of US-Israeli strikes against Iran last weekend, a friend and former colleague in Dubai sent me a video from his rooftop. Emirati air defences had just intercepted an Iranian drone across the street, metres from his house.

A loud explosion rattled his windows. I could hear car alarms in the background and his wife and young children expressing concern as he calmly escorted them down from the roof. I asked if I could do anything to help, and he came back with one word: “Exfil?”

“Exfiltration” – evacuation from the most heavily targeted areas – is a priority for some locals, most expats and many governments including Australia, which this week mounted one of the largest consular operations in our history.

Leaving not an option

For Iranian civilians facing intensive air and missile strikes after weeks of regime crackdowns that have already killed thousands, leaving is not an option.

Friends elsewhere in the region have decided to stay put, concluding their best bet is to shelter in place. In any case, with US and Israeli aircraft bombing all over Iran, and Iranian rockets striking targets across the Middle East, most have nowhere to go.

Evacuation flights have been made more difficult by sudden airspace closures given lack of warning for the attack, which began with Israeli air strikes while Iran and the US were still in negotiations, right after Omani mediators had announced a possible breakthrough.

Apart from its suddenness – despite a massive US military build-up across the past month, Israel struck without warning – the main feature of the conflict so far is its scope, scale and intensity.

This is by far the largest air campaign mounted by Israel and one of the largest conducted by the US, on a par with the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 or the initial air campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A group of men inspects the ruins of a police station in Tehran struck amid the US-Israel barrage on Iran. Picture: AP

A group of men inspects the ruins of a police station in Tehran struck amid the US-Israel barrage on Iran. Picture: AP

Already, within the first 100 hours, US aircraft had launched thousands of sorties, destroying hundreds of missile sites, command posts and air defences across Iran. Whatever its political framing, in practical terms this is a full-scale war.

The initial main effort was to establish air superiority, with F-35, F-22 and F-15E aircraft destroying Iranian warplanes and air base infrastructure. On the fourth day of the war, an Israeli F-35 shot down an Iranian fighter jet over northern Tehran, the first air-to-air combat kill by an F-35, and Israel’s first such aerial victory in 40 years.

The take-down of Iran’s air force was followed by the destruction of its air defences by US B-2 bombers using stand-off missiles, opening the skies for follow-on attacks by B-1 and B-52 bombers. These non-stealthy aircraft carry a massive bomb load. B-52s have been involved in the campaign already, releasing air-launched missiles up to 370km from their targets. Once Iran’s surface-to-air missiles are suppressed, however, the bombers can operate directly overhead, hugely increasing the weight of bombs dropped.

Expect more

We can expect US and Israeli aircraft, once they can operate with impunity, to further ramp up strikes, roaming the skies over Iran and hitting any identified threat. In effect, they will be working their way down the priority list as successive categories of higher-value targets are destroyed, a process that may take weeks.

A second task – destruction of Iran’s offensive missile launchers, command-and-control systems and storage and production facilities – is now the focus. Israeli and US forces are working in tandem, with Israel focusing on northern and western Iran, and US aircraft striking sites in the country’s central and southern regions.

A satellite image shows damage at Garmdarah missile base in northern Iran on March 4 following precision strikes. Picture: AFP/Satellite Image (c) 2026 Vantor

A satellite image shows damage at Garmdarah missile base in northern Iran on March 4 following precision strikes. Picture: AFP/Satellite Image (c) 2026 Vantor

This aspect of the campaign has been less successful so far. Iran is still launching large numbers of missiles against Haifa, Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, and many are successfully evading Israeli interceptors. Other missiles have been destroyed over urban centres, with falling debris causing casualties on the ground. In strictly military terms, the campaign is going well for Israel and the US. But other aspects of the war have been more problematic.

The killing of supreme leader Ali Khamenei and other senior leaders in the first strike may have been intended to decapitate Iran’s regime and dislocate its response. But key leaders such as foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and Ali Larijani – former speaker of parliament, leader of the deadly anti-democracy crackdown in January and head of Iran’s national security council – are alive and in place.

Khamenei appears to have delegated launch authority to lower-level commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose aerospace forces control parts of Iran’s missile arsenal, and the Artesh, Iran’s regular military which controls air defence. Junior commanders, cut off from Tehran in the first hours of the war, are making their own target selections, launching missiles and drones as far afield as Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Closer in, Persian Gulf states such as Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates have been particularly hard hit.

Hiogjh-ranking members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attend an unveiling ceremony of an IRGC underground facility that houses hundreds of domestically built precision-strike missiles. Picture: IMAGO / ZUMA

Hiogjh-ranking members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attend an unveiling ceremony of an IRGC underground facility that houses hundreds of domestically built precision-strike missiles. Picture: IMAGO / ZUMA

Iranian missiles are targeting civilian infrastructure, diplomatic posts, military bases, oil refineries, gas terminals, hotels, houses and shopping centres. Desalination plants – critical in a water-poor region – also have been targeted. Iran’s Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, seems to have launched the drone that hit Britain’s Akrotiri Air Base in Cyprus; in response, Israel is bombing Beirut, and Israeli troops and tanks have pushed farther into Lebanon, widening the war and inflicting several hundred casualties.

War on water

The war at sea has expanded even further. US and Israeli strikes destroyed the Iranian navy’s command post at Bandar Abbas this week and damaged at least nine warships including Iran’s sole drone carrier, the IRIS Shahid Bagheri, along with several Soleimani-class corvettes, smaller warships capable of operating independently or supporting fast attack craft in the Persian Gulf.

In a major escalation, the larger Moudge-class frigate IRIS Dena was sunk off Sri Lanka by a torpedo from a US submarine, as it made its way back to Iran after joint naval exercises with India, with the loss of up to 150 lives. In another grim milestone, this was the first time since 1945 that a US submarine has sunk an enemy warship by torpedo.

At least 10 oil tankers are now ablaze or sunk in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint that accounts for more than 20 per cent of global oil flow. Commercial shipping has fallen to almost nothing.

On Thursday, Iran allowed a Chinese-flagged tanker through the strait, and the US has offered insur­ance and naval escort for other vessels in the area, but shipping companies and captains are understandably reluctant to run the risk, triggering a 90 per cent drop in traffic.

Further west, Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen are restarting their efforts – suspended after last year’s Gaza ceasefire – to interdict shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb, the chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea. The Houthis also appear to have launched missiles into Saudi Arabia, which also has been hit by rockets from Iran itself.

Also this week, a Russian-flagged oil tanker was attacked in the western Mediterranean by a Ukrainian sea drone. Ukrainian attacks continue against Russian ships in the Black Sea, underscoring the connection between conflict in Europe and the newly opened front in the Middle East.

On the ground

On land, there is no sign yet of US or Israeli ground troops entering the war, though Israeli aircraft have begun targeting Iranian internal security forces such as the IRGC and its paramilitary arm, the Basij, which might be used to suppress an uprising. US media outlets are reporting CIA plans to arm and support Kurdish separatists against the regime. Kurdish leaders have denied this, even as Kurdish troops in Iraq are massingon the Iranian border, and there are unconfirmed reports of conflict inside northwestern Iran.

Other dissident groups – the anti-regime democracy movement and ethnic separatist Arab, Azeri and Baloch – suffered severely in January’s regime crackdown but may move against the government if the conflict continues. Such efforts almost certainly will fail unless these groups receive arms and support from external players.

Pakistan, which shares a border with Iran and is allied with Tehran’s regional rival Saudi Arabia, is committed to a war against its own former proxy, the Afghan Taliban, but could join in if the war escalates further.

Israeli police and emergency teams respond at the scene after a missile strike hit buildings in Tel Aviv’s Gush Dan area, in Israel, as Iran's missile attacks in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes continue. Picture: Getty Images

Israeli police and emergency teams respond at the scene after a missile strike hit buildings in Tel Aviv’s Gush Dan area, in Israel, as Iran’s missile attacks in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes continue. Picture: Getty Images

If a ground war does develop, it may look something like the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when intelligence and special warfare teams worked with Afghan allies on the ground, combining with US air power to overthrow the Taliban in less than seven weeks.

Conventional US ground forces are politically problematic for President Donald Trump, given deep scepticism among his MAGA base about foreign wars, American casualties and Israeli intentions.

On the other hand, CIA or special operations teams – given their small numbers and low profile – are seen as less risky, easier to justify, and thus the preferred option.

As in Afghanistan, the question for any ground campaign is what comes next. The potential for full-scale civil war inside Iran, accompanied by state fragmentation and a region-wide flood of refugees, was on the minds of diplomats and intelligence officers with whom I spoke this week, even as the conflict’s future remains unclear.

Taking down the regime is one thing; standing up a stable successor is entirely another, as any Iraq or Afghanistan veteran knows. Many leaders are clearly concerned about this.

All of this makes the current conflict more than just a third Gulf war. Countries that escaped previous conflicts are now suffering direct attacks, up-ending regional relationships as governments scramble to protect their populations. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz involves superpower interests and the global economy much more than previous rounds of conflict. The longer the war lasts, the greater the risk that it escalates even further, pulling more countries in.

International response

Broader responses have been mixed. European countries – following inter-allied controversy earlier this year over US threats to seize Denmark’s autonomous territory in Greenland – have expressed reservations, as has the EU.

An intercepted projectile falls into the sea near Dubai's Palm Jumeirah archipelago on March 1, 2026. Picture: AFP

An intercepted projectile falls into the sea near Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah archipelago on March 1, 2026. Picture: AFP

Britain offered defensive support only, prompting Trump to criticise Prime Minister Keir Starmer as “no Churchill” and complain that the special relationship is not what it once was.

Trump also announced “total suspension” of trade with Spain after Madrid blocked US aircraft from using Spanish bases for the attack. French President Emmanuel Macron declared the US-Israeli attack in violation of international law and called for a return to negotiations, while the UN said it had seen no evidence of ongoing Iranian nuclear weapons programs.

On the other hand, NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte expressed support for the operation.

US adversaries Russia and North Korea – both of which have close relationships with Iran – strongly condemned the attack. China did so too, but so far has offered only rhetorical support. This is somewhat surprising since China is a major weapon supplier to the regime in Tehran and announced, days before the US attack, that it was sending offensive and defensive weapons to Iran.

Under a 25-year agreement signed in 2021, China also accounts for 80 per cent of Iran’s oil exports and depends heavily on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. China has been stockpiling oil for several years, so Chinese leaders may calculate they can afford to wait, letting US stockpiles of bombs and missiles be depleted as the war goes on.

Alternatively, they may be scrambling to catch up with a rapidly evolving situation. Neither Moscow nor Beijing has yet moved to mediate or resolve the war.

Against this background, military lessons are already emerging. Artificial intelligence has dramatically accelerated the targeting process, with the campaign running on a continuously updated dynamic engagement matrix rather than a traditional daily task order. Satellite communications are ubiquitous, with small Starlink antennas seen mounted on American Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System drones, themselves an improved copy of Iran’s Shahed-136 drone, the export version of which played a prominent part in Russia’s arsenal in Ukraine.

Beyond showing how adversaries copy each other’s battlefield technologies, the LUCAS drones illustrate how important space systems such as Starlink now are. Space has emerged as what the military calls a “warfighting domain” alongside air, space, sea and cyberspace. GPS spoofing and jamming, as all sides interfere with each other’s navigation satellites, has been particularly noticeable here as in Ukraine, with knock-on effects for civilian ships, aircraft and infrastructure.

Attacks on data centres, including three Amazon Web Services data centres hit by Iranian drones in the Emirates, underline the vulnerability of AI and cyber systems to physical attack.

An ambulance is parked near a sweeping blaze following Israeli bombardment on a solar farm and electricity generation facility in Lebanon's southern coastal city of Tyre on March 4, 2026. Israeli forces on March 4 advanced into a number of towns and villages in south Lebanon, a source from the UN peacekeeping force in the country, UNIFIL, told AFP. Picture: AFP

An ambulance is parked near a sweeping blaze following Israeli bombardment on a solar farm and electricity generation facility in Lebanon’s southern coastal city of Tyre on March 4, 2026. Israeli forces on March 4 advanced into a number of towns and villages in south Lebanon, a source from the UN peacekeeping force in the country, UNIFIL, told AFP. Picture: AFP

The war’s rapid spread outside Iran’s vicinity emphasises how modern conflicts, irrespective of causes, rarely remain geographically contained. Regional proxies – Hezbollah and the Houthis but also pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Iranian-sponsored sleeper cells in Western countries, and the possibility that resistance groups may play the leading role in any ground campaign – emphasise how even the most conventional conflicts involve irregular warfare, with non-state armed groups operating on their own or advised by specialist operators.

At the strategic level, one lesson is that, irrespective of Trump’s need for a quick resolution to the conflict, lest it undermine his support ahead of critical midterm elections in November, war is inherently complex and non-linear, unleashing forces that cannot be predicted or controlled. Even now, the campaign is illustrating the impossibility of doing regime change from the air, to say nothing of whether regime change is even a viable goal: 20 years of the war on terror would suggest not.

One thing I heard whispered in Washington this week was that – between Venezuela, Greenland and now Iran – others may be concluding they cannot trust American negotiators. The terms of any deal seem increasingly contingent on political whim in the White House, rather than consistent policy, and attacking a counterparts mid-negotiation makes it less likely that adversaries will themselves negotiate in good faith.

This US navy handout photo released by US Central Command public affairs shows US sailors preparing to stage ordnance on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in support of Operation Epic Fury. Picture: US navy/US Central Command/AFP

This US navy handout photo released by US Central Command public affairs shows US sailors preparing to stage ordnance on the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) in support of Operation Epic Fury. Picture: US navy/US Central Command/AFP

One congressional staffer gloomily told me this week that, under this administration’s force-based approach to international relations, diplomatic consistency carried less weight, but that wouldn’t always be the case. Russia and China were watching this conflict closely, she noted, and if they saw an opportunity to move against Western interests while the US was tied down in Iran, credibility with allies would matter again, fast. The broader potential for escalation – for Gulf War III to become World War III – is not in the forefront of anyone’s mind at present but the risk is real.

Impact at home

For Australia, the implications of the current conflict are stark enough. As a globally connected trading nation, with millions of Australians overseas and massive exposure to the global system, Australians’ safety and our nation’s prosperity can easily be disrupted by events thousands of kilometres away. Just one illustration of this is petroleum imports, which despite rapid growth in renewables still drive almost every aspect of our economy.

The latest Australian petroleum statistics, from December 2025, showed Australia with 50 days net import coverage, 25 days of diesel consumption, enough jet fuel for 20 days and enough automotive petrol for 26 days. In other words, if global oil supplies are interrupted for more than three to four weeks, Australia’s transportation and production systems start grinding to a halt. The government has rightly advised against panic hoarding, but fuel resilience will become a real issue as the conflict drags on.

There is also the possibility that an expanded conflict may lead to a spike in terrorism risk. Iranian-sponsored terror cells aside, unrest among or against Iranian, Jewish, Kurdish, Arab and other communities is a real issue, one that many Western governments are watching, Australia almost certainly included.

A final possibility is that, if the war drags on or escalates, Australia and other allies may receive a US request for support. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – including joint facilities in Australia – are almost certainly already involved. No request for warships, aircraft or ground troops has been publicly discussed but planners would be wise to be thinking ahead.

In the meantime, and much more importantly, families such as my friend’s – across Iran, Israel, the Gulf states and elsewhere – are sheltering in basements, comforting their kids, hoping they have enough food, water, cash and medical supplies, and worrying what the future holds. Tens of thousands of Australians and other expats are stranded as they seek to leave the region, and millions more locals have no exit in sight. This war is unlikely to end soon, but it has already changed the game

 

Rojava revisited. Can Syria break its sectarian cycle?

In January 2019, In That Howling Infinite published, Rojava and the Kurdish conundrum. The post wrote of Rojava as both experiment and predicament – a small, improbable polity suspended between larger, harder powers, “trapped between the Turkish hammer and the Syrian anvil.” Aris Roussinos, whose work we have reviewed before, now returns to the same terrain with the sombre clarity of hindsight. His recent essay on the collapse of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria reads less like contradiction than culmination. What was foreboding then is aftermath now.

Back in 2019, the drama was framed in the key of Trumpian bombast – promises to “totally destroy and obliterate” Turkey’s economy if Ankara stepped out of line — but the underlying reality was austere. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces had borne the brunt of the fight against ISIS, lost thousands of men and women, guarded tens of thousands of jihadist detainees, and constructed, under the thin canopy of American airpower, a fragile, decentralised experiment in multi-ethnic governance. Remove the canopy and the weather would change. The Kurds knew it. So did Ankara, Damascus, Moscow and Tehran.

Roussinos describes that experiment –  the AANES – as an attempt to defy the “grim logic” of civil war in divided societies: that conflict eventually collapses into sectarian arithmetic. Ideologically, it was a pivot away from classic PKK ethnonationalism toward Abdullah Öcalan’s “democratic confederalism”: devolved authority, gender parity, communal councils, a deliberate blurring of ethnic hierarchy. In a region shaped by the memory of genocide, forced migration, Baathist Arabisation and mutual suspicion, it was both necessity and idealism. The geography of the Jazira –  oil-rich, landlocked, demographically mixed – demanded accommodation if it was to function at all.

Yet even in 2019 the limits were visible. Rojava was romanticised abroad –  “an anarchist-lite Paris Commune,” as we noted, perhaps half  ironically half-ironised then – but on the ground it was strategically exposed and socially fissured. Arabs and Turkmen did not uniformly welcome Kurdish administration. Kurdish politics itself was riven by clan and party rivalries. Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran all loathed the prospect of a sovereign Kurdistan. The experiment depended not merely on theory but on patronage.

That patronage proved fickle. The likely endgame sketched seven years ago was stark: the Kurds would fight if forced, but ultimately they would deal with Damascus to save their towns and families. Russia would mediate; Turkey would demand a border free of the YPG; Assad would insist on reintegration, autonomy trimmed to vassalage. The analogy to the Paris Commune was offered with unease – bold communal experiments have a habit of ending in blood and absorption.

Roussinos now writes from beyond that threshold. The new Damascus government –  jihadist-derived yet internationally tolerated – has reasserted control. The much-vaunted multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces, proudly described as majority Arab, fractured under pressure. Arab components drifted back toward their ethnic kin in Damascus. What remained was recognisably Kurdish: the YPG under another name. Integration proceeded not as confederal partnership but as coerced subsumption.

Pro–Damascus media have seized on the SDF’s recruitment of women, alleging coercion and forced enlistment of minors. While underage recruitment has been documented in past years and prompted formal pledges to demobilise minors -with uneven implementation – broader claims of systematic kidnapping lack clear substantiation and coexist with extensive evidence of voluntary female participation grounded in the movement’s gender-egalitarian ethos. Such allegations serve a wider political purpose: portraying the Kurdish administration as socially aberrant and incompatible with a re-centralised Syrian state, framing critique of specific practices as part of its broader delegitimisation. In Roussinos’ terms, this is another instrument of Syria’s recurring cycle: peripheral autonomy is undermined not only by coercion on the battlefield but also by shaping perception, marking alternative governance as morally and politically untenable.

His larger point is less about Kurdish miscalculation than Syrian structure. Since independence, Syria has oscillated between peripheral revolt and centralised coercion. Its demographic entanglement – Sunni Arab majorities, Alawite and Druze minorities, Kurds without a state, ancient Christian communities –  renders majoritarian triumph unstable and decentralisation fragile. The AANES sought to transcend that arithmetic; it ultimately succumbed to it. Meanwhile, sectarian reprisals against Alawites and Druze in western Syria deepen minority distrust of Damascus, reinforcing the very cycle the new regime claims to end.

The pattern is not uniquely Syrian. Lebanon’s confessional balancing act has veered between uneasy accommodation and paralysis; Iraq’s post-2003 settlement oscillates between sectarian mobilisation and fragile cross-sectarian moments; the Balkans, from Bosnia to Kosovo, demonstrate how externally brokered pluralism can freeze conflict without dissolving its underlying fears. In each case, demography and memory shape politics as much as constitutions do. Power-sharing without trust calcifies; centralisation without restraint provokes resistance. The pendulum swings.

What is striking is the dialectical twist. The Kurdish movement in Syria attempted to move beyond ethnonationalism toward a post-national confederalism. Its collapse may instead accelerate a harder pan-Kurdish nationalism – the revival of the Ala Rengin flag, the renewed invocation of Rojava as West Kurdistan, the rhetoric of betrayed nationhood. When pluralist experiment yields vulnerability, ethnic consolidation gains appeal. The effort to dissolve identity politics may intensify it.

Can Syria break its sectarian cycle? Roussinos leaves the question open, but the burden is heavy. It would require disciplined control over disparate armed factions, credible guarantees to minorities, and a majority willing to exercise restraint rather than vengeance – feats rarer than battlefield victories. The Kurdish experiment failed not simply because it was naïve, but because it unfolded within a regional system that punishes fragility and rewards coercion.

In 2019, the mood was, borrowing from King Lear, “cheerless, dark and deadly.” In 2026, the darkness feels less theatrical, more structural. The Kurds remain what they have long been: resilient, battle-hardened, accustomed to betrayal. Their attempt to sketch another way -neither Baathist despotism nor jihadist dominion – has been curtailed. Yet the problem it sought to solve endures, not only in Syria but in every state where demography, memory and power are tightly braided. The lesson, as Roussinos insists, reaches well beyond the plains of the Jazira.

Paul hemphill, February 2026, with assistance in drafting by ChatGPT

For more on the Middle East in in That Howling Infinite, see A Middle East Miscellany.

See also, Syria. Illusion, delusion and the fall of tyrants, Cold Wind in Damascus …Syria at the crossroads, Between Heaven and Hell … Syria at the crossroads

Can Syria break its sectarian cycle?The Kurdish experiment was doomed

Aris Roussinos, Unherd 10 February 2026

Can Syria break its sectarian cycle?

‘The remorseless logic of a country, like neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq, held hostage by its own tangled demographics.’ (Delil Souleiman / AFP / Getty Imges)

It is generally expected that, whatever the ostensible cause of a civil war, in a country divided on ethnic and religious lines the fighting will sooner or later assume an interethnic or sectarian flavour. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), now having surrendered its autonomy under assault from the Syrian state’s new jihadist-derived government, was, whatever else it may have been, an attempt to rebut this grim logic. Indeed, the dusty and unprepossessing plains of the Syrian Jazira — the northeastern portion of the country, east of the Euphrates — served for more than a decade as an unlikely political experiment in the management and diffusion of ethnic conflict.

Whether noble or naive, this project now looks doomed as AANES’s great power backers turn their fickle attentions to Damascus, and the Damascus government has in turn successfully reasserted its control through military coercion. Within a matter of days, as its Sunni Arab levies turned their affections to their ethnic kin in Damascus and their guns on their former allies, Northeast Syria switched from a bold experiment in multi-ethnic governance to a desperate, rearguard battle for Kurdish cultural and political autonomy. The war, at its presumed end, reverted to the dynamics of its earliest days, when Ahmed al-Sharaa, then leader of the Syrian al-Qaeda faction Jabhat al-Nusra, had attempted, along with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels and tribes of changeable loyalties, to seize control of the oil-rich, and newly Kurdish-run region, Syria’s breadbasket.

Simultaneously rich in resources yet neglected by its central government, and host to the country’s richest mix of ethnic and religious minorities, alternately the tools and the victims of the central state, the Syrian Jazira had always run according to its own dynamics. Both colonial French and independent Syrian administrations in distant, Levantine Damascus expended significant, if sporadic, effort in absorbing this neglected region of Mesopotamia within the modern state system, privileging one ethnic group against another for reasons of statecraft, and building model towns and vast dams, as evocative in their current dilapidation of failed modernities as the ancient tells dotting the landscape, now repurposed as gun emplacements, are of earlier lost civilisations.

Perhaps the AANES experiment can now be added to this melancholy list. Birthed from the fusion of Kurdish nationalism and Marxist-Leninist thought that initially drove the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) independence movement, the AANES, a project of the PKK’s Syrian sister organisation, the Democratic Union Party ‎(PYD), performed an attempted shift to anarchist political theory. The thought of the American writer Murray Bookchin, as reworked by the PKK’s occluded godhead figure Abdullah Öcalan from his Turkish jail cell, was its most notable innovation. Echoing Öcalan’s rejection of the PKK’s previous project of independence for the Kurdish nation, the AANES presented itself as an explicitly multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian state in which the greatest possible autonomy was devolved to religious and ethnic communities, beneath the benign framework of Jazira’s de facto autonomy from Damascus. In practice, the quasi-anarchist devolution of power resulted in the proliferation of bureaucratic structures. Local empowerment, similarly, meant the elevation of new elites loyal to the project, and the freezing out of dissidents, particularly rival Kurdish factions. Imperfect though it may have been, compared to the overt totalitarianism of the Baathist state, the anarchic infighting of the FSA rebels, and the gothic cruelties of ISIS, history is likely to remember it more favourably than today’s discourse would suggest.

“Perhaps the AANES experiment can now be added to this melancholy list.”

Barely populated until the French Mandate period, except during the annual circulation of nomadic Bedouin shepherds, the portion of Syria east of the Euphrates underwent during the early 20th century a transformative period of internal and external immigration and development analogous, in a modest way, to that of California or Australia. Ethnic Kurds fleeing the collapse of proto-nationalist rebellions in Ataturk’s Turkey, along with Syriac Christians fleeing the Seifo genocide and many uprooted Armenians streamed south across the culverts and rusting tracks of the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway line, which still marks the modern border, joining their ethnic kin residing there from the beginning of recorded history. Ethnic Assyrians from British-Mandate northern Iraq similarly sought French protection from the predation of the Iraqi state and its Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen auxiliaries, establishing a string of fiercely Christian villages along the Khabur river. Northeast Syria was shaped by the cultural memory of ethnic conflict; its past decade of governance was an attempt to evade the return of its attendant cruelties.

As such, the AANES project was always as much one of necessity as Leftist idealism. The Kurdish regions of northern Syria, stretching West of the Euphrates into Aleppo, were separated from each other by clusters of Arab and Turkmen towns and villages, in large part the result of the Baathist state’s settlement of Arabs from Syria’s desert hinterland to hinder any Kurdish attempts at secession. While the early successes of the Syrian Kurds under the PYD, following a negotiated handover of control by Assad’s overstretched government, resulted in what was essentially the occupation by its YPG military forces of Arab settlements, loyal to one or other rebel or jihadist faction, America’s decisive intervention in the war against ISIS resulted in both sudden and unexpected great power backing for Northeast Syria and an evolution of Kurdish political attitudes towards local Arabs.

Partly at America’s behest, in a failed attempt to assuage the Syrian rebels’ combative Western think-tank diaspora, and partly a genuine attempt to impose progressive governance among a population Kurds frequently portray as stunted by its own reactionary obscurantism and crude ethnic chauvinism, Northeast Syria’s autonomous quasi-government undertook a project of delegating political and military authority to Arab regions won back from ISIS. It was an ambitious goal which seemed, for a decade, to have won majority acquiescence, if not affection. It became the boast of the regional administration that its armed forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was now predominantly composed of Arabs, a feat of enlightened governance that rapidly proved hollow, over the past two weeks, when the majority of these Arab fighters effortlessly switched sides. Having lost almost all its Arab accretions, the SDF was once again, in practice, the Kurdish YPG, an ethnic militia fighting for purely Kurdish goals. Now that, under the threat of military defeat, a shrunken version of these forces will be subsumed under the Damascus government’s control, their future role — on paper, and in reality — remains to be seen.

The integration terms finally accepted, at gunpoint, by the autonomous administration last weekend, though better than those of a fortnight ago are worse than those of the unimplemented March agreement. Consequently, much has been made in recent days of the AANES’s failures to come to terms with al-Sharaa’s shock capture of the Syrian state just over a year ago, and negotiate a settlement with the new reality. Certainly, the region’s political focus had, since the seeming cornering of the Sunni Arab rebellion into its Idlib Bantustan, centred on negotiating re-integration into Assad’s Baathist state in a manner that preserved some means of political and military autonomy. Yet Assad, over-confident of his own position as victor of the long and bloody war, refused to offer more than integration into the central state on terms that amounted to surrender. The new regime in Damascus now offers little different: what has changed is its greater power of coercion, and international backing, compared to its previous Baathist iteration.

Putin, once an occasional, tacit partner of the Kurds west of the Euphrates, has fully backed the new Damascus government, another instance where Russia, once America’s rival in Syria, shares increasingly aligned interests with the Trump White House. Calls for the protection of Kurdish cultural rights and social norms by European states are outweighed by their overriding political interest in the accelerated removal of their more than one million mostly Sunni Arab refugees. Regionally, the success or otherwise of the Northeast’s reintegration will determine Israel’s ability to justify its military protection of Druze autonomists in the southern province of Sweida. Relations with mostly Shia Iraq, which has its own reasons to look askance at Sunni jihadist governance and is currently making a show of reinforcing its border with Syria, will be fraught at best. Given the sheer improbability of fate’s wheel suddenly projecting al-Sharaa into Assad’s Damascus palace, it would be foolhardy to offer any firm predictions, rather than vague anxieties, for the country’s future.

For the Kurds themselves, the experiment in enlightened multi-ethnic governance proved, at the crucial moment, a dramatic and costly Achilles heel. The result, over time, will likely be the weakening of PKK ideology in favour of some form of pan-Kurdish ethnic nationalism, whose early stirrings are apparent in the flow of volunteers from northern Iraq to defend their ethnic kin, the sudden revival of the Kurdish flag, Ala Rengin, in Northeast Syria, and in the readoption of the ethnic term Rojava, or West Kurdistan, in place of its previously bland geographic descriptor. When even Abdullah Öcalan’s nephew Ömer, an MP in Turkey’s parliament for the movement-aligned DEM party, feels compelled to proclaim “Long live the Kurds and Kurdistan”, and “the Kurdish nation will not forgive the enmity committed against it”, we sense the tectonic plates of Kurdish politics shifting away from Leftist post-national idealism towards an embryonic ethnic nationalism. The decade-long experience of Kurdish self-governance, military success and international diplomacy will shape whatever follows the likely collapse of the AANES statelet, whether what replaces it will coalesce in the mountainous redoubts of eastern Turkey, Western Iran and northern Iraq, or in the grey cities of the European diaspora. So, too, will bitter analysis of the project’s failings.

Yet it would be unfair for harsh self-criticism to so soon follow hindsight. For all its faults, the Kurdish project of autonomy from the Syrian central state evolved, through managing the dynamics of their multi-ethnic region, into one that ironically and idealistically attempted to make the very idea of equable Syrian co-existence a political possibility. Inversely, the current Damascus project of re-centralisation has, in western Syria, been accompanied by sectarian massacres and other abuses, which have increased the antipathy of peripheral minority populations towards the central state. Sunni Arab supporters of the al-Sharaa government, whose decade-long displeasure at having their ethnic kin ruled by minorities is accompanied by certainty of their own natural right to rule those same minorities, have made much of Kurdish intransigence while minimising or even justifying the starkest governance failures of their own new regime. Yet the past year’s massacres of Alawites and Druze, punctuating the failed integration talks with the AANES, only heightened the Kurdish disinclination to disarm and dissolve its forces and place the fates of its people in the benevolence of the central state.

Syria’s post-independence oscillation between peripheral revolts and centralised coercion, the very cycle that produced both Assad and his own overthrow, is simply the remorseless logic of a country, like neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq, held hostage by its own tangled demographics. Whether or not the new Syria can break this cycle is an open question. It will take great feats of governance, and of control over his own disparate armed forces, by al-Sharaa to avoid the logic of Syria’s demographic confusion weakening his own state-building project just as, suddenly and catastrophically, it did for the Kurds. Syria’s ethnic and religious complexity makes it a hard country to rule, historically veering, as a result, between instability and oppression. The Kurdish attempt to find another, progressive path ultimately failed, for the same reasons. The lessons, it ought not to need underlining, reach far beyond Syria’s borders.


Aris Roussinos is an UnHerd columnist and a former war reporter.

One Land, Two Peoples: History, Memory, Continuity, and Inheritance

It’s the Land, it is our wisdom
It’s the Land, it shines us through
It’s the Land, it feeds our children
It’s the Land, you cannot own the Land
The Land owns you
Dougie McLean, Solid Ground

This is a story about the land – and the people who have reside thereupon.

Scottish folksinger Dougie McLean’s verse captures exactly its ethos: of the land as relational, ancestral, and moral; of belonging as stewardship rather than conquest; of identity entwined with place rather than imposed upon it. “You cannot own the Land – the Land owns you” resonates with what we are about to write about overlapping inheritances, continuity, and indigeneity. The verse gives us a lyrical bearing: it allows us to frame Jewish and Palestinian attachment to the land not as a contest of exclusive ownership, but as overlapping, reciprocal, and living relationships. It legitimises the presence of both without forcing a zero-sum moral calculus.

The featured image at the head of this post? When last In Ramallah, de facto administrative “capital” of that part of the West Bank governed  by the  Palestinian Authority – Area A of the Oslo dispensation – we visited the cultural centre of Dar Zahran, a beautifully restored Ottoman house just south of the city. By fortunate serendipity, Dar Zahran was hosting a small exhibition of paintings by the late Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout. This large painting pictures the skyline of Jerusalem – Al Quds with its mosques and churches and the infinite variety of the Palestinian people, was front and centre. [In In That Howling Infinite, see Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]

Forward: the Myth of Fingerprints

Watching the coverage of the Gaza war –  in mainstream commentary, on social media, in slogans chanted half a world away –  In That Howling Infinite was struck less by passion than by historical amnesia. Dates collapsed into each other. 1948 was invoked without 1917. 1967 without 1948. 2023 without Ottoman decline, Mandate ambiguity, imperial cartography, demographic upheaval. Archaeology was dismissed as propaganda; genealogy as myth; continuity as invention. A century was compressed into a headline; millennia into a meme.

We prefer our tragedies forensic.

Modern political culture trains us to search for a single print on the glass –  the moment, the document, the leader, the decision that explains everything. We want the smudge that proves who began it, who bears the primal guilt, who stands at the origin of the wound. A history with fingerprints is reassuring. It suggests that if only one actor had behaved differently – one declaration withheld, one militia restrained, one settlement not built, one massacre not committed – the catastrophe might have been avoided.

But the history of Israel and Palestine does not yield to forensic neatness.

There is no solitary fingerprint pressed into this soil. Not Balfour’s, nor Lloyd George’s. Not Haj Amin al-Husseini’s, nor Ben-Gurion’s. Not Nasser’s, not Arafat’s, not Sharon’s, not Netanyahu’s, not Hamas’s. No single impression explains the pattern. The land bears instead a dense overlay of smudged prints: empire and partition, fear and ambition, miscalculation and opportunism, exile and return, massacre and reprisal, daring and folly. Each generation has added its own layer. Each act has generated reaction; each reaction has hardened into structure; each structure has constrained the next set of choices.

The myth of fingerprints flatters our appetite for moral certainty. It allows us to say: there — that was the sin; there –  that is the villain. It relieves us of complexity. It permits outrage without introspection. It offers altitude without clarity.

Yet this conflict is cumulative. The Nakba did not occur in a vacuum. Nor did the wars that followed. Nor did the Occupation arise ex nihilo. Nor did Palestinian rejectionism or Israeli settlement expansion spring from pure malice detached from context. Nor did October 7 erupt without genealogy – however indefensible its brutality, however catastrophic its consequences. Each event is entangled with what preceded it and what followed after. Violence here is not a fingerprint; it is a palimpsest.

To say this is not to dissolve accountability. It is to resist reductionism. It is to refuse the consolations of moral monoculture – the narrowing of empathy into a single authorised grief, the shaping of facts to fit feelings, the retreat into what I have elsewhere called the box canyon of certainty. Intellectual honesty demands a more difficult posture: to hold multiple truths in tension without collapsing them into equivalence.

This land — like any homeland, like any “country” in the deeper sense First Nations Australians use the word –  holds layered attachment. It holds Jewish longing and Palestinian dispossession; British imperial design and Arab nationalist pride; secular aspiration and religious revival; survival strategy and ideological fervour. None alone explains the whole. Together they form the sediment of a century.

If this essay resists simple answers, it is because the land itself resists them. What follows is not an argument for neutrality, nor a plea for bloodless detachment. It is an attempt to describe historical continuity in a place where memory is weaponised and identity compressed into accusation. It is written in the hope – perhaps naïve, perhaps stubborn –  that understanding genealogy, archaeology, chronology, and context might slow the reflex to eliminate rather than to comprehend.

There are no clean fingerprints here. Only accumulated traces.

And the work begins by learning to see them all.

Embrace the Middle East, Sliman Mansour

Before you begin …

There is a temptation, with this land, to search for fingerprints. To press the soil for a single impression and declare: “Here  –  here is where it began. Here is the trespass. Here is the theft. Here is the wound from which every other wound must have  flowed”. But the ground does not yield so easily. It holds not one print, but many, layered and half-erased – footsteps crossing footsteps, prayers rising from ruins, stones reused and renamed. It is less a crime scene than a palimpsest: written, scraped back, written again though the old script never fully disappears.

This essay begins there. It moves slowly, because the history moves slowly. Jewish civilisation is not incidental to this terrain; it was formed there, fractured there, remembered there in exile for two millennia through liturgy and law and longing. Nor are Palestinians latecomers to their own homes; their belonging is carried in olive groves and family deeds, in village names, in the memory of 1948 spoken not as theory but as rupture.

Two continuities. Uneven in power, different in structure, but real.

Modern nationalism – that restless 19th- and 20th-century force – took older forms of attachment and hardened them into programs. Zionism emerged from European peril and Jewish memory; Palestinian nationalism emerged from Ottoman dissolution and local rootedness. Empire intervened. War intervened. Fear intervened. What might once have overlapped became mutually exclusive.

The language we now reach for –  settler colonialism, indigeneity, apartheid – illuminates some contours and obscures others. These frameworks explain structures of domination, especially in the territories occupied since 1967. Yet they often falter before the stubborn fact of Jewish historical continuity. When analysis becomes catechism, history flattens; complexity is treated as betrayal.

At the centre of the essay stand two words that mirror each other across the decades: Aliyah and al-‘Awda. Return and return. Ascent and homecoming. One largely realised in the sovereignty of a state; the other deferred, carried as al Muftah, the key, and inheritance. These are not merely political claims. They are existential longings. Each fears that recognising the other threatens its own legitimacy. Each is haunted by absence.

And then there is the present –  October 7 2023, and the devastating war that it precipitated, and the shattering of whatever fragile equilibrium once existed. Trauma does not cancel trauma; it compounds it. Israeli politics hardens toward security and annexationist imagination. Palestinian politics fragments, with religion filling the vacuum left by exhausted secular promises. The two-state solution lingers like a map no longer consulted but not yet discarded.

This is not a plea for neutrality. Nor is it a ritual balancing of grief. Power asymmetries are real. Civilian suffering is real. So too is the danger of moral monoculture –  the insistence that only one story counts, only one inheritance is authentic, only one people may speak in the language of belonging.

The land between the river and the sea has never held a single narrative. It carries more than one continuity, more than one exile, more than one claim to home. Any future worth imagining must begin by resisting erasure — of Jews, of Palestinians, of history itself.

If the essay asks anything of the reader, it is patience. A willingness to sit with more than one truth at once. A willingness to see that complexity is not evasion but reality.

The soil remembers more than we do. Are we prepared to remember with it?

Why we have written this story

This long essay was born less out of certainty than unease.

In the months following October 7 2023 and the Gaza war that followed, lasting two years and yet unresolved, we found ourselves increasingly disheartened – not only by the violence itself, but by the impoverished historical literacy that now dominates much of the public conversation. In mainstream commentary and across social media, Israel–Palestine is routinely reduced to slogans, memes, and moral shortcuts: 1948 as original sin, or 1967 as sole reference point, or 2023 as rupture unmoored from everything that came before. The deeper history – the Ottoman centuries, the layered genealogies, the archaeology underfoot, the long coexistence and long frictions of peoples and faiths – is treated as dispensable, even suspect. Ignorance is worn as conviction.

This narrowing of historical vision has consequences. It breeds existentialist and eliminationist rhetoric on all sides: claims that one people is fabricated, the other uniquely criminal; that history itself can be annulled by denunciation. It flattens complex inheritances into moral caricature, and in doing so accelerates a global coarsening of discourse – one that has travelled far beyond the region, seeding division, hatred, and a hardening of hearts across societies that once imagined themselves distant observers.

Our purpose here is modest but insistent. We want to describe, as clearly and simply as possible, the historical continuity of both Israel and Palestine: how peoples persist, inherit, adapt, and remain attached to land across conquest, conversion, exile, and return. We want to show that the land has never been empty, never singular, never owned by one story alone. And we want to counter the moral monoculture that insists this conflict can be understood, let alone solved through absolutes.

This essay does not argue for innocence. It argues against erasure. It is not an argument against passion, nor a plea for bloodless neutrality. It is written in resistance to the idea that complexity is a form of evasion, or that empathy is betrayal. If it insists on anything, it is that history matters – and that without it, moral seriousness quickly curdles into moral certainty, and certainty into something far more dangerous. A lot of  intellectual labour is required to stand on what we like to call the high ground without mistaking altitude for clarity.

As for the position of In That Howling Infinite on Israel, Palestine, and the Gaza war, it is neither declarative nor devotional; it is diagnostic. Inclined – by background, training, temperament, and long engagement with the region – to hold multiple truths in tension, it seeks to see, as the song has it, the whole of the moon. It is less interested in purity than in resisting moral monoculture and the consolations of unanimity. That stance does not claim wisdom. It claims only a refusal to outsource judgment, and a suspicion of movements that confuse volume with truth.

On Zionism, this essay treats it not as a slogan but as a historical fact with moral weight: the assertion – hard-won, contingent, flawed – that Jews are entitled to collective political existence on the same terms as other peoples. In this limited but essential sense, this blog is Zionist. It does not sanctify Israeli policy, excuse occupation, or romanticise state power. But it rejects the sleight of hand by which Israel’s existence is transformed from a political reality into a metaphysical crime – an expectation uniquely imposed upon Jews, and demanded of no other nation: justification for being.

On anti-Zionism, it is unsparing. Not because criticism of Israel is illegitimate – on the contrary, it is necessary – but because anti-Zionism increasingly operates as a categorical refusal to accept Jewish collective self-determination at all. What troubles us most is not its anger, but its certainty: its indifference to history, its appetite for erasure, its readiness to recycle older antisemitic patterns – collective guilt, inversion of victimhood, the portrayal of Jews as uniquely malignant actors – while insisting, with studied innocence, that Jews are not the subject. If not always antisemitism outright, the line separating the two is wafer-thin, and too often crossed.

At the same time, this essay is deeply critical of Israeli power: of occupation, settlement, annexationist fantasy, and the moral corrosion of permanent domination. It takes seriously the Palestinian experience of dispossession, fragmentation, humiliation, and despair – and the ways in which those conditions have fostered not only resistance, but radicalisation, sacralisation, and a narrowing of political imagination.

October 7 stands as a grim hinge. It has not only set back any prospect of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians for a generation; it has unleashed a wider contagion – one that has coarsened global discourse, legitimised eliminationist language, and normalised the idea that complexity itself is suspect. As Warren Zevon warned, “the hurt gets worse, and the heart gets harder”.

This essay is written against that hardening. It asks whether it is still possible to think historically, ethically, and imaginatively about a land claimed by more than one people – and whether refusing moral certainty might yet be an act not of evasion, but of responsibility.

The sections that follow are designed to stand alone and to accumulate. Each may be read independently; together they form a single, unfolding argument. Individually, they invite further inquiry. If certain themes recur – and with it, a degree of repetition – that is intentional. The history under discussion does not advance in straight lines but circles back, reappears, and insists upon review and reconsideration. The structure mirrors the subject, so repetition here is not redundancy, but return.

It is a long read, because there is much that must be said. For readers who are time-poor, what follows is a brief précis – enough, I hope, to give you the outline, and perhaps to tempt you further.

Beginnings … Naming and Continuity

If there is a place to begin, it is not with a verdict but with a name.

Names are where history first hardens into meaning. They signal continuity or rupture, belonging or exclusion, memory or erasure. In this land especially, names do not merely describe; they contend. They carry sedimented layers of empire, scripture, conquest, pilgrimage, and return. To name is already to argue – but to refuse names altogether is also to argue, and more crudely.

One of the great distortions in contemporary debate is the insistence that political legitimacy must rest on administrative tidiness: that because the Ottomans did not govern a province called “Palestine,” Palestine did not exist; or conversely, that because modern Zionism emerged in Europe, Jewish attachment to the land is a late invention rather than an ancient continuity. Both claims mistake bureaucracy for belonging, paperwork for peoplehood. Both treat history as a courtroom exhibit rather than a lived inheritance.

What endures instead – often inconveniently – is continuity without sovereignty: peoples who remain present without power, attached without permission, named and renamed by others but never entirely erased. Jews prayed toward this land long before they could govern it. Palestinians inhabited it long before they could claim it politically. Neither experience cancels the other. Both are real. Both are incomplete on their own.

To understand how these parallel attachments hardened into mutually exclusive claims requires moving slowly, historically, and without the false comfort of absolutes. It requires tracing how a land administered by empires became a land imagined by nations; how religious memory became political project; how return – Aliyah for Jews, al-‘Awda for Palestinians – came to function not merely as aspiration but as moral horizon. It also requires acknowledging how each side’s story, when pressed by trauma and fear, learned to deny the depth of the other’s.

What follows, then, is not a search for origins that absolve, but for continuities that explain. Not a competition of suffering, but an examination of how attachment becomes destiny – and how destiny, when absolutised, forecloses imagination.

The story begins, as so many arguments do, with the claim that there was “no Palestine.” And with the equal and opposite insistence that there was no Jewish return – only intrusion. Both are wrong. Both are revealing. And both point us, inevitably, to the longer history that neither slogan can contain.

The claim that “Palestinians were here before Jews” is historically imprecise – but so is the claim that Jewish antiquity erases Palestinian presence. Both are simplifications, moral absolutes that flatten centuries of layered reality into slogans. The land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean has been inhabited continuously for millennia, by overlapping peoples, faiths, and cultures.

Jewish civilisation has deep roots here, attested by archaeology, scripture, ritual, and memory. Cities such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Shechem, Jericho, Gaza, and Jaffa are not abstractions – they are places woven into law, worship, settlement, and daily life across time, repeatedly reoccupied, referenced, and remembered. Yet these same cities have been continuously inhabited by non-Jewish populations, who over centuries became Christian, Muslim, Arabic-speaking, and eventually Palestinian in identity. The Arabic place-names that survive – Nablus, Al-Khalil, Silwan, Yafa – often preserve Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, or Latin forms, just as London preserves its Roman past or Paris its Gaulish echoes. Continuity in place is not ownership; inheritance is layered, overlapping, and sometimes contested.

The Roman renaming of Judea as Syria Palaestina was a gesture of imperial punishment, yet even this act of erasure could not erase lived reality. Centuries later, European travelers, missionaries, cartographers, and strategists reanimated the name “Palestine,” overlaying the land with biblical imagination, imperial calculation, and the romance of Orientalism. European frameworks – strategic, moral, and aesthetic – shaped modern political consciousness long before modern political actors arrived. The Europeanisation of the Holy Land created a template into which both Jewish and Arab claims would later be poured, each seeking legitimacy and recognition.

This essay traces these interwoven threads. It begins with the names themselves – the enduring markers of settlement, memory, and linguistic survival. From there, it examines continuity and archaeological evidence, showing how material culture and living communities intersect in ways that defy simple claims of precedence. It then moves to the language of settler colonialism and the frameworks imported from European empire, exposing how interpretive categories can be mobilised to delegitimise or moralise historical presence. Finally, it engages with indigeneity – not as a racial or ethnic label, but as a language of connection, survival, and attachment to place – demonstrating how both Jewish and Palestinian identities are inseparable from the soil, the history, and the lived landscape of the land.

History here does not grant exclusive ownership. It grants memory, attachment, and responsibility. The tragedy – and the challenge – is that two peoples trace their histories into the same soil, each with legitimate claims, each bearing inherited trauma, and each constrained by a political struggle that too often demands a single story. This essay does not promise resolution. It seeks reflection: to trace the layers, to illuminate the overlaps, and to hold complexity without collapsing it into certainty.

The return of “Palestine”: naming, memory, and the politics of inheritance

One of the more persistent confusions in contemporary debate is the claim – often made with an air of finality – that “Palestine” is either an ancient, uninterrupted political reality or a wholly modern invention, conjured out of thin air in the twentieth century. Both positions flatten history into a moral ordering exercise: one name authentic, the other fraudulent; one memory legitimate, the other contrived. This is precisely how historical argument slips into a box canyon, where complexity is mistaken for weakness and certainty for truth.

The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the region from the early sixteenth century until the First World War, did not govern a province called Palestine. Its administrative logic was practical rather than symbolic. The land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan was divided among the Eyalet (later Vilayet) of Damascus, the Vilayet of Beirut, and, from 1872, the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, which reported directly to Istanbul. Taxes, conscription, roads, and security mattered; biblical resonance did not. In that narrow bureaucratic sense, “Palestine” did not exist.

But absence from an imperium is not the same thing as absence from historical memory. The name Palestine never vanished. It persisted in European cartography, in Christian pilgrimage literature, in Islamic geographical writing as part of Bilad al-Sham, and in the loose regional vocabulary used by locals themselves, locals who belonged to a variety of ethnicities and faiths. It survived as a cultural and geographic term rather than a sovereign one. This distinction – between administrative reality and historical imagination – is often ignored, and much mischief flows from that omission.

The decisive shift came not from Istanbul, but from Europe. From the late eighteenth century onward, the eastern Mediterranean became an object of renewed European attention. The Ottoman Empire was weakening; Britain, France, Russia, and later Germany were probing for influence. Strategic considerations – sea routes, land bridges, ports, and imperial rivalry – pulled the region into a new geopolitical frame. “Palestine” proved a convenient and evocative name for this space: recognisable, resonant, and already embedded in European mental maps.

Religion deepened this re-engagement. For European Christians, especially Protestants, Palestine was not merely a territory but the word made flesh – the physical stage of the Bible. Missionaries, biblical scholars, archaeologists, and pilgrims flooded the region in the nineteenth century. Guidebooks, maps, and sermons revived biblical place-names and overlaid them onto a living landscape. The land was read as Scripture, and Scripture was projected back onto the land. Ottoman administrative divisions were quietly bypassed in favour of a vocabulary saturated with sacred history.

This religious lens blended seamlessly with the romance of Orientalism. Painters, travel writers, and antiquarians portrayed Palestine as timeless, unchanging, and curiously suspended outside modern history. Its inhabitants appeared as figures in a tableau – colourful, ancient, but politically inert. Europe “rediscovered” Palestine by freezing it in a biblical past, a move that simultaneously elevated the land’s symbolic value and erased the modern lives unfolding upon it. Historical memory was curated selectively, with some layers illuminated and others dimmed. [In In That Howling Infinite, see Alf Layla wa Laylah – the Orient and Orientalism]

Commerce and infrastructure reinforced this process. Steamships, railways, ports, and telegraph lines tied the region more tightly to Europe. Consuls, traders, and investors spoke of Palestine as a commercial and logistical unit. The term functioned as a brand – useful, intelligible, and already freighted with meaning. Still, this was not sovereignty. It was recognition through repetition.

The First World War transformed repetition into authority. British leaders did not speak of conquering Ottoman districts; they spoke of liberating Palestine. This choice of language was not accidental. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, a son of the Welsh chapel and steeped in biblical culture, understood the land through Scripture as much as strategy. Jerusalem mattered to him symbolically, almost providentially. The term “Palestine” resonated with the British public, aligned with long-standing European usage, and wrapped military objectives in moral narrative. In naming, power announced itself. [Regarding the Balfour Declaration, which we will come to later, see In That Howling Infinite‘s The hand that signed the paper]

The British Mandate formalised what European imagination had long rehearsed. “Palestine” became a legal entity under international law. The name appeared on stamps, coins, and passports, rendered in Arabic (Filastin) and Hebrew (Eretz-Yisrael (Palestina)). Zionist institutions were legally Palestinian; Arab inhabitants were administratively Palestinian. Only later, as national conflict sharpened, did the term become a site of rejection and contestation. What began as an externally imposed administrative label was gradually inhabited as an identity by those who lived within its bounds. [In In That Howling Infinite, see The first Intifada … Palestine 1936]

None of this means that Palestinian identity was invented wholesale by Europeans, nor that Jewish historical connection to the land is diminished or negotiable. It means something more uncomfortable and more human: that modern political identities often crystallise under pressure, shaped by imperial power, local experience, and inherited memory alike. To declare one authentic and the other fraudulent is to impose a moral hierarchy onto history itself, a hierarchy confounds understanding.

Here, the danger is not ignorance but moral certainty. Historical memory becomes a sorting mechanism: ancient equals legitimate, modern equals suspect; one story accumulates moral credit, the other moral debt. This is how history is quietly recruited into a hierarchy of hostility – not through overt hatred, but through the denial of standing. Once a people’s name is dismissed as an invention, their claims can be treated as optional.

The harder truth is that Palestine returned to political life not because the Ottomans named it, nor because Europeans fabricated it ex nihilo, but because European power needed a name that carried biblical gravity, strategic clarity, and cultural familiarity. That name was then lived into – contested, resisted, embraced, and redefined – by the people on the ground. Modernity did the rest.

History here does not issue verdicts. It records inheritances – some ancient, some imposed, some painfully recent. When we try to force it into a moral ordering system, we lose precisely what makes it useful: its capacity to show how overlapping memories can coexist long before they are weaponised against one another.

Continuity, inheritance, and the limits of proof

Few arguments in this conflict are deployed with more confidence – and less care – than the appeal to ancient place names. Lists are recited, verses quoted, etymologies traced with forensic zeal, and the conclusion announced as if self-evident: the names are Hebrew, therefore the land is Jewish; the Arabic forms are later, therefore derivative. Continuity is treated as ownership, and inheritance as exclusivity. History is reduced to a ledger.

The facts themselves are rarely in dispute. Many of the region’s towns and cities bear names that can be traced deep into antiquity, and many of those names appear in the Hebrew Bible. Shechem becomes Neapolis under Rome and Nablus in Arabic. Hebron becomes al-Khalil, preserving Abraham’s epithet, “the Friend.” Shiloah echoes in Silwan; Jaffa in Yafa; Gaza in Ghazza; Jericho in Ariha. Even where the phonetics shift, the bones of the name remain. Language remembers.

What this demonstrates – powerfully and legitimately – is continuity of place. These are not invented towns dropped onto an empty map. They are inhabited sites with long, layered histories, revisited, renamed, translated, and repurposed by successive cultures. The land has not been erased and rebooted; it has been overwritten, like a palimpsest, with earlier texts still faintly visible beneath the newer script.

But continuity of place is not the same thing as continuity of people, and neither is the same as political entitlement. Names travel across languages precisely because populations change while places endure. Arabic, like English, routinely absorbs older toponyms rather than replacing them wholesale. London keeps its Roman core; Paris its Gallic one; Istanbul carries Byzantium in its shadow. No one imagines that linguistic survival alone settles questions of sovereignty.

The Hebrew Bible is an indispensable historical source, but it is also a theological text. When biblical names are cited as proof, the argument quietly shifts registers – from history to sacred memory. That shift is not illegitimate, but it must be acknowledged. For Jews, these names encode ancestral attachment, ritual meaning, and historical consciousness. They are part of a civilisational inheritance. To deny that is dishonest.

Yet it is equally dishonest to pretend that the later Arabic names represent rupture rather than translation. Al-Khalil does not erase Hebron; it reframes it through another religious lens that also venerates Abraham. Yafa does not cancel Jaffa; it carries it forward in a new linguistic register. In many cases, Arabic usage preserved ancient names when European empires and modern nationalisms might have flattened them. [See In That Howling Infinite, Children of Abraham, a story of Hebron]

This is where the argument often slips into a moral ordering exercise. Ancient becomes authentic; later becomes suspect. One inheritance is elevated as original, the other demoted as parasitic. But history is not a queue where the first arrival gets eternal priority. It is an accumulation of lives lived in the same places under changing conditions, languages, and powers.

Archaeology reinforces this layered reality rather than resolving it. Jewish ritual baths, Hebrew inscriptions, coins, winepresses and mikvas – these are real and abundant. So too are churches, mosques, monasteries, Islamic endowments, and centuries of continuous habitation by Arabic-speaking communities. The soil, the rocks, the bricks do not adjudicate; they record.

The mistake is not in pointing out Hebrew origins. The mistake is in imagining that etymology can do moral work it was never designed to perform. Place names testify to historical depth, not to exclusive possession. They tell us that people came, stayed, left, returned, converted, translated, adapted – and named what they loved in the language they spoke.

Inheritance, in this sense, is not a single line of descent but a woven one. Jews inherit these names as memory and longing; Palestinians inherit them as lived geography and daily speech. Both inherit them honestly. Conflict arises when inheritance is mistaken for cancellation – when one story is told in order to invalidate the other.

Used carefully, place names can rescue us from the fantasy of emptiness and the lie of discontinuity. Used carelessly, they become weapons of erasure, enlisted in a hierarchy of legitimacy that history itself does not recognise. That is the box canyon: mistaking linguistic survival for moral verdict.

Names endure because people endure. The tragedy is not that the land has too many names, but that its names have been asked to carry a burden they were never meant to bear.

Settler Colonialism and the European frame: a theory migrates

The Europeanisation of the Holy Land in the nineteenth century created a template into which both Jewish and Arab claims would later be poured, each seeking recognition, legitimacy, and moral validation. Modern debates over “settler colonialism” reflect this European lens.

The contemporary description of Israel as a “settler-colonial” project did not arise organically from the Ottoman or even early Mandate experience of the land. It is a later interpretive overlay, shaped by intellectual currents that themselves emerged from Europe’s reckoning with empire. Like the modern political revival of the name “Palestine,” the settler-colonial frame is best understood not as an invention ex nihilo, but as a concept imported, adapted, and weaponised under particular historical pressures.

Settler colonialism, as a theory, was developed to explain societies such as Australia, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand – places where European settlers crossed oceans, displaced Indigenous populations, and sought not merely to rule but to replace. Its defining features are familiar: elimination rather than exploitation, permanence rather than extraction, the transformation of land into property, and the erasure – physical or cultural – of prior inhabitants. It is a powerful lens, forged in the moral aftermath of European expansion and decolonisation.

When this framework is applied to Israel, it draws much of its force from the earlier Europeanisation of Palestine itself. Once the land was reconceived through European strategic, biblical, and Orientalist eyes – as a space legible primarily to Western moral categories – it became available for reclassification within Europe’s own moral inventory. Palestine, first imagined as a biblical landscape awaiting modern administration, later became recast as a colonial theatre awaiting decolonial judgement.

The argument runs roughly as follows: Zionism was a European movement; European Jews migrated to Palestine; the project relied on imperial sponsorship; therefore Israel is a settler-colonial state. The clarity of this syllogism is precisely what makes it attractive – and what makes it misleading. It collapses different historical phenomena into a single moral category, flattening motives, origins, and outcomes into a single narrative of invasion and replacement.

What this framing often overlooks is that Zionism did not emerge from imperial confidence but from European catastrophe. Jews were not agents of a confident metropole exporting surplus population; they were refugees, outcasts, and survivors of a continent that had repeatedly expelled or exterminated them. The first Jewish arrivals were fleeing from pogroms in Poland and Ukraine. Their relationship to Europe was not one of imperial extension but of repudiation. To describe this as simply another European colonial venture is to read Jewish history backwards through a framework designed for very different cases.

At the same time, the settler-colonial critique persists because it names something real: the experience of dispossession endured by Arab Palestinians. Land was acquired, institutions were built, borders were enforced, and a new sovereign order emerged that many inhabitants experienced as imposed rather than negotiated. For Palestinians, the language of settler colonialism offers a way to translate loss into a globally recognisable moral grammar – one that resonates with other Indigenous and postcolonial struggles. In this sense, it functions less as a precise historical diagnosis than as a political vernacular of grievance.

Right-wing Israeli nationalists deploy antiquity and indigeneity to delegitimise Palestinian claims, presenting Arab presence as late, derivative, or contingent. The settler-colonial argument, in turn, delegitimises Jewish political presence by recoding it as foreign, European, and imposed. Each side selects a different temporal starting point and treats it as dispositive. Each claims history as an audit rather than an inheritance.

The danger lies in how quickly these frameworks harden into moral absolutes. Once Israel is defined as a settler-colonial state, its existence becomes a standing injustice rather than a contested reality. Decolonisation, in this register, cannot mean reform, compromise, or coexistence; it implies undoing. Conversely, once Palestinian identity is dismissed as a colonial by-product or an invention of the Mandate, Palestinian claims become negotiable at best, disposable at worst.

It is no accident that the settler-colonial frame gains traction in Western academic and activist spaces. It speaks in a language those spaces already know – one shaped by Europe’s own reckoning with empire, race, and guilt. Israel, long cast as a European outpost in the Middle East, fits neatly into this moral template. The irony is sharp: a people once excluded from Europe are now condemned as its agents.

None of this requires denying the realities of occupation, inequality, or Palestinian suffering. But it does require recognising that “settler colonialism” is not a neutral descriptor. It is a polemical category, one that orders history toward a conclusion. It answers the question before it is fully asked.

The tragedy of this debate is not that the concept is used, but that it is used as a final word rather than a starting point. When theory becomes destiny, politics becomes theology. The conflict is no longer about borders, rights, or security, but about moral existence itself.

In that sense, the settler-colonial argument is less an explanation of Israel–Palestine than a continuation of the same European framing that once reimagined the land as “Palestine” in the first place: a tendency to see the region primarily through Western categories, whether biblical or decolonial, and to sort its inhabitants accordingly.

History here resists clean typologies. It offers no immaculate victims and no unblemished founders. What it offers instead is a warning: when legitimacy is treated as a finite resource, history becomes a courtroom and memory a weapon. That is how arguments meant to liberate end up reproducing the very logic they oppose.

Indigeneity and the struggle for moral standing

In contemporary debates over Israel and Palestine, few terms carry as much moral voltage – and as much conceptual confusion – as indigeneity. Borrowed from global struggles against colonial domination, the term now circulates as a claim to moral priority: to be indigenous is to possess an ethical standing that precedes politics, a legitimacy that demands recognition rather than negotiation. But like “Palestine” and “settler colonialism,” indigeneity is not a timeless category. It is a modern political language, forged in response to empire, and its application to the Levant reveals as much about contemporary moral frameworks as it does about ancient history.

At its core, indigeneity refers not simply to being “there first,” nor to race or bloodline, but to historical continuity with pre-colonial societies, to distinct cultural and linguistic traditions, and to a sustained relationship – often spiritual as much as economic – with a particular land. It is a global identity, articulated most forcefully by peoples confronting or surviving colonial domination, and it centres resistance to dispossession rather than mere antiquity.

This definition already exposes the difficulty. The land between the Jordan and the Mediterranean is not a blank slate upon which a single indigenous identity can be inscribed. It is one of the most continuously inhabited regions on earth, layered with successive empires, religions, and populations. Pre-colonial, in this context, depends entirely on where one chooses to begin the clock.

Jewish claims to indigeneity rest on several pillars: ancient presence, religious centrality, continuous textual and ritual attachment, and demonstrable archaeological record. Judaism is not merely a faith but a civilisation rooted in a specific land, with laws, festivals, and narratives oriented toward it. Even after exile, Jewish life remained geographically tethered to the land, to Zion, through prayer, pilgrimage, and memory. Return was not a metaphor but a liturgical expectation. In this sense, Jewish indigeneity is civilisational rather than demographic – maintained across time even when population density fluctuated.

Arab Palestinian claims, by contrast, emphasise continuous physical presence and lived inheritance. Generations cultivated the land, built villages, spoke local dialects, and developed social and religious institutions in situ. Their indigeneity is experiential rather than textual, grounded in daily life rather than eschatological hope. For Palestinians, the land was not a promise deferred but a home inhabited. Dispossession, when it came, was not a theological wound but a practical and immediate one.

Both claims fit parts of the global indigeneity definition – and neither fits it perfectly. Jews are indigenous in origin but diasporic in history; Palestinians are indigenous in continuity but historically shaped by Arabisation and Islamisation, processes that themselves followed earlier imperial expansions. To insist that one of these realities cancels the other is to misunderstand what indigeneity was meant to do.

Here is where the concept begins to deform under polemical pressure. External supporters – particularly in Western activist and academic spaces – often import indigeneity frameworks developed in the Americas or Australasia and apply them mechanically to the Levant. In those contexts, the moral geometry is clearer: a distant metropole, a settler population, an indigenous society pushed to the margins. Israel–Palestine does not conform to that template, yet the language is seductive because it promises moral clarity.

Thus Jews are cast as non-indigenous Europeans, despite the Middle Eastern origins of Jewish civilisation and the presence of large Mizrahi or Eastern Jewish populations whose histories cannot be reduced to Europe. Palestinians are cast as indigenous in a singular, exclusive sense, despite the region’s long history of migration, conversion, and cultural fusion. Each simplification flatters one side while erasing inconvenient facts on the other.

What emerges is a competition for moral standing rather than a serious engagement with history. Indigeneity becomes a zero-sum status: to recognise one claim is assumed to invalidate the other. This is the same logic we have seen with place names and settler colonialism – a moral ordering of history that ranks suffering and legitimacy rather than seeking coexistence.

The irony is that indigeneity, as a global concept, was meant to protect vulnerable peoples from erasure, not to authorise it. Its ethical force lies in resisting domination and dispossession, not in adjudicating which people has the superior claim to a land saturated with overlapping inheritances.

In the Levant, indigeneity is best understood not as a verdict but as a condition: multiple communities, each with deep roots, each shaped by conquest and survival, each bearing legitimate attachments that cannot be reduced to slogans. Jews did not arrive as strangers to a foreign land; Palestinians did not materialise as historical afterthoughts. Both are native to the story of the place, even if they entered different chapters at different times.

When indigeneity is pressed into service as a weapon, it joins the hierarchy of malice and hostility – not through open hatred, but through the quiet withdrawal of legitimacy. One people’s history is declared foundational; the other’s is recoded as contingent. Once that move is made, compromise begins to look like betrayal, and coexistence like moral failure.

The harder, and more honest, conclusion is also the less satisfying one: indigeneity here does not resolve the conflict. It explains why it is so difficult to resolve. The land is not contested because one people lacks roots, but because too many roots run too deep, too close together, and too painfully intertwined.

That recognition does not end the argument. But it does prevent it from becoming a theology  – where history is scripture, identity is fate, and politics is reduced to exegesis.

Beyond religion and race: peoples, continuity, and a multiplicity of origins

A persistent misconception in discussions of the Levant is the urge to reduce its peoples to singular categories: Judaism treated as merely a religion; Palestinians treated as a race. Both simplifications obscure far more than they explain. Jewish and Palestinian identities are not fixed or monolithic; they are composite formations – layers of ancestry, culture, language, belief, and historical experience accumulated over millennia.

Judaism undeniably carries a religious dimension, but it has never been only a matter of faith. It is also an ethnic and civilisational identity, sustained across time through shared law, memory, ritual, and a sense of common origin. Even in dispersion, Jewish communities retained continuity – cultural, linguistic, and symbolic – with the Levant. Genetic studies reinforce this historical record: many Jewish populations share markers linking them to the broader Levantine gene pool, interwoven, inevitably, with the DNA of the regions where they lived for centuries. Jewish identity, then, is simultaneously ancestral and diasporic, religious and biological, local in origin and global in experience.

Palestinian identity is no less complex. Palestinians are not a singular race, but the inheritors of continuous habitation shaped by centuries of settlement, cultivation, migration, and cultural change. Their modern Arabic language and predominantly Muslim faith are historically significant layers, not immutable markers of origin. Beneath them lie older strata: Canaanites, Philistines, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, Ottomans – peoples who arrived, mixed, converted, intermarried, and remained. Palestinian identity is grounded not in racial purity but in historical presence, social continuity, and sustained attachment to land.

The broader reality is that the peoples of the Levant are interconnected rather than discrete. Ancient Levantine ancestry flows through both modern Jewish and Palestinian populations. The region has always been a mosaic, shaped by movement rather than isolation, by overlap rather than exclusion. Attempts to categorically separate Jews and Palestinians – biologically, historically, or morally – are less grounded in evidence than in polemic. They simplify a shared past in service of present-day argument.

Understanding identity in this layered way clarifies a crucial point: claims of “first,” “pure,” or exclusive belonging are historically misleading. Both Jews and Palestinians are inheritors of the land in overlapping and entangled ways. If indigeneity is understood as sustained attachment to place, culture, and memory, then it applies to both. Each carries the land in story and ritual, in family memory and embodied history. Neither people’s connection is negated by the presence of the other.

The Levant has never been static. Jewish communities absorbed influences from Egypt, Babylon, Rome, and Europe while maintaining continuity with their Levantine origins. Palestinian communities likewise carry the genetic and cultural imprints of successive civilisations layered onto a continuous local presence. Both are products of continuity through multiplicity. Both are indigenous not because they are unchanged, but because they have endured.

Recognising this multiplicity undermines the temptation to treat indigeneity as an exclusive claim. Jewish historical connection does not erase Palestinian continuity; Palestinian rootedness does not negate Jewish ancestral ties. Their histories are not competing ledgers of legitimacy. They are overlapping inheritances inscribed into the same hills, valleys, and cities. History here does not operate as a zero-sum game.

The error arises when indigeneity is weaponised – when one people’s connection is elevated only by recasting the other as foreign, derivative, or invented. This logic echoes through debates over naming, settler-colonial framing, and historical legitimacy, where memory becomes proof, ancestry becomes argument, and recognition is treated as a finite resource. Yet the historical, archaeological, cultural, and genetic record consistently resists such neat separation.

Acknowledging multiplicity shifts the conversation away from moral absolutism toward historical understanding. Multiplicity clarifies the Levant’s moral geography. To be indigenous in the Levant is to belong to a palimpsest – to carry the land in memory, culture, and body while sharing it with others who do the same. Both Jews and Palestinians meet these criteria. Both are rooted. Both are inheritors. Both bear trauma and attachment, memory and aspiration.

Both possess a need to belong, to anchor identity in soil, to maintain continuity across generations. Both are entangled with history, trauma, and memory. Both assert presence and attachment without cancelling the other. And yet politics has rendered these dreams asymmetrical: one realised in statehood, the other deferred in exile. The Levant’s moral geography demands recognition of both impulses, even where political realities frustrate fulfilment.

The broader lesson is straightforward but demanding: indigeneity does not grant exclusivity; continuity does not require erasure; ancestry does not mandate conquest. In a land shaped by layered histories, any serious moral or political imagination must reckon with overlap, entanglement, and coexistence -not pretend that one lineage can cancel another. Recognising shared yet distinct claims is not a compromise of truth. It is, rather, fidelity to historical reality itself.

Aliyah and al-‘Awda: the twin mirrors of return

The parallel dreams of Aliyah and Al-‘Awda. illustrate this entanglement. These two words embrace two histories and two dreams, and also, haunting symmetry. Each carries the weight of exile and the promise of homecoming. Both animate national imagination. Both are rooted in soil, memory, and moral inheritance. And both illustrate how deeply intertwined Jewish and Palestinian connections to the land truly are.

They are mirror dreams, shaped by different histories but animated by the same human impulse: the need to belong, to root identity in soil, and to carry continuity across generations fractured by exile and loss. Each word gathers within it a history of displacement and a promise of return; each turns geography into memory, and memory into moral claim. Together they reveal not a clash of myths, but an entanglement of inheritances embedded in the same hills, valleys, and stones.

Aliyah – literally “ascent” – is the Jewish return to Ha Aretz, the Land, at once physical and spiritual. It is pilgrimage and homecoming, covenant and geography braided together. For centuries of diaspora, Jews prayed toward Jerusalem, invoked the landscapes of scripture, and rehearsed return through ritual, law, and liturgy. Even when absence was enforced, presence was maintained in memory. Aliyah is therefore not merely migration but fulfilment: the realisation of a promise sustained across time, carried forward through text, prayer, and collective imagination.

Al-‘Awda – the Palestinian “return” – is equally profound, though shaped by a different rupture. It arises not from distant exile alone but from lived displacement: from villages depopulated in 1948, from homes lost or made unreachable under occupation, from continuity violently interrupted rather than slowly deferred. It is at once literal and symbolic, a longing for restoration and a refusal of erasure. Mahmoud Darwish, recognised as Palestine’s national poet, gave this longing its most enduring language, transforming Palestine into a moral landscape of memory and loss, where homeland becomes metaphor without ceasing to be real. In his poetry, return is not nostalgia but ethical insistence: the land remembers those who remember it.

The symbols of al-‘Awda – most famously al-muftah, the key – encode this insistence. The key appears in art, in refugee camps, in protest iconography not as a fantasy of reversal but as a declaration of continuity: doors once opened, homes once lived in, identities anchored in place even when bodies are barred from return. Like Aliyah, al-‘Awda is transmitted intergenerationally, carried in stories, photographs, olive groves, and family names that refuse to dissolve into abstraction.

Seen together, these two traditions expose a shared pattern. The land is never merely territory. It is memory made material, identity rendered geographical. Aliyah seeks reconnection with an ancestral homeland from which Jews were historically exiled; Al-‘Awda seeks restoration within a land Palestinians never wholly left. One is framed as fulfilment, the other as reclamation – but both arise from the same grammar of belonging, continuity under duress, and moral inheritance. The symmetry is haunting, even when the outcomes are radically unequal.

Politics, however, has rendered these dreams asymmetrical. Aliyah culminated in statehood; al-‘Awda remains deferred, constrained by demography, sovereignty, and an international system that has institutionalized exile without resolving it. This disparity has encouraged a zero-sum reading in which one return is treated as legitimate history and the other as an insoluble problem. Yet such framing obscures the deeper truth: attachment to land is not exclusive. Memory does not cancel memory. Longing does not negate longing.

Understanding Aliyah and al-‘Awda side by side clarifies why claims of precedence – “first,” “original,” “native” – fail to capture the moral complexity of the Levant. Indigeneity here is not a single thread but a braid: sustained attachment expressed through ritual and law on one hand, through lived presence and inherited community on the other. Jewish and Palestinian connections to the land are not mutually annihilating; they are layered, overlapping, and historically entangled.

The Levant is not a ledger in which legitimacy must be won and lost. It is a palimpsest, bearing multiple inscriptions of memory, loss, and return. Aliyah and Al-‘Awda are not opposites but reflections – each giving form to the same human need to belong, to return, to anchor the self in soil and story. The tragedy lies not in the coexistence of these dreams, but in the political imagination that insists only one may be honoured.

To recognise both is not to resolve the conflict, nor to sentimentalise it. It is simply to acknowledge the moral geography of the place itself: a land that carries more than one inheritance, more than one claim, more than one dream – and demands a capacity to hold multiplicity, even where fulfilment remains contested.

Seen this way, Aliyah and al-‘Awda are not merely parallel dreams of return, but incompatible political grammars shaped by trauma, timing, and power. Each encodes a moral claim that feels existential to those who carry it, yet threatening to those on the other side. Jewish return, forged in diaspora and catastrophe, demanded permanence and sovereignty; Palestinian return, forged in dispossession and exile, demanded reversal and restoration. Both are rooted in continuity and memory, yet when translated into politics rather than poetry, each risks negating the other. The tragedy is not that these aspirations exist, but that history arranged them to collide – each seeking justice through a vision that leaves little room for the other’s survival.

[In In That Howling Infinite, see Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]

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Return, continuity, and multiplicity

The mirrored impulses of Aliyah and al-‘Awda reveal a deeper pattern in the Levant: land as inheritance, memory, and moral geography, not merely as territory. Jewish Aliyah – the ascent to Ha Aretz – is rooted in centuries of diaspora experience, ritual, and ancestral memory. Palestinian al-‘Awda – the dream of return- is grounded in lived experience, collective memory, and the trauma of displacement. Both articulate belonging, both assert continuity, and both affirm a claim to presence, yet neither is reducible to exclusive ownership.

Understanding these aspirations through the lens of indigeneity clarifies the Levant’s complexity. Indigenous identity is not defined solely by ancestry or race, but by sustained attachment to place, unique culture, language, and historical continuity. Jewish communities, even after centuries in diaspora, maintained a living connection to the land through prayer, law, and cultural memory; Palestinians, continuously inhabiting villages, towns, and cities, preserve attachment through lived experience, story, and inherited community. Both meet the criteria of indigenous presence, both are rooted in the same soil, and both inherit overlapping geographies.

Multiplicity is the key. Neither Aliyah nor al-‘Awda exists in isolation; both emerge from entangled histories, migrations, and interwoven ancestries. The Levant is not a canvas for singular claims, nor a ledger for moral points. It is a palimpsest, where dreams, memory, and continuity coexist—even when politics imposes a zero-sum frame. Recognising this multiplicity transforms how we see legitimacy: it is not a finite resource to be won or lost, but a shared inheritance to be acknowledged.

In this light, the “return” is as much about imagination and moral continuity as it is about geography. The Jewish ascent, the Palestinian return, the dreams held in exile or diaspora, all testify to the same human impulse: to belong, to anchor identity in soil, and to see history not merely as a past but as an inheritance shaping the present. Both peoples carry the land in body, memory, and story; both dreams illuminate the impossibility – and the necessity – of coexistence.

Ultimately, Aliyah and al-‘Awda demonstrate that historical continuity, cultural memory, and ancestral attachment are not zero-sum. The land can carry more than one claim, more than one people, more than one dream. What is required is a moral and political imagination capable of holding multiplicity, of recognising overlapping rights, and of acknowledging that inheritance is shared, entangled, and enduring.

Why sharing the land has proved so difficult

If there is a single, stubborn question running beneath all of this, it is not who belongs, but why coexistence has proved so elusive. Two peoples, both rooted, both carrying memory, both claiming continuity – yet locked into a conflict that seems to resist every appeal to shared humanity.

One part of the answer lies not in antiquity, but in modernity – in the habits of mind carried from Europe to the eastern Mediterranean. Ilan Pappé argues, persuasively, that early Jewish settlers in Palestine, particularly in the late Ottoman and Mandate periods, largely did not see the local Arab population as a political subject. They were not the object of hatred, exactly; they were something more corrosive – irrelevant. The project was inward-facing: to build, to revive, to normalise Jewish life after centuries of vulnerability and persecution. The locals did not so much obstruct the vision as fail to register within it.

This indifference was not uniquely Jewish. It was recognisably European. The mindset closely resembled that of settlers who arrived, with their own fears and hopes, on the shores of North America, Australia, or the Cape. They came not primarily to dominate, but to begin again – to escape religious persecution, economic stagnation, or political precarity. The land appeared underused, underdeveloped, waiting. The people already there were often perceived less as political actors than as features of the landscape – present, but not decisive.

One does not need much imagination to see how this felt from the other side. To be continuous, rooted, embedded in place – and yet rendered invisible by a project unfolding around you. To watch newcomers build institutions, towns, and legal frameworks that did not include you, did not consult you, and did not imagine you as co-heirs. Even absent overt malice, this was experienced as dispossession in slow motion.

What makes the Jewish–Palestinian case especially tragic is that the settlers themselves were not an imperial metropole exporting surplus population, but a people long excluded, often brutalised, and desperate for normality. Zionism was not merely a political ideology; it was a survival strategy. Yet survival pursued without recognition of those already present reproduces—unintentionally – the very hierarchies it seeks to escape. Moral urgency crowds out moral vision. One people’s existential fear eclipses another’s lived reality.

This is where the conflict begins to harden. Palestinians experienced Zionist settlement not as return, but as arrival; not as redemption, but as replacement. Jews experienced Palestinian resistance not as indigenous defence, but as rejection of their most basic claim to safety and self-determination. Each side misread the other through the lens of its own trauma. Each interpreted the other’s actions as negation.

Once this dynamic sets in, sharing the land becomes psychologically – and then politically – extraordinarily difficult. Fear replaces curiosity. Memory becomes weaponised. Every concession feels like erasure. What began as indifference curdles into mistrust, and mistrust into moral absolutism. The box canyon narrows: only one narrative can survive; only one future can be imagined.

And yet history rarely leaves asymmetry unreciprocated.

If early Zionist indifference helped harden Palestinian resistance, Palestinian political culture also evolved in ways that increasingly mirrored the exclusivist logic it opposed. Faced with dispossession, fragmentation, and repeated defeat, Palestinian identity cohered around loss—around al Nakba as organising principle, and al-‘Awda as moral horizon. Over time, this produced not only solidarity and resilience, but also a narrowing of political imagination. Jewish presence came to be read not as layered or historical, but as entirely alien; Jewish continuity was reframed as fabrication, invention, or fraud.

This was understandable as a defensive reflex – but it came at a cost. By denying Jewish indigeneity altogether, Palestinian leadership and its external advocates adopted the same zero-sum logic they rightly condemned. Recognition became conditional, legitimacy indivisible. What began as a struggle against erasure risked becoming a project of counter-erasure. The hierarchy of malice inverted itself but did not disappear.

At the same time, the familiar settler-colonial frame begins to strain under the weight of historical complication. The early Jewish settlers were indeed overwhelmingly European in origin, language, and political culture, arriving with mental furniture shaped by Europe: nationalism, socialism, agrarian revival, and the settler imagination. In that sense, they do fit the classic profile of settler colonists, and this provides much of the grist for contemporary anti-Zionist critique. But the Yishuv did not imagine – could not have imagined—the demographic rupture that followed 1948: the arrival of nearly a million Jews expelled or forced to flee from Arab countries and Iran.

These Mizrahi Jews were not European interlopers parachuted into the Middle East. They were, to all practical purposes, Arab Jews Arabic-speaking, culturally embedded in the region, shaped by its music, food, social codes, and outlook. Their displacement from Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Sana’a, Fez, and Tehran was not incidental to Israel’s formation; it became constitutive of it. The state that emerged was not simply a transplanted Europe, but an improvised, often uneasy fusion of diasporas – Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Mizrahi – many of them poor, marginalised, and themselves refugees. [In In That Howling Infinite, see The Mizrahi Factor

This complicates the moral geometry. Israel becomes not a single settler project with a clear metropole and periphery, but a crowded refuge absorbing multiple expulsions at once. After more than seventy years, this reality is immediately visible to anyone who lands at Ben Gurion: Israel is not, and has not been for a long time, a “white” country, whatever the slogans suggest. That this fact is so rarely acknowledged let alone integrated into popular discourse—reveals how rigid and inattentive many contemporary moral frameworks have become.

Thus, both peoples arrived – by different routes – at a similar impasse. Each came to see itself as the true refugee of history. Each feared that recognising the other’s depth of attachment would annul its own. Each retreated into a moral box canyon of absolute narratives.

What was lost, on both sides, was the possibility of shared inheritance – of seeing the land not as a prize to be awarded, but as a burden to be carried together. The tragedy is not that two peoples loved the same land. It is that they entered modern politics with incompatible expectations shaped by Europe’s long shadow, and neither fully saw the other in time. Once mutual visibility is lost at the beginning, history has a way of compounding the error.

Understanding this does not assign guilt in tidy proportions. It asks something more demanding: to recognise how good faith, deep attachment, and legitimate claims can still produce a conflict that feels unsolvable –

not because one side is uniquely wicked, but because both became trapped in stories that left no room for the other to remain.

Only by loosening those stories – by allowing attachment to coexist without cancellation—does the land begin to re-emerge not as a zero-sum possession, but as something closer to what all indigenous traditions, in different tongues, have always known it to be: not owned, but endured; not conquered, but shared.

Why the Two-State horizon has receded – perhaps for a generation

If the two-state solution once functioned as a shared horizon – distant, hazy, but orienting -it now lies behind a wall of wreckage. Not abandoned in theory, perhaps, but rendered inert by history’s latest accelerant. October 7 2023 and the Gaza war that followed did not create the impasse; they detonated it.

The occupation, long described as “temporary,” has hardened into a permanent condition – administrative, psychological, and moral. It is no longer experienced by most Israelis as an emergency requiring resolution, but as an ambient fact of life, managed like traffic or crime. For Palestinians, it is no longer experienced as a condition awaiting negotiation, but as an enclosure tightening year by year: land eaten away by settlements, movement throttled by permits and checkpoints, political agency hollowed out by collaborators, donors, and armed factions alike. This normalisation corrodes both sides simultaneously. The occupation deforms Israel’s moral language while dissolving Palestinian political coherence. Each adapts in ways that make disentanglement harder.

In the West Bank, the ongoing “range war” in the hills and fields – the quiet violence of settler depredations, land seizures, olive groves torched, mosques and churches vandalised – has become the grinding background noise of daily life. It is rarely decisive enough to provoke international rupture, but cumulative enough to destroy trust entirely. The IDF’s role as occupying power, security guarantor, and, too often, arbiter of civilian life entrenches a system in which force substitutes for politics. The more soldiers are deployed to police civilians, the more civilian resistance becomes criminalised, and the more violence is routinised on both sides.

Yet this is only half the picture, and you are careful not to avert your gaze from the other half.

Despite the Separation Wall, despite the intelligence dragnet, despite the overwhelming asymmetry of power, there are still thousands of attacks on Israeli civilians each year—stabbings, shootings, car rammings, rockets, lone-wolf assaults. They do not threaten Israel’s existence, but they do something more corrosive: they reaffirm, daily, the belief that withdrawal invites annihilation. For Israelis shaped by the Second Intifada, and now by October 7, the line between occupation and survival has collapsed. Every concession is read as exposure. Every Palestinian death is tragic; every Israeli death is existential.

As Warren Zevon sang,”the hurt gets worse and the heart gets harder”, That lyric captures something neither UN resolutions nor peace plans ever quite grasp: trauma compounds. It does not cancel out.

October 7 shattered whatever residual belief remained among Israelis that separation could be achieved without mortal risk. Gaza – already sealed off, already written off by many Israelis as a lost cause – became proof, in their minds, that withdrawal does not end conflict, it relocates it closer to home. The war that followed, with its vast civilian toll, obliterated any remaining Palestinian faith that Israel distinguishes meaningfully between combatant and captive population. Each side now possesses fresh, blood-warm evidence for its bleakest assumptions about the other.

In this climate, the two-state solution survives mostly as rhetoric – recited by diplomats, invoked by editorial boards, but no longer animated by constituencies willing to pay its price. The Israeli electorate has moved decisively toward management over resolution: control without citizenship, security without reconciliation. The Palestinians, fragmented between a corrupt, hollowed-out Authority in the West Bank and a nihilistic, theocratic militia in Gaza, lack both legitimacy and leverage. There is no credible partner on either side capable of delivering compromise without being destroyed by their own people.

And beneath all this lies the deeper fracture you keep returning to: mutual invisibility.

Most Israelis no longer encounter Palestinians as neighbours, co-workers, or fellow citizens-in-waiting. They encounter them as threats, filtered through screens or uniforms. Most Palestinians encounter Israelis almost exclusively as soldiers, settlers, or jailers. Each people experiences the other not in ordinary human contexts, but at the sharp edge of power. This is not a soil from which compromise grows.

The two-state solution depended, at minimum, on three conditions: a belief in eventual separation, a willingness to recognise the other’s legitimacy, and a shared sense that time was running out. All three have inverted. Separation now feels dangerous. Recognition feels like surrender. And time feels abundant—because the status quo, however ugly, appears survivable.

That is why the two-state outcome is not merely stalled but suspended by psychology as much as by geography. It may yet return -but not soon, and not until a generation shaped by checkpoints, rockets, funerals, and revenge has loosened its grip on the wheel.

Until then, Israel and Palestine remain, as Avi Shalit put it, locked in a grotesque embrace: one squeezing for control, the other for breath. Trapped by each other, and by histories that have taught them, again and again, that to relent is to perish.

The tragedy is not that solutions are unknown. It is that, for now, neither side can imagine surviving the journey to them. That, more than borders or maps, is why the two-state horizon has receded – and why, in the wreckage of October 7 and Gaza, it may take a generation before it comes back into view.

The One-State Solution and the Limits of Lennonism

Among many progressives, particularly in the West, a one-state solution has acquired an almost utopian appeal. Faced with the apparent death of the two-state solution, they envisage a single democratic, secular, egalitarian state stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, in which Jews and Palestinians live together as equal citizens under a common constitutional framework. It is an attractive vision. Indeed, its attraction lies precisely in its moral simplicity. If two peoples inhabit the same land, why should one enjoy rights, privileges, or national status denied to the other? Why not a state that belongs equally to all?

As a statement of principle, it is difficult to object to. As a practical political project, however, In That Howling Infinite remains deeply sceptical.

We sometimes think of the one-state solution as a form of what might be called John Lennonism. Like Lennon’s Imagine, it invites us to picture a world in which the barriers dividing human beings – nationality, religion, identity, inherited loyalties – simply fade away “… and the world will live as one”. It is, in political terms, a fantasy. Human beings have proven remarkably resistant to abandoning the identities by which they define themselves, particularly when those identities have been forged in trauma, conflict, and memory.

The obstacle is not merely political. If it were only a matter of drawing borders or writing constitutions, the conflict might have been resolved decades ago. The deeper problem is that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are not simply rival populations occupying the same territory. They are distinct national communities with different historical experiences, cultural assumptions, political traditions, and social norms.

Modern Israel, despite its many internal divisions, has evolved as a democratic state with a vigorous civil society, an independent judiciary, a highly visible secular culture, and social attitudes that often resemble those of the Mediterranean and Western worlds. Palestinian society is itself diverse and cannot be reduced to stereotypes, but it remains on average more religious, more socially conservative, and more communitarian in outlook. Questions of gender, sexuality, family structure, religion, and public morality are often approached very differently.

This is not a matter of superiority or inferiority. It is simply a recognition that cultures develop in different ways. A constitution can proclaim equality before the law; it cannot instantly reconcile competing visions of how society should be organised.

Nor is religion a secondary issue that can be neatly confined to the private sphere. The Holy Land is not merely a geographical expression. Jerusalem is sacred to Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike. The Temple Mount and Haram al-Sharif are not interchangeable pieces of real estate. Hebron is not simply another provincial town. The land itself is saturated with competing sacred histories and theological meaning. Secular liberals often underestimate the extent to which these beliefs continue to shape political reality.

Most importantly, there is the question of national identity. The majority of Israeli Jews do not regard Israel merely as the place where they happen to live. They see it as the national homeland of the Jewish people, hard won after centuries of persecution, expulsion, and ultimately the Holocaust. Most Palestinians, with equal sincerity, see themselves as a distinct people whose own homeland was fragmented, occupied, and partially lost. Neither national narrative is likely to disappear because intellectuals devise an elegant constitutional formula.

The one-state solution therefore requires something extraordinary. It asks two peoples who have spent more than a century developing separate national identities, fighting wars, enduring terrorism, experiencing occupation, displacement, and mutual fear, to place their trust in a common political project. It asks them not merely to share territory but to share sovereignty, institutions, symbols, and ultimately a vision of the future.

History offers few examples of such transformations succeeding quickly or peacefully. Lebanon, Bosnia, Cyprus, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia serve as reminders that multinational states are often fragile even under far less traumatic circumstances. Northern Ireland, often cited as a success story, was not resolved by the disappearance of identity but by painstaking arrangements that acknowledged and accommodated competing identities rather than pretending they no longer mattered.

This is why it is understandable to remain sceptical of the one-state solution, despite understanding its moral appeal. The scepticism does not arise from hostility to coexistence, nor from a belief that Jews and Arabs are somehow incapable of living together. They have done so before, and they may yet do so again. Rather, it arises from a recognition that human beings are shaped by history, culture, religion, memory, and collective experience. These things are not easily discarded.

The tragedy of Israel and Palestine is that there are many compelling moral arguments and very few convincing practical solutions. The one-state solution may satisfy the imagination, much as Imagine satisfies the ear. But politics is not a song. States are built not from aspirations alone but from the consent, trust, and shared assumptions of the people who inhabit them. At present, those foundations appear conspicuously absent.

That may strike some as pessimistic. But it is more an attempt to see the conflict not as we wish it to be, but as it is: a struggle between two deeply rooted national communities, each carrying histories, loyalties, fears, and aspirations that cannot simply be wished away by even the noblest of ideals.

The transformation of Palestinian nationalism from secular to Islamist

Palestinian nationalism, like much Arab nationalism, was not always framed in the language of religion. In the early twentieth century, movements across the Levant. anti-colonial, anti-Zionist, and Arabist—were largely secular, rooted in a combination of local civic identity, anti-imperial sentiment, and the vision of a shared Arab polity. Leaders envisioned the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of self-governing institutions through political mobilization, diplomacy, and, at times, armed struggle, rather than religious imperatives.

Over the decades, however, the ideological contours of Palestinian nationalism shifted markedly. The repeated failures of secular parties, the political fragmentation of the Palestinian leadership, the enduring dislocations of the diaspora, and the harsh realities of occupation contributed to a turn toward religion as both a mobilizing force and a framework for justice. By the late twentieth century, Islamist movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad had emerged not simply as religious actors, but as ideologically coherent alternatives to secular nationalism. These groups foreground jihad, martyrdom, and the religious sanctity of the land in their rhetoric, framing the struggle for Palestine as a cosmic as well as temporal obligation.

The transformation is reinforced and symbolically anchored in sites of singular significance. The Haram al-Sharif – or Al Aqsa compound – has become more than a physical locus; it is an icon, a rallying point, and a metonym for the broader struggle. Events such as the naming of military campaigns “Al Aqsa Flood,” and the explicit articulation of eschatological promises, like the “Hamas Promise of the Hereafter,” signal the intertwining of politics and theology in contemporary mobilization. For many young Palestinians, religiosity is inseparable from identity and resistance, shaping curricula, media consumption, and communal norms, and providing moral justification and existential purpose to a struggle defined by occupation, dispossession, and chronic vulnerability.

This turn toward Islamist framing cannot be understood in isolation from the broader regional context. Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” – its network of ideological, financial, and military support extending to Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic factions, and other actors – has reinforced the sectarian and geopolitical overlay on what was once largely a nationalist struggle. Palestinian nationalism, once secular and civic, is now entangled with a wider regional contest over ideology, faith, and influence.

The result is a politics that is profoundly resistant to compromise. Where once the possibility of pragmatic negotiation might have existed under secular leadership, religious imperatives, narratives of martyrdom, and the sanctity of sacred space have complicated the landscape. The intersection of youth religiosity, ideological indoctrination, regional sponsorship, and symbolic geography means that even limited concessions are difficult to imagine without appearing sacrilegious, existentially threatening, or politically fatal.

In sum, the ideological evolution of Palestinian nationalism—from secular, civic, and political mobilization toward religiously framed struggle – illuminates why contemporary conflict cannot be understood solely through the lens of territory or governance. It is simultaneously geopolitical, generational, and spiritual, embedded in the sacred geography of the land and in the cosmology of a people who have endured loss, occupation, and existential threat. Understanding this transformation is essential to comprehending why peace is so elusive, why the Two-State Solution is increasingly improbable, and why the wounds of October 7 and the Gaza War are likely to reverberate across generations. [In In That Howling Infinite see Lebensraum Redux – Hamas’ promise of the hereafter and Al Aqsa Flood and the Hamas holy war.

Israeli religiosity, nationalism, and the hardening of intransigence

Just as Palestinian nationalism has shifted from secular civic aspiration to an Islamist, jihad-inflected orientation, Israeli politics and identity have undergone a parallel, if distinct, transformation. The early Zionist project – rooted in secular socialism, pragmatic state-building, and European Jewish cultural memory – emphasized settlement, cultivation, and defense of a Jewish homeland, but largely avoided overt messianism or religious justification for territorial claims. For decades, labor Zionism and pragmatic governance dominated the state, seeking coexistence when possible and security when necessary.

Over time, however, particularly following the 1967 war and Israel’s acquisition of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, a potent strain of religious-nationalist ideology gained influence. Settler movements, many infused with messianic belief, framed the West Bank and other “biblical heartlands” not as disputed territory to be negotiated but as divinely mandated inheritance. Military victory became moral vindication; the conquest of hills, valleys, and historic cities was interpreted as the fulfilment of prophecy. For many young Israelis. particularly those raised in settler communities or religious schools – attachment to the land is inseparable from divine obligation, identity, and collective destiny.

The fusion of religiosity with nationalism has been reinforced by political consolidation. Governments led by right-wing parties, often aligned with settler constituencies and religious Zionist ideologues, have enacted policies that expand settlements, prioritize security over compromise, and embed ideological imperatives into law and practice. The “Greater Israel” project is not merely strategic; it is sacred, moral, and historical. Even military service, once largely secular, now socializes many Israelis – soldiers, conscripts, and officers alike – into a worldview in which defense, occupation, and settlement are intertwined with divine sanction.

This hardening of ideology has been mirrored culturally. Public rituals, school curricula, media, and religious observance reinforce narratives of historical continuity, existential threat, and moral righteousness. Palestinian identity is often perceived through a lens of threat, suspicion, or delegitimization—echoing the zero-sum dynamics that have hardened Palestinian views in response. Generationally, the result is a cohort of Israelis for whom compromise is morally fraught, politically risky, and psychologically difficult. [In In That Howling Infinite, see A Messiah is needed – so that he will not come]

The convergence is stark. On one side, Palestinian youth are inculcated with religiosity, martyrdom, and symbolic attachment to sacred sites; on the other, Israeli youth are shaped by historical consciousness, messianic settlement ideology, and the ethos of defense and divine inheritance. Both trajectories interact with persistent violence, security operations, and cycles of attack and reprisal to produce symmetrical intransigence: each side perceives the other not merely as a political opponent, but as a moral and existential threat.

The consequence is a landscape in which “living together” is extraordinarily difficult. Generations of separation, trauma, and ideological reinforcement – accelerated and amplified by events such as the October 7 attacks and the ensuing Gaza War – have left both peoples locked in narratives of absolute moral and historical entitlement. The Two-State Solution, always tenuous, is now likely off the table for a generation, as each side’s ideological and spiritual imperatives make compromise psychologically, socially, and politically fraught. What remains is a contest over narratives, memory, sacred geography, and identity as much as over territory – a reality that ensures the conflict’s endurance, and the persistence of hurt and hardened hearts, long into the future.

A shared turn towards the sacred – and the absolute

Taken together, these parallel transformations reveal something deeply unsettling: the conflict is no longer driven primarily by negotiable political claims, but by sacred narratives that resist compromise by design. What began, on both sides, as largely secular national movements – Palestinian nationalism rooted in anti-colonial liberation, Zionism grounded in pragmatic state-building—has evolved into something more brittle and more dangerous. Land has been transfigured into destiny; territory into covenant; grievance into metaphysics. Each side now increasingly understands itself not merely as a people with rights, but as a people with a mandate. And mandates do not share easily. In this mirror-play of sacralised nationalism, each claims moral altitude, each sees concession as betrayal, and each reads the other not as a neighbour with history, but as an obstacle to redemption. This is not symmetry of guilt, but symmetry of entrapment – a narrowing corridor in which politics gives way to prophecy, and coexistence becomes heresy.

The weaponisation of Jerusalem

One of the recurring tragedies of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been the weaponisation of Jerusalem’s holy places. Few locations on earth carry such a concentration of religious, historical, and emotional significance. For Jews, Jerusalem is the city of King David, the site of the First and Second Temples, and the focus of centuries of prayer and longing. For Muslims, Jerusalem is al Quds, the Holy. Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Haram al-Sharif are bound to the Prophet Muhammad’s Night Journey and Ascension, making them the third holiest site in Islam. For both peoples, Jerusalem is not merely a city; it is a repository of memory, identity, and destiny.

The problem is not that these places are revered. Reverence is natural. The problem arises when sacred sites become political instruments, enlisted to mobilise populations, legitimise agendas, and elevate earthly disputes into cosmic struggles. Once that transformation occurs, compromise becomes extraordinarily difficult. Negotiations over borders, sovereignty, and security become entangled with questions of divine promise, historical grievance, and religious duty.

The modern conflict offers many examples. In Palestinian politics, Al-Aqsa has often functioned as both a religious symbol and a nationalist rallying cry. Yasser Arafat’s adoption of the term “Al-Aqsa Intifada” in 2000 helped frame a political uprising in the language of defending a sacred sanctuary. Two decades later, Hamas would take this a step further by naming the October 7 attacks Tufan al-Aqsa – the “Al-Aqsa Flood.” The implication was clear: the violence was not merely a military operation but part of a sacred struggle conducted in defence of Islam’s holy places. [See Al Aqsa Flood and the Hamas holy war]

This invocation of Al-Aqsa has proven extraordinarily powerful because Jerusalem occupies such a central place in the Palestinian imagination. Yet it has also carried a heavy cost. The language of holy war and sacred obligation can create expectations that no political settlement can satisfy. It encourages the belief that victory lies just beyond the next sacrifice, the next uprising, the next confrontation. In doing so, it can transform a complex national conflict into a perpetual religious crusade, with devastating consequences for ordinary Palestinians and Israelis alike.

A similar dynamic can be found, albeit in different forms, on the Israeli side. The City of David, located just south of the Old City walls, is not merely an archaeological site. For many Jews it represents the tangible connection between the modern Jewish state and the ancient Israelite kingdom. The Kotel – the Western Wall – serves as a living reminder of the destruction of the Second Temple and of two millennia of exile and longing. These are not abstract symbols but deeply emotional touchstones embedded in Jewish collective memory.

Most Jews experience these places primarily as sites of prayer, history, and cultural continuity. Yet for some religious-nationalists, they can also become symbols of exclusive claims and redemptive politics. Biblical history may be invoked not simply as a source of identity but as a mandate for contemporary sovereignty. Palestinians, in turn, often interpret such assertions as challenges to their own historical presence in Jerusalem and the surrounding land. Thus sacred history becomes intertwined with modern political conflict.

The result is that Jerusalem often functions as a mirror, reflecting the deepest hopes and fears of both peoples. Rumours regarding changes to the status quo at Al-Aqsa can trigger unrest across the region, and indeed, from Morocco to the Malacca Strait.  Proposals concerning Jewish prayer rights on the Temple Mount can provoke international crises. Archaeological excavations are scrutinised not merely as scientific endeavours but as political acts that have alost politicised UNESCO. Even language itself becomes contested, as competing names and narratives signal competing visions of legitimacy and belonging.

What makes the situation particularly combustible is that both peoples possess genuine historical connections to the city. Neither attachment is invented. Neither can simply be dismissed as propaganda. The challenge lies in recognising that the existence of one narrative does not invalidate the other. Yet political movements often find it easier to mobilise supporters through exclusivity than through complexity. Sacred sites become symbols not of shared history but of zero-sum ownership.

History offers many examples of holy places becoming vehicles for nationalism, irredentism, and ideological struggle. Jerusalem is perhaps the most potent example because so many sacred geographies overlap within such a small space. The danger arises when the defence of a shrine, a wall, or a mount becomes more important than the lives of the people who live around it. At that point, stone acquires greater value than flesh, and symbols begin to outweigh human beings.

The tragedy is that the religious traditions rooted in Jerusalem contain resources for a different conclusion. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic teachings all emphasise the sanctity of human life. Indeed, a well-known Islamic tradition holds that the life of a believer is more sacred in God’s sight than the Kaaba itself. Such teachings suggest that holy places should inspire humility rather than militancy, reverence rather than violence.

Yet throughout the conflict, Jerusalem’s sacred geography has too often been transformed into political ammunition. The challenge for any future peace will not be to diminish the importance of these places, but to prevent them from being used as weapons in a struggle that has already consumed far too many lives.

Last words. One land, two peoples, many inheritances

Early Zionist leaders invoked the phrase “a land without a people for a people without a land,” a formulation that sounds tidy on paper but collapses under the weight of soil, memory, and ordinary life. Lloyd George did not invent the phrase, but he embraced its logic – animated by imperial strategy, evangelical imagination, and a genuine sense of moral obligation. Jews, he believed, were a “remarkable race,” entitled to rebuild their ancient home. Yet that home already lived and breathed through generations of Arabs who tilled its soil, named its springs, and prayed in its cities. The Balfour Declaration, for all its lofty phrasing, attempted to reconcile history and aspiration, European strategy and ancestral longing – but it did so without fully pausing to accommodate the people already present. That omission was not incidental; it was foundational. [Regarding the Balfour Declaration, see In That Howling Infinite‘s The hand that signed the paper]

That unresolved tension – between return and continuity, between memory and presence, between claim and lived reality – became the defining heartbeat of the land. Names echo across centuries: Hebron and al-Khalil, Shechem and Nablus, Jaffa and Yafa. Each syllable carries strata of meaning -Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Arabic, conquest and conversion, exile and resettlement, survival and reinvention. Archaeology records footprints but cannot arbitrate possession. History testifies, but it does not decree. Both Jews and Palestinians inhabit these layers. Both are rooted in ways that are real, profound, and entangled,and both carry histories that cannot be wished away without violence -moral, cultural, or physical..

Modern frameworks – settler colonialism, indigeneity, even race and ethnicity – promise clarity, but clarity here often disguises moral adjudication. Jews are rendered outsiders when diaspora experience is foregrounded; Palestinians are rendered singularly indigenous when centuries of migration, conversion, and intermingling are flattened. The Levant resists such neat categories. Its peoples are mosaics: ancestry interwoven, culture layered, memory overlapping. To treat legitimacy as a zero-sum game is to misunderstand the soil itself.

What has changed – what darkens the horizon – is that this already tragic entanglement is now being refracted through absolutist religious and ideological lenses on both sides. Palestinian nationalism, once largely secular, has increasingly fused with Islamist cosmology, jihadist rhetoric, and sacralised grievance. Israeli politics, once dominated by pragmatic secular Zionism, has in turn absorbed messianic nationalism, settler theology, and the sanctification of territory. The land is no longer merely inherited; it is promised. No longer contested; it is ordained.

October 7 did not create this transformation, but it detonated it. The massacre, and the catastrophic war that followed, have not only extinguished what little remained of trust or political imagination between Israelis and Palestinians; they have radiated outward, poisoning discourse far beyond the region. They have hardened identities, licensed eliminationist rhetoric, and accelerated the global spread of moral monoculture – where outrage substitutes for understanding, and certainty for thought. For a generation at least, the two-state solution now sits not just beyond reach, but beyond belief – undermined by geography, demographics, trauma, and the collapse of faith in compromise itself.

And yet, the hardest truth remains unchanged. This conflict is not a clash of right and wrong, but of right and right – of two peoples carrying deep, legitimate attachments to the same land, each convinced that recognition of the other threatens their own survival. The tragedy is not that the land cannot sustain more than one people; it is that politics, ideology, and now theology have conspired to make that multiplicity feel impossible.

This is the context in which the two-state solution falters. Not merely because of settlements, borders, or security dilemmas – real and devastating as those are – but because the political imagination required to sustain partition has been eroded. Two states presume mutual recognition of legitimacy, not just pragmatic separation. They require each side to accept that the other’s story is not provisional, not fraudulent, not temporary. That moral groundwork has thinned, even as the physical geography has grown more entangled.

Yet the alternative – one state without mutual recognition – offers no clearer horizon. Power without legitimacy curdles into domination: legitimacy without power dissolves into grievance. Neither yields coexistence. The land does not reward absolutism. It absorbs it, layers it, and hands it back as tragedy.

The challenge of one land, two peoples is therefore not to determine who arrived first, nor to tally historical grievances like entries in a ledger. It is to imagine a politics capable of holding multiplicity without erasure, continuity without dispossession, and memory without weaponization. The land—and the histories it holds -can sustain more than one life, more than one inheritance, more than one truth.

Ownership is not the measure of legitimacy. Continuity, memory, and attachment are. Both Jewish and Palestinian peoples carry the land in body, story, ritual, and longing. Both are indigenous. Both are real. And both reveal the Levant’s most stubborn lesson: history is not a verdict, memory is not a weapon, and legitimacy is not diminished by being shared.

The challenge, then, is not to resolve history like a court case, nor to assign moral scores, nor to demand purification through denunciation. It is to recover a politics capable of holding multiplicity without erasure, continuity without dispossession, and memory without weaponisation. That task feels impossibly distant. But abandoning it altogether guarantees only one outcome: an endless tightening of the moral box canyon, where fear replaces curiosity, and every future is imagined only as the negation of another.

As Dougie MacLean sings of land and belonging, in words that echo far beyond Scotland – or Australia, or the Levant: you cannot own the land; the land owns you. The soil of Israel–Palestine has carried many peoples, many faiths, many dreams. It will outlast them all. The question is not who deserves it most, but whether those who inherit it can learn – before more generations are lost – to live upon it without turning memory into a weapon and faith into a sentence of perpetual war.

The Levant, like Australia, like all homelands marked by layered inheritance, demands the same humility – to inhabit without erasure, to remember without domination, to recognise that the soil has always carried more than one people, more than one dream, more than one future.

Coda: the Myth of Fingerprints

We began with the myth of fingerprints – the comforting fiction that history can be reduced to a single originating smudge, a primal sin from which all subsequent calamity flows.

But what this tale of two peoples and two nationalisms in one land reveals is something more complex and more unsettling.

Neither national movement was born fully formed. Both evolved under empire, war, demographic upheaval, exile, and memory. Both shifted ideologically over time –  from reformism to revolt, from socialism to religiosity, from civic aspiration to sacralised entitlement. Each radicalisation found justification in the other’s excess. Each hardened position generated its mirror. The sediment thickened.

October 7 did not appear ex nihilo, nor did the devastation that followed. They sit atop decades of unresolved grievance, failed diplomacy, ideological drift, and mutual distrust. Yet to explain is not to excuse. Genealogy clarifies causation; it does not dissolve responsibility.

The temptation remains to isolate one fingerprint – one declaration, one occupation, one uprising, one massacre – and declare it definitive. But the land bears too many impressions. Empire pressed its thumb there. National revival did too. Exile. Settlement. Insurgency. Security doctrine. Sacred text. Demography. Memory. And now algorithms and the howling internet. In our time, moral capture accelerates what history once sedimented slowly. Certainty travels faster than context. Outrage outruns chronology. Box canyons of conviction form instantly online, their walls built from curated evidence and reciprocal fear. Within them, one hears only affirmation. Height masquerades as clarity. difficult. [In In That Howling Infinite, see Moral capture and conditional empathy]

The refusal of this essay has been simple, if unfashionable: to resist singular blame, to resist moral monoculture, to resist the shaping of facts to fit feelings. Not to equalise suffering, nor to flatten power asymmetries, but to insist that intellectual honesty requires proportion, chronology, and reciprocity of scrutiny.

Two peoples with aspirations for collective self-determination. Each convinced of depth. Each carrying trauma. Each tempted, under pressure, toward absolutism.

There are no clean fingerprints here.

Only layered traces – and the continuing choice, on all sides, whether to add another.

Paul Hemphill, February 2026

This essay was written in conversation with books I’ve read, places I’ve visited, conversation, ideas formed and half-formed, and, more recently, in sustained dialogue with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: selected, tested, revised and revised again, and owned.

For more on the Middle East in in That Howling Infinite, see A Middle East Miscellany.

Bibliography

Sources drawn on for this essay.

Books and Memoirs

Lyons, John. Balcony in Jerusalem: Memoir of Six Years as Middle East Correspondent. Sydney: HarperCollins Australia, 2017.

Pappé, Ilan. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Pappé, Ilan. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. One World Publications, 2006.

Oren Kessler, Palestine 1936: The Great Revolt and the Roots of the Middle East Conflict (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)

Shalit, Avi. My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel. New York: Schocken Books, 2014.

Shulman, David. Kingdom of Olives and Ash: Writers Confront the Occupation. New York: New York Review Books, 2017.

Journal Articles and Essays

Darwish, Mahmoud. “The Key and the Return – Palestine as a Metaphor.” In Palestine as Metaphor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Khalil-Habib, Nejmeh. “The Concept of Return (Al-‘Awda) in Contemporary Arabic Literature.” Nebula 5, no. 2 (2008): 41–58.

Natour, Raja. “Mahmoud Darwish and the Palestinian Narrative.” Haaretz, June 28, 2020.

Sulaimi, Samah. “Reclaiming the Homeland in Palestinian Memory and Art.” Haaretz, July 8, 2020.

Primary Historical Documents

Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917.

Correspondence and speeches of David Lloyd George relating to Zionism, 1917–1922.

If you must say it, don’t say it in Jerusalem!

It was entitled: “Keeping Wolves from the Flock: The Case for Good Religion to Fight Anti-Semitism”. It was delivered on International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January 2026 at the Binyaney Ha’uma Conference Center, Jerusalem, Israel. The presenter was former Australian prime Minister Scott Morrison. It was well received by audience, and praised by Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu. And it quickly reverberated back home.

The venue, the timing, and the company mattered. Israel, in the midst of an ongoing war and under the leadership of a government increasingly isolated internationally, was hardly a neutral stage. The event itself was framed as a moral gathering – a stand against antisemitism at a moment when Jewish communities worldwide feel newly exposed and embattled. Into this charged atmosphere stepped a deposed and disgraced Australian leader, now embarked on an international, largely ecclesiastical speaking circuit, offering prescriptions not for Israel, but for Islam in Australia.

The reaction in Australia followed well-worn grooves. Conservative outlets and commentators – most loudly those aligned with Murdoch media – cast Morrison as a truth-teller, bravely naming uncomfortable realities about radical Islam and standing up for Jewish security against a censorious, “woke” establishment that had been slow to deal with the acknowledged threat of radical Islamism. Progressive commentators, by contrast, focused on the dangers of securitising religion, the selective targeting of Muslims, exacerbating existing Islamophobia, and the symbolic violence of lecturing Australian minorities from abroad. The argument was instantly polarised, less a conversation than a mirror held up to our own media ecosystems and their predictable reflexes.

What was largely missing, however, was sustained attention to the deeper questions the speech inadvertently raised – questions that recur across debates about diversity, cohesion, and authority in plural societies. Who gets to speak about whom, and from where? How does a liberal democracy balance legitimate security concerns with religious freedom and civic trust? When does critique shade into control, and when does concern curdle into performance? And what happens when discussions about coexistence are conducted not face to face, but at altitude, before distant audiences primed for applause?

It is to those questions – rather than to the outrage or applause – that the brief following essay turns.

The politics of posturing 

There is a particular genre of speech that is recognisable before one even reaches the second paragraph. It is delivered abroad, framed as courageous, freighted with moral urgency, and aimed not so much at those ostensibly being addressed as at a wider, watching audience. Scott Morrison’s address in Israel belongs squarely in this genre. It is less a contribution to Australian social cohesion than a performance within a global culture war, delivered from a stage carefully chosen for its symbolism rather than its suitability.

Morrison, now out of office and out in the world, occupies a familiar post-political niche as he treads an international speaking circuit, heavily ecclesiastical in tone and audience, where moral clarity is prized over policy detail and applause over accountability. This matters, because the speech was not made in the Australian Parliament, not to Australian Muslims, not even in Australia. It was made in Israel – at a moment when Benjamin Netanyahu, politically cornered and morally embattled, will accept reassurance and affirmation from almost any quarter. In that sense, the speech served two purposes: it burnished Morrison’s credentials with a transnational conservative audience, and it offered Netanyahu symbolic solidarity. Australia, and Australian Muslims, were almost incidental.

The content of Morrison’s address has been widely rehearsed: calls for nationally consistent standards for Islamic institutions; accreditation and registration of imams; translation of sermons; expanded scrutiny of foreign funding; praise for Middle Eastern states that have “reasserted authority” over religious teaching. None of these ideas, taken in isolation, are wholly unthinkable. Liberal democracies already regulate religion in numerous ways – through education standards, charity law, financial transparency, and criminal statutes relating to incitement and abuse. No faith operates in a vacuum, and Islam is not exempt from the tensions between patriarchal authority and moral absolutism, and the egalitarian instincts of a secular, humanist society like Australia’s.

Nor is it controversial to observe that Islam, like Christianity before it, is engaged in a long, unfinished argument with modernity. Questions of gender, authority, pluralism, sexuality, and the limits of clerical power are not impositions from outside but live debates within Muslim communities themselves (see, in In That Howling Infinite, Islam’s house of many mansions and Educate a girl and you educate a community – exclude her and you impoverish it ). Australian Islam, however, is overwhelmingly benign, pragmatic, and law-abiding – a quiet negotiation between inherited tradition and lived reality, not a breeding ground of medieval zealotry. The men and women who left Australia to fight for ISIS were not summoned by local mosques but seduced by freelancing radicals in unregulated prayer halls algorithmic feeds, online grievance, and a search for meaning in a fractured digital world in which they find no place..

This is where Morrison’s argument begins to fray. Security agencies themselves – including ASIO director Mike Burgess – have been clear: you cannot arrest your way to social cohesion, nor spy your way to less youth radicalisation. The most rapidly evolving threats now emerge from the post-Covid morass of conspiracy theorists, anti-government paranoiacs, white nationalists, and apocalyptic survivalists – movements that often cloak themselves in Christian symbolism without any expectation that Christianity as a whole should be placed under special surveillance. To single out Islam, therefore, is not just analytically weak but politically loaded.

That loading is amplified by Morrison’s own biography. He is not a neutral secularist but an openly proselytising evangelical Christian, steeped in a tradition that would respond angrily to equivalent proposals applied to its own institutions. His political career was marked by secrecy, performative culture-war gestures, and a tendency to govern by symbolic posture rather than deliberative engagement – a style that ultimately saw him removed from office. These things do not invalidate his right to speak, but they do shape how his speech is received in his home country.

Then there is the matter of exemplars. Morrison’s citing of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan as models of religious regulation is not merely unfortunate; it is disqualifying. These are regimes that suppress women, persecute Christians and heterodox Muslims, criminalise dissent, and weaponise religion as an instrument of authoritarian control. They have form for dealing with Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood with what the Americans euphemistically call “extreme prejudice”.

To invoke them while speaking the language of freedom of worship is to betray a deep confusion about the difference between liberal regulation and illiberal domination. If the aim is integration, these are strange teachers to cite.

Yet even all this misses the most important point, which is not what Morrison said but how and where he said it.

It is presumptuous to lecture Australians from abroad. It is disrespectful to address Australian Muslims without engaging them directly. And it is incendiary to do so from Israel – a place that is anything but neutral in Muslim political consciousness, and where questions of religion, power, land, and legitimacy are already saturated with pain and contestation. To speak from there is to speak over, not to; to align oneself symbolically before dialogue has even begun. No amount of policy caveating can undo that gesture.

This is where the charge of Islamophobia becomes both understandable and, paradoxically, incomplete. Morrison did not denounce Muslims as such, nor did he advocate exclusion or expulsion. But by singling out Islam, invoking authoritarian models, and delivering his critique from a stage freighted with geopolitical meaning, he helped reinforce the sense that Muslims are a problem to be managed rather than citizens to be engaged. That perception matters, because alienation is not a side effect of radicalisation; it is one of its preconditions.

The reactions to the speech followed predictable lines. British commentator Brendan O’Neill, for example, writing in The Australian, cast Morrison as a brave blasphemer, persecuted by a censorious “Islamophobia industry” – a piece of rhetorical theatre entirely consistent with Spiked’s long-standing contrarian brand and its comfortable alignment with Murdoch culture-war politics. Jacqueline Maley, writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, and the progressive wing of liberal commentary, focused on the dangers of securitisation, surveillance, and selective moral panic. Neither is wrong, exactly, but neither escapes their own political ecosystem.

What is striking is how little the speech had to do with Australia at all. It was not an attempt to build consensus, to consult, or to wrestle with the messy realities of pluralism. It was an attention-seeking intervention by a man no longer accountable to the electorate and yet nostalgic for its attention, speaking to an international audience that rewards moral certainty and civilisational framing. In that sense, the speech says less about Islam than it does about the temptations of post-power relevance.

If there is a lesson here, it is an old one. Social cohesion is not forged by speaking about communities from afar, nor by borrowing the language of security to police belief. It is built, slowly and imperfectly, through proximity, dialogue, and the unglamorous work of trust. Morrison chose distance instead. And in doing so, he turned a necessary conversation into a symbolic skirmish – one that generated headlines, applause, and division, but very little understanding. One that we hope, unrealistically alas, in today’s febrile political climate, will be forgotten sooner rather than later.

Call it concern if you like; politics has another word for speeches that travel so far to say so little at home: posturing.

For more on the Middle East in in That Howling Infinite, see A Middle East Miscellany.

Recent posts on the current state of Australian politics include Same old stone, different rock. What’s in a word?’ Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty, Moral capture and conditional empathy, and Standing on the high moral ground is hard work!