A rabbi, a priest and an imam walk into a bomb shelter … a Jerusalem story

Shelter from the storm

In the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City, where the bomb shelter beneath apartment is a fifteen-hundred-year-old Byzantine well, the ancient stones are apparently expected to add ballistic missiles to their already impressive curriculum vitae.

During the many missile alerts and anxious descents underground, the Byzantine cistern became an informal United Nations of the Levant – not the dysfunctional institution as presently constituted, but the older version of humanity: friend and neighbours, strangers, pilgrims and passers-by of all races, faiths and fashions gather together, seeking shelter from the metal rain falling through the skies above.

On 11 June, a gas explosion in in the building above this well killed one person and severely injured another. The old walls held, but the apartments above the blast did not fare so well and their residents were rendered homeless – among them was Jerusalem writer Sarah Tuttle-Singer, whose account of life in the bomb shelter is one of those rare pieces of journalism that manages to be simultaneously funny, melancholy and oddly reassuring. The story was first told on her Facebook page last March but is also included in her recently published Fairy Lights in God’s Backyard –  A Jerusalem Love  Story.

The people you meet when your bomb shelter is a Byzantine well

Sarah Tuttle-Singer’s Facebook page, 1 March 2026

There are cities with reinforced concrete and government-issued instructions laminated on the wall.

And then there is Jerusalem.

Here, when the siren goes off, you descend into a 1,500-year-old Byzantine well beneath the Old City and hope the WiFi holds.

It may not be up to code, but it has survived Crusaders, Salahadin’s brother in law, Mamluks, Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians — and now, apparently, this.

This is who you meet there.

1. The 90-Year-Old Armenian with the Keys
He has a ring of keys large enough to open half the Old City.
His family has been here longer than most borders.
He doesn’t speak much, but when he does, it’s very. Precise.
He has seen different flags, different uniforms, different promises. Same sky.
“We always stay.”
It’s not defiance. It’s point of fact.

2. The Amateur Archaeologist
He insists the well survived empires and will therefore survive this. He runs his hand along the stones like they’re old friends.
“Feel that?” he says. “Byzantine engineering.”
He says it the way other men say, “Trust me.”
He is not calm. He is performing calm for the rest of us.

3. The Broadcaster from East Jerusalem
Two phones. One on speaker. An entire extended family pouring out of little squares like the Brady Bunch — cousins, uncles, someone’s sister’s friend’s mother’s hairstylist. Advice. Prayers. Rumors. The well somehow has WiFi.
He keeps saying, “One second, one second,” to both the people on the phone and the people in the room.
Everyone is talking with their hands and shouting.
It’s a Woody Allen movie in Arabic.

4. The Existentialist
She is unimpressed by empires. Unimpressed by history. Unimpressed by all of us.
“If this well survived the Crusades, why doesn’t it have better lighting?” she asks.
She scrolls. She sighs.
She was supposed to meet Tomer from Tinder later.
She’d rather be taking selfies on the roof.

5. The Father from America Who Wants Regional Analysis
He asks for an assessment of what will happen next.
Not tonight.
Over the next seventeen years.
He wants a 32-minute breakdown of geopolitical implications, regional actors, economic shifts, global realignments.
He is crushingly specific.
The siren wails above us and he says, “So strategically speaking…”

6. The Small Boy Who Wants to Know If Wells Have Ghosts
He asks this without irony.
He wants to know if Byzantine ghosts speak Arabic or Hebrew or another language.
He wants to know if ghosts are afraid of sirens.
No one has a good answer.

7. The Armenian Pit Bull Named Baku
He is having a regional crisis of his own.
He is vibrating.
He requires antipsychotics and possibly a UN envoy.
His presence alone makes this officially multinational.
He does not care about geopolitics.
He cares about chewing the historian’s hat.

8. The Rabbi, the Priest, the Imam — and the Armenian Electrician
They arrive slightly out of breath.
They still meet once a year for coffee during Ramadan, after Iftar and Shabbat.
They argue about history.
They argue about God.
They argue about whose mother cooks best.
When the siren peaks, each whispers something different.
They don’t coordinate. But they all look up at the same time.

9. The French Tourists Who Just Want a Cigarette
They did not see this in the brochure.
“Excusez-moi,” one asks, peering upward toward the mouth of the well, “is it safe to smoke?”
Everyone stares.
The dog vibrates harder.
They apologize beautifully and then take a selfie with the stones.
Later they will describe this as authentique

10. The WhatsApp General
He has no formal rank but enormous authority.
“Forwarded many times,” he announces, as if citing peer-reviewed research.
He reads updates from three different groups: family, neighborhood, and something ominous called “Security Real Truth.”
His information contradicts itself every four minutes.
He refreshes anyway.
He has not been called up for miluim.

11. The Amateur Historian’s Rival
He gently corrects the Archaeologist.
“Late Byzantine,” he says. “Possibly early Umayyad modifications.”
If the siren lasts longer, they may carbon-date each other.
Their debate is oddly comforting.
If men can argue about masonry during a missile alert, civilization is intact

12. The Woman Who Texts Both Sides
She checks on her Jewish cousin in Talpiot and her Palestinian friend in Beit Hanina at the same time.
“Are you safe?” she types, twice, in two languages.
Her face is tight but composed.
She does not make speeches.
She makes sure everyone replies.

13. The Reservist on Silent Mode
Phone face down. Boots dusty.
He hasn’t been called up yet.
He keeps calculating how long it would take to get from here to his unit if the message comes.
He says nothing about it.
He eats sunflower seeds like it’s a normal Motzei Shabbat.

14. The Shopkeeper Who Locked Up Mid-Sentence
He came straight from the shuk.
Apron still on. Change still in his pocket.
He locked the shop while telling someone, “One second, I’ll be right back.”
He says this every time.
He means it.

15. The One Who Can’t Wait for Mashiach
“This isn’t a war,” he says, eyes bright. “It’s Purim.”
Redemption is HERE. Right around the corner.
He is already narrating the reversal.
The plot twist.
The downfall of enemies.
He quotes verses. He forwards voice notes. He smiles like someone who has read the last page and knows how it ends.
The siren wails and he nods.
“Geula,” he whispers.
He is not afraid.
Or maybe he is – and this is how he metabolizes it.

16. The Fiddler on the Roof
He makes a cameo in the shelter after filming the missiles. He is neurotically energized.

17. The Person Watching It All
Not neutral. Not detached. Just noticing.
The absurdity of a regional war compressed into a stone cylinder beneath the Old City.
Armenians. Jews. Palestinians.
WiFi. Sirens. Sunflower seeds.
A dog named Baku.
A man analyzing the next seventeen years while we wait for the next seven minutes to pass.

All of us sitting on stones laid when theology was still being argued in sandals.

And the well – older than all our arguments – holding.

Above us, the siren rises and falls.

Below, history breathes through limestone.

Empires argue. Politicians posture. Analysts predict seventeen-year arcs.

But in the well, we share space . We refresh WhatsApp. We whisper different prayers to the same ceiling of sky.

And when it’s over, we climb back up the narrow steps into whatever century is waiting for us — still here.

Sarah Tuttle-Singer is the author of Jerusalem Drawn and Quartered and Fairy Lights in Gods Backyard – A Jerusalem Love Story, and the New Media Editor at Times of Israel. She was raised in Venice Beach, California on Yiddish lullabies and Civil Rights anthems, and she now lives in Jerusalem with her 3 kids where she climbs roofs, explores cisterns, opens secret doors, talks to strangers, and writes stories about people. Sarah also speaks before audiences left, right, and center through the Jewish Speakers Bureau, asking them to wrestle with important questions while celebrating their willingness to do so. She loves whisky and tacos and chocolate chip cookies and old maps and foreign coins and discovering new ideas from different perspectives. Sarah is a work in progress.

 

Fairy Lights in God’s Backyard … a Jerusalem love story

Jerusalem is all about faith and passion, and there is no city on Earth that people get more passionate about. The light is luminous. In high summer it almost shimmers. The very air is full of prayer and politics, passion and pain, and the rocks and stones virtually sing a hallelujah chorus of history. I am not a religious person, but I cannot help getting excited by the place –  although I do not transcend to the transports of delight and delirium that enrapture many or make their way here from all over the world.

We have been to Jerusalem many times, and hope to return. During our recent stay, we had the pleasure of meeting journalist, storyteller and author Sarah Tuttle-Singer several times – twice in the Old City, an appropriate place to meet someone whose relationship with the city is so deeply woven into her writing. We know the Old City well and love it. Having spent time with Sarah walking its streets and alleys, we know it better and love it more.

Her new book, Fairy Lights in God’s Backyard: A Jerusalem Love Story, is an affectionate, sometimes heartbreaking, often funny and very personal account of a city that has a habit of getting under one’s skin.

History, memory and humanity in a city that refuses to be possessed

Fairy Lights in God’s Backyard is not a conventional history of Jerusalem, nor an excitable gallop like Simon Sebag-Montefiore’s Jerusalem – the Biography. Nor is it an analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is something rather more intimate: a memoir of life in a city where the extraordinary and the mundane, the sacred and the profane, the ancient and the contemporary are continually bumping into one another. But Sarah’s observations about Jerusalem have a particular resonance for anyone interested in the accumulated history of this remarkable place, and I found myself returning repeatedly to one central idea: Jerusalem as a palimpsest, a city in which the past is not simply remembered but physically inhabited.

“History in Jerusalem is so thick it sometimes feels like another person in the room,” Sarah writes. It is a wonderful description of something that is difficult to explain to anyone who has not spent time wandering its streets. Jerusalem is not simply a city with a long history. Its history is part of the everyday landscape, embedded in the stones, walls, foundations, courtyards and alleyways, sometimes exposed, sometimes concealed, but rarely absent. One does not have to go looking for the past; one merely has to walk through the present.

As Sarah observes, Jerusalem “does not behave politely nor geographically. It stacks centuries on top of each other and calls it a street.” Elsewhere, cities may have an old town and a new; a museum where the past has been safely preserved; or an archaeological precinct separated from the business of contemporary life. Jerusalem is less accommodating. Here, people build apartments on Crusader arches and conduct their daily business above the foundations of earlier civilisations. The stones of one age become the building materials of another; temples become churches, churches become mosques, synagogues rise beside ruins, and buildings acquire successive identities as political and religious authority changes hands. As Sarah puts it, “One family’s foundation becomes another family’s archaeology.”

There is something almost geological about this accumulation. The city has been built, destroyed, rebuilt, appropriated, excavated and reconstructed so many times that its physical fabric resembles a series of overlapping historical deposits. A wall may contain stones quarried by Romans, incorporated into a later Byzantine structure, adapted by Crusaders and subsequently absorbed into an Ottoman building. A street may follow a route established centuries before the people now walking along it were born. The archaeological record is not simply beneath the city; it is part of the city, often inconveniently interrupting the present.

Sarah captures this when she writes that Jerusalem “has always been built twice: once by those who first laid the stones and again by the people who lovingly uncover them, preserve them and refuse to let them disappear.” The past is continually being rediscovered, although in Jerusalem rediscovery is rarely an entirely neutral exercise. Archaeology can establish what was there, but the interpretation of what has been found, and what it means for the people living above it, can become another dimension of the city’s continuing contest over history, identity and belonging.

For thousands of years, empires have marched through Jerusalem convinced that they would be the ones to tame her. “None of them did. Jerusalem outlived them all”. Sarah lists the Romans, Umayyads, Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans and British, among others, each leaving behind something of their presence and each, at some point, believing that its particular political arrangement might endure. The wider landscape has also been shaped by Egyptians, Syrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Byzantines, Jordanians and Israelis. Their histories overlap, sometimes complementing one another, sometimes contradicting one another, but never quite disappearing.

There is a certain literary licence in personifying the city in this way, but the historical point is a sound one. Political power is transient, even when it appears otherwise to those exercising it. Kingdoms rise and fall, occupations begin and end, flags change, borders move and the names on maps are erased and written again. The city remains, carrying the physical traces of those who came before.

Sarah makes the observation: “Once you could travel all the way from Beirut to Cairo through Jerusalem.” This simple sentence opens up a much larger historical perspective. The political geography of the contemporary Middle East, with its apparently fixed national boundaries, is a relatively recent construction when set against the longer history of the region. A century sounds like a long time until one realises that it is barely longer than a human lifetime. Empires and political systems that once seemed immovable have disappeared within the span of a few generations. “Every generation”, she writes, “somehow imagines that its version of the map is the final one. History suggests otherwise.”

This  speaks to a recurring interest of mine: the relationship between maps, political authority and historical memory [See Maps, memory, and the myth of fingerprints]. We draw lines on maps and then behave as though those lines were somehow inherent in the landscape, rather than the products of particular historical circumstances, political decisions and exercises of power. The map is always a snapshot of a moment, not a guarantee of permanence. As Sarah observes, “The sands shift. The maps shift with them.”

She takes that thought further, and perhaps provides the most compelling historical perspective in the book: “The sun rises. The moon waxes and wanes. Generations come believing they have an inherited permanence only to discover they are merely another layer of sediment in a place measured not in decades but in millennia.”

There is a humility in that image. Jerusalem has seen too many generations arrive convinced of their permanence, only to become another archaeological layer themselves. It is not that history necessarily repeats itself, or that the present can be predicted from the past, but that a little historical perspective might make us less confident about our own claims to finality. Jerusalem has a way of reminding us that no generation owns the last word.

Yet she is careful not to reduce the city to a succession of empires, archaeological discoveries and competing national narratives. That would be to miss the point of her book. Its  real subject is what happens when a place becomes part of one’s identity, when streets cease to be merely history or scenery and become the setting for the most intimate experiences of ordinary life.

The quotation at the beginning of this essay observed that Jerusalem was “a city of the mind as much as of this earth, it haunts the prayers and dreams of three faiths, and to this this day, it is coveted and contested”. As Sarah puts it, “It was somewhere both distant and deeply intimate. We carried it with us long before we ever lived there.” Because  Jerusalem exists in the imagination of millions of people who may never have visited it.

It is a city of inherited stories, religious traditions, childhood memories, family histories and expectations, a place that can be emotionally familiar long before it becomes physically known. For Jews, Christians and Muslims, it carries meanings that extend far beyond its geographical boundaries. Pilgrims and tourists arrive looking for miracles in ancient stones, while residents are trying to negotiate the rather more immediate business of getting children to school, buying groceries, finding somewhere to park or persuading a shopkeeper to open his door.

But, says Sarah, of the visitors who travel thousands of miles to see Jerusalem’s famous sites: “They come searching for miracles in ancient stones. I think they’re looking in the wrong place.” The miracle, perhaps, is not in the stones themselves but in the people who continue to live among them, with all the complications that entails.

Spirit of place

It is here that the book becomes particularly personal. Sarah’s own relationship with Jerusalem has been shaped by motherhood, friendship, faith, separation, loss and the daily challenges of raising three children, including her youngest son, who has special needs. She writes about the beauty, exhaustion, absurdity and occasional loneliness of motherhood, and about the way her son experiences the city through its sounds, textures, rhythms and familiar routines. A street corner, a favourite gate, a repeated phrase or a little hand reaching for hers can become part of what she calls a “sacred geography”.

It is an important shift in perspective. The great historical sites of Jerusalem may attract the attention of the world, but the geography of belonging is often much smaller and more personal. It is made up of places that acquire meaning through repetition, affection and shared experience. The city becomes familiar not because one has mastered its history, but because one has accumulated a thousand small memories within it.

The circumstances that prompted Sarah to write this book give that personal dimension an added poignancy. In June 2026, a gas explosion destroyed her home in the Old City and killed a neighbour. The experience left her confronting the loss of her home, the trauma of the event and the disorienting experience of being displaced from a place with which she had become so intimately connected. Rabbi Menachem Creditor suggested that writing might help her process what had happened. The result became something much larger than an account of personal trauma: a love letter to Jerusalem, to its inhabitants and to the fragile business of being alive.

“I wanted to write about the darkness without allowing it to swallow the light,” she explains. And that is the key to the book’s title. For Sarah, Jerusalem is “God’s backyard”, not because its inhabitants necessarily agree about God – quite the contrary – but because the divine and the ridiculous, the sacred and the profane, the ancient and the ordinary are constantly colliding. The fairy lights are the small moments of beauty and human connection that illuminate the darkness: conversations, friendships, acts of kindness, unexpected generosity and flashes of joy that remind us why life remains worth living, even when the circumstances are difficult.

This a lovely way of viewing Jerusalem, partly because it resists the temptation to turn the city into an abstraction. We tend to encounter Jerusalem through its competing claims, religious significance, political controversies and recurring violence. All of those things matter, of course, and none can simply be wished away. But they are not the whole story. Beneath the headlines there are people getting on with their lives, forming friendships across boundaries, raising families, arguing, laughing, mourning and occasionally discovering that the person they had been taught to regard as an adversary is rather more complicated, generous or human than they had imagined.

Sarah says she is interested in “the ways people connect across differences, and in the moments when someone surprises us by being more complicated, more generous, or more human than we expected.” She adds that Jerusalem has taught her that “multiple truths can exist at once, and listening to someone else doesn’t require surrendering your own.”

That is an important distinction, particularly in a city where almost every historical or political observation can be interpreted as an endorsement of one narrative at the expense of another. Recognising another person’s history does not invalidate your own; acknowledging another community’s attachment to the city does not require you to abandon your own. Jerusalem’s difficulty, and perhaps its enduring fascination, lies partly in the fact that it has held more than one story at once for a very long time. Its inhabitants do not necessarily share the same memories, loyalties, religious convictions or aspirations, but they occupy an extraordinarily intimate and contested physical space.

That does not mean that all claims are equally justified, that competing narratives are immune from historical scrutiny, or that the inequalities and injustices of the present can be dissolved in a warm sentiment about shared humanity. Nor does it mean that the city’s conflicts are simply misunderstandings waiting to be resolved over coffee. Sarah is not offering a political prescription, and readers ought not won’t impose one upon her book. What she offers instead is something perhaps more modest but no less valuable: a reminder that people are more complicated than the categories into which history, politics and sometimes our own prejudices place them.

It is also a reminder that Jerusalem is not exclusively the possession of those who visit its holy places, excavate its ruins, draw its maps or argue over its future. It belongs, in the everyday sense of belonging, to the people who live there, who know its rhythms and eccentricities, who recognise one another in the street and who carry its memories with them when they leave.

I have found myself thinking about all this during our own stay in the Old City. We have wandered its lanes, passed through its gates, crossed between its quarters and watched the ordinary business of life unfold against a backdrop that elsewhere would be regarded as an extraordinary historical and religious landscape. Having spent time with Sarah during our time here, those encounters have added a personal dimension to reading her account. There is something rather appropriate about meeting someone whose writing is so much about the human texture of Jerusalem in the very streets that have shaped it.

One morning, Sarah took us on something of a magical mystery tour of places that most visitors would probably never find for themselves. It was less a conventional guided walk than an excursion through the city’s hidden histories, eccentricities and unexpected connections.

Our itinerary was wonderfully eclectic. We visited what is reputed to be the oldest tattoo parlour in the Middle East; discovered the best place in Jerusalem to buy – and, importantly, sample – Islay malt whiskies; and called in at a shop run by the son of one of Jerusalem’s most celebrated photographers. We visited a church that Vladimir Putin apparently has ambitions to incorporate into the expanding cultural and political universe of Russki Mir, the Russian World. We explored a remarkable sixteenth-century palace built by a high-born woman of Central Asian origin and subsequently inherited by Suleiman the Magnificent’s blonde Ukrainian consort. Along the way, Sarah explained the curious story behind Jerusalem’s cats, before we came upon a weathered red Royal Mail postbox, complete with its royal crown and the initials GR – a small but wonderfully tangible relic of the days this land was part of the British Empire.

It was Jerusalem in miniature: stories  tucked away in the labyrinth of streets and courtyards that make up the Old City. Every doorway seems to conceal another story, every alleyway another historical surprise. And that, is perhaps what Sarah means when she writes that Jerusalem does not behave politely or geographically, but stacks centuries on top of each other and calls it a street.

What made the morning particularly enjoyable was the way Sarah moves between these worlds. She knows the people, the places and the stories, but she also understands that the city is not simply a collection of monuments waiting to be explained to visitors. It is a living neighbourhood, full of personalities, family histories, unexpected friendships and the sort of everyday eccentricities that rarely make it into guidebooks.

And it revealed the spirit of Fairy Lights in God’s Backyard. The magic is not necessarily to be found in the places marked on the tourist map, but in the people and stories encountered along the way. Sometimes all it takes is someone who knows where to look, and is generous enough to show you.

The Old City can be bewildering, sometimes exasperating, occasionally overwhelming, but it is difficult to remain indifferent to it. One moment you are standing beside a wall that has witnessed the passage of empires; the next you are negotiating a narrow alley crowded with residents, merchants, pilgrims and tourists, The sacred and the ridiculous are never very far apart. Sarah understands that, and she writes about it with affection rather than reverence, which is probably the more honest response.

“The city breaks your heart, hands it back to you and somehow convinces you to keep loving it anyway.”  I suspect that anyone who has spent much time in Jerusalem will recognise something of themselves in that sentiment. It is a city that can be infuriating, contradictory and emotionally demanding, but which also possesses an extraordinary capacity to surprise and enchant. It does not make loving it particularly easy, and perhaps that is part of the attraction.

Ultimately, Fairy Lights in God’s Backyard is not a book about who owns Jerusalem, who conquered it, whose history takes precedence or which political map will eventually prevail. Those questions are unavoidable, and Sarah’s historical observations remind us that none should be approached without a sense of perspective. But her deeper subject is the experience of belonging to a place that has become inseparable from one’s identity, and of finding reasons to love it even when it has taken something precious away.

Jerusalem has always been built twice, Sarah reminds us, by those who laid its stones and by those who subsequently uncovered and preserved them. I would add that it is also continually being rebuilt in the memories and affections of the people who inhabit it. Every generation leaves something behind: a building, a street name, a religious tradition, a family story, a friendship, a kindness, a grievance or a memory that refuses to disappear. The city absorbs them all, not necessarily reconciling them, but carrying them forward.

Perhaps that is the ultimate lesson of its accumulated history. Empires come and go, political certainties turn into archaeological curiosities, and the maps that once seemed immutable become historical documents themselves. The stones endure, but so do the stories, including those of people whose names will never appear in a history book.

“The sun rises. The moon waxes and wanes”, Sarah writes; and in the Old City, life goes on: a child walking home, a shopkeeper opening his shutters, a neighbour offering a cup of coffee, and people discovering that they have rather more in common than they expected.

The fairy lights are still there, if we remember to look for them.

And perhaps that is why Jerusalem continues to draw us back. It is a city that refuses to be reduced to a single history, a single faith, a single political claim or even a single meaning. It is ancient and contemporary, intimate and unknowable, sacred and profane, beloved and exasperating. It carries the footprints and the fingerprints of generations long vanished while making room, sometimes reluctantly, for those who come next.

History in Jerusalem is thick enough to feel like another person in the room. Perhaps it is the oldest inhabitant of them all. Sarah said that …

Paul Hemphill, Jerusalem, October 2026

Our walkabout with Sarah has inspired Un That Howling Infinite to publish several “small stories”. Here is one of them: Some dope, a small church and a big headache … A Jerusalem story. 

For own snapshot of the Old City, see Amazing Grace – there’s magic in the air

Walkabout with Sarah: Al Wad Street

Sarah at the Little Wailing Wall, The Muslim Quarter

Some dope, a small church and a big headache … A Jerusalem story

One morning when we were last in Jerusalem, Sarah Tuttle-Singer, author of the recently published and enthralling Fairy Lights in Godʻs Backyard: A Jerusalem Love Story , took us on something of a magical mystery tour of places that most visitors would probably never find for themselves. It was less a conventional guided walk than an excursion through the city’s hidden histories, eccentricities and unexpected connections.

Our itinerary was wonderfully eclectic. We visited what is reputed to be the oldest tattoo parlour in the Middle East; discovered the best place in Jerusalem to buy – and, importantly, sample – Islay malt whiskies; and called in at a shop run by the son of one of Jerusalem’s most celebrated photographers. We explored a remarkable sixteenth-century palace built by a high-born woman of Central Asian origin and subsequently inherited by Suleiman the Magnificent’s blonde Ukrainian consort. Along the way, Sarah explained the curious story behind Jerusalem’s cats, before we came upon a weathered red Royal Mail postbox, complete with its royal crown and the initials GR – a small but wonderfully tangible relic of the days this land was part of the British Empire. And in the Christian Quarter, between the New Gate and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, we stood outside the less well-known Orthodox Church of Alexander Nevsky. It was, she stated, with a sly grin, a place that could potentially start World War III – a church that Russian president Vladimir Putin apparently has ambitions to incorporate into the expanding cultural and political universe of Russky Mir, the Russian World.

Sarah gave us the black and white short film version. here it is retold in Russian red, white and blue technicolor.

The Kremlin, Moscow, Christmas morning 7 January 2020

The telephone rings. President (for life) Vladimir Putin stares at it with the expression of a man who has just been informed that the West has invented another human right. He answers grumpily:

Vlad: Da?

Bibi: Hi, Vlad! It’s Bibi. You know, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, calling from Israel. How are you, my friend?

Vlad: Bibi! It is seven in the morning! It is Christmas! Russian Christmas. Even God is not taking calls today. Why are you?

Bibi: Vlad, Vlad, my friend, tovarishch,  I wouldn’t disturb you unless it were important..

Vlad: (… a long, wintry pause) You said this last time. It was Trump. I am beginning to think you people have no respect for the holidays.

Bibi: Vlad, my friend, listen, I’m asking you for one small favour. One small favour! Naama Issachar. Remember her? Lovely girl. Israeli-American. Good family. A little cannabis in her luggage. Nine grams! I mean, what is that? A salad garnish? You’re giving her seven and a half years. For nine grams! What is this, a prison sentence or a lifetime supply?

Vlad: She broke Russian law.

Bibi: Yes, but Vlad, between friends, surely we can be flexible about the law. I mean, you have laws, I have laws, everybody has laws. If we enforced all of them, where would we be? I couldn’t run a government!

Vlad: Nyet!

Bibi: Nyet? Just like that? You don’t even want to hear what I have to say? I’ve come all this way. I’ve had meetings. I’ve had advisers. I’ve had advisers who advise other advisers. Do you know what that costs?

Vlad: Not my problem.

Bibi: No, of course not. Why should it be your problem? You have your own problems. Ukraine, sanctions, the economy. And now you have an opportunity to do something really positive. A gesture! A gesture of goodwill. Think of the public relations. Think of the Russian Jews in Israel. Important people, Vlad. Voters! You understand voters.

Vlad: I understand power.

Bibi: Yes, well, voters are a kind of power. A rather irritating kind, admittedly, but you have to have them.

Vlad: What do you offer?

Bibi: Ah! Now we’re talking. I knew there was a Russian in there somewhere.

Vlad: Do not waste my time, Bibi.

Bibi: The Alexander Courtyard. Here in Jerusalem. The Christian Quarter. A beautiful property. A church, the Alexabder Nevsky church. History, religion, Russian pilgrims. All those babushkas coming here with their headscarves and shopping bags, kissing icons and buying souvenirs. They’ll adore you! And Patriarch Kirill will be absolutely thrilled. You’ll be the man who restored Russia’s place in the Holy City.

Vlad: The property belongs to Russia.

Bibi: Well, it doesn’t exactly belong to Russia yet. That’s the beauty of the arrangement! You see, we have a little legal difficulty. Nothing serious. A technicality. The sort of thing that can be resolved over lunch, assuming nobody brings a lawyer.

Vlad: Alexander Nevsky?  Mmm.

Bibi: Exactly! Alexander Nevsky. A great Russian warrior, a saint, a national hero. You like that sort of thing. Your friend Alexander Dugin likes that sort of thing. A little medieval glory, a little Orthodox mysticism, a little imperial nostalgia. You could hardly have designed it better yourself.

Vlad: I do not require your interpretation of Russian history.

Bibi: No, no, naturally. You have people for that. I’m merely offering the venue.

Vlad: And the church?

Bibi: The church, the courtyard, the whole historical package. Practically turnkey! Well, subject to a few administrative matters. And possibly the courts. But those things can be managed.

Vlad: You will transfer it.

Bibi: Vlad, I’m a politician. I never use the word transfer when I can use the phrase facilitate an administrative outcome.

Vlad: Bibi!

Bibi: Alright! Alright! You’ll get your church. Naama comes home, you get your Alexander Nevsky, the babushkas light their candles, Kirill says a prayer, and everybody goes home happy. It’s a win-win!

Vlad: There is no win-win. There is Russia, and there are those who understand Russia.

Bibi: Of course. Of course. I was speaking metaphorically.

Vlad: See that you keep your word. Russia remembers.

Bibi: Trust me, Vlad. Trust me. I’m a man of my word.

Vlad: That is what concerns me.

Bibi: You know, I really don’t appreciate that sort of remark. I come to you in friendship, I offer you a church, I ask you to release a young woman from prison, and you insult me! Honestly, next time I’ll send a lawyer.

Vlad: Please do. He can serve her sentence.

Bibi: (outraged) Vlad! I’m asking for a little human compassion!

Vlad: And I am offering you a little Russian justice. We are both disappointed.

Bibi: You know, you really should have been a comedian.

Vlad: I am president of Russia.

Bibi: Yes. Well. Nobody’s perfect.

Please note: This is an imagined conversation. But the bargain made is not entirely so.

A little dope, a small Russian church, and a big geopolitical headache

There are places in Jerusalem’s Old City where the stones have seen so much history that one might reasonably expect them to have acquired a certain immunity to political intrigue. The Alexander Courtyard, tucked away in the Christian Quarter, within a stone’s throw of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, is not one of them. Here, amid the competing claims of emperors, patriarchs, governments and rival Christian traditions, a small piece of real estate has become entangled in a distinctly modern tale of diplomatic horse-trading, Russian nationalism and the fate of an Israeli woman arrested with a little cannabis.

It began in 2019, when Naama Issachar, an Israeli-American woman travelling from India to Israel via Moscow, was arrested at Sheremetyevo Airport. A small quantity of cannabis – about nine grams – was found in her luggage. Russia charged her with drug smuggling, and in October 2019 she was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison. The sentence struck many observers as wildly disproportionate, and suspicions quickly arose that the case had become a convenient instrument of Russian leverage.

Benjamin Netanyahu, then serving his previous term as Israeli prime minister, took a personal interest in securing her release. In January 2020, Russian president Vladimir Putin pardoned Issachar and she returned to Israel.

But diplomatic courtesies, as we know, are rarely entirely gratuitous. There was another matter on the table: the Alexander Courtyard, a historically and religiously sensitive compound in Jerusalem which Russia had long sought to have formally registered in its name.

That same month,  Netanyahu signed an order designating the courtyard a holy place under legislation dating from the British Mandate. This opened the way for the land registry commissioner to register the property in the name of the Russian Federation. It was a substantial diplomatic gesture, although the legal machinery proved rather less obliging than the politicians might have hoped.

The courtyard’s history is complicated. The site is associated with the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, founded in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century to promote Russian Orthodox pilgrimage and maintain a Russian presence in the Holy Land. The compound contains the Church of St Alexander Nevsky, built over archaeological remains traditionally associated with the vicinity of the ancient city and its gates. Its significance is religious, historical and political, with Russia’s imperial past and modern ambitions woven into the fabric of the place. We have added an addendum to this story below. It provides a brief explainer with respect to Russia’s historical interest in Jerusalem’s Holy Places.

Here, the story takes a distinctly awkward turn. The people actually maintaining the religious life of the site have included Ukrainian Orthodox nuns, associated with the historical Orthodox Palestine Society. The political contest is therefore not simply between Israel and Russia, or between competing Christian claims. It has acquired an added irony since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022: a compound sought by Moscow is, on the ground, associated with Ukrainian religious custodians. The ecclesiastical and institutional arrangements are complicated, and should not be mistaken for a straightforward contest between two national churches, but the symbolism is hard to miss.

In March 2022, the Jerusalem District Court annulled the attempted registration of the property in Russia’s name. The court held, in essence, that the transfer of a designated holy site involved decisions beyond the authority of an administrative land registrar. Given the religious and geopolitical sensitivities, the matter required action at cabinet level. Putin was not amused. He subsequently wrote to Naftali Bennett, Netanyahu’s successor, pressing Israel to complete the transfer. Bennett established a process to examine the issue, but it stalled.

Netanyahu’s return to office brought the dispute back into active consideration. By 2024–26, the government was again examining the question, with Russia insisting that registration in its name ought to be nearing completion while Israeli authorities maintained that the matter remained under review. The precise legal status and timing of any final decision have continued to be contested.

Meanwhile, the courtyard remains where it has always been: in the Christian Quarter, beside some of the most sacred sites in Christendom, some seventy metres from Golgotha, caught between the claims of history, religion, property law and national power.

There is something almost irresistibly Jerusalemite about the whole affair. A few grams of cannabis become a diplomatic crisis; the release of a young woman becomes an opportunity for a property transaction; a medieval Russian saint becomes an instrument of contemporary statecraft; and Ukrainian nuns find themselves at the intersection of an argument involving Netanyahu, Putin, the Russian Orthodox world and the aftershocks of a European war.

Jerusalem has always been a city in which the sacred and the profane share the same narrow streets. Sometimes the distance between them is measured in centuries. Sometimes it is measured in nine grams of cannabis.

And sometimes, if you are Benjamin Netanyahu, it is measured in square metres of disputed real estate.

Historical note: The imagined dialogue is satire, not an actual transcript. It coukd possible have been written by Woody Allen ot Jack Benny. The precise quid pro quo between Issachar’s release and the Alexander Courtyard’s transfer should not be presented as conclusively established. The chronology of the legal proceedings and the status of the property should also be checked against the latest Israeli court and government records..

Addendum: The Russians Are Coming (and have been  for centuries)

Russia’s interest in Jerusalem is no passing fancy, nor is it simply a matter of Putin’s imperial nostalgia. It goes back centuries, gathering momentum in the nineteenth, when the Russian Empire increasingly presented itself as the protector of Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule. The Crimean War (1853–56), fought partly over competing Russian and Western claims to protect Christian holy places, demonstrated just how combustible the mixture of religion, imperial ambition and control of the Holy Land could become. Jerusalem was never merely a destination for Russian pilgrims; it was also a stage on which great powers performed their rival claims to influence and prestige.

The Russian presence grew substantially in the nineteenth century, particularly after the establishment of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society in 1882, which organised pilgrimages, supported Orthodox communities and built accommodation and religious institutions for Russian visitors. The grand Russian Compound outside the Old City walls became a small Russian world in its own right, while churches, hospices and courtyards sprang up around the Holy City. The Bolshevik Revolution disrupted the old imperial arrangements, but it did not extinguish the Russian religious attachment to Jerusalem. Soviet atheism was eventually followed by a remarkable revival of Russian Orthodox pilgrimage after the collapse of the USSR.

The imperial legacy is still visible in some rather unexpected places. The Church of St Mary Magdalene in Gethsemane, with its distinctive golden onion domes, was built in the 1880s by Tsar Alexander III in memory of his mother, Empress Maria Alexandrovna. Among those buried there is Grand Duchess Elizabeth Feodorovna, the sister of the last Russian empress, Alexandra Feodorovna. Elizabeth became a nun after her husband, Grand Duke Sergei – a harsh governor of Moscow who expelled Jews from the city, was assassinated in 1905. The Grand Duchess was herself murdered by the Bolsheviks in 1918 along with many Russian nobles. Their execution is described in melancholy detail in British historian Anthony Beevor’s recent history of Rasputin and the end of the Romanovs (see Rasputin and the downfall of the Romanovs). Her remains were eventually brought to Jerusalem and laid to rest in the church. Alexandra herself, the last tsarina, lies with Nicholas II and their children in the Peter and Paul Cathedral in St Petersburg, not Jerusalem. The distinction matters, although it is easy to see how the stories become entangled amid the layered history of the Russian holy places.

And the pilgrims keep coming. During our visits to Jerusalem, we have often encountered Russian groups moving through the Old City, some reverent, some weary, all adding their voices to the extraordinary human murmur of the streets. Just last night, at Versavee restaurant beside our hotel, the New Imperial, the owner told us that only a few days earlier he had catered for six Russian nuns. One small anecdote, perhaps, but it brings the larger history down to street level: the old connections are not merely diplomatic abstractions or relics of tsarist ambition. They are people arriving, praying, eating, sleeping and finding their way through the same narrow lanes we walk.

Which brings us back to the Alexander Courtyard. For Putin, a Russian foothold beside the Church of the Holy Sepulcher carries the weight of history, Orthodox identity and the recovery of imperial prestige. For the Israeli government, it is a sensitive question of sovereignty, property law and international relations. And for the Ukrainian nuns associated with the site’s religious life, it is a place of worship caught in the crosscurrents of a much larger struggle.

Jerusalem has always attracted pilgrims who see heaven in its stones, and rulers who see power. The difficulty, as ever, is that they often want the same piece of ground [See Amazing Grace – there’s magic in the air]

Alexander Who?

There are, in fact, three Alexanders lurking behind his little Jerusalem real-estate drama, and it is worth distinguishing them before the history becomes even more complicated than the politics.

First, Alexander III, Tsar of Russia from 1881 to 1894, was a staunch autocrat and champion of Russian Orthodoxy and imperial power. His reign saw the expansion of Russia’s religious and cultural presence in the Holy Land, encouraged by the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, founded in 1882. It was in this imperial spirit that the Alexander Courtyard was constructed in 1896, two years after the tsar’s death, and named in his honour. There is an uncomfortable irony here: Alexander III’s Russia presided over the persecution of Jews and a wave of pogroms that drove many to seek refuge abroad, while the modern Israeli state is now considering whether to place this particular piece of Jerusalem under Russian ownership.

The second Alexander is Alexander Nevsky (c.1221–1263), the medieval Russian prince and military hero canonised by the Orthodox Church, whose name is borne by the church within the courtyard. Nevsky has acquired renewed significance under Vladimir Putin, for whom the prince embodies the marriage of Russian national identity, Orthodox Christianity and military power. Sergei Eisenstein’s celebrated 1938 film Alexander Nevsky, with its stirring score by Sergei Prokofiev, dramatised the prince’s victory over the Teutonic Knights as a defence of Russia against Western aggression. Made on the eve of war with Nazi Germany, it was a powerful exercise in patriotic propaganda, subsequently reclaimed as a symbol of Russian greatness and resistance to the West. The church in Jerusalem thus carries more than religious significance: it belongs to a tradition in which Russian Orthodoxy and national power have long reinforced one another.

And finally, there is Alexander Dugin, the contemporary Russian ultranationalist philosopher and advocate of a resurgent Russian empire, whose ideas about Russia’s distinctive civilisational destiny have often been associated with the ideological climate of Putin’s regime, although the precise extent of his influence on the president is disputed. He has, however, been described as “Putin’s Brain”. He features in several essays in In That Howling Infinite, the most recent being Alexander Dugin versus Sydney Sweeney. Dugin is not Nevsky reincarnated, nor is he the architect of every Kremlin ambition, but his vision of a Russia resisting Western liberalism and reclaiming its historic sphere of influence provides a useful contemporary echo of the older imperial and Orthodox traditions.

Three Alexanders, then: a tsar, a saintly warrior and a modern ideologue. Their lives span eight centuries, but their stories converge in a small compound barely seventy metres from Golgotha, where the Russian state seeks to secure a foothold in one of Christianity’s holiest places. For Putin, the courtyard is more than a property dispute; it offers a tangible connection to Russia’s imperial past, Orthodox identity and aspirations to renewed greatness. For Israel, it presents a delicate question of sovereignty, religious sensitivities and diplomatic leverage. And for the rest of us, watching this particular piece of Jerusalem real estate become entangled in the politics of Moscow, Kyiv and Jerusalem, it is a reminder that history rarely stays buried beneath the stones. Sometimes it comes back demanding the deeds.

For more on Russia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union in In That Howling Infinite, see Russky Mir – Russian history’s long shadow

The Holy Martyr Elizaveta Feodorovna.

 

What’s new in In That Howling Infinite?

The past beats inside me like a second heart
John Banville, The Sea

Why is this blog called In That Howling Infinite?  It refers to Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, a magnificent study in mania and obsession:

“But as in landlessness alone resides highest truth, shoreless, indefinite as God – so better is it to perish in that howling infinite, than be ingloriously dashed upon the lee, even if that were safety!”  Moby–Dick, Chapter 23

In a figurative sense, it speaks of the themes and schemes that are addressed in the thoughts, ideas, songs, poems and stories that feature in this blog. We are, as Bob Dylan sang, “condemned to drift or else be kept from drifting”. And we like to hope that, as the ancient Greek lyric poet Sappho said, “someone will remember us, I say, even in another time”

Here are the most recent articles in In That Howling Infinite.

Once upon a time in England … memories of summer days. A farewell a friend of near on sixty years

Some dope, a small church and a big headache … A Jerusalem story. Recent magical mystery tour of the Old City of Jerusalem with Sarah-Tuttle Singer inspired this unlikely tale of geopolitical sleight of hand.

Adrift In the digital undertow. Its power lies in its lack of drama. It does not drag us suddenly beneath the surface. It carries us, almost imperceptibly, away from where we thought we were.

It’s 3am and an hour of existential angst. F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote: “In a real dark night of the soul it is always 3 o’clock in the morning, day after day”.

A historian talks about Palestine’s deep history. An interview with British historian William Dalrymple

Becoming Arab … the myth of fingerprints. A discussion regard Yossef Rapoport’s illuminating Becoming Arab: The Formation of Arab Identity in the Medieval Middle East

Lucifer ascending … the Dark Lord and the evil within. A free-flowing contemplation on the archetypical “big bad” of story and scripture. The sequel to Lucifer Descending … encounters with the morning star 

The Geography of Faith: America and the Gospel of Power. What happens when a nation with immense material power begins to clothe that power in sacred language?

Smyrna 1922 and the Ottoman endgame. The expulsion of the millennia long Greek presence in Anatolia was one of the last chapters in the extraordinarily violent disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

Maps, memory, and the myth of fingerprints. Old maps are not title deeds and cannot be manifestos – the limits of cartography.

The featured picture at the head of this page is the interior of St George’s Greek Orthodox Church in Madaba, Jordan, home of the sixth century Madaba map, discussed in Maps, memory, and the myth of fingerprints 

I am friend to the undertow. I take you in, I don’t let go. Suzanne Vega, 1985

Ten  favourites:

A Short History of the Rise and Fall of the West. In one of the first essays published in In That Howling Infinite, we walked down what Welsh poet RS Thomas called ‘the long road of history”, beginning with the usual suspects: power and pride, greed, and aggrandisement, and as accessories after the fact, dolour, devastation, and death.

Blood and Brick … a world of walls. Hadrian’s Wall, the Theodosian Wall, the Berlin Wall, Northerm Ireland’s Peace Wall, Israel’s Separation Wall, George RR Martin’s Ice Wall, the wall you can see from space, and walls that most people have never heard of. If walls could talk, what take they woukd tell. While walls are destined to fall one day, people like them. They project a language of security – but they stem from a sense of insecurity, a fear of losing what you have.

One Land, Two Peoples: History, Memory, Continuity, and Inheritance. The history of Israel and Palestine does not yield to forensic neatness. This land holds layered attachment; Jewish longing and Palestinian dispossession; British imperial design and Arab nationalist pride; secular aspiration and religious revival; survival strategy and ideological fervour. None alone explains the whole. Together they form the sediment of a century.

The Twilight of the Equine Gods. An illuminating canter through the story of the “Centaurian Pact” between humans and horses. it is at once a ride and revelation. The horse, as German academic and cultural scientist Ulrich Raulff’s tells us, “has been man’s most important companion – forget cats and dogs – and the most durable of historical alliances – against which every other covenant into which we have entered has been fragile and ephemeral – not even our relationship with our gods has shown a comparable degree of stability”.

The Sport of Kings. CE Morgan’s “great American novel” is not a history book – nor is it an historical novel. But it is most certainly about history. And about identity. As Morgan puts it: “You would never escape the category of your birth”. It is also about memory and myth: “Repeated long enough, stories become memory and memory becomes fact”.

Blue remembered hills – a land of lost contentment. “Nostalgia”, literally the pain associated with the thought of home, or homesickness, is derived from the Greek “nostos” – a theme used in Ancient Greek literature most notably in the recently reimagined Odyssey, involving an epic hero returning home after a long time away. Nostalgia reveals the deep longing for a home that our younger selves took for granted, and bittersweet return to people and places that have changed forever. But it isn’t all it’s cracked out to be, and, indeed, can bring out the worst in us, becoming a millstone of bitterness and regret strung about the necks of discontented souls who drift off into a maze of memories, meanings and emotions.

A cowboy key – how the west was sung. My riding days are over, but I have been into westerns all my life, and the songs inspired by them – in films, musicals and popular song, from ghostly herds to outlaw chic, Frankie Laing to Leonard Cohen and Taylor Swift. And, as a onetime musician myself, I have, back in days gone by, penned songs in a cowboy key.

McGoohan’s Blues – sunbathing in the rain. How an eighteen minute digression from the concept if not the plot of an iconic if indecipherable ‘sixties’ television series made an indelible impression on an impressionable twenty year old who remains mightily impressed with this song by Britain’s high priest of angst.

The Boys of Wexford – memory and memoir. “Fast forwaranother century, and I was “on the Holy Ground once more” attending the wedding of an old pal held in an old pub in the heart of Ireland. Getting there, we’d done a whistle-stop tour of the south, including Inis Córthaid (my mother’s hometown), Wexford and Ross, the heartland of the ‘98 rebellion … I was best man at that wedding, and in a speech largely devoted to the groom and our mutual, lifelong appreciation of Bob Dylan, I was able to relate to guests young and old tales of my Irish childhood, taking us all “down the foggy ruins of time”, and sang extracts from songs I actually did learn at my mothers knee, the song-lines of my Celtic twilight.

About the creator of this blog

Paul Hemphill is a British-born Australian songwriter, poet, and blogger.

Once upon a time, he was an accountant by profession, a manager, mentor and mediator. A long-time resident of Sydney, he is now living in the middle of the forest on the mid north coast of New South Wales, Australia, where he spends much of his time in the great outdoors.

His interests include music, poetry, politics and history. He has had a lifelong passion for the history, politics and people of the Middle East. Over the years, through study and travel, he has acquired a working knowledge of standard and colloquial Arabic.

Listen to some of Paul’s songs on SoundCloud and YouTube. Search under Paul Hemphill or HuldreFolk (but ignore the Flemish death metal band of the same name). He has assembled seven volumes of poetry and verse, and these can be read on this blog.

Check out In That Howling Infinite on FaceBook.

Asemitism … when Jews disappear from the argument

Yesterday, upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn’t there
He wasn’t there again today
I wish, I wish he’d go away
William Hughes Mearns, Antigonish (1899)

When bestselling Australian author Richard Flanagan recently delivered a provocative address at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, he struck a nerve. Conservative commentators were quick to condemn what they saw as a dangerous minimisation of antisemitism, particularly in the wake of the Bondi attack.

His argument was not that antisemitism did not exist, but that much of the contemporary Australian discussion of it had been misdirected. He argued that the “Israel lobby” – a term he used broadly for those campaigning on behalf of Israel and against what they regarded as antisemitism – had helped create a climate in which criticism of Israel was too readily conflated with hatred of Jews. More controversially, he questioned the way the Bondi murders of 14 December last year had been understood, arguing that the killings should not simply be explained as the product of antisemitism, and suggested that provocative actions and rhetoric surrounding Israel and Gaza had contributed to the circumstances in which they occurred.

Three responses, from academic Greg Craven, historian Nick Dyrenfurth, and economist Henry Ergas, each republished below., were particularly interesting, if hardly surprising given their respective positions on the subject.

For Craven, this amounted to a profound inversion of cause and effect: antisemitism was being treated not as something that produced violence, but as something produced by the political conduct of its victims or their alleged representatives. Dyrenfurth similarly saw in Flanagan’s argument a refusal to confront the deeper sources of contemporary Jew-hatred.

Ergas argues that contemporary antisemitism need not take the familiar form of overt hostility towards Jews. Instead, Jews can disappear as people while Jewishness remains present as a political abstraction: “the Lobby”, hidden influence, divided loyalty, or an alleged mechanism of control. Accusations of antisemitism can themselves be dismissed as instruments of Jewish or pro-Israel manipulation.

Yet what particularly caught my attention was something almost incidental in Craven’s response. He suggested that there is a phenomenon distinct from antisemitism, which he called “asemitism”: not hatred of Jews, but a curious inability to see Jews at all – to acknowledge their presence as Jews, or their particular vulnerability, within an argument ostensibly about something else.

The Jew becomes almost invisible as an individual human being, yet somehow omnipresent as an explanation. It is, in effect, absence becoming presence – the  Jew disappearing from view while the imagined Jew remains everywhere.

This struck a chord because it was something I had observed before, although from a rather different perspective, without giving it a name. I have written about the tendency, in arguments over Israel and Palestine, to turn actual people into political abstractions: Israelis into Zionists, Jews into Israel, Palestinians into Hamas, and individuals into representatives of causes they may or may not support.

Craven’s word therefore got me thinking. What happens when Jews disappear from the argument, when they disappear from the moral field as people and reappear only as a political abstraction?

The invisible man

There is a curious form of antisemitism that does not necessarily hate Jews. It simply cannot see them.

The former Australian Catholic University vice-chancellor Greg Craven has given this phenomenon a useful name: asemitism. His immediate target was the novelist Richard Flanagan, whose argument about antisemitism in Australia, as Craven describes it, attributes much of the present hostility to Jews to the activities of an amorphous “Israel lobby”. But the larger idea is more interesting than the particular quarrel. Asemitism describes the tendency to make Jews disappear from a discussion precisely when Jews are among the people most directly affected by it.

The distinction matters. Antisemitism is relatively easy to recognise when it takes the familiar form of hatred, conspiracy theory, racial slurs, intimidation or violence. Asemitism is subtler. It says, in effect: this isn’t about Jews. It is about Israel, Zionism, colonialism, Gaza, the occupation, the lobby, American foreign policy, or something else entirely. Jews therefore need not enter the moral equation.

The problem is that they do.

A Jewish school requiring armed security is not merely a footnote to a debate about Israel. A Jewish child being abused in the street is not simply collateral damage from a geopolitical argument. A Jewish Australian being told that he or she is responsible for the actions of a government on the other side of the world is not participating in a debate about foreign policy. These are things happening to actual people.

Asemitism works by substituting an abstraction for those people. “The Jews” become “the Israel lobby”; Jewish identity becomes Zionism; Zionism becomes Israel; Israel becomes the actions of its current government; and suddenly the ordinary Jew has vanished from view. Once that substitution has been made, almost anything can be explained without reference to the people experiencing it. Antisemitism becomes an invention of the lobby. Jewish anxiety becomes political manipulation. Jewish objections become attempts to silence criticism of Israel. A threat to Jews becomes merely an unpleasant but understandable by-product of protest.

None of this means that criticism of Israel is antisemitic. It plainly is not. Nor is criticism of Zionism, the Israeli government, the occupation or the conduct of the Gaza war automatically antisemitic. Democratic societies depend upon the freedom to make precisely such arguments. Nor should accusations of antisemitism be used as a shield against uncomfortable political criticism.

The test is rather different: can Jews remain visible as Jews and as individuals while the argument is being made?

That question has particular force in Australia because the history of Australian Jewry does not fit neatly into the popular image of multiculturalism as a succession of migrant communities arriving from elsewhere. Jews were here with the First Fleet. They have been part of the Australian story for more than two centuries. They have served in the armed forces, entered Parliament, populated universities and the professions, built businesses, contributed to philanthropy and the arts, and occupied distinguished positions in public life.

In other words, most Australian Jews are not visibly “foreign”. They are Australians.

That makes the contemporary phenomenon of asemitism especially revealing. Australian Jews are often indistinguishable, culturally and physically, from their fellow Australians. Their Jewishness may be expressed through religion, family, memory, community or simply ancestry; it may be barely visible at all. Yet in moments of political crisis they can suddenly be transformed from ordinary Australians into representatives of an imagined foreign entity.

It is a strange reversal. A community that has spent generations becoming unexceptional in the best sense of the word – part of the ordinary fabric of Australian life – is suddenly rendered foreign by the political imagination of others.

There is an analogy here with the long history of Irish Catholics in Australia. They were once regarded by sections of the Anglo-Protestant establishment as a suspect, disloyal or insufficiently Australian minority. Over generations, that distinction largely dissolved. The descendants of Irish immigrants became simply Australians. Their Irishness did not disappear; it ceased to (determine their status as citizens.

Something similar happened with Australian Jews. They did not cease to be Jewish. They became Australian Jews.

Asemitism threatens to reverse that achievement. It does so not necessarily by expelling Jews from the national community but by reassigning them to another political category. You are Jewish; therefore you are assumed to have a position on Israel. You are a Zionist; therefore you are assumed to support everything Israel does. You support Israel’s existence; therefore you are treated as an agent of the Israeli state. You object to antisemitic rhetoric, therefore you are assumed to be defending the Israeli government. The individual disappears beneath the label.

There is an even older pattern here. One of the most persistent features of antisemitism has been the refusal to allow Jews to be merely what everyone else is allowed to be: individuals with differing opinions, loyalties, interests and political beliefs. Jews have historically been imagined as a collective possessing a hidden solidarity and a common agenda. The modern version need not invoke the old language of Jewish conspiracy. It can speak instead of “the lobby”, “Zionists”, “Jewish influence” or “Israel supporters”. The vocabulary changes; the underlying collectivisation can remain.

That is why asemitism is an interesting concept. It identifies the point at which apparently sophisticated political discourse can reproduce an ancient habit without necessarily resembling traditional antisemitic rhetoric.

And it cuts both ways. If every criticism of Israel is declared antisemitic, Jews themselves are reduced to a political instrument: their identity is invoked to protect a government or ideology with which individual Jews may agree, disagree or have no connection. That too makes Jews disappear as individuals. The cure for asemitism cannot therefore be to place Israel beyond criticism. It must be to insist upon the opposite: Jews are entitled to the same diversity of political opinion as everybody else.

Asemitism is, at bottom, a failure of recognition. It is the inability to see the Jewish person standing behind the political abstraction.

That is why the concept is potentially more important than the particular controversy in which Craven introduced it. It allows us to distinguish between hatred and blindness. The antisemite sees the Jew and hates him. The asemite may insist that the Jew isn’t there at all.

But if Jews are absent from the argument, while Jewish schools require guards, Jewish children are intimidated, Jewish institutions are threatened and Jewish Australians are held responsible for events overseas, then something has gone badly wrong with the argument.

The first obligation is simply to see the person.

Before Jew, before Zionist, before Israeli, before Palestinian, before supporter or opponent of any government or cause, there is an Australian citizen standing in front of us. And that, perhaps, is precisely what asemitism makes hardest to see.

In That Howling Infinite, September 2026

Coda: Mearn’s paradox

William Hughes Mearns, the American educator and poet, best known for Antigonish (“The Little Man Who Wasn’t There”). That makes the opening much more directly relevant. His short poem, Antagonish, inspired by a Nova Scotia ghost story, gives us the paradox of something simultaneously absent and impossible to ignore: a phantom whose very invisibility makes him present. It is an apt metaphor for asemitism – not necessarily hatred of Jews, but the tendency to make Jews disappear from the frame while they remain implicated in what is being discussed. The Jewish Australian is “not there” when the subject is Israel, Zionism, Gaza or the lobby, yet somehow reappears in the consequences. In other words, Jews can be rendered invisible as people while becoming conspicuously visible as symbols: the ordinary Australian suddenly recast as “Zionist”, “Israel”, or part of some amorphous “lobby”

That is a neat metaphor for what you are exploring. Asemitism is not necessarily the hatred of Jews; it is the curious phenomenon in which Jews disappear from the frame while remaining the unacknowledged subject of what is happening. The Jewish Australian is “not there”—the discussion is about Israel, Zionism, Gaza, colonialism, lobbying or foreign policy—but somehow the Jew keeps turning up in the consequences.

Indeed, the Mearns poem gives you an even sharper formulation. The man “wasn’t there”, yet the speaker met him. His absence has become an encounter.

That is precisely the paradox you can pursue: Jews can be rendered invisible as people while becoming highly visible as symbols. The Australian Jew may be simply another Australian—neighbour, colleague, soldier, academic, businessperson, friend—until a distant conflict causes him or her to be recast as “Zionist”, “Israel”, “the lobby”, or some other political abstraction.

And this makes your later reference to H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man rather nice. Mearns gives you the whimsical, unsettling version: the man who wasn’t there. Wells gives you the literalised version: a man who is physically present but cannot be seen. Your essay explores a third version: the person who is visible but whom a political culture has learned not to see.

That could become a particularly elegant opening motif for the essay: Mearns’ little poem begins as a ghost story but turns out to be a story about perception. Your argument then asks what happens when an entire category of people becomes similarly imperceptible—not because they have disappeared, but because we have learned to look past them.

The curious asymmetry

There is a paradox here, one that takes us beyond asemitism itself. Many of those caught up in what has become an algorithmic tangle had never previously shown much interest in the Middle East. They had not followed its history, its competing national narratives or its wars, and had never displayed anything like the same intensity about conflicts and atrocities elsewhere in the world. Yet Israel and Gaza have somehow acquired the extraordinary capacity to inflame them—to turn a distant and complicated conflict into an intensely personal moral cause.

There are, of course, perfectly legitimate reasons why Israel–Palestine attracts unusual attention. The conflict has a long and tragic history; it touches three major religions; it has involved the great powers; Australia has its own connections to the region; and the images emerging from Gaza are genuinely horrific. Israel is also a Western-aligned democracy, and it is entirely reasonable to argue that democratic states should be held to demanding standards.

But none of this quite explains the asymmetry.

We do not ordinarily hold Russian Australians responsible for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, or Chinese Australians for the policies of Beijing, or Serbian Australians for the crimes of Belgrade. Indonesians in Australia were not generally treated as proxies for the Indonesian government when East Timor was invaded. There have certainly been outbreaks of hostility towards people associated with countries whose governments have behaved appallingly; nothing about antisemitism is unique in that respect. What is unusual is the persistent tendency to collapse the distinction between a Jewish person and a foreign state.

A Jewish Australian may be expected to explain or condemn the actions of the Israeli government simply because he is Jewish. His views about Netanyahu, Gaza or the occupation may be unknown and entirely irrelevant. His Jewishness itself can become politically diagnostic. The individual disappears and the symbol takes his place.

This is where the algorithmic age adds another layer to the problem. Social media does not require historical knowledge before it delivers moral certainty. A sequence of images of dead children, demolished buildings, grieving parents, angry slogans and simplified historical explanations can turn a previously remote conflict into an emotional universe. The more intensely one reacts, the more of the same material the algorithm supplies. Complexity becomes noise; qualification becomes equivocation; competing narratives become evidence of bad faith. Eventually the viewer may know remarkably little about the history of the conflict while possessing absolute certainty about who is guilty.

The result is not necessarily antisemitism. Many people genuinely care about Palestinian suffering and are motivated by a perfectly legitimate moral impulse. But something else can happen along the way. Israel ceases to be a country whose government is being criticised and becomes a moral abstraction: colonialism, racism, Western imperialism, apartheid, or some other embodiment of political evil. And because Israel is so closely identified with Jews in the popular imagination, Jews can become implicated in that abstraction whether they want to be or not.

This is the point at which the idea of asemitism becomes useful. The Jewish Australian is simultaneously invisible and hyper-visible. Invisible as an individual, because nobody asks who he or she actually is or what they actually believe; hyper-visible as a symbol, because Jewishness is treated as evidence of a presumed relationship to Israel.

The irony is considerable. Australian Jews have been here since the First Fleet. They are not, for the most part, visibly distinguishable from their fellow citizens. They have served in our armed forces, entered Parliament, taught in our universities, built businesses, practised the professions and contributed to public and cultural life. Like the descendants of Irish Catholics who were once regarded as an alien and suspect minority, generations of Australian Jews have simply become Australians.

Yet a conflict thousands of kilometres away can suddenly make them foreign again.

That is the question I find difficult to get past. Not why people criticise Israel—they should be free to do so, vigorously. Not even why this particular conflict attracts more attention than others. But why the asymmetry becomes so pronounced when Jews are involved. Why can an ordinary Australian citizen be transformed, by nothing more than his or her Jewish identity, into a representative of a foreign state? Why is the distinction between a government and the people associated with it so readily maintained in almost every other case, yet so often abandoned here?

There may be many answers: the extraordinary history of antisemitism; the symbolic and religious importance of the land; the polarising power of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; the politics of the diaspora; the peculiarities of the Western left and right; the influence of social media; or simply the human tendency to reduce complicated conflicts to stories of innocent victims and malevolent perpetrators.

Perhaps it is some combination of all of them.

But the question remains. Why this conflict? Why this country? And why, when Israel becomes the object of moral outrage, do Jews so often become entangled in a conflict that is not theirs simply by virtue of being Jewish?

That is where the phantom in Mearns’s poem returns. The Jew who supposedly “isn’t there” turns out to have been there all along.

Pavlov’s progressives

There seems to be a Pavlovian reflex abroad among progressives – whenever there are government moves to combat the upsurge of antisemitism in Australia, and when resources are allocated towards combatting it, and particularly when Jewish organisations are the perceived or actual recipients, people of ostensible goodwill post comments and share memes asserting: that there is no upsurge in antisemitism; that other minorities are the most vulnerable targets of harassment and discrimination, particularly Muslims ; that Jews receive special treatment, and benefits disproportionate to their meagre numbers population-wise; that special treatment runs contrary to our government’s duty to promote equality for all. These arguments were also raised – ironically on the right – during the Voice to Parliament referendum campaign.

Why is this is so?

Part of it is simple moral competition in an age of scarcity – not scarcity of money necessarily, but scarcity of attention, legitimacy, symbolic recognition, and institutional empathy. Modern politics increasingly operates through what sociologists sometimes call a “hierarchy of suffering,” in which recognition of one group’s vulnerability is often interpreted, wrongly but emotionally powerfully, as diminishing another’s.

So when governments announce funding, inquiries, security measures, educational programs, or public condemnations relating to antisemitism, some progressives instinctively translate this not as “the state is addressing one real problem,” but as “the state is privileging this minority over others.”

The response becomes comparative rather than diagnostic: what about Islamophobia? what about Indigenous Australians? what about refugees? In principle, comparative concern can be healthy. In practice, it often slides into resentment politics.

There is also a specifically post-October 7 dynamic at work. For many people on the progressive side, support for Palestinians has become morally central to their political identity. Because Israel is widely perceived within those circles as aligned with Western power, military dominance, and colonial structures, Jews in diaspora communities are sometimes – unfairly and dangerously – perceived as adjacent to that power. The distinction between “Jews,” “Zionists,” “supporters of Israel,” “the Israeli government,” and “organised Jewish institutions” becomes blurred in public discourse. Once that blur occurs, anti-antisemitism initiatives are no longer viewed neutrally as anti-racism measures; they are interpreted as political instruments protecting power.

That helps explain the peculiar reflex whereby even acknowledging antisemitism can be treated with suspicion. If Jewish vulnerability is admitted, then Jews cease to fit neatly into the binary moral framework of “powerful oppressor” versus “marginalised oppressed.” Contemporary activist culture often struggles with complexity of that sort. Jews occupy an awkward sociological position: a tiny minority with visible success in some sectors, but also with a long history of persecution and recurring vulnerability. Minority status and perceived privilege coexist. Many ideological frameworks are uncomfortable holding both ideas simultaneously.

The irony is that similar arguments emerged from parts of the conservative side during the Indigenous Voice to Parliament debate – which led to the failure of the referendum: why should one group receive special recognition? why should resources or institutional mechanisms exist for one minority and not others?

The rhetoric changes, but the underlying egalitarian objection is structurally similar. Liberal democracies constantly wrestle with the tension between universal equality and targeted protections. We accept specialised programs for veterans, Indigenous communities, domestic violence victims, rural Australians, disabled people, and multicultural groups because formal equality alone does not always address particular vulnerabilities. Yet when Jews are involved, some people suddenly become hyper-universalist.

Another factor is the persistence of older tropes about Jewish influence and access. These rarely appear today in openly conspiratorial language among educated progressives. Instead they emerge in coded institutional form: “disproportionate influence,” “special access,” “lobby power,” “politicians are afraid,” “media protection,” “exceptional treatment.” Sometimes there are legitimate discussions to be had about lobbying or political advocacy – every organised community advocates. But Jews occupy a unique symbolic place in Western political imagination, shaped by centuries of antisemitic narratives portraying them as secretly powerful, unusually connected, or able to manipulate institutions for communal gain. Modern educated discourse often reproduces these themes unconsciously while believing itself entirely anti-racist.

Social media worsens all this.

Algorithms reward outrage, simplification, and tribal reinforcement. It is emotionally satisfying within online communities to puncture perceived hypocrisy: “Look, the government cares more about Jews than Muslims.” The claim signals moral sophistication and resistance to establishment narratives. But the medium discourages nuance – for example, the possibility that both antisemitism and Islamophobia have risen; that both Jews and Muslims can feel vulnerable simultaneously; that governments can address multiple forms of racism at once; or that Jewish institutions receiving security funding after synagogue attacks is not evidence of sinister favouritism but a response to assessed threat levels.

There is also an older progressive discomfort with Jews that long predates Israel. Jews historically complicated left-wing narratives because they did not fit neatly into class categories either: often urban, diasporic, literate, commercially successful in in some fields, yet periodically scapegoated, excluded, expelled, and massacred. In some strands of radical thought, success itself becomes suspicious. A minority perceived as “doing well” can lose moral legitimacy in the eyes of movements that increasingly interpret justice through visible disadvantage.

And finally, there is the psychological appeal of inversion. Many educated people like to imagine themselves as resisting dominant power. Since antisemitism is associated in public memory with fascism and the far right, acknowledging antisemitism within progressive spaces threatens self-identity. It is easier to redefine the problem away – to insist concerns are exaggerated, instrumentalised, or distractions from Gaza – than to confront the uncomfortable possibility that movements devoted to justice can also incubate prejudice.

None of this means criticism of Israeli policy is antisemitic, nor that concerns about unequal treatment of minorities are inherently illegitimate. Democracies should debate allocation of resources and consistency of anti-racism policy. But when every discussion of antisemitism immediately triggers denial, deflection, comparative minimisation, or insinuations about Jewish power, something deeper than ordinary policy disagreement is usually operating beneath the surface.

In That Howling Infinite, September 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and structure.

Postscript:  We’ve been here before.

This opinion piece is one of several which discus the attitudes of progressives towards the Israel, Palestine and the Gaza war, and also, consider the subjects of invisibility and asymmetry.

The first is Moral capture, conditional empathy and the failure of shock, a discussion on why erstwhile liberal, humanistic, progressive people from all walks of life have been caught up in what can be without subtly described as that anti-Israel machinery Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty– regarding the Gaza war, intellectual dishonesty is everywhere, on both sides of the divide, magnified by mainstream and social media’s hunger for moral simplicity and viral outrage. Standing on the high moral ground is hard work! discusses the issues of free speech and “cancellation”, and boycotts with regard to the recent self-implosion of the Adelaide Writers’ Festival, one of the country’s oldest and most revered. Meet the Crybully, a hybrid of victim and victor, the symbolic citizen of a culture that increasingly confuses feeling wounded with being right, visibility with virtue, and accusation with truth. See also, Regarding Australia’s Royal Commission into Antisemitism, see also in In That Howling Infinite: An Australian Jew’s submission to the Royal Commission

In most of these essays, we concluded with the following segment. It touches on many of the issues and arguments of this article on Asemitism. It is followed by a supplemental section written by ChatGPT on the question of the so-called “Jewish Lobby” that underlies many contemporary narratives on the extreme left and right and what we see as the myth of Jewish influence over Australian politics.

Looking for the “good Jews”

In This Is What It Looks Like, we wrote: “… antisemitism does not arrive announcing itself. It seeps. It jokes. It chants. It flatters those who believe they are on the right side of history, until history arrives and asks what they tolerated in its name”.

One of those jokes landed, flatly, on January 7 when the otherwise circumspect Age and Sydney Morning Herald published a caricature drawn by the award-winning cartoonist Cathy Wilcox. It presented those calling for a forthcoming royal commission into antisemitism as naïve participants in a hierarchy of manipulation. At the surface were the petitioners themselves; beneath them senior Coalition figures – Sussan Ley, Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, John Howard, David Littleproud – alongside Rupert Murdoch and Jillian Siegel, lawyer, businesswoman and Australia’s Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism; and behind them all, setting the rhythm, Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Each layer marched to a beat not its own.

Cathy Wilcox cartoon, SMH 7 January 2026

Critics argued that the image revived a familiar and corrosive trope: the suggestion of hidden Jewish influence directing political life from the shadows. The cartoon, titled Grass roots, depicts a cluster of foolish-looking figures demanding a royal commission. They are presumably meant to represent the families of the dead, as well as lawyers, judges, business leaders and sporting figures who had urged government action long before the Prime Minister concluded that continued indifference might stain his legacy. When he finally announced a royal commission—expanded, without explanation, to include the elastic phrase “social cohesion” – no journalist paused to ask what that addition was meant to clarify.

In the drawing, a dog stands among these Australians, holding a placard and thinking, “Don’t mention the war.” The grass beneath their feet is supported by a menacing cast: and stock villains of the anti-Zionist imagination. The implication is unmistakable: that the pleas of grieving families and prominent citizens are neither organic nor sincere, but choreographed – another performance conducted from afar.

That implication did not arise in isolation. Across social and mainstream media, many progressives called for Jillian Segal to be removed and her report rejected out of hand. Others elevated Jewish critics of the war, of Zionism, or of Netanyahu as moral exemplars – “good Jews,” “some Jews tell the truth” – as if Jewish legitimacy were contingent on ideological alignment.  Some wrote openly that Jews, “for their numbers,” exercised excessive influence. One circulating meme complained, “We didn’t vote for a Zionist voice”, whilst other posts informed their echo chamber that Chabad Bondi, a branch of the global Jewish outreach organisation, which had organised the Hanukkah gathering on the fateful Sunday evening and also the local commemorations for the victims (and later, the tribute at the Sydney Opera House) was but another tentacle of the sinister and  uber-influential Jewish Lobby. Some of the most incongruous postings have been of ultra Orthodox Jews – Haredim – with signs condemning the Gaza war and Zionism, as if to say these are the authentic, “good” Jews. Some footage actually shows Haredim protesting against the Israeli government’s efforts to conscript exempt yeshiva students into the IDF – but, as they say, every picture tells a story.

Running beneath this was a persistent misconception. Judaism was treated as a religion, detachable and voluntary, rather than as an ethnoreligious identity shaped by lineage, memory and shared fate. Jews were asked not simply to oppose Israeli policy but to renounce their “homeland,” their inheritance, their sense of collective belonging. Census figures were deployed to minimise Jewish presence, overlooking the fact that many Jews, with Germany in the 1930s still in mind, remain reluctant to advertise religious affiliation. Genealogical platforms tell a different story: the number of people who discover Jewish ancestry far exceeds those who publicly profess the faith.

Another factor further clouds understanding. Jews are rarely dogmatically regarded as part of what Australians loosely call our “multicultural” society – a variegated demographic more often reserved for the post–White Australia waves of migration – communities that are visibly non-European or culturally distinct. Jews slipped beneath that radar. Many arrived well before the Second World War, and those who came before and after tended to integrate, to go mainstream, to succeed, and therefore not to stand out.

As a result, Jews were quietly folded into an older Judeo-Christian demographic, grouped alongside Protestants and Catholics as part of the cultural furniture rather than recognised as a minority with a distinct history and vulnerability. In most urban, and even regional settings, many Australians would be unaware that Jewish families live among them at all. At the same time, a surprising number of people carry Jewish ancestry several generations back, or are connected through marriage or descent, without regarding this as identity in any conscious way.

This invisibility cuts both ways. It has allowed Jews to belong without friction, but it has also made Jewishness strangely abstract – easy to misclassify as belief rather than continuity, easy to overlook as lived experience, and easy, when political passions rise, to treat as conditional.

Here the paradox sharpens, particularly among progressives. There is genuine respect for Indigenous Australians’ reverence for history, genealogy and Country: an understanding that identity is inherited as much as chosen, that land carries memory and obligation across generations. Yet the Jewish connection to Zion is denied that same conceptual dignity. What is recognised as ancestral continuity in one case is dismissed in the other as theology, nationalism or ideology.

The inconsistency is telling. Jewish attachment to place is stripped of its historical depth and cultural persistence, judged by standards not applied elsewhere. In that light, the cartoon does more than offend. It gives visual form to a deeper habit of thought: one that sorts Jews into acceptable and unacceptable categories, organic grief and foreign orchestration, legitimate belonging and suspect attachment- depending on who is being asked to explain themselves, and to whom.

All of this helps to explain the dangerous and disturbing upsurge in antisemitism over the past two years and earlier.

The Bondi massacre did not invent anti-Semitism in Australia; it exposed a system already bent, quietly, against seeing it. Two recent articles in The Australian show in complementary ways two faces of the same failure: one structural, one intimate. On the one hand, Professor Timothy Lynch diagnoses the intellectual and institutional blindness that allows hatred to incubate unchecked; on the other, author Lee Kofman shows the personal toll when grief itself is made conditional on passing someone else’s moral purity test. Together, they reveal a society in which moral frameworks have become cages rather than guides.

For decades, Australian multiculturalism has performed a delicate contortion: apologising for its own history while demanding loyalty from newcomers. Original British settlement is framed as a sin; multiethnic immigration is a progressive corrective. The paradox, Lynch notes, is that the very order migrants join is simultaneously denigrated by the leaders they are expected to trust. Within this structure, Jews occupy an uncomfortable space: electorally negligible, culturally visible, historically persecuted, yet paradoxically recoded as white and colonial. Zionism – a project of survival and refug e- is reframed as a form of imperial wrongdoing, while other nationalisms pass without scrutiny. Anti-Semitism, filtered through progressive identity politics, becomes an exception to the very rules designed to prevent harm.

Bondi rendered these abstract asymmetries concrete. The massacre forced recognition that anti-Semitism, once dismissed as campus rhetoric or aestheticised resistance, could and would become lethal. Lynch observes that progressive moral frameworks – micro-aggressions monitored, systemic racism theorised -stop precisely at the Jew. A royal commission, he argues, would not be vindictive; it would be a sober exercise in moral clarity, tracing the cultural and ideological currents that incubated violence. Yet the same cultural institutions that produced those currents remain invested in their own innocence, framing ideas as harmless discourse even as they provide tacit validation for hatred.

The myth of Jewish influence 

The starting question – whether there is “solid, concrete evidence” of Zionist or Jewish influence over Australian government and society – has, since October 7, acquired a sharper edge and a louder echo. In the wake of the attacks, the war in Gaza, and the subsequent rise in domestic tension, social media in particular has filled with claims—often from the progressive side, and not infrequently from otherwise careful and intelligent commentators – about the malign and disproportionate influence of a “Zionist” or “Jewish lobby.” This rhetoric has been further amplified in Australia by the appointment of Jillian Segal as the Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, and by the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry (often loosely described as a “royal commission”) into antisemitism on Australian university campuses and in public life. Together, these developments have been read by some as evidence not of a policy response to rising antisemitism, but of the very influence they allege.

That interpretation, however, only makes sense if one begins from the assumption that such influence exists in a covert, coordinated, and disproportionate form. The more useful approach is to step back and examine how influence actually operates across the Australian system as a whole.

Australian public life is shaped most heavily by large, well-resourced peak bodies, particularly in business and industry. Organisations such as the Business Council of Australia, the Minerals Council, the Property Council, and the Australian Energy Producers (formerly APPEA) are permanent fixtures in policy formation. They produce economic modelling, maintain direct access to ministers and departments, and help define what governments regard as economically viable. Their influence is not hidden; it is structural, continuous, and grounded in resources, expertise, and institutional proximity to decision-making.

Alongside them sit the trade union movement, coordinated by the ACTU and expressed through powerful sectoral unions like the CFMEU, ANMF, and TWU. Their influence operates through membership, industrial leverage, and formal ties to the Labor Party. They shape debates on wages, workplace law, and social policy, sometimes from within government, sometimes through public campaigns. Like business groups, their role is embedded and enduring.

A third layer consists of issue-based advocacy organisations, particularly in the environmental sector. Groups such as the Australian Conservation Foundation, Greenpeace, WWF, and the Climate Council have been central to elevating climate and environmental concerns within national politics. Their influence tends to operate through public persuasion, media engagement, and strategic litigation rather than direct economic leverage. They rarely determine policy outcomes alone, but they have significantly shifted the parameters of debate over time.

The social welfare sector – including ACOSS, Anglicare, Mission Australia, and the St Vincent de Paul Society – contributes a different kind of influence. These organisations draw on service delivery and lived experience to inform policy on poverty, housing, and inequality. They are less dominant in fiscal decision-making but play an important role in shaping the ethical and empirical context in which those decisions are made.

In health and medicine, bodies such as the AMA, RACGP, and Cancer Council exercise influence grounded in professional authority and public trust. Their input is often decisive in technical areas of policy and becomes especially prominent during national crises, though it remains part of a broader advisory ecosystem.

Legal and civil liberties organisations – the Law Council, Human Rights Law Centre, and others – operate at the level of principle, scrutinising legislation and advocating for rights-based constraints on government action. Their influence is typically indirect but can be significant in shaping legal frameworks and public debate.

Within this wider system sit community and diaspora advocacy groups, including Jewish organisations (such as the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council), Muslim organisations (AFIC, ANIC), and others (such as FECCA and Armenian advocacy bodies). These groups engage in standard democratic practices: making submissions, meeting with policymakers, contributing to public debate, and, at times, facilitating international engagement. Their influence is real in the sense that they are part of the policy conversation, particularly on foreign affairs and multicultural issues. However, in comparative terms, they are generally modest in financial resources, institutional reach, and structural power relative to major business or union actors.

Finally, think tanks such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the Lowy Institute, and the United States Studies Centre play a distinct role. They do not represent mass constituencies, but they shape the analytical frameworks within which policy is discussed, particularly in foreign policy and national security. Their influence lies in framing, expertise, and elite networks rather than direct political mobilisation.

Against this broader landscape, the claim that “Jewish or Zionist interests control or infiltrate many of these groups” does not withstand scrutiny. To sustain such a claim would require evidence of coordinated, cross-sector control—shared command structures, dominant funding pipelines, or consistent policy alignment traceable to a central directive. No such evidence exists.

What does exist is something far more prosaic: Australians of Jewish background, like Australians of every background, participate across public life. Some hold senior roles in business, academia, media, and government. Their views are not uniform. Some are strongly supportive of Israel; others are critical; many occupy positions in between. That diversity alone makes the idea of a single, coherent “Zionist interest” directing multiple sectors implausible.

Moreover, the organisations themselves behave exactly as their mandates would predict. Industry groups advocate for industry; unions for workers; environmental organisations for climate action; welfare bodies for social support. Their positions frequently conflict – not only with each other, but also with the policies of Israel, the United States, and indeed with the views of different Jewish organisations. If there were hidden coordination, one would expect consistency. What we observe instead is disagreement, fragmentation, and issue-specific alignment.

It is also important to recognise a recurring pattern in such claims. Assertions of diffuse, concealed Jewish influence have historically relied on association, inference, and aggregation—not on demonstrable mechanisms of control. By the normal standards of evidence applied to any other claim of political power, they fall short.

This returns us to the initial concern. There is clear, concrete evidence that Jewish and pro-Israel organisations—like many other advocacy groups – engage in lobbying, public debate, and policy advocacy in Australia. There is also clear evidence that they do so openly, within democratic norms, and on a scale generally smaller than that of major economic or industrial actors. What is not supported by credible evidence is the claim that they exercise covert, disproportionate, or controlling influence over Australian government or society.

The more accurate picture is not one of hidden command, but of a system in which many organised interests compete to persuade, and where outcomes reflect the shifting balance between them.

Richard Flanagan’s dangerous idea is just a chilling form of denial

Greg Craven, The Australian, September

At the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, Richard Flanagan asked where the antisemitism was in the Bondi massacre and answered: “Nowhere. Nowhere. Nowhere”. Pictures: News Corp/Supplied

At the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, Richard Flanagan asked where the antisemitism was in the Bondi massacre and answered: “Nowhere. Nowhere. Nowhere”. Pictures: News Corp/Supplied

It’s always a good opening to a column to write that the only thing needed for evil to triumph over good is that good men stay silent. But this nostrum is not entirely true. The added element is that supposedly good people cannot recognise evil when they see it – or misattribute it to the wrong source or spend so much time denying it they end up with an apologia.

The longwinded speech by novelist Richard Flanagan at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas last month, flicking aside the reality of antisemitism, falls into all these categories. When it comes to identifying evil, here is a bloke who could not pick Satan out of a line-up of nuns.

Flanagan’s position seems to be that antisemitism in Australia is all the fault of “the Israel lobby”, a loathsome gang he never satisfactorily defines but you have a horrible feeling includes every Australian Jew – and probably non-Jew – who dares disagree with Flanagan on the October 7 attack, the Bondi Beach massacre and the war in Gaza.

His elaborated thesis is that the Bondi murders were not fundamentally antisemitic but were incited by provocative acts and misrepresentations by – you guessed it – the “Israel lobby”. What’s more, if things get any worse it will be all its fault as well.

A menorah is lit as people participate in a candlelight vigil at Bondi Pavilion. Picture: Getty Images

A menorah is lit as people participate in a candlelight vigil at Bondi Pavilion. Picture: Getty Images

Two general things stand out about Flanagan’s rant. First, it illustrates there is no correlation between creative talent, whether writing, acting or tap dancing, and intelligence. Flanagan is a passable author, but as a cultural analyst he ranks well below most rugby league commentators. Second, as an exercise in bad schoolboy debating, Flanagan has the lot. In his speech he packs in denial, deflection, blame-shifting, abuse, threats, distraction, conspiracy and obfuscation. Where was he when I needed him in grade 4?

This is not his first foray into mangled prose. His famously garbled Gould’s Book of Fish was reviewed by my brother Peter as comprising “multiple verbal collisions” and “massive lapses of narrative judgment”. I’m with you, brother.

Flanagan’s central and most bizarre claim is there actually was no antisemitism present at Bondi, other than the two shooters themselves. He seems incapable of comprehending that those monsters fired their guns from within a wider capsule of social antisemitism that walked alongside them. The shooters did not produce antisemitism. It produced them.

But let us indulge the Fish Man just for a moment. His analysis is the best let out for any war criminal so far detected. So as long as you were not the man pouring the Zyklon B into the gas chamber, you’re off scot-free. The person who hands you the canister, the man who orders it, the man who makes it and the man who thought up the idea in the first place are neither antisemitic nor murderers. They are just bystanders to the guilty physical act of another.

In the same way, vicious antisemites abusing Jews in the streets, chanting infamy and intimidation, and forcing Jewish schools to be secured by armed guards are not an actively authorising environment but merely a realistic human context.

If you tried to apply this analysis to the persecution of any other minority group in Australia, whether Indigenous people or indeed our Muslim brothers and sisters, you rightly would be run out of town on a very sharp rail.

Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism Jillian Segal appears at Parliament House in Canberra. Picture: Martin Ollman

Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism Jillian Segal appears at Parliament House in Canberra. Picture: Martin Ollman

The constant references to the “Israel lobby” are less illogical than chilling. One of the oldest stereotypes of Jewish history, the existence of some shadowy, all-powerful Jewish conspiracy, is wheeled out one more time.

Of course, Flanagan does accept that these insidious Jewish types are supported by an array of malicious non-Jewish Australians. It is unclear why they have joined the plot. Money, probably.

This is where it all gets rather more sinister. Flanagan makes repeated references not only to antisemitism being the result of the insidious actions of the “Israel lobby” itself but hints pretty broadly that future horrors also will be self-inflicted.

He seems to have a particular terror of special envoy to combat antisemitism Jillian Segal. Apparently she plans a McCarthyistic takeover of the Australian nation-state. Good luck to her.

In fairness to Flanagan’s positions, they may not be positively antisemitic. Instead, they may represent a different form of Jewish dismissal. This is asemitism.

Asemitism does not involve hating Jews, it just involves never being able to see them in any debate or controversy. So, there’s no antisemitism here because it’s not about the Jews. I’m not antisemitic, I just hate all Zionists and the state of Israel. These protests aren’t threatening anyone, they’re just healthy instances of freedom of assembly.

As Basil Fawlty might have put it: “Don’t mention the Jews.”

Greg Craven is former vice-chancellor of the Australian Catholic University.

Source: The Australian. Full Article at theaustralian.com.au.

Why Richard Flanagan is in denial on the true sources of Jew hate

Nick Dyrenfurth, The Australian, 31 August 2026

 

Author Richard Flanagan speaks at No Stadium Rally in Hobart. Picture: Nikki Davis-Jones

Author Richard Flanagan at No Stadium Rally in Hobart. Picture: Nikki Davis-Jones

I am a writer. Public writing is an inherently narcissistic business. You presume your thoughts deserve other people’s attention. Writers overreach. I have done it myself and no doubt will again. But there is overreach, and then there is Richard Flanagan.

Not long ago I stood in synagogue saying Kaddish for my late grandmother. Kaddish is called the Jewish prayer for the dead, though it says almost nothing about death. It is about life, God and continuity. Like so much of Judaism, it is an act of memory. Zachor – remember.

The command runs through Jewish civilisation. We remember slavery in Egypt, Jerusalem, persecution, liberation, catastrophe and survival. Jewish tradition is scaffolded by memory.

That is why much of the Australian left does not understand what happened to Jewish Australians since October 7, 2023. They imagine war ends, the marches will shrink, social media will move on, old alliances will re-form and everyone will forget what was said and done. Left-wing Jews like me will not.

The Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion has finished its public hearings. But where was the accountability for those who celebrated October 7, romanticised slaughter as “resistance”, doxxed Jews, reduced Jewish grief to propaganda or revived ancient ideas about Jewish money and conspiratorial power with “Zionist” substituted for “Jew”?

Criticism of Israel is not antisemitism. Zionism itself has been an argument among Jews since its birth. But something remarkable has happened to the word. In sections of the left, Zionist has mutated into a receptacle for old fantasies about Jews: greedy Zionists, bloodthirsty Zionists, media-controlling Zionists. Change the noun and the grammar is ancient.

The Soviets did not invent Zionism or Zionist but after 1967 Soviet propaganda helped perfect their use as a proxy for Jew. Secret power, divided loyalty, financial influence and conspiracy were repackaged. The Jew became the Zionist; the conspiracy remained.

Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism Jillian Segal, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia Aftab Malik. Artwork: Frank Ling

Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism Jillian Segal, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia Aftab Malik. Artwork: Frank Ling

At the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, Flanagan asked where the antisemitism was in the Bondi massacre and answered: “Nowhere. Nowhere. Nowhere.” He argued instead that an “Israel lobby” politicised the massacre and asked whether that lobby might be fuelling antisemitism.

Think about that. Jews are massacred at a Jewish festival and an acclaimed Australian writer peers into the wreckage, concludes antisemitism is absent, then turns his suspicion back on organised Jewish Australians. Flanagan distinguishes the “Israel lobby” from Jews, then attributes to it extraordinary power over government, universities, broadcasters, schools and public debate.

Antisemitism survives because it adapts to the moral vocabulary of each age.

The same alarm sounds in a recent piece published by The Shot. Dave Milner describes an “Epstein class” comprising “vampiric corporations, techno-fascists, militarists, Zionists” and American imperial power. Elsewhere he writes of Labor being “beholden to the Zionist lobby”, called for “Zionist plants” to be expelled from trade unions and described government as acting for a “cadre of genocidal pedophiles”.

Epstein. Zionists. Pedophiles. Secret influence. A corrupt ruling class controlling governments and institutions. At what point does a supposedly progressive publication hear the historical alarm screaming? Jeffrey Epstein was a real criminal. Turning “Epstein” into a metaphysical category of global power and placing “Zionists” inside it is something else.

You do not need the Protocols open on your desk for the architecture of an ancient conspiracy theory to become recognisable. For Jews of the left, Jews like me, the betrayal is profound.

We were not tourists in left politics asking for indulgence. Jews helped build trade unions, labour parties, civil rights campaigns and anti-racist movements.

Many of us spent our lives insisting minorities should be listened to when they describe hatred directed at them.

Jews as politically diverse as Mark Leibler and Henry Pinskier backed the voice to the hilt precisely because they believed Indigenous Australians should be heard when describing their own experience of dispossession and prejudice. That instinct was treated as a basic principle of anti-racism. Yet when Australian Jews asked for the same courtesy, parts of the left decided lived experience required ideological clearance.

A menorah is lit as people participate in a candlelight vigil at Bondi Pavilion at Bondi Beach. Picture: Audrey Richardson / Getty Images

A menorah is lit as people participate in a candlelight vigil at Bondi Pavilion at Bondi Beach. Picture: Audrey Richardson / Getty Images

Jewish fear was “weaponised”. Jewish grief was “politicised”. Jewish institutions became suspect. Jews were expected to denounce Israel before their experience of antisemitism could be admitted into evidence.

Solidarity that operates only for minorities whose politics you approve of is not solidarity. The answer is not censorship. It is argument, daylight and accountability. Ask people what they meant. Make movements defend their rhetoric. Stop allowing Palestine to function as an intellectual indemnity against ordinary standards of decency.

The left once knew hatred matters before it becomes violence, language prepared the ground for dehumanisation and minorities do not have to earn the right to be afraid. Jews know something else: hatred mutates, and memory helps us recognise the mutation.

Recently I was at a public Jewish festival with my seven-year-old daughter. She noticed the security men at the festival’s entrance, then their guns. “Why do they have guns?”

There are questions you expect from a seven-year-old at a festival. Can I have something to eat? Can we go on that ride? Not that. I gave her the answer a seven-year-old could understand. One day she will be old enough for the longer answer.

And when that day comes, I will remember standing in synagogue saying Kaddish for my grandmother. I will remember these years. I will remember who stood beside us, who remained silent, who explained it away – and who, even after Jews were murdered on an Australian beach, somehow managed to make the Jews answer for antisemitism.

Nick Dyrenfurth is executive director of the John Curtin Research

Source: The Australian. Full Article at theaustralian.com.au. For corporate sharing, find licensing options at the end of the article.

 

Richard Flanagan’s dangerous ideas were intellectually lazy

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 11 September 2026
At the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, Richard Flanagan asked where the antisemitism was in the Bondi massacre and answered:

At the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, Flanagan asked where the antisemitism was in the Bondi massacre. He answered: “Nowhere. Nowhere. Nowhere.”: News Corp / Supplied

Richard Flanagan’s speech at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas has one merit and one merit only: it crystallises the falsehoods, delusions and hypocrisy at the heart of the wave of hatred that has swept Australia since October 7, 2023.

Listening to the litany of factual errors, it is hard to know whether Flanagan is stupid, ignorant or both. He claims, for example, that Einstein was ardently opposed to Zionism. Yet Einstein famously called Israel “our state” – “unser staat”, a possessive stronger in German than any English can convey – bequeathed his papers to the Hebrew University and was working, when he died, on an address celebrating Israel’s seventh Independence Day.

Flanagan equally presents the Bund – a Jewish socialist movement – as implacably hostile to the state of Israel, conveniently ignoring that in 1955, as the reality of the Holocaust and of Stalinist antisemitism sank it, the Bund’s Third World Conference clamorously reversed its position.

But the factual errors are not mere intellectual sloppiness: they contribute to demonising Israel and the Australian Jews who support its right to exist, in some cases by ignoring reality in others by not providing crucial context.

To take just one instance, Flanagan recycles the Committee to Protect Journalists’ contention that “more journalists have been killed in Gaza by the IDF than in the entirety of World War Two”. What he omits is that the comparison applies a far looser definition of “journalist” to Gaza than to World War Two.

Worse, as the scholarly source underlying the wartime tally acknowledges, it excludes journalists killed on the Soviet and Chinese fronts, where 80 per cent of combat fatalities occurred, as well as journalists reporting from the Axis forces. Making those adjustments shows the claim to be utterly baseless – a fact Flanagan either knew or should have known.

All that, however, merely prepares the ground for “exposing” a conspiracy of monstrous scope and ambition. There is, in Flanagan’s telling, an ominously amorphous “Israel lobby”, operating both directly and through the Special Envoy for Antisemitism, Jillian Segal. Aided by “sustained” yet “mysterious” pressure from the Trump administration, its aim is to control “every significant arena of Australian public life”.

The “lobby’s” not-so-secret weapon is the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism, which it wants enforced by “oversight committees” designed to “cower civil society and curb free speech”, leaving “Australians silenced, fearful and divided”. The restrictions those committees impose are “certain to be (on) terms that please Israel, a foreign nation”, so that this country would be controlled not by “the Australian state, but essentially the Israeli state”. Australians would become vassals of a foreign power, denied even the freedom to criticise their overlords.

Faced with those claims, one is irresistibly reminded of Richard Hofstadter’s classic 1964 essay on the paranoid style in American politics. Unlike clinical paranoids, the conspiracists Hofstadter focused on did not see themselves as singled out by a hostile world. Rather, they perceived, lurking behind every event, the sinister hand of a demonic force directed “against a nation, a culture, a way of life”.

Hofstadter called this style paranoid, he explained, “because no other word adequately evokes its qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”. And its archetypal expression is the malevolent fiction of a Jewish cabal plotting to bring the world to heel.

Little wonder then that direct references to “the Lobby’s” machinations account for almost a third of the words Flanagan utters. Yet what is most telling is not what Flanagan says but what he leaves unsaid. In a speech devoted to Gaza, Israel is mentioned 60 times; Hamas once. Jews are mentioned 43 times; Islam and Muslims, never.

The distortions that bias creates are glaring. Demonstrating that abject ignorance cannot dent his outrage, Flanagan foolishly claims that Zionism, whose intellectual origins owe incomparably more to Mazzini’s liberal nationalism and Moses Hess’s romantic socialism than to Fichte’s chauvinistic illiberalism, “arose out of the same fetid, ethno-nationalist ferment” that “gave the world Nazism, fascism, extreme nationalism and authoritarianism”. What he does not say is that this ferment, which left no discernible imprint on Zionism, shaped post-war Arab nationalism and modern Islamism, reinforced by fascism and Nazi ideology’s vitriolic antisemitism.

Equally, he endlessly excoriates the “Israel lobby”. Yet he never mentions the lavishly taxpayer-funded Muslim lobby, with its own special envoy, which has coalesced a wide range of Islamic and pro-Palestinian organisations in submissions to public inquiries, including the royal commission, urging, among other things, for the terrorism legislation to be weakened.

And while denouncing the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition in vitriolic terms, Flanagan passes over the far more sweeping restrictions on what they call Islamophobia proposed by those organisations and by the Islamophobia Special Envoy: restrictions advanced without even the sketchiest definition of the “Islamophobia” they seek to repress.

The double standard then reaches its nadir in his suggestion that the representative bodies of Australian Jewry benefit from inciting hatred against the very people they represent – a charge he would never level at their Muslim counterparts.

To describe those assertions as outrageous would be an understatement; and Flanagan is plainly aware of their enormity. He therefore moves to pre-empt criticism by adopting the manoeuvre notoriously associated with former London mayor Ken Livingstone, who dismissed every charge of antisemitism as an attempt to silence legitimate criticism of Israel.

The goal is simple: to avoid addressing the substance of the charge by impugning the accuser’s supposed motives. Critics are presumed to be acting in bad faith, fabricating persecution to advance their political ends. Hatred is thus rebaptised as legitimate criticism, while those who object become accomplices in a secret campaign to stifle debate.

With every attempt to expose antisemitism is therefore just further proof of Jewish deceit, allowing the Jews to be accused of inventing the antisemitism that now mars our national life.

But Flanagan’s evasive tactics do not end there. Aping the techniques that saturate social media, he repeatedly poses as merely asking questions. The rhetorical approach is puerile: “A question needs to be asked,” Flanagan declares, casting himself as prepared to ask what others dare not. Then the inflammatory allegations are smuggled in: “To what extent has the Israel lobby itself contributed to antisemitism in Australia”, because it would, “perhaps perversely”, “accord with their existential message that only in Israel are Jews safe”? The insinuation is left hanging, as though the answer were self-evident, allowing Flanagan to don the mantle of truth-telling without ever shouldering the burden of proof it entails.

Every one of those claims and tactics could and should have been ruthlessly demolished on the day. Yet the so-called Festival of Dangerous Ideas evidently considered that prospect too dangerous to countenance. Its lineup featured Israel haters, but it included absolutely no one who would take them on.

The imbalance is, unfortunately, completely unremarkable: it is now a deeply ingrained feature of this country’s increasingly mediocre cultural life. But that only makes it even more important that those who purport to care about the truth should restore the balance that has been destroyed.

It is therefore much worse than scandalous that the festival was sponsored by the Ethics Centre and the NSW state government. It is an unforgivable disgrace.

A historian talks about Palestine’s deep history

History is rarely as tidy as the stories we tell about it. Places acquire names long before they acquire nations; peoples inherit memories they did not themselves create; languages, religions and identities change without ever quite erasing what came before. Palestine may be one of the world’s most conspicuous examples of this historical palimpsest, a place where ancient geography, successive civilisations and modern national identities have become so entangled that disentangling them can itself seem political.

That is partly why I have always valued William Dalrymple. He is a historian who understands that the past is inhabited by people, not merely populated by dates and events. His recent conversation about Palestine prompted me to revisit not only what he said, but what he left unsaid: the complicated process by which a population became a people, a geographical name acquired a modern national meaning, and history became memory – and memory, in turn, became identity.

It also led me back to a broader fascination of mine: the relationship between history, travel and place, and to writers who understand that landscapes are not backdrops to history but repositories of it.

The featured image at the head of this post? When last In Ramallah, de facto administrative “capital” of that part of the West Bank governed  by the  Palestinian Authority – Area A of the Oslo dispensation – we visited the cultural centre of Dar Zahran, a beautifully restored Ottoman house just south of the city. By fortunate serendipity, Dar Zahran was hosting a small exhibition of paintings by the late Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout. This large painting pictures the skyline of Jerusalem – Al Quds with its mosques and churches and the infinite variety of the Palestinian people, was front and centre. [In In That Howling Infinite, see Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]

Talking about Palestine and Palestinians

There are some historians whose books I buy almost automatically. British historian William Dalrymple is one of them. I have read many of his works over the years, from his debut, In Xanadu, through From the Holy Mountain, The Last Mughal, Return of a King and The Anarchy (see, in In That Howling Infinite, Bad company – how Britain conquered India, the story of the rise and fall of the notoriously rapacious British East India Company).

Dalrymple is well-educated, well-read, and well-travelled, having had his boots on the ground and its dust on those boots. He is what we call a “popular” historian and not an academic in the narrow sense, writing with enthusiasm, empathy, and the authority of someone who has visited the places he describes. And, to borrow from Bob Dylan, he knows his song well before he starts singing. His aim, refreshingly, is to educate, not to inculcate.

What has always appealed to me is not simply the depth of his scholarship but his refusal to become anyone’s court historian. His admirers come from different directions, and his critics do too. The old Empire loyalists dislike him because he writes unflinchingly about the violence and arrogance of imperialism. Progressives often embrace him for precisely that reason, yet they, too, sometimes seem disappointed when he refuses to enlist in their causes. Dalrymple has always struck me as someone who hoes his own row. He follows the evidence where it leads rather than where his audience might wish it to go.

That quality was on full display in his recent interview with Palestinian journalist and British resident Ahmed Alnaouq on the chat show Palestine Deep Dive, discussing his forthcoming, and as yet unfinished, book on the Palestinians. I encourage reader to take the time to watch the video below before reading the detailed appraisal that follows; but the time poor may nevertheless find it of interest.

To anyone familiar with the history of the region, little of the story itself is unfamiliar. Nor, contrary to some popular assumptions, has this history been ignored by Israeli historians. Ilan Pappé’s A History of Modern Palestine remains one of the best examples of a history that restores Palestinians to the centre of their own story, particularly those who rarely appear in conventional political histories: the villagers who cultivated the land, often on estates owned by absentee urban families or tribal elites who harvested much of the wealth.

That, perhaps, is the real significance of Dalrymple’s project. It belongs not simply to Middle Eastern history but to the much broader revolution that historians call social history. For centuries history was largely the story of rulers, wars, dynasties and diplomacy. Ordinary people appeared only fleetingly. Their lives belonged, if anywhere, to anthropology or sociology. Only relatively recently have historians begun asking what history looked like from the fields rather than the palaces.

Yet there is another trap which Dalrymple carefully avoids.

It has become fashionable to speak of the inhabitants of Palestine as though they constituted an unchanged people stretching seamlessly from biblical times until today. That is no more convincing than similar claims made by almost any nation.

Palestine has always been one of the great crossroads of civilisation. Long before the Philistines and the Hebrews there were other peoples. Afterwards came Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, Mamluks, Ottomans and countless others, accompanied not merely by armies but by settlers, merchants, pilgrims, labourers and refugees. Even in the late Ottoman and British Mandate periods, economic opportunity attracted migrants from throughout the Levant. The Suez Canal, the expansion of Haifa, the Hauran railway, and later British infrastructure projects all drew workers from neighbouring lands. Family names such as al-Misri, al-Shami, Homsi and Halabi quietly preserve those journeys.

And yet Dalrymple is equally correct when he points to the growing body of genetic evidence demonstrating profound continuities across the centuries. Human populations do not simply replace one another like changing tenants. They absorb, intermingle and endure. DNA reveals not racial purity but remarkable persistence.

One aspect of the interview that particularly caught my attention was Dalrymple’s discussion of religion – not as an immutable badge of identity but as another thread in the long weaving of Palestinian society. Conversion, he observed, was rarely a single dramatic event. More often it was gradual, pragmatic and deeply human. Families embraced Christianity under Byzantine rule, Islam under the Caliphates and the Ottomans, sometimes from conviction, sometimes because new rulers brought new opportunities, and often because children simply inherited the world into which they were born. Nor was the movement one way. Jews became Christians; Christians became Muslims; communities adapted over centuries rather than changing overnight.

Language followed much the same path. Arabic became not merely the language of religion but of administration, commerce, literature and everyday life. It gradually supplanted earlier tongues without erasing the peoples who spoke them. Identity, like language itself, accumulated layer upon layer.

His brief reference to Yossef Rapoport’s Becoming Arab particularly caught my attention because I suspect it offers an important clue to the intellectual architecture of the book he is writing Rapoport’s central thesis is that peoples are not born fully formed; they become. It exercised a profound influence on my own essay One Land, Two Peoples: History, Memory, Continuity, and Inheritance. See also, Becoming Arab … the myth of fingerprints

There is a quiet subversiveness in Becoming Arab because it quietly removes the ladder that every competing nationalism insists upon climbing. By demonstrating that Arab identity in medieval Palestine emerged through a long process of linguistic, cultural and social transformation rather than existing unchanged since antiquity, Rapoport undermines the comforting assumption that any modern national identity is primordial and immutable. The implication extends well beyond Palestinians. Jews, too, have continually reinvented themselves through exile, diaspora, return and statehood. Israelis and Palestinians alike remain peoples in the making.

Belonging, then, rests less upon ancient blood than upon lived continuity, accumulated memory and attachment to place. Rapoport gently redirects us away from the sterile question, “Who was here first?”, towards the infinitely richer question, “How do people come to belong?” It is an insight I have found equally illuminating when thinking about the British, the Americans, and even the tangled histories of Russians and Ukrainians. It also underpins what I have elsewhere called the “myth of fingerprints”: the mistaken belief that nations possess fixed and immutable identities when, in truth, every people is a palimpsest, written and rewritten over centuries without ever completely erasing what came before.

Dalrymple also highlighted the remarkable role of churches and monasteries across successive eras – Byzantine, Arab, Ottoman and British. They were far more than places of worship. They were centres of learning, repositories of manuscripts, guardians of memory and, eventually, pioneers of modern education. During the Mandate years, Christian schools became among the first institutions to embrace European models of education. It is therefore hardly surprising that Christian Arabs were disproportionately represented among the intellectual architects of both Arab nationalism and the emerging Palestinian national movement. This, too, complicates the modern tendency to reduce the story to a simple contest between Jews and Muslims. The reality, as always, is richer and more textured.

Dalrymple’s passing reference to George Antonius was equally telling. Antonius remains one of the most poignant figures of the Mandate years. Urbane, multilingual and deeply cultivated, he believed there remained a path towards accommodation between Arab and Jewish aspirations. Alongside moderates such as Musa Alami, he searched for political middle ground as extremism steadily crowded out compromise. Increasingly isolated, distrusted by radicals on both sides and ultimately ignored by the great powers, he watched the possibility of reconciliation slip away. He died in Jerusalem in 1942, disappointed and politically alone. There is something profoundly melancholy about his story. Men such as Antonius devoted their lives to preventing the catastrophe that would later be remembered as the Nakba. History tends to remember the militants, the revolutionaries and the generals; it is far less generous to the moderates who failed. Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, it is often those failed moderates who seem to have understood the coming tragedy most clearly. [See The first Intifada … Palestine 1936]

There is, however, a significant historical link missing from Dalrymple’s account.

To speak of Palestinians as a people with a distinctive heritage, history and culture is entirely legitimate, but it also raises the prior question of when and how that collective identity emerged. The people we now call Palestinians did not arrive in Palestine as a discrete nation from elsewhere; they emerged over centuries from the settled populations of the region, predominantly Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians alongside smaller Jewish and other communities, whose identities under Ottoman rule were more likely to be local, familial, religious, Ottoman or broadly Arab than specifically Palestinian. A modern Palestinian national consciousness crystallised only in the late nineteenth and, more decisively, the first half of the twentieth century, amid the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of Arab nationalism, British rule, Zionist immigration and the intensifying struggle over the land.

Nor should “Palestine” itself be confused with a Palestinian nation: the name is far older, deriving ultimately from Greek and Roman Palaestina and subsequently used in various forms by Roman, Byzantine, Islamic and European writers; under the Ottomans, the territory was not a sovereign province or nation-state called Palestine but was divided among administrative districts. None of this makes Palestinian identity artificial. Like most modern national identities, it is both modern and genuine, rooted in an older population and a deeply layered attachment to place.

Perhaps Dalrymple simply takes this history as read. More likely, it is unmentioned because the interviewer did not ask about it. He does write about it in a piece published in The Guardian in August 2025 (republished below). But his readers and particularly an audience hearing a relatively compressed interview – may not. When the process by which a people acquired a modern national identity is left unstated, audiences tend to fill the gap with their own assumptions: some hearing an ancient, continuous Palestinian nation, others an identity recently invented from nothing. Both are historical distortions. The point is not to diminish Palestinian peoplehood but to locate it accurately: between the much older history of the land and the modern political history that transformed its inhabitants into distinct national communities.

As with Israeli identity, Palestinian identity belongs to the modern age while drawing upon memories, attachments, communities and histories that are considerably older. That distinction is essential if the Palestinian story is to be understood rather than simply enlisted in one of the competing narratives of the conflict.

It was telling that, despite repeated invitations from his interviewer, Dalrymple steadfastly refused to enter the contemporary ideological battlefield. He would not be drawn into pronouncements about settler colonialism, the legitimacy of Israel or competing national claims. He remained a historian.

Dalrymple displayed the same intellectual discipline when discussion turned towards the future. His interviewer clearly hoped he would venture predictions. He declined. Historians, he observed, can tell us what happened; they are far less qualified to say what will happen. The future delights in making fools of prophets.

Anthony Eden supposedly reduced politics to three words: “Events, dear boy, events.” Orwell supplied the darker warning through the Ministry of Truth: “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.” That remains one of the great cautions against allowing history to become merely another instrument of political mobilisation. Less bleakly, Robert Fisk – another writer I greatly admired – offered the wisest answer of all: “My crystal ball is broken.” Those who confidently predict the future almost invariably discover that history has other ideas. [See The Night of Power – Robert Fisk’s bitter epilogue ]

One curiosity remained with me after the interview. Dalrymple remarked upon young Israeli soldiers carrying rifles almost everywhere, yet the obvious question went unexplored: why? I have wondered about this myself ever since my first visit to Israel. I can still picture my late friend Avi’s rifle standing against the hallway wall in his parents’ home in Ramat Gan after he returned from reserve duty during the 1973 war. On my most recent visit I asked Israelis directly. Unless a weapon can be securely stored, soldiers are required to keep it with them. Our friend Shmuel’s son, serving as an army medic, once absent-mindedly left his rifle on a military bus after an exhausting exercise. His reward was several weeks in military prison. What appears to outsiders as a symbol of militarisation is, to many Israelis, simply one more expression of a society shaped by permanent insecurity.

Dalrymple also refers to the annual Jerusalem Day march, an event that commemorates the IDF’s capture of the Old City in June 1967 and the “unification” of the city. We happened to witness similar scenes ourselves near the Western Wall only days beforehand. They were ugly, confronting and impossible to dismiss as merely social media caricature.

I look forward to reading the finished book. Not because I expect it to settle the argument—history almost never does—but because the best historians enlarge rather than narrow our understanding. They remind us that identities are not fossils buried in the earth waiting to be excavated, but living things, fashioned over centuries by conquest and coexistence, faith and language, migration and memory. They leave us with fewer slogans and more questions; fewer certainties and greater humility. In an age increasingly addicted to binaries, that may be the most subversive act of all.

Travelers’  tales

There is a thread that runs through much of my writing, though I did not always recognise it at the time. It is a thread woven from history, travel, memory and place, and it connects figures as seemingly disparate as Jan Morris, Robert Fisk and William Dalrymple. They are very different writers, with different perspectives and different temperaments, but they share a quality that I have always valued: they do not simply describe places; they allow places to speak.

During my early encounters with the history and culture of the Middle East at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies – the “Madrasat al-Jawāsīs”, the “School of Spies”, as Arab friends would jokingly call it – I became fascinated by a trio of British writers whose books transported me into the worlds they described.described. Gertrude Bell, Freya Stark and Jan Morris each approached the region differently, yet all possessed that rare ability to convey not merely information but atmosphere: the smells of markets, the rhythms of streets, the weight of history embedded in landscapes.

Jan Morris was perhaps the greatest exponent of this art. Her genius was not merely as a chronicler of empire, nor simply as a travel writer, but as someone who understood that places possess personalities. She once wrote, “All my life I have felt in places, in landscapes as in cities, an allure that seems to me actually sexual, purer but no less exciting than the sexuality of the body.” It is a remarkable observation because it captures something that many travellers experience but few can articulate: that certain landscapes exert a pull beyond geography, that cities and countries can possess a kind of emotional and even sensual presence.

Bell, the archaeologist, traveller and administrator sometimes called the “Queen of the Desert”, was present at the creation of the modern Middle East after the First World War. Stark travelled through the region in the middle decades of the twentieth century, recording a world already beginning to disappear. James Morris, later Jan Morris, chronicled the rise and decline of British imperial confidence and the uncertain transition into a post-imperial age.

What makes Jan Morris such a fascinating figure is that her personal transformation occurred alongside the transformation of Britain itself. The end of Empire and the discovery of a new identity unfolded in parallel. The writer who chronicled the fading grandeur of British power was also undergoing a profound reimagining of self. Her Pax Britannica trilogy remains an extraordinary work, though it is also deeply complicated. Morris’s relationship with empire was neither a simple condemnation nor an uncomplicated celebration. She recognised its violence and arrogance, yet she was also fascinated by its energy, ambition and sense of adventure. Empire, in her telling, was a vast human drama: magnificent, destructive, creative and cruel.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 represented the moment when that imperial illusion finally collapsed. Morris described it as a kind of tombstone for British power and a crisis of British masculinity. The old confidence had disappeared. The imperial actor who had once imagined himself striding across the world stage was suddenly confronted with his own limitations. “Old forces were dying and new energies emerging,” she wrote. “Patterns that had seemed permanent were falling into chaos.” That insight resonates far beyond Britain. History repeatedly teaches us that identities and institutions which appear permanent are often temporary arrangements. Empires, nations and cultures are not fixed monuments but living things, constantly being reshaped by events.

This is why William Dalrymple’s work has always appealed to me. Like Morris, he understands that history is not simply about dates, battles and rulers. It is about people in places. His great strength is that he belongs to no faction. He follows the evidence, and he makes his own judgments. He resists the temptation to reduce history to contemporary political arguments. Instead, he explored the deeper processes by which societies and identities emerge.

As we have noted above, his observations intersect with Yossef Rapoport’s Becoming Arab, a work that has greatly influenced my own thinking. Rapoport challenges the assumption that national identities are ancient, fixed and immutable. Arab identity in Palestine, he argues, emerged through centuries of linguistic, cultural and social development. This does not diminish Palestinian identity; rather, it explains how all identities are formed.

The same applies elsewhere. Jewish identity has also evolved through exile, diaspora, return and statehood. British identity, American identity, Russian identity and Ukrainian identity are all products of history rather than timeless inheritances. Peoples are not fingerprints stamped permanently into existence. They are palimpsests, written and rewritten across generations, retaining traces of what came before while continually becoming something new.

This is also why Dalrymple’s observations about religion are significant. Faith, like language, is not simply inherited unchanged through the centuries. Communities converted, adapted and transformed. Jews became Christians, Christians became Muslims, and Arabic gradually became the dominant language of administration, commerce and culture. Churches and monasteries served not only as places of worship but as centres of learning and memory. During the British Mandate, as we have noted above, Christian schools were among the pioneers of modern education, and Christian Arabs played a disproportionately important role in the development of Arab nationalism and Palestinian political consciousness.

Again, the lesson is one of complexity. The history of Palestine cannot be reduced to simple categories. It is a story of migration and continuity, faith and adaptation, conflict and coexistence.

A personal coda

I make no comparison between my own experiences and those of writers such as Morris or Dalrymple, who devoted years of their lives to the places they studied. My own travels have been measured in days and weeks rather than prolonged residence, and I possess neither their linguistic gifts nor their local knowledge. Yet they have taught me some of the same lessons.

Over the years I have wandered through mosques and basilicas, monasteries and synagogues, castles and catacombs, museums and markets. I have traced the layers of history in weathered stones, walked streets that have changed little for centuries, and watched successive civilisations leave their marks upon the same landscape. Everywhere, the faces, languages and faiths have reminded me that history is one of mixture rather than purity, continuity rather than replacement. it is this extraordinary diversity that makes these lands so compelling.

Israel and Palestine affected me more deeply than almost anywhere else. I have read widely, but books can only take one so far. I have stood at checkpoints, seen the separation barrier close up and, witnessed the daily inconveniences, restrictions and humiliations that accompany life under occupation. Equally, I have spoken with Israelis and Palestinians whose lives have been shaped by generations of fear and insecurity, and come to understand, even if not always to agree with, the fears that underpin so many aspects of everyday life. By design, good fortune or simple caution, I have never witnessed the violence itself. But I have seen enough to understand that both peoples live with histories that cannot simply be dismissed.

Travel has not made me an idealist, nor has it turned me into a partisan. If anything, it has left me increasingly suspicious of certainties. The longer one spends amidst places where history is layered one civilisation upon another, the harder it becomes to accept simple stories about pure origins, immutable identities, uniquely righteous causes, and uncomplicated heroes and villains. Reality is almost always more complicated – and more human – than that.

Perhaps that is the enduring lesson of writers like Jan Morris, Robert Fisk and William Dalrymple. They remind us that landscapes have longer memories than nations, that stones often preserve truths that politics attempts to conceal, and that history is rarely a straight line. It is a conversation across centuries, written by countless hands.

In the forward to East – an Arab anthology, republished below, I wrote: “these are the lands of testament and prophecy, of sacrifice and sacrament, of seers and sages, of vision and vicissitude”. Their histories are “carved in stone, mysteries locked in stone”. And perhaps that is why they continue to draw us back: because beneath every empire, every ideology and every argument lie the enduring traces of ordinary human beings who lived, loved, fought, worshipped and dreamed in the same places we walk today.

Paul Hemphill and In That Howling Infinite, August 2026

For more on the Middle East in In That Howling Infinite see: A Middle East Miscellany and East – an Arab anthology; and, most recently: Maps, memory, and the myth of fingerprints.

Eastward, aye, he wandered

Forward to East – an Arab anthology  of poems by Paul Hemphill
In these troubled times, I look back on a part of the world that has captivated much of my intellectual life. I was drawn to the Middle East in another age, when it was the land of myth and magic, of dreamers and adventurers, of quixotic tilters at windmills, of pioneers who would make the deserts bloom, of dissemblers and deceivers bearing false promises. The ancient lands of the Bible, the fabled realm of A Thousand and One Nights, the restless quests of Richard Burton, Charles Doughty, and TE Lawrence; the pulp-fiction fantasies of Frank Herbert, James Michener, and Leon Uris; the celluloid myths of Peter O’Toole, Omar Sharif, and Paul Newman.
These are the lands of testament and prophecy, of sacrifice and sacrament, of seers and sages, of vision and vicissitude, of warriors and holy men. The spiritual and the temporal have melded here since time immemorial. We still see the remnants of ancient empires and the echoes of their faiths. We can chart their decline and fall in monuments and mausoleums, in the “tumbled towers and fallen stones, broken statues, empty tombs,” where “ghosts of commoners and kings walk the walls and catacombs of the castles and the shrines.” Histories carved in stone, mysteries locked in stone, as “canyons and castles pass ageless and ageing and captive in time.”
I first travelled through these lands when the gaze of our Western world was directed elsewhere. The big stories then were the Vietnam quagmire and the Cold War, words made flesh when Brezhnev’s Red Army euthanised the Prague Spring – much as Nikita Kruschev crushed Hungary’s short lived revolution a decade earlier. Then plucky little Israel – that’s how the world viewed the Jewish state back in the day – made its pre-emptive blitzkrieg against the braggadocio of Egypt, and the dubious martial prowess of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, and put the Middle East back in the news again.
And there it has stayed, with hijackings, hostages, terrorism, the Oil Crisis and OPEC, civil war and invasion in Lebanon, Gulf Wars One, Two, and Three, the Twin Towers, the Wars of American Vengeance. And so to the present day, the brief Arab Spring giving way to a long and bloody Arab Winter, and the demolition of the Sykes-Picot dispensation with Daish’s redrawing of the map of the Middle East, the Abraham Accords with their promise of Arab-Israeli “normalisation” – an opaque and controversial word in this box canyon of false hopes – the fall of the Assad regime and the prospect of a revived Syria, and, in the endgame of many Israeli incursions into Hamas’ Gaza autocracy, the pogrom of October 7 and Israel’s biblical vengeance.
There is a place for dissertations on the state of the world and the tectonic movements that continue to reverberate and ricochet through these most antique of lands. And this is not one. But they have been the inspiration for much of my writing, and this volume is an anthology of those pieces. And unavoidably, they reflect and comment upon ideas and incidents, actions and accidents, memories and monuments.
I wear the weave of history like a second skin, as though each stone, each ruin, each sun-baked wadi, each vibrant soul has pressed itself into my being. As the Irish novelist John Banville wrote, “the past beats inside me like a second heart,” and in these lands, it beats with a particular resonance – ancient and immediate, mythic and human. The Middle East is not merely a subject of study or a theatre for politics; it is a history and geography I have walked through, a landscape I have viewed, a culture I have carried with me in the dust of its deserts, in the sounds and scents of its streets, in the quiet of its mosques, churches and synagogues, and its ruins.
My poems and songs have mirrored what I have carried in memory, and carry still. The cadence of markets and mosques, the call to prayer, the silence of the canyons. the desert wind, remind me that these lands live not only in history books but in lived, sung, remembered experience of all who have passed through They recall centuries of triumph and loss. The past is not distant; it rises in waves, song lines across stone and sand, linking the footsteps of pilgrims, soldiers, merchants, and wanderers with my own.
I know the Old Cities of Jerusalem and Damascus like my own neighbourhood. I’ve promenaded down the Street Called Straight and the Suq Al Hammadiyeh many times; shopped in the ancient Aleppo Souk – before it was destroyed; walked though the deserted Dead Cities of the North – which became later refuge for the homeless; climbed the Masada massif twice, once in the full heat of high summer, and again one time in predawn darkness to watch the sunrise over the Dead Sea and Moab; traveled overland through the Judean Desert to the old monastery of Mar Saba Stood; stood atop the battlements of Krak de Chevaliers; slept a ledge overlooking Petra, the Rose City and walked the Siq both ways three times; rode in a jeep through the canyons of Wadi Rum; traveled on the famous Nairn Express from Damascus to Baghdad, and an old bus through the Khyber Pass; stood by the Euphrates at Babylon, the Nile at Karnak, and the Ganges at burning ghat of Varenesi; visited Palmyra and watched the sunset atop Qala’at Fakhe al Din al Ma’ani.
All of these, now memories, carry the stories of centuries: the echo of prophets, conquerors, poets, and common folk whose lives have risen and fallen in patterns invisible yet inscribed in every wall, every minaret, every crumbling mosaic. The present weighs upon them as heavily as the past: geopolitics, ideology, oil, invasion, and resistance all leave their marks, mingling with the dust of empires long gone. Yet amid it all, the pulse of life persists—bright, stubborn, and singin – reminding me that beauty and despair coexist in ways the mind alone can scarcely contain.
These lands, as I first knew them, were the lands of story, legend, and lore; of pilgrims and explorers; of warriors and sages. And now, reading, writing and singing their echoes through books, prose and verse, I understand that memory, imagination, and presence are inseparable. One cannot approach the Middle East without the awareness that history is embodied, tactile, insistent: in the sun upon skin, the dust on boots, the voices of markets, mosques, and alleys, and in the pull of ruins that hold the ghosts of kings and commoners alike.
Writing about the Middle East, I am reminded that story, song, and memory intertwine. The poems and songs I carry are part of this landscape, as much as the stones and winds themselves, shaping how I see, feel, and reflect. Their cadence is my compass, their imagery my guide, the echoes, the pulse of lands that refuse abstraction. Here, history and the present are inseparable; the past is alive in the dust, the stone, the sun, and the song.
I wear its dust, I carry its past, I feel its presence. In prose and in song, in memory and in presence, I am tethered to these lands. And in this tethering, I find the resonance that drives the writing in this anthology: an awareness of the Middle East not as a distant object but as a living, breathing interlocutor, shaping thought, reflection, and imagination with the weight, warmth, and insistence of centuries.
Decades later, I wrote about my early travels in Tanks for the memory – how Brezhnev changed my life.It encapsulates very much how I travelled in those gone days:

“I’d like to think that perhaps it is something intrinsically part of my software – an ability to adapt, accept, empathize, and, as far as it is indeed possible for a stranger, to become one with the scenery and slip into the machinery, and, to put it bluntly, take it all at face value. As a “stranger in a strange land”, I accepted what I saw, observed, heard and learned, moved on – to quote American beat poet Lawrence Ferlinghetti – like “a mirror walking down a strange street’. For this is how I traveled in those roving years, leaving very little by way of words and pictures of my travelling. All I saw, heard, observed, felt and learned was mostly stashed away on my own, internal hard-drive to be accessed in latter years – waiting, perhaps, for the advent of social media, blogs and highly portable electronic devices”.

For more about these journeys, see Song of the Road (2) – The Accidental Traveller

One of the oldest urban centres: Gaza’s rich history in ruins

The Guardian,17 Oct 2025

In October 2025, William Dalrymple wrote this  fine piece on the long, entangled history of Gaza in The Guardian, publicizing a forthcoming multi-episode series on his excellent Empire podcast. He wrote of how the territory’s ancient heritage has too often been ignored. As we mourn incalculable human losses, learning about its past can help us better understand the present

As a ceasefire brings a measure of peace to the Dresden-like hellscape that Gaza has become, it is time to take stock of all that has been lost. The human cost of what the UN commission of inquiry recognises as a genocide is of course incalculable, but fewer are aware of how much rich history and archaeology has also been destroyed in these horrific months. This is bolstered by the widespread assumption that Gaza was little more than a huge refugee camp built on a recently settled portion of desert. That is quite wrong. In reality Gaza it is one of the oldest urban centres on the planet.

Golda Meir famously declared that “there was no such thing as Palestinians”, but the reality is very different. Palestine is actually one of humanity’s oldest toponyms, and records of a people named after it are as old as literacy itself. Palestine was an established name for the coast between Egypt and Phoenicia since at least the second millennium BCE: the ancient Egyptian texts refer to “Peleset” from about 1450BCE, Assyrians inscriptions to the “Palashtu” c800BCE, and Herodotus c480BCE to “Παλαιστίνη” (Palaistinē). This was all brought home to me as I worked, with my co-presenter Anita Anand, on a 12-part series on Gaza’s history for the Empire podcast.

Gaza was first referenced as a strategic prize in an Egyptian inscription of Thutmose III in the 15th century BCE, where it is referred to as Ghazzati. It is also one of the most fought-over and contested spaces: for more than 4,000 years this area has been an ethnically mixed crossroads, linking Africa with Asia, and the desert with the Mediterranean. It has also been a crucial strategic and economic hub: an often incredibly rich and prosperous port from which the spices, incense, perfumes and wines of western Asia were exported to Greece and Rome, the end of the caravan route from Arabia via Petra. As well as a fortress guarding the strategically crucial route leading from the eastern Mediterranean coastline to Egypt.

Travellers who visited Gaza over the centuries have often remarked on the fecundity of its vegetation and the diversity of its agriculture, both of which are the products of its underground waters and the Mediterranean climate. It is this that enabled Gaza to grow the excellent grapes that for many centuries were made into a much celebrated sweet wine, the Château d’Yquem of the classical world. An exhibition of the salvaged antiquities of Gaza currently showing at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris opens with a fabulous display of the distinctive “torpedo jars” in which the Gazans exported their wine. As late as the sixth century AD, these amphorae were reaching both Merovingian France and Anglo-Saxon England.

Each successive power in the Middle East has always wanted to own Gaza, and to conquer it, and over the centuries we hear of a succession of empires – first the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks and Romans, and later the Umayyads, Mamluks, Turks and the British – coming through and fighting to seize it. More difficult to see in the chronicles of conquests and sieges are the locals who have always lived hereabouts, century after century, whose faith has slowly evolved from paganism to all three of the Abrahamic faiths, and whose dominant language has moved from Aramaic to Greek then from Greek to Arabic.

Archaeology shows that the DNA of the different peoples who lived here has remained fairly consistent throughout the centuries: the modern inhabitants of this land, both Jewish and Palestinian, share much the same mix of DNA groups as the peoples who lived here in the bronze age, and whose skeletons have been tested in contemporary labs. The small Samaritan and Palestinian Christian minorities, the latter descendants of the first Christians, exhibit genetic patterns that are especially close to those extracted from ancient skeletons.

Although the town remained a robust centre of paganism long after many other cities in the region, its beachfront was also the home to the earliest monasteries of Palestine, as followers of St Antony of Egypt migrated there bringing the monastic movement to the Levant; soon “the desert became a city” as monasteries sprang up across the region. In 406 the Empress Eudoxia provided the funds for a cathedral for Gaza, and by the end of the sixth century, the celebrated church of St Sergius was built.

The Arab conquest used to be considered a major turning point in the region’s history, but according to many historians and archaeologists who specialise in this period, the conquest is almost invisible archaeologically. Surviving documents from the period indicate that for many years after, Gaza continued as an administrative centre of the region, and Greek-speaking Christians continued to run the bureaucracy. The son and grandson of two of the early chancellors of the Ummayad Caliphs, St John of Damascus, ended his life in the monastery of Mar Saba not very far from Gaza in the Judean desert. In time, the inhabitants of Palestine accepted the language, government and religion of their new masters; but it was a gradual process of transition, over many centuries, not a sudden catastrophic end of civilisation. The Arab conquerors were a small military elite; the local people remained much the same.

The site of Saint Hilarion monastery, Deir al-Balah, June 8, 2022. Mahmud Hams/AFP/Getty 

Gaza continued to flourish through the Crusader period, when it was given over to the Knights Templar to guard the frontier with Egypt; and even more so after the Mamluks expelled the Crusaders and filled Gaza with fine mosques and caravanserais. During the Ottoman period, Jaffa and Acre took over from Gaza as the most prosperous ports of the region, out of which Galilee cotton and Jaffa oranges were exported; but Gaza remained an important regional centre.

Though Gaza now dominates news bulletins for the worst reasons, it is a place about which we have traditionally learned remarkably little; we are not taught its story in movies or TV documentaries, let alone as part of formal education. Yet it is something we obviously badly need to know in order to grasp current events.

This month sees the publication of several new books addressing that absence. As well as the catalogue of the brilliant Paris exhibition, Trésors sauvés de Gaza: 5,000 ans d’histoire (Saved Treasures of Gaza: 5,000 Years of History) historian Anne Irfan has just produced an excellent primer, A Short History of the Gaza Strip, while Jean-Pierre Filiu has published a supplement to his wonderful Gaza: A History, called A Historian in Gaza. In it, he writes: “The Gaza I knew, and whose length and breadth I’ve travelled, has ceased to exist.” All three count as essential reading for those hungry to know more about this ancient territory so as to better understand the current, desperate chapter in its history.

A Short History of the Gaza Strip by Anne Irfan (Simon & Schuster, £18.99). To support the Guardian, order your copy at guardianbookshop.com. Delivery charges may apply.

A Historian in Gaza by Jean-Pierre Filiu (C Hurst & Co Publishers, £16.99). To support the Guardian, order your copy at guardianbookshop.com. Delivery charges may apply.

 

Beside Strange Waters

I have admired Pink Floyd since the sixties. I still thrill to the memory of sitting in the darkness on Parliament Hill in the fall of 1968 as the  lights of the city sparkled below us and as jet planes roared overhead on their descent to Heathrow airport to the accompaniment of Interstellar Overdrive and Careful With That Axe, Eugene. The Dark Side of the Moon remains, in my view, one of the greatest albums ever recorded: musically adventurous, philosophically rich, endlessly rewarding. Like much of Floyd’s best work, it explores madness, alienation, mortality and power with extraordinary subtlety.

That subtlety is precisely what seems missing from co-founder and principal songwriter Roger Waters’ contemporary activism. Flying Pink Floyd’s iconic inflatable pigs – now adorned with the Hagan David or swastika imagery; describing Israel as uniquely evil; dismissing inconvenient evidence about the atrocities of October 7, 2026; and denouncing former colleagues as idiots. All this may generate headlines, but they lack the complexity of the art that made him and Pink Floyd famous.

Perhaps that is the enduring irony. Guitarist David Gilmour rarely pretended to be a political philosopher. Waters plainly believes he is one. Yet the songs they created together endure precisely because they resisted simplistic moral binaries. The Dark Side of the Moon recognises that human beings are contradictory creatures, capable of love and cruelty, sanity and madness, empathy and tribalism. Waters’ current politics increasingly divide humanity into those who possess truth and those who have been brainwashed.

The Haaretz article republished below unintentionally illustrates another uncomfortable truth. In 2006 Waters was still embraced by most Israelis despite his criticisms. Today he is regarded by many not merely as a critic of Israel but as someone who has crossed into demonisation. Whether one agrees with that judgement or not, the shift is real. His critics see not an artist speaking truth to power but a man whose empathy has become radically selective.

The music, however, remains untouched. It is still magnificent. One can treasure the album while concluding that its principal lyricist has become, to borrow one of his own titles, rather more comfortably certain than comfortably numb. The  younger Roger Waters asked us to question authority. The contemporary Roger Waters often seems to demand that we accept his own. That is a curious destination for one of rock’s greatest sceptics.

One might attribute all this, in Waters’s case,  to a Momentary Lapse of Reason – the title of Pink Floyd’s 1987 album. There is a double irony here: a song thereon, On The Turning Away, is a longtime favourite of mine. What is there to object to in the lyrics of what is a powerful, melodic and anthemic song – and one that was not written by Waters, who left the band in 1985 due to personal, musical and political differences, but by cofounder David Gilmour and Floyd collaborator Anthony Moore.

No more turning away
From the weak and the weary
No more turning away
From the coldness inside
Just a world that we all must share
It’s not enough just to stand and stare
Is it only a dream that there’ll be
No more turning away?

The dark side of Roger Waters

This is a fascinating article, not because it settles anything – it manifestly does not – but because it captures Roger Waters almost in the raw.  Israeli music journalist Ben Shalev deserves credit for largely getting out of the way and letting his subject speak. The result is both revealing and, at times, deeply unsettling.

The article begins as a piece of rock-and-roll history. In 2006, Waters agreed to perform in Israel but, under pressure from the fledgling Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, cancelled the planned Tel Aviv concert and instead performed in Neve Shalom (Wahat al-Salam), the Jewish-Arab “Oasis of Peace” village near Latrun. The move required an extraordinary logistical effort: a chickpea field became a wheat field, then an amphitheatre for some 60,000 people. Traffic collapsed, helicopters ferried the wealthy, and the concert itself – a performance of The Dark Side of the Moon – became one of the largest and most memorable rock events Israel has ever hosted.

Around this entertaining backstage story swirl competing memories. Did Waters himself suggest Neve Shalom? Was it promoter Shuki Weiss? Did Waters witness armed Israeli soldiers at the separation barrier or not? Did security concerns prevent him attending a peace gathering, or did he simply go shopping? Almost every anecdote has two or three incompatible versions. Shalev wisely resists deciding who is right. Memory, ideology and self-mythologising have become inseparable.

The more interesting story is Waters’ own political evolution. He describes 2006 as the beginning of his radicalisation, crediting Qatari-Palestinian activist Omar Barghouti and the nascent BDS movement with opening his eyes to what he now regards as Zionism’s original sin. He claims his deceased father’s letters from British Mandatory Palestine anticipated these concerns decades earlier. Since then, he says, he has concluded not merely that Israeli governments have committed grave wrongs, but that Israel itself – and Zionism as such – is “a failed experiment.”

At that point the interview changes register entirely. It ceases to be about a concert and becomes a prolonged political jeremiad. Waters insists Israelis have been comprehensively brainwashed, dismisses Israeli society as morally corrupted, embraces armed struggle as historically necessary, rejects Nick Cave’s argument for cultural engagement, and repeats claims about October 7 that have been extensively challenged by independent investigations. His denial that Hamas committed rapes, despite substantial evidence collected by UN investigators, journalists and Israeli forensic teams, inevitably overwhelms everything else he says. Whether one is sympathetic to Palestinian suffering or highly critical of Israeli policy, this is where many readers simply stop listening.

That is perhaps the tragedy of Roger Waters. He undoubtedly possesses genuine moral passion. The anti-authoritarian themes running through Animals, The Wall and Dark Side of the Moon were always political, even when listeners preferred to hear only the music. But somewhere along the way, righteous anger seems to have hardened into absolute certainty. There is almost no room left for ambiguity, self-doubt or tragedy. Israelis become collectively brainwashed; Palestinians collectively embody resistance; every contradictory fact is assimilated into a single explanatory framework.

It is an oddly totalising worldview from a man who once warned us against “thought control.”

Postscript

On 4th September 2026, The Times of Israel Israel reported that Roger Waters, “a far-left conspiracist who has long been accused of antisemitism”, was scheduled to headline a New York City conference run by a group that raises conspiracies about the September 11, 2001 terror attack. “Waters and the group organizing the conference, the International Center for 9/11 Justice, have raised false allegations that Israel was involved in the al-Qaeda terror attacks”.

According to The Times, “The group identifies with the “truth movement” that raises alternative explanations for the attacks and calls the attacks an “inside job” orchestrated by the US government with assistance from Israel and other countries”. “9/11 was the first step in the plan for US-Israel hegemony in the Middle East,” the group said earlier this year.

The Times notes that Waters has endorsed conspiracy theories about the September 11, 2001, attacks, telling Tucker Carlson in July that the towers fell due to “controlled demolitions. “It fell down because it was demolished, and the question is, ‘Who placed the explosives in it? Who pressed the button?’” he said. He alleged Israelis had foreknowledge of the attacks, saying, “They were dancing around, sort of congratulating themselves”. He has also raised conspiracies or denied atrocities related to Hamas’s October 2023 invasion of Israel and has a history of anti-Jewish rhetoric.

Paul Hemphill, August 2026

For more on the Middle East in in That Howling Infinite, see A Middle East Miscellany.

Roger Waters: ‘My Songs That Israelis Love Are About Truth and Love. Israel Is the Complete Opposite’

Twenty years after his performance in the Jewish-Arab village of Neve Shalom, Roger Waters recounts his version of what really happened there – and what has changed for him since. ‘They went from, ‘Waaaah! Roger, Pink Floyd, we love you’ – to ‘What the fuck is he talking about?”

June 18, 2026

Roger Waters: "Israel is a failed experiment."
Shortly after 10 P.M. on June 22, 2006, as Roger Waters’ concert in the Jewish-Arab Israeli village of Neve Shalom was in full swing, a member of the production team mistakenly believed that police were preparing to arrest the Pink Floyd legend.

The employee, a member of Israeli producer Shuki Weiss’ team, thought he had heard over the radio that Waters would be arrested on suspicion of damaging IDF property the moment he stepped offstage. He alerted Amir Feingold, who was in charge of security for the production.

Already under immense pressure as the concert drew to a close and 60,000 attendees prepared to leave, Feingold took the report seriously. “We called the Jerusalem District commander, who was at the site, and asked him to look into it,” he recalls.

“Listen, we know how easily the police arrest people. Look at what’s happening today with protest activists.”

That was in 2006. The minister responsible for the police was not Ben-Gvir.

“If there was the slightest chance something would go wrong, we wanted to make sure it didn’t happen. The district commander reassured us. He said, ‘I’m with you.’ At the same time, Shuki and I went to Waters’ manager and told him, ‘Listen, here’s the situation. There could be problems.’ As soon as Waters got off stage, we put him in a car, even before giving the order to turn on the lights in the facility. Shuki said a few words to the audience while the man was already on his way to Ben-Gurion International Airport, escorted by special police patrol unit vans.”

רוג'ר ווטרס גרפיטי
Rogers Waters spraying graffiti on the separation wall, 2006.  Credit: AP

The story about the complaint against Waters is an insignificant anecdote, but it illustrates how much Israeli reality has changed in the 20 years since that performance.

In 2006, Ben-Gvir was a serial offender who belonged to the lunatic, ostracized fringes of the far-right, far outside the bounds of public legitimacy. Today, he is the national security minister. Waters is the one who has moved far beyond the bounds of Israeli legitimacy in the past two decades. In 2006, he was still a huge cultural hero, unconditionally loved and admired. His arrival in the country was seen as a historic event.

Israelis’ attitude toward Waters has, as is well known, totally changed since then. First, he has been a vocal and tireless advocate for the cultural boycott against Israel, as part of the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement. Then, he denied the scale of the Hamas massacre on October 7.

Pink Floyd’s music is still very much loved in the country, but Waters himself is probably among the most hated people in Israel. The possibility of him setting foot in the country today is beyond imagination. This makes the memories of his performance here, exactly 20 years ago, particularly charged and interesting.

What does Waters himself remember from that visit to Israel and the performance in Neve Shalom? What is the most significant thing that stuck with him?

“Very, very comfortable, shabby chic white sofas arranged backstage. Not the most meaningful memory, but you said, how do you remember it? But the main memory, obviously, is the memory of when I made the little speech at the end where I said, you are the generation of young Israelis who must make peace with your neighbors and blah blah blah,” Waters says in a Zoom interview from his New York home.

He then mimics a screaming, fawning audience: “They went from, ‘Waaaah! Roger, Pink Floyd, we love you’ – to ‘What the fuck is he talking about?’ Wow. It was something of a surprise. I went back the next year and I learned a lot more about Israeli psychology. But that first year, it was still a bit of a surprise.”

Waters is not precise with the timing: He returned three years later, in 2009.

Was the change in audience reaction really that extreme?

“It went from ecstasy to silent horror in a split second. And I thought, whoa, that was by far the most important bit. The rest was just a gig, with an adoring audience.”

Israel is waiting for Roger

One need not accept Waters’ recollection. I asked several people who were there how they remembered that moment. Some didn’t recall Waters’ statement at all. Others said the audience reacted supportively. No one remembered a reserved response, certainly not “silent horror.”

A significant discrepancy between different accounts of the same events characterizes the entire story of Waters’ performance and his 2006 visit to Israel. Whose idea was it to move the concert from its original venue in Yarkon Park to Neve Shalom’s chickpea field? What did Waters see during his visit to the separation barrier? Why didn’t he attend the meeting organized for him with intellectuals and peace activists?

The answer to all these questions is: It depends on whom you ask. So we asked. To mark 20 years since the most complex and charged performance in the history of international rock concerts in Israel, we will try to tell its story in the most reliable and interesting way.

This story has two protagonists: Waters and producer Shuki Weiss. In the 1970s, before Weiss became one of the country’s biggest concert producers, he managed record stores in Tel Aviv and was one of those responsible for introducing Pink Floyd’s music to Israelis. Later, when he owned the Dan Cinema Club in Tel Aviv, he used to hold record listening evenings there. One time he played “The Wall.”

“People would come to listen,” he recalls. “Many people.”

In the early 1980s, Weiss and Miron Rechtman, the owner of the Betty Bam event equipment company, bought the sound system that Pink Floyd used on its “The Wall” tour. In the mid-1980s, Weiss tried in vain to bring David Gilmour, Pink Floyd’s guitarist, to Israel as a solo artist. Toward the end of the 1980s, after Waters had left the band, he negotiated to bring Pink Floyd to perform in the country in its trio lineup (Gilmour, keyboardist Rick Wright and drummer Nick Mason. But that attempt also failed.

The crowd waiting for Waters to perform. The concert caused a traffic nightmare.

The crowd waiting for Waters to perform. Credit: Oren Levin

“I stalked them, so to speak,” he says.

In early 2006, Weiss learned that Waters was planning a world tour based on the album “The Dark Side of the Moon.”

“I went to London, met his agent, and offered a huge sum, much more than he received anywhere else,” Weiss recalls. After the contract was signed and the planned performance in Yarkon Park was announced, he traveled to Paris for a brief meeting with Waters. “I told him that Israel was excited for him,” he says. “He was perfectly fine.” Weiss says ticket sales were excellent, with 35,000 sold three months before the show.

A couple of weeks later, Weiss was vacationing with his family in the Netherlands, when Waters’ manager, Mark Fenwick, called him. He told Weiss that pro-Palestinian activists were exerting heavy pressure on Waters. A few hours later, Fenwick called again to say that Waters had decided to cancel the performance.

“I got lots of emails from my brothers and sisters after the announcement of Hayarkon Park. But the important one was from Omar Barghouti,” Waters recalls about changing his mind, referring to one of the founders of the BDS movement. “We had a conversation, and then I eventually cancelled Hayarkon Park. Organizing this concert instead was a compromise with Omar and with the rest of the people who had just started the BDS movement, because obviously even doing Neve Shalom broke the boundaries of the cultural boycott.”

Waters describes that exchange as “a huge moment” in his political thinking.

“You know, in this song that Mona Miari and I have just released, a re-imagination of my song ‘Comfortably Numb,’ I sing, ‘We never knew about the Nakba. I was only 5 years old in ’48.’ And we didn’t,” he says. “And the lie that is Zionism had been spread all over the world since the Second World War. So I wasn’t alone. Very, very few people quite got it.”

Waters says that one of the few people who “got it” before the war was his father.

Shuki Weiss giving an interview ahead of the Rogers Water concert in 2006.
Shuki Weiss giving an interview ahead of the concert. Credit: Oren Levin

“My father taught at St. George’s School in Jerusalem from 1934 to 1936,” he says. “And he wrote letters home to my grandmother, which I have, saying how worried he was about the influx of American money, mainly, to buy up land, and about the establishment of the settlements that he saw going on, and how desperately worried and concerned he was,” he recounts, referring to the pre-state Jewish communities. “Of course, he was killed in the war, so I never got to talk to him about these things. but it’s a fascinating fact.”

Following the deepening of his awareness of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to the appeal of the BDS movement, Waters made his second visit in 2009. “My travels around the occupied territories … were deeply, deeply moving and very informative,” he says. “I’ve tried never to shut my mouth from that moment. And things have only got worse, obviously, except that it’s becoming clearer and clearer to the vast majority of people all over the world now that this is a failed experiment, and it should be stopped.”

What is the failed experiment?

“Israel is the failed experiment. Zionism is the failed experiment. and this is becoming increasingly a position taken up by a huge majority of human beings all over the world, because we witness and are appalled by the horrific policies of the state of Israel in its massacre of the indigenous people whose land it stole in order to create itself. And so it’s a terrible, terrible, terrible tragedy, and it remains to be seen: Will I see the end of the story in my lifetime? Probably not. I’m 82 years old.”

פותחת
Waters performing in Neve Shalom in 2006.  Credit: Assaf Evron

Field of wheat

In response to Waters’ decision to cancel the Yarkon Park concert, the most monumental improvisation in the history of performances in Israel occurred. Thanks to the move to Neve Shalom, Weiss says he was called “The King of the Chickpea Field” for years by people in the global music industry.

“When Waters’ manager informed me of the cancellation, I told him: ‘What if I move the show to a place for Jews and Arabs?’ I don’t know where that came from,” Weiss says. ‘I knew Neve Shalom. David Broza’s grandfather was one of the first residents there. I had done performances there many years before this show, events for peace. But nothing of this magnitude. Performances for a few thousand people. I had no idea if a huge concert could be held there. I left my family in the Netherlands and returned to Israel. That night, Waters’ manager called me back and said: ‘We checked what Neve Shalom is. If you can do it there, and if you invite Arabs to the show and arrange meetings with peace activists, we’re in.’ I told him: ‘Yes, yes, yes.”

Rayek Rizek, a Neve Shalom resident, offers a different version of the events that led to the Neve Shalom performance. “Sometime in late March 2006, I heard two employees in the community’s secretariat talking about Roger Waters,” recalls Rizek who was the community’s secretary general in 2006. “I’ve loved Pink Floyd since high school. I still listen to them today. When I was studying at university in the United States, around when “Animals” (the band’s 1977 album) came out, I missed a performance of theirs in Houston. By the time I managed to look for a ticket, everything was sold out. I was very sorry,” Rizek says as an aside.

“So when I heard the employees in the office talking about Waters, I asked what was going on. They said his manager had sent us an email. Waters was interested in Neve Shalom and was asking for information about the village,” he says. “As soon as I saw I had a direct connection with the manager, I sat down and wrote him a long email telling him about Neve Shalom and inviting him to hold the concert with us. I didn’t know about the pressure being exerted on him. Two days later, Shuki Weiss came to the village and told me, ‘This morning, Waters’ manager called me and asked about the possibility of moving the concert to Neve Shalom.’ I imagine the manager received my letter and understood that such a possibility existed.”

Rizek’s version doesn’t necessarily contradict Weiss’s entirely. Perhaps Weiss suggested the idea to Waters’ manager, and then the manager sent an email to Neve Shalom. But it’s also possible that the initial email to Neve Shalom was sent to explore the option of holding some separate activity in the community. In this scenario, when the Yarkon gig was canceled amid Rizek’s offer to hold a concert in Neve Shalom, Waters and his manager adopted the proposal. Rizek recounts that during one of the preliminary meetings with police officers at the event site, one of the commanders got annoyed over some details and asked, “‘Why are we even holding the concert here? Why didn’t it stay in Tel Aviv?'”

Rizek recalls: “Shuki looked at me and told the commander: ‘Blame him.’ As for me, all I did was send a letter.”

Waters himself doesn’t remember the history of the concert’s move to Neve Shalom. “Shuki Weiss, bless him, he’s just another promoter,” he says with a smile. “I don’t know him at all. I wouldn’t trust him as far as I can spit.”

On the other hand, he stresses, “I loved the idea of Neve Shalom, of this agricultural community.” He says fondly: “It’s like this is the dream that we have of how Palestine could go, could go back to being, where everybody lives together, and there’s no supremacists, there’s no racism. Whatever it may be that has caused this great catastrophe, there was none of that in Neve Shalom. I hope it’s still doing well.”

Flyers for the Roger Waters concert in Israel

Flyers for the Roger Waters concert in Israel Credit: Oren Levin

Weiss picked the new concert site’s location with Giora Porter, who designed the producer’s concert venues for many years. “There was only one area that came into consideration, with a certain slope, a kind of natural amphitheater,” Porter recalls. “It was a chickpea field owned by two brothers from one of the local moshavim. I located the field owners and said: ‘I want to buy your chickpeas.’ They said: ‘Okay, we’ll harvest in May.’ I said: ‘No, now.’ They understood they could make a killing off me. I bought the chickpea field, the crop they wouldn’t harvest, for $100,000. They were nice guys, but they knew how to bargain.”

“But there was a problem with the crappy soil in the Latrun area,” Porter says. “Exposed soil in June is all dust. It’s terrible. I suggested sowing grass, but the moshav resident said: ‘No, that will ruin my land.’ I said: ‘I can’t do a show on dirt.’ I think he was the one who suggested sowing wheat. He said: ‘It’ll sprout and be green like grass.’ So we went to see wheat sprouting elsewhere. I told him: ‘It’s terribly sparse.’ He said: ‘We’ll double sow it, increase the density.’ And that’s what he did. Shuki paid for it. And that entire huge area turned green within days. It was a miracle.”

Weiss and Porter recount that various state authorities created numerous difficulties for the show. The Israel Antiquities Authority remembered that salvage excavations needed to be carried out on the site and delayed the work. The Israel Land Authority charged several hundred thousand shekels to rezone the land for commercial use, even if only for one night. Meanwhile, the Health Ministry prohibited watering the compound with reclaimed water and forced Weiss to bring tankers. “It didn’t matter that we used reclaimed water at night, but I showed them we had tankers,” Weiss says.

“Quite cunning bodies,” Porter says of the authorities that created difficulties and collected payments. Weiss adds, laughing: “They know their job. That’s governance!”

Weiss and Amir Feingold, who was his security officer, have mostly praise for the police’s conduct. Some officers, Weiss says, were Pink Floyd fans. The event morphed into a kind of national project that the police wished to see succeed. There was, however, a dispute over the number of paid police officers the production was required to fund. The Jerusalem District commander demanded 1,000, including several dozen detectives to hunt for pot smokers among the crowd.

“We argued with them about it,” Feingold recalls. “I told the district commander: ‘In the end, it’s rock and roll. Are you bringing 80 detectives to arrest the pot smokers? Let them enjoy themselves.” The police, he says, complied and eased the demands.

Waters landed in Israel two days before the concert. The morning after his arrival, he visited the separation barrier near Bethlehem, where he protested against its construction with spray paint and words. Weiss says Waters gave interviews after his visit in which he said he was shocked to see “soldiers with drawn weapons” near the wall.

“A lie. There wasn’t a single soldier there, certainly not with drawn weapons,” Weiss says. Feingold, who accompanied Waters’ entourage on the trip to the wall, confirms no soldiers were present.

קהל אנשים צופים רוג'ר ווטרז ווטרס

Fans at the concert in 2006. Most did not arrive by helicopter: Assaf Evron

No-show in Neve Shalom

Waters laughs when he hears this claim. “So which story rings truer, Shuki Weiss’ story, no weapons, no soldiers, just a nice wall, or my story? I’ll tell you which one is true: my story,” he insists. “Shuki Weiss is a lying schmuck, obviously. I’m sure he’s very smiley, and he likes to make a lot of money. Good luck to him, but he’s just making stuff up.”

Another claim by Weiss concerns Waters’ non-attendance at an event organized in his honor in Neve Shalom. It was to be a meeting with intellectuals, peace activists, and village residents. Singer David Broza “helped me bring artists, writers, very serious people,” Weiss recalls. “They brought an olive tree for him to plant. There was a children’s orchestra. Tons of excitement. Everyone was already there, but he wasn’t. No Roger. They called him. He didn’t answer. His manager didn’t know where he was. In the end, David planted the tree in his place. Later it turned out he went to Kikar Hamedina to buy jewelry for his partner.”

Not only an olive tree was prepared for Waters, but also a sculpture of the famous prism from the cover of “The Dark Side of the Moon,” Rayek Rizek recounts. “I went to an artist in the Rehovot area, he told me 20,000 shekels ($4,500 in 2006). In the end, we made it from marble-coated concrete. It cost 4,000 shekels. Shuki paid,” Rizek says. “We waited and waited. In the end, someone on Waters’ behalf came and said he couldn’t come. There were too many people.”

Weiss says Waters was a no-show in Neve Shalom the day before the concert, but the event took place the afternoon of the show. “He was supposed to go to the community from the backstage area,” Feingold says. “His security guard came and looked around. I told him: ‘Tell me what you need. We’ll sort it out.’ He didn’t say a word and left. Later, he announced, ‘We’re not coming.’ I don’t know if he or Waters decided. He just said, ‘Security problems.’ What security problems? First-graders and 30 other people from the left. Where was the threat?”

Rogers says “of course” he didn’t come. “You don’t do anything on a gig day, except the gig,” he says. “I’m glad I’ve had this career and that I’ve been able to do multiple shows all over the world to fabulous audiences, but it’s very rare to do other things on show days.”

“And I’m absolutely, totally against the Nick Cave school of thought that, oh, we should all go and talk to people in meetings and that’ll do it,” he stresses, parodying hippie naivete. “No, it fucking won’t, you prick. No people has ever freed themselves without armed struggle, ever. It just doesn’t happen. It reminds me of the best interview that any of us have ever seen. (Palestinian writer) Ghassan Kanafani gave that fabulous interview where he talks about the conversation between the hatchet and the neck. What a wonderful writer.” He adds, referring to one of Kanafani’s books, “I can still remember almost every word in ‘Returning to Haifa.'”

A few weeks after the Neve Shalom concert, Waters wrote Rizek. “Dear Rayek, I’m deeply saddened that I was unable to plant the olive tree, but our efforts to reach the site were thwarted by the sheer numbers of people surrounding the vehicle in which I was travelling,” he wrote. “I know how upset you are that this did not take place and I hope that will not blight the memory of our visit to your land.” It sounds like something Waters would write, not his agent or manager.

“You see, Ben? I’m not just evil,” Waters comments.

The wheat field that replaced the chickpea field near Neve Shalom, 2006.
The wheat field that replaced the chickpea field near Neve Shalom, Oren Levin

When I sent him an email a few weeks ago asking if he would agree to be interviewed for this article, I didn’t expect a positive answer. But it was positive and even cordial. When I told him during the Zoom call that I was pleasantly surprised, and that the conventional wisdom here is that he has no desire for dialogue with Israelis, certainly not after October 7, he responded: “Yes, I am. I’m just having one with you now.”

However, some things he said were difficult to hear and didn’t seem very open-minded.

“You, as a country, Israeli people have been brainwashed, and consequently you are now subjects, nationals of the most evil thing that has happened in the world since the Nazis and the Second World War. And you can’t seem to grasp it, and that is so sad,” he said.

“You used the two magic words: Gideon and Levy,” he continued, referring to my email mentioning Gideon Levy as my Haaretz colleague. “It’s only these words that got you the ability to get to me, and even Gideon got the whole October 7th thing wrong. We almost fell out over it, because he was so brainwashed. He believed all that crap about burning babies and raping women and stuff, and it’s all complete nonsense, and everybody knows it’s complete and utter nonsense. There was no rape by Hamas on October the 7th. However, there have been documented multiple rapes by the IDF, of men and women and children.”

After pushing back that I did believe these things happened, I asked Waters to change the subject. It was unbearable to hear him say these things. I knew that any attempt to continue responding to him would blow up the interview. But he continued.

“Your position is indefensible, and no amount of talking intelligently to any of you is going to change any of this. You’ve been Ben-Gvir’d until you can’t accept any reason,” he retorted. “Your state, Israel, is psychotic, psychopathic, criminally insane, and the only way out of it is for you to re-establish connection with the rest of the human race. Stop thinking that you are superior in some way and should rule the world, and join in with the community of the part of the world you’re living in. Until you do that, you are doomed, but you may well drag the rest of the world down with you. You know, it wouldn’t surprise me at all if suddenly some lunatic was to drop a nuclear bomb on Iran or something, and that’s the end of the world. You, Israel, and the United States, the U.K., France and Germany, and all the people in that cabal are dragging the whole globe towards its extinction, extinction of all life on the planet. And that’s what I complain about. It’s not weird to complain about that.”

Aviv Geffen arrives by chopper

Back to the concert, enormous traffic jams formed on the way to Neve Shalom in the afternoon and evening, and on the way from it that night. “The biggest traffic jam of 2006, perhaps of the entire decade,” Feingold asserts.

“A massive transportation failure. To this day, people are still stuck there trying to get out,” Porter laughs. Still, he acknowledges the huge traffic jams were unavoidable. “That’s the geography. We invested a lot in finding access roads, dirt roads,” he says. “We rented entire fields from nearby kibbutzim and leveled them for parking. And still, in the end, everything converged on one turn off the main road. Like everyone coming to Tel Aviv in the morning. It’s an unmanageable rush hour.”

דיויד גילמור

David Gilmour. “He’s dumb as shit.” Credit: Gregorio Borgia/AP

So, did you bear responsibility for the failure, or did you say “it couldn’t be prevented”?

“Both,” Porter says.

Those who didn’t suffer from the traffic jams were the affluent who could afford 3,000 shekels for helicopter transport to the concert venue. A special helicopter line operated from Sde Dov airport in Tel Aviv. “Rani Rahav rented two helicopters for himself and the group that came with him,” Weiss says, referring to the PR consultant. “Aviv Geffen also arrived by helicopter. They told me afterward: ‘You don’t understand what a sight unfolded before us from above. It was worth every shekel.”

As for the concert, the quadraphonic sound was excellent. The superb backing band, which included acclaimed guitarists Snowy White and Dave Kilminster, was flawless. Waters occasionally used playback or excellent backing vocalists. It wasn’t a spontaneous or surprising performance, but it was clearly going to be that way. For the fortunate few who had the luck to see Pink Floyd perform, it was necessarily a diluted version. (Weiss is one of them, saying, “It was a poor man’s Pink Floyd. It wasn’t the real thing.”). But a straw poll I took last week among people who were there suggests that the enjoyment was complete, overwhelming and enthusiastic.

Musician Oded Tamsoot came to the concert from Ma’ale Gamla in the Golan Heights. “The entire event, the performance itself, was an amazing experience, beyond imagination,” he says. A year later, he formed the Pink Floyd tribute band Ummagumma.

Yael Ori, a former teacher and kindergarten teacher from Jerusalem, says Pink Floyd’s messages, which deeply influenced her as a teenager, inspired her to choose the teaching profession. “My high school was a nightmare,” she says. “I decided I wanted to be a teacher so my children wouldn’t suffer what I suffered.” Singing “We don’t need no education” with Waters and the masses was a wonderful experience, she says.

Dvir Zhorno from Jerusalem was 16. “The concert’s timing was perfect for me. It was shortly after I discovered Pink Floyd and started delving into their music,” says Zhorno, now a finance professional. “After the show, I heard critiques that he performed the songs exactly as they were on the albums, but that style suited me. That’s what I wanted to hear. ‘The Great Gig in the Sky’ live, exactly like on the album – it was awesome.”

David Broza at the tree planting ceremony at Neve Shalom. He was the default replacement for Waters.
David Broza at the tree planting ceremony at Neve Shalom. Credit: Oren Levin

Truth and love, lies and hate

Toward the end of the interview, I asked Waters what he thought about the enormous, unbridgeable gap between the deep love hundreds of thousands of Israelis feel for Pink Floyd’s music and the extreme hatred most Israelis feel toward him, his views and his statements.

“This is their problem,” he sighs. “All my work, all that work that they love, all those songs I wrote for Pink Floyd – “Shine On You Crazy Diamond,” “Comfortably Numb,” “Wish You Were Here,” – are all about truth and love. And all of my work that I do now is about truth and love. The State of Israel and what the children of Israel are taught to believe from the minute they’re grown up is the exact opposite. You’ve been brought up to believe the lies about October 7th. That’s not true. That’s just pure evil lies. And you’ve been taught to hate Arabs and Palestinians. That’s the opposite of love. So you live in a world that’s built on lies and hatred. … My music is built on love and truth, and that’s why there’s a dichotomy – oh, we love his music, but we hate him.

“I’m so sorry that even talking to you, I can see that you have been brainwashed, my brother Ben, completely. And I know you’re laughing at me now, but it’s really not funny. It’s sad. Israel is the saddest thing on earth, with the possible exception of the Trump White House. It’s sad because human beings are better than this. There is a capacity within every human soul for an attachment to love and truth. So for us to be persuaded that lies and hatred are a better alternative is why I go on working and expressing myself in my great songs.

“You think that ‘Dark Side of the Moon’ and ‘The Wall’ and ‘Animals’ weren’t political? Are you fucking stupid? Yes, they are stupid. If they don’t get that, they’re very, very stupid. You can’t really blame them. There were people in the band who don’t get it. David Gilmour doesn’t get it. He’s dumb as shit. He never understood a single bit of any of it. … That’s why he was miserable. And he was miserable with the band, because he never understood what I was doing.”

Waters started to say another sentence but then stopped and said: “Well, no, I’m not gonna [there]. Good luck with getting them to print any of this.”

Thank you very much.

“You’re welcome. Thank you for still having a smile on your face at the end of this conversation.”

Maps, memory, and the myth of fingerprints

Palestine Mapped. From the River to the Sea in Early Geographic Thought
Thomas Suárez

Tom Suarez is one of the most meticulous and careful researchers on Palestine and Zionism although he is relatively unknown. His first book, which the Zionists did their best to prevent being publicized, disrupting his speaking tours, The State of Terror was a majestic tour de force of the Zionist terrorism that created the Israeli state and their strategies for the future ethnic cleansing of Palestine.

Suarez’s second book, ‘Palestine Hijacked – How Zionism Forged an Apartheid State from the River to the Sea’ was another tour de force. As Ilan Pappe wrote, Suarez showed how “The use of terror was deliberate and sustained, carried out or supported by the same leaders who then established and led the Israeli state. We are still living this history: The book proves that Israel’s regime of Apartheid against the Palestinians and the continued expropriation of their country are not the result of complex historical circumstances, but the intended, singular goal of Zionism since its beginning.

It is not surprising that Suarez’s latest book is in the tradition of his previous books even if it concentrates mainly on the visual rather than the verbal.

Palestine Mapped guides the reader through the Greek and Roman concepts of Palestine, the various medieval Mediterranean civilizations and the European Christian “Holy Land” mapping that has dominated since the Reformation and continues to inform modern political thought. This isn’t simply a book about cartography or map making but how notions of the ‘Holy Land’ and Palestine informed the maps and visual representations that were produced.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A beautifully illustrated book on the mapping of the river to the sea might seem a luxury disconnect given that Palestinians are being massacred daily. Suárez is very much aware of this. He explains in his Introduction why the ongoing genocide in fact makes the topic all the more relevant. Perhaps key to this is the subtitle’s final word, geographic thought.

Much of the West’s fanatical support for Israel is rooted in Evangelical messianism, the psychosis (to use the author’s word) that the Israeli state is the place in the Biblical Genesis, “placing it apart from the realm of all other earthly nations and securing wide Christian devotion.”

Suarez argues that this collective elite and religious mindset is powered by our own geographic wiring, and that the book is intended in part as an antidote to what he calls the “mapping of the Holy Land” narrative.

al-Idrīsī, map of the Levant, mid-12th century, this copy c1250. (National Library of France; image Library of Congress)

Al-Idrīsī, map of the Levant, mid-12th century  (National Library of France; Image Library of Congress)

Since the book is organized roughly chronologically, its real-world relevancy is borne out mostly in the final chapter — though the Israeli state’s manipulation of ancient maps is already demonstrated with the sixth century ‘Madaba’ map.

The book begins with the earliest extant mapping of the Levant, that of the Greeks and Romans, then devotes two chapters to the medieval period. The first addresses mapping by Europeans in which Palestine is a focus: those from the distance of the Church, and that of on-the-scene pilgrims.

The interior of the Church of St. George, Madaba, Jordan. Part of the floor is the remains of a mid-6th century mosaic map of the Levant.

The interior of the Church of St. George, Madaba, Jordan, and the remains of a mid-6th century mosaic map of the Levant.

The second addresses mapping in which Palestine was not the focus, but through which the mapping — and Western perception — of Palestine nonetheless evolved: sea charts, advanced world maps, Ptolemy’s Geography, and what the author calls ‘Arabic’ mapping, a term used in place of the usual ‘Islamic’ mapping of academia, which he considers to be flawed terminology.

The book then arrives at what is described as the pivotal year of 1500. Three revolutions of the period are said to influence Palestine’s future: Europeans’ dramatically widened world view, the advent of printing, and above all, Lutheranism.

World map in the Fasciculus temporum of the Carthusian monk, Werner Rolewink, 1484. Woodcut.

World map in the Fasciculus Temporum of the Carthusian monk, Werner Rolewink, 1484. Woodcut.

The future stage is set during that century, and Suárez gives short shrift to the years 1600-1800, other than to establish the rise of proto-Zionist ideology.

European mapping of Palestine during that period is said to be stuck in a time warp, Biblically oriented no matter the variety of renderings, in stark contrast to Europe’s mapping of the rest of the world, which was a quest for the latest, the most accurate. It is, however, here that today’s manipulation of geographic thought is first addressed, because a 1714 work of one Adriaan Reland is cited today to erase Palestinians (for which Reland is said to be blameless).

The final, long chapter begins at the year 1800, at which simmering Christian Zionist ideology takes active form with the confluence of Christian millennialism, Western imperialism, and advanced mapping techniques.

The end of the century brings of course Theodor Herzl and the advent of Political Zionism. Suárez cites both Herzl’s 1896 Der Judenstaat and a map from his 1897 newsletter, Die Welt, to argue that Herzl failed to understand the opportunity Christian Evangelicalism offered his project. I’m not so sure that this is true. One of his main supporters was William Hechler, the Chaplain at Britain’s Vienna Embassy, where Herzl was living.

Star of David with a map of the eastern Mediterranean, on the heading of the weekly Die Welt, June 4, 1897.
Star of David with a map of the Eastern Mediterranean, on the heading of the weekly Die Welt, June 4, 1897.

Hechler believed firmly that the Jews must be enabled to resettle in Palestine in order to hasten the second coming of Christ. He was constantly looking forward to a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy along these lines. He presented a memorandum to Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, urging him to take up the cause of the Jewish return to Palestine even before he had met Herzl or read the “Jewish State”.

Hechler had been a tutor to the Grand Duke of Baden, and he introduced Herzl to him and also to the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II. He also accompanied Herzl to Palestine where he met Kaiser Wilhelm II in Jerusalem.

Herzl had an instructive meeting with the Grand Duke April 23 1896 in Karlsruhe and he noted in his diaries that Grand Duke

‘took my project for building a state with the utmost earnestness. His chief misgiving was that if he supported the cause, people might accuse him of anti-Semitism’.

As Francis Nicosia, the Raul Hilberg Professor of Holocaust Studies at Vermont University observed:

‘whereas today non-Jewish criticism of Zionism or the State of Israel is often dismissed as motivated by a deeper anti-Semitism, in Herzl’s day an opposite non-Jewish reaction, one of support for the Zionist idea, might have resulted in a similar reaction.’

With Herzl’s death, Zionism continued to receive the enthusiastic endorsement of Christian Zionism and its millenarian supporters. Prominent supporters included Arthur James Balfour who combined antisemitism and Zionism effortlessly.

The 1947 UN Partition map receives its due attention: the author deconstructs it as a scam intended to produce the opposite result.

Suarez analyses the manipulation of geographic thought employed by Israel’s propagandists and argues that the ‘pro-Palestine’ community defeats itself by engaging with this propaganda on its own terms.

Put in its crudest form, when Zionists say ‘there was never such a place as Palestine’, we respond with an old map in which the entire land is called ‘Palestine’, or other such ‘evidence’.

Suárez argues that this is a mistake, a trap, the result of cultural conditioning:

we are geographically hard-wired to accept [that] the ancient origins of a place-name has the power to grant or deny personhood today, to justify the expulsion of anyone to whom that geographic name is or is not attached.

This is a heavily cross-disciplinary work, and it is hard to imagine anyone with Suárez’s background in the Palestinian issue who is so experienced in the history of cartography. It strikes me that this might be a book that can bring the Palestinian issue to a wider audience: Everyone, it seems, loves old maps, and perhaps this book is the perfect Trojan Horse gift for acquaintances who believe they are fair-minded but can’t quite make the break from Israel.

The reader is disarmed by the earlier ‘apolitical’ part of the book, gradually drawn into cultural conditioning addressed in the middle part, and already long engrossed when encountering the final chapter. But it is also a cautionary work for those long active in the issue of Palestinian liberation, who, as with all aspects of the issue, often disempower themselves by responding to Israel’s propaganda on its own terms.


Tony Greenstein
Tony Greenstein is a longstanding Jewish anti-Zionist and an anti-fascist activist from Brighton. In 1982 he was a co-founder of Britain’s Palestine Solidarity Campaign. Tony was suspended from the Labour Party in 2016 and expelled in 2018 as a result of the antisemitism witch-hunt–the first Jewish person to be expelled. Tony is the author of The Fight Against Fascism in Brighton and the South Coast. He has written extensively on Palestine and Zionism for, amongst others, the Guardian’s Comment is Free, the Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies, Tribune and the Weekly Worker. Tony was the child of an Orthodox Jewish Rabbi and when young a member of the religious Zionist Bnei Akiva, now part of the Greater Israel movement.

Historical Atlases

My collection of Collins and Harper Collins historical falls into five broad groups:

General World History

  1. Collins Atlas of World History – Geoffrey Barraclough, Collins
  2. HarperCollins Atlas of World History – Geoffrey Barraclough, HarperCollins
  3. History of the World in Maps: The Ultimate Cartographic Exploration of Our Past – Philip Parker, Collins
  4. The Times Complete History of the World – The Times / Collins

Military, Political and European History

  1. The Times Atlas of the Second World War
  2. Atlas of the Crusades – edited by Jonathan Riley-Smith
  3. Atlas of European History

Archaeology and Exploration

  1. Past Worlds: The Times Atlas of Archaeology – also published as the HarperCollins Atlas of Archaeology
  2. The Times Atlas of World Exploration

Biblical History and Geography

  1. HarperCollins Atlas of Bible History – James B. Pritchard
  2. HarperCollins Atlas of the Bible
  3. HarperCollins Concise Atlas of the Bible

5. Biblical Geography  – Evangelical Reference

  1. NIV Atlas of the Bible –  Zondervan / HarperCollins

There are 13 titles, although a couple represent different editions or titles of essentially the same work: The Collins Atlas of World History and the HarperCollins Atlas of World History are essentially the Barraclough atlas in different editions/imprints [Henry Barraclough was a renowned  British historian, historiographer, and medievalist. I read his The Meaning of History back when I was in Sixth Form at Moseley Grammar School] Past Worlds and the HarperCollins Atlas of Archaeology anre  alternative titles/editions of the archaeological atlas. The HarperCollins Atlas of the Bible and Concise Atlas of the Bible are related but distinct editions. The  HarperCollins Atlas of Bible History is a separate, more specialised biblical-history work.

In chronological and subject breadth the collection isn’t simply a collection of history books with maps. It is almost a cartographic library of human history:

Prehistory → Archaeology → Ancient Near East → Biblical world → Greece and Rome → Christianity → Crusades → European kingdoms and empires → exploration → global history → the Second World War → the modern world.

And that perhaps explains why the physical atlases mattered to me in the first place. Their great virtue was not merely the information contained in them but the ability to see history spatially: peoples moving, empires expanding and contracting, frontiers shifting, trade and exploration routes opening, armies advancing and retreating, and religious and political worlds overlapping.

They are heavy both literally and figuratively, providing a way of understanding history that a conventional chronological narrative often cannot: history as movement across landscape and time.

The Great Unravelling – modern history is built on exodus and displacement 

And who will live in the house after us, my father?
The house, my son, will remain as it was!
Why did you leave the horse alone?
To keep the house company, my son.
When their residents go, the houses will die.
Together we will hold on
until we return.
When, my father?
Tomorrow, my son, and perhaps in another day or two!
That tomorrow trailed behind them, chewing the wind
in the endless winter nights.
Mahmoud Darwish

Two years ago, in an essay in In That Howling Infinite published entitled Modern history is built upon exodus and displacement we wrote: “The term ethnic cleansing is elusive and politically charged. In an age of endemic conflict, identity politics and competing narratives, it has become a contested and often diluted concept invoked with increasing frequency. Yet, it remains undefined in law. Unlike genocide or war crimes, it has never been codified as a distinct offence under international law, and so its use is contested.”

Henry Ergas’s essay begins from a premise that is not wrong in itself: the Palestinian Nakba did not occur in isolation from the twentieth century’s wider history of mass displacement. Modernity proved remarkably adept at producing refugees. The collapse of empires, the rise of nation-states, world wars, partitions and revolutions uprooted tens of millions of people. Greeks and Turks, Armenians, Germans, Poles, Indians and Pakistanis, Jews from Arab lands, and many others found themselves swept into movements of population that often combined violence, dispossession and the attempt to create more homogeneous states.

This broader historical context matters because contemporary discussion of Israel–Palestine often proceeds as though 1948 emerged from a vacuum. It did not. The creation of Israel, the Palestinian exodus, and the simultaneous flight and expulsion of Jews from Arab countries all unfolded in a world where population transfer – while morally disturbing to modern sensibilities – was often treated by governments as regrettable but practical statecraft.

Yet Ergas then moves beyond historical context into a stronger argument: that the Palestinians constitute a unique exception because their refugee status became institutionalised rather than resolved. Here too there is a substantial point beneath the rhetoric. Unlike most post-war refugee populations, Palestinian refugee status passed across generations through UNRWA rather than being handled under the broader UNHCR framework. The expectation of return became central to Palestinian national identity and politics. The refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and elsewhere became not simply humanitarian spaces but political spaces.

But this is where the argument narrows and history becomes more selective.

The essay tends to compress a complex chain of causes into a single line of responsibility. The 1948 refugee crisis did not arise simply because Arab leaders invaded and then refused to absorb the consequences. As discussed previously, historians describe a more tangled picture: military collapse, fear, local expulsions, battlefield conditions, psychological warfare, direct expulsions in some areas, and decisions by Arab authorities all played roles that varied from place to place.

Nor does the proposition that Arab states “created” the refugee crisis command broad historical consensus. What is more broadly accepted is that many Arab states subsequently chose policies that preserved refugee distinctiveness rather than encouraging full integration, often because permanent absorption was seen as abandoning claims of return or acquiescing in Israel’s legitimacy.

There is also a danger in drawing too neat a lesson from other twentieth-century displacements. Many of those “successful” examples came after immense suffering and often under conditions we would now regard as profoundly unjust. The Greek–Turkish exchange, the expulsions of Germans from Eastern Europe, and Partition in India all left deep scars that continue to shape politics generations later. Stability eventually emerged, but stability and justice are not identical things.

This recalls themes from that earlier essay of ours. There,  the argument was not that ethnic cleansing or forced population movements are unique, nor that Israel–Palestine should be detached from wider historical patterns. Rather, the point was almost the opposite: modern history itself appears built on recurring acts of uprooting and demographic engineering. Michael Mann called this “the dark side of democracy”: the tendency of modern states toward homogeneity, where political belonging becomes increasingly tied to identity.

The distinction matters because Ergas implicitly suggests that history eventually tidies itself up – that refugees are absorbed, wounds heal, and life moves on, except in the Palestinian case. The historical record appears less orderly. Displacement rarely disappears; it becomes memory, and memory becomes politics.

The Armenian diaspora still carries the memory of 1915. Partition remains embedded in Indian and Pakistani consciousness. The descendants of expelled Germans preserved memory of lost homelands for decades. Jewish memory of exile persisted for two millennia and became central to Zionism itself. Human beings have shown little inclination simply to reconcile themselves to history and forget.

Which brings us back to a previous discussion about stories and belonging in our Blue remembered hills (2) – the history we hold within us – Tolkien’s sub-creation, Scruton’s observations on home, Tyrion Lannister’s line that “there is nothing more powerful than a good story.” Nations are, among other things, stories people tell about themselves. Refugees do not merely lose houses or land; they lose continuity – the narrative linking memory, place and identity.

Palestinians constructed such a narrative around the Nakba. Israelis constructed one around return after exile and persecution. Both narratives contain truths; both contain mythologies; both can harden into absolutes.

That perhaps is the deeper tragedy. The problem was never simply refugee camps or UN agencies or demographic statistics. It was that two peoples built foundational stories around dispossession and return in the same small strip of land – your earlier “TARDIS nation”: a place physically tiny but historically and emotionally vast, where centuries of memory somehow occupy the same ground at the same time.

The twentieth century produced many displaced peoples. Most eventually found states, borders or political settlements that transformed exile into citizenship. Palestinians remain suspended between memory and statehood, between return and permanence. Whether this makes their situation unique is debatable. That it makes it unusually enduring is harder to deny.

The unravelling, then, may not be the Nakba itself, nor UNRWA, nor even 1948. It may be the wider unraveling of an older assumption: that history’s brutal rearrangements eventually settle into stable endings. History has shown a disconcerting habit of reopening what people believed was closed. And memory, unlike borders, seldom remains where states draw the lines.

What about ‘Whataboutism’?

When one widens the frame as we have dine here, an accusation appears sooner or later, often delivered with a certain weary certainty: whataboutism. The implication is not merely that one has made a weak argument but that one has committed a kind of moral sleight of hand- that by widening the frame one is really narrowing the conscience; that by speaking of Greeks and Armenians, Germans and Jews, Indians and Pakistanis, Bosnians and Rohingya, one is attempting to diminish Palestinians by dissolving them into statistics.

The charge deserves attention because there is such a thing as genuine whataboutism. The old Soviet formulation – and what about your own crimes? – was never an attempt at understanding. It was an escape hatch, a manoeuvre for changing the subject rather than addressing it. One suffering became a shield against discussing another. The object was evasion.

But comparison and evasion are not the same thing.

History itself is an exercise in comparison. Historians are forever placing one event beside another, not because they believe suffering can be ranked on some grotesque league table of misery, but because isolated events often become clearer when seen against a wider landscape. The Nakba did not occur on another planet. It unfolded amid a twentieth century that seemed to possess a grim talent for uprooting people from ancestral homes and redistributing them across maps with ruler-straight borders and bureaucratic efficiency. The century moved populations around with astonishing confidence, as though nations were puzzles whose pieces merely needed rearranging.

To note this is not to say that Palestinian suffering was unimportant, or unreal, or somehow cancelled out by the suffering of others. Human beings do not experience tragedy comparatively. Nobody standing beside a burning village pauses to think, yes, but larger displacements occurred elsewhere. People experience loss in the singular. The family home is not less mourned because millions of others lost theirs too.

And yet memory and history often operate differently. Memory looks inward. History looks outward. Memory says: this happened to us. History asks: where else has this happened, and why?

Perhaps the tension lies there.

Because the Holy Land –  a curious, poorly understood TARDIS territory, tiny on a map and infinite in emotional and historical dimensions – contains overlapping stories of exile and return. Palestinians built a national memory around dispossession; Israelis built one around return after exile and persecution. Both stories contain truth. Both contain myth. Both contain wounds carried across generations.

To place one beside wider human experience is not necessarily to belittle it. Sometimes it is the opposite. Sometimes it is an attempt to recognise that the Palestinian tragedy was not an aberration committed by monsters from another species, but part of a recurring and deeply human pattern – our alarming capacity to convince ourselves that peace, security or national redemption can be achieved by separating peoples and remaking maps.

The question, then, is not whether comparison itself is suspect. It is whether comparison is being used to illuminate or to dismiss.

The former enlarges understanding. The latter shrinks it.

And perhaps that distinction matters, because if modern history teaches anything, it is that human beings have shown little talent for forgetting and remarkable talent for carrying stories — stories of homes left behind, keys kept in drawers, vanished streets and remembered landscapes — across decades and across oceans.

Borders may eventually settle.

Memory seldom does.

Keys, homelands and the stories we carry within us

We did not weep
when we were leaving –
for we had neither
time nor tears
and there was no farewell.
We did not know
at the moment of parting
that it was a parting
so where would our weeping 
have come from?”
Taha Muhammad Ali

There is perhaps a further answer to the question of whether widening the frame becomes a form of whataboutism, and it lies in something written years earlier in In That Howling Infinite, in an essay on Mahmoud Darwish, Ismail Shammout and the symbolism of al-’awda –  return: Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]. 

That essay did not begin with demographic tables, refugee agencies, diplomatic resolutions or arguments about international law. It began instead with Darwish’s father and son, with a house left behind and a horse kept company in the absence of those who had gone. It entered history through memory rather than politics. The language was intimate and domestic because exile is experienced first not through abstractions but through ordinary things: streets once walked, kitchens once occupied, olive trees, neighbourhoods and names. Long before displacement becomes a political problem, it is a human one.

Darwish understood Palestine not merely as territory but as metaphor: a homeland certainly, but also a language of longing, absence and dispossession. Palestine became not simply a place on a map but a way of expressing exile itself. Around that idea grew al-’awda, the dream of return, symbolised by al-muftah, the key that appears throughout refugee camps, paintings and political iconography. The key became more than metal. It became continuity –  evidence that interrupted lives had not entirely ended. Villages might disappear, maps be redrawn, and landscapes altered beyond recognition, but the key remained as a quiet refusal to surrender memory.

The earlier essay eventually moved into more contested territory, discussing UNRWA, inherited refugee status and the possibility that institutions established to preserve refugee welfare had also preserved expectation itself, transforming temporary exile into a political condition transmitted across generations. Yet the order in which those arguments appeared matters. The essay did not begin by reducing Palestinians to a demographic question or a bureaucratic problem. It first sought to understand what loss meant to those who carried it.

Perhaps that touches upon the larger issue raised here. Comparative history and lived memory often ask different questions and operate at different scales. History asks about patterns, causes and precedents. It seeks connections and broader landscapes, comparing one experience with another to understand how societies and states behave across time. Memory is more particular and less interested in patterns. It concerns itself with the singular experience of those who lost something and who continue to carry the memory of that loss.

The two perspectives are not necessarily opposed, but neither are they interchangeable. Statistics without memory can become sterile and detached. Memory without wider historical context can harden into myth, becoming a self-contained narrative resistant to complication.

This has been a recurring theme across earlier discussions – from Tolkien’s idea of sub-creation and Scruton’s reflections on belonging to Tyrion Lannister’s observation that there is nothing in the world more powerful than a good story. Stories are not merely embellishments laid over identity; they often become identity itself. They explain where people came from, who they are, and where they imagine themselves to be going.

Palestinians built such a story around the Nakba and the hope of return. Jews built one around exile and return as well: Jerusalem remembered across centuries, prayers ending with Next Year in Jerusalem, memory transformed into national aspiration. Both peoples, in different ways, carried keys. Some were literal objects passed through generations; others existed in memory and imagination.

Perhaps this explains why the accusation of whataboutism can feel misplaced in such discussions. Comparison does not necessarily diminish suffering by placing it alongside other suffering. Sometimes it attempts the opposite. Sometimes it seeks to recognise that exile, loss and the desire for return are among the oldest and most enduring of human experiences.

The danger lies not in telling stories but in mistaking stories for complete maps of reality. A key can indeed open a door, but after enough years –  after generations have passed, after landscapes have changed and houses have disappeared – it may become something else entirely. It becomes not a practical instrument but a memory carried in the hand, a reminder that home is not always a physical place waiting patiently at the end of a road. Sometimes it survives most completely in the minds of those still searching for it.

In That Howling Infinite, May 2026

In That Howling Infinite  has recently published a long essay explaining its position with regard to what is probably the most intractable conflict in modern times: One Land, Two Peoples: History, Memory, Continuity, and Inheritance 

See also in In That Howling Infinite, Modern history is built upon exodus and displacement, Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout , We did not weep when we were leaving – the poet of Nazareth 

The featured picture at the head of this blog post is one of Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout’s striking illustrations of Al Nakba, the dispossession of tens of thousands of Palestinian Arabs during Israel’s war of independence, from In That Howling Infinite’s Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]. 

Al Miftah

How the Arab world recast the Nakba

Every May, Nakba Day, with its noisy demonstrations on our streets, brings the same charge against Israel: that the displacement of some 700,000 Palestinians in 1948 was a unique crime in modern history. The reverse is closer to the truth. Almost nothing about the Palestinian exodus was singular. What was singular – and which still disfigures the lives of Palestinians, Israelis and the wider world – is what was done with it ­afterwards.

For two centuries, modern states have been built on the unmixing of peoples. The idea is older than the romantic nationalists who weaponised it. Ferdinand and Isabella expelled the Jews from Spain in 1492, and Philip III the Moriscos a century later, precisely because they could no longer imagine a unified crown ruling a religiously mixed people. France’s revolutionary Jacobins, alarmed at Breton, Provencal and Alsatian, declared linguistic uniformity the price of citizenship; Mazzini and his epigoni said much the same for Italy.

Even that arch-liberal John Stuart Mill argued in 1861 that ­representative institutions could scarcely function in countries divided among “different nationalities” speaking different languages.

Bismarck drew the operational conclusion, expelling tens of thousands of Polish and Jewish “foreigners” from Prussia’s eastern provinces in 1885-86 – a program regarded at the time as enlightened statecraft and applauded throughout the liberal press of central Europe.

The unmixing accelerated as the great land empires – Ottoman, Habsburg, Romanov – gave way to nation-states. The Crimean War alone drove 900,000 Muslims from the Caucasus and Crimea into Ottoman territory; the Balkan Wars and the First World War uprooted two million more.

By 1923, the movements were no longer an incidental consequence of war; they were being designed. The burning of Smyrna in September 1922, which destroyed one of the great cosmopolitan cities of the eastern Mediterranean and drove 200,000 Greeks and Armenians into the harbour while Allied warships looked on, made any continued Greek presence in Anatolia impossible – and the world’s diplomats simply codified the new reality.

The Lausanne Convention of January 1923 compelled roughly 1.3 million Greek Orthodox to leave Anatolia for Greece and 400,000 Muslims to leave Greece for Turkey, stripping each of nationality, their possessions and any right of return. Cretan Muslims who had never seen Anatolia and knew only Greek were shipped to Anatolia; Cappadocian Greeks who knew only Turkish were shipped to Greece.

Set against the Armenian genocide of 1915, the exchange was hailed as humane and progressive, and Athens and Ankara settled into the longest peace they had ever known. Raymond Poincare spoke for the age when he concluded that “the mixture of populations of different races and religions has been the main cause of troubles and of war”.

That lesson governed what came next. In 1944, with Hitler’s empire collapsing, Churchill told the Commons he was “not alarmed by the prospect of the ­disentanglement of populations”. The Potsdam Agreement formalised it, providing for the expulsion of 12 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe.

The 1948 Palestinian exodus, known in Arabic as the Nakba. Picture: via Getty Images

The 1948 Palestinian exodus, known in Arabic as the Nakba. Picture: via Getty Images

The German share of Czechoslovakia’s population fell from 23 per cent to less than 2 within five years, under Benes’ decrees that stripped ethnic Germans of citizenship and property overnight. Equally, Poland’s minorities, 30 per cent of its inter-war population, were reduced to under 5 per cent; in 1947, the Ukrainian remnant was forcibly scattered across the new western territories to prevent any cohesive ethnic block reforming.

Meanwhile, the dismantling of Japan’s empire moved another five million Japanese back from Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin, often after long internment, while Koreans and Chinese were marched in the opposite direction. And in 1947, Partition uprooted between 12 and 20 million people on the subcontinent; Pakistani Punjab’s Hindus and Sikhs went from 20 per cent of the population to 0.2 per cent in four years, amid massacres on the Lahore-Delhi railway that nobody who lived through them ever forgot.

Shortly afterwards it was the turn of the Jewish communities of Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Morocco.

Some 800,000 people, whose ancestors had lived in those lands for two millennia, were evicted, forced to flee or statutorily expelled, losing their nationality and all their assets in the process. Iraq’s Jews, once 40 per cent of Baghdad’s population and producers of the country’s first finance minister, were down to under 1 per cent within five years.

In each case the expectation was the same: the receiving state would absorb its co-religionists or co-ethnics and prevent revanchism. Ataturk’s Turkey did exactly that – any attempts by the Muslims expelled from Greece to organise politically were firmly ­repressed.

So did the Allied occupiers, and then Adenauer’s Federal Republic, banning refugee parties in Germany and shutting down any attempt at creating new ones. Forced to accommodate to their new country, West Germany’s 12 million expellees – many of whom either spoke no German or antique forms of German locals could barely understand – powered the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) and helped ­rebuild Germany’s fabled network of small firms.

Nor were they alone in proving a source of flexibility and innovation. In West Bengal, Hindus expelled from East Bengal transformed the jute industry, making it a pillar of India’s economy. The million-odd North Koreans who fled south during and after the Korean War, Chung Ju-yung of Hyundai prominent among them, supplied the entrepreneurial core of what became the South Korean miracle.

Israel, for its part, absorbed almost the entirety of the displaced Jews of the Arab lands: Operation Ezra and Nehemiah airlifted some 120,000 Iraqi Jews in 1950-51; Operation Magic Carpet flew 49,000 Yemenite Jews to Israel in 1949-50; Operation Moses, in 1984, collected the Beta Israel from the Sudanese desert, every wave transforming the country and yielding generations of military heroes and entrepreneurs.

Palestinian fighters beside a burned-out Israeli Haganah supply truck near Jerusalem in 1948. Picture: via Getty Images

Palestinian fighters beside a Haganah supply truck near Jerusalem in 1948. Picture: Getty Images

The pain was always immense; the absorption, almost everywhere, successful. Almost everywhere. For the Palestinians were the single, decisive exception.

In 1948, the Arab states had launched a war the Arab League’s Secretary-General announced would be “a war of extermination and a memorable massacre comparable to the Mongol massacres and the Crusades”, urged on by the rector of Cairo’s Al-Azhar Mosque, who told Muslims resident in Mandatory Palestine to “leave the territory temporarily so that our warriors can freely undertake their task of extermination”.

But unlike every other immediate historical precedent, the Arab states, having lost the war, refused to absorb the refugees their own actions had created. King Abdullah I of Jordan, who alone among Arab leaders had been prepared to come to terms with Israel and absorb the Palestinians, was assassinated at al-Aqsa in 1951 – a warning that subsequent Arab rulers heeded, until Anwar Sadat repeated the gesture in 1981 and met the same fate.

Predictably, the UN played a major role in the tragedy. Of the roughly 50 million people displaced by the Second World War and its aftermath, only two groups – Koreans and Palestinians – were given country-specific UN refugee agencies, and both were meant to be temporary. The UN Korean Reconstruction Agency wound up in 1958. UNRWA’s own founding report warned that “sustained relief operations inevitably contain the germ of human deterioration” and committed to speedily shut down.

Seven decades later, UNRWA still exists. It employs roughly 31,000 staff to serve almost six ­million registered “refugees”, the overwhelming majority of whom were born decades after 1948 and have never set foot in Mandatory Palestine. A fifth-generation Gazan whose ancestors left Jaffa remains classified as a refugee in a way that would be inconceivable anywhere else on earth.

The result was not merely administrative absurdity but political radicalisation. From the Cairo Agreement of 1969 onwards, the Palestinian camps in Lebanon became autonomous political and military zones. There and elsewhere, UNRWA facilities rapidly evolved into an integral part of the terrorist infrastructure.

Refugeehood ceased to be a temporary humanitarian condition and became an institutionalised political identity organised around the goal of destroying Israel, in an illusion that has instead destroyed generation after generation of Palestinians.

The Nakba charade

Those, in short, are the historical realities. But they do nothing to prevent the annual Nakba charade from insisting that Israel committed a uniquely monstrous act of “ethnic cleansing” in 1948.

Well, if ethnic homogenisation was truly the goal, Israel pursued it with startling incompetence. Arab citizens of Israel today are roughly a fifth of the population, a share slightly larger than at independence. And far from being “ethnically cleansed”, Israel is by far the most plural state in its region with its population Jewish (Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, Ethiopian, Russian), Arab Muslim, Christian, Druze, Circassian and Baha’i.

Compare that with northern Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots went from 82 per cent of the population in 1973 to zero within two years of the Turkish invasion.

Erdogan nevertheless stands among the loudest voices accusing Israel of practising precisely what Turkey has long excelled at – the expulsion and displacement of unwanted peoples, most recently the Kurds of northern Syria. Nor is Turkey alone. Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemeni workers in 1990 in retaliation for Sana’a’s tilt towards Saddam Hussein, while Kuwait expelled every single one of its 400,000 Palestinians in 1991 for the same offence.

These were not isolated episodes of political vengeance or wartime coercion. They formed part of a much broader regional trajectory: the ongoing, largely forced displacement and disappearance of the Muslim Middle East’s non-Muslim and minority populations.

Albert Hourani’s Minorities in the Arab World (1947) brilliantly mapped a region whose Christians, Jews, Yazidis, Druze, Alawites and countless smaller communities sustained a dense and intricate civic fabric. It was, unfortunately, a world on the cusp of extinction.

Today, the Christian share of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon combined – around 11 per cent in 1945 – has fallen to 3 per cent, and the decline is accelerating. Syria’s Christians have declined from 9.7 per cent of its population in 1970 to under 2 per cent today; Iraq’s, once above 6 per cent, are well under 1 per cent; Egypt’s Copts continue their long erosion, from 8 per cent to no more than 3 per cent. Lebanon’s Christians, who made up over half of the population in 1970, are now below a third.

Nor is it a question of Christians alone. The Zoroastrians, whose religion once shaped an empire from the Indus to the Nile, have vanished from the Arab Middle East.

The Yazidis were enslaved and slaughtered in their thousands at Sinjar by Islamic State in 2014, in what was unquestionably a genocide. The Man­daeans of southern Iraq, who numbered 60,000 a generation ago, are now a remnant of perhaps 4,000. Almost everywhere, the Baha’is and Ahmadis have fled.

Stark contrast

As for the Jews, they are entirely gone, a population of close to a million across the Arab world reduced to a few thousand, almost all elderly; Egypt’s once 80,000-strong community now numbers in the low hundreds, and Yemen’s 50,000-strong Jewry, planted there in antiquity, was essentially lifted out by Operation Magic Carpet, with the Houthi takeover erasing the few that remained.

The trend is unmistakeable, the contrast stark. While the West accommodates ever more Muslims, the Arab world accommodates ever fewer non-Muslims. Its activists and their Western fellow travellers demand multiculturalism elsewhere; they ruthlessly deny it at home. They denounce Israel; but they are the ones engaged in the systematic destruction of ethnic and religious variety.

That is the historical fact the Nakba charade cannot accommodate. The 20th century normalised population transfer on a colossal scale, and the suffering it caused was sustained, widespread and ­immense.

But no international movement emerged demanding the restoration of Breslau to Germany, the ethnic reconstitution of the Sudetenland, a right of return for the Jews thrown out of the Arab lands, or hereditary refugee status for the descendants of the enormous population movements that swept across what had been British India. The displaced were expected to rebuild their lives where they arrived. However ­brutal the process, however bitter the pain, the governing assumption was clear: refugeehood was to disappear, not reproduce itself across generations.

The Palestinians alone were taught a different lesson – and that is the true Palestinian uniqueness. They were told not to end refugeehood but to preserve and reify it; not to build a future where they were, but to await the destruction of the state beside them; not to reconcile themselves to history, but to believe that history itself could be reversed.

For 75 years, generation after generation has been raised on that promise. It has brought not return but ruin, not recovery but repeated catastrophe. And as Gaza now demonstrates once again, it is the Palestinians themselves who pay the highest price for the post-war world’s longest and costliest political fraud.

An Australian Jew’s submission to the Royal Commission

The Royal Commission into Antisemitism was convened in the shadow of the Bondi Beach massacre of December 2025, when fifteen people were murdered at a Hanukkah gathering in what has been described as the deadliest antisemitic attack in Australian history. It was, on any reading, a rupture –  not only because of its scale, but because it forced into the open a question that had been building, uneasily, for more than two years: how a country that prides itself on pluralism and civic ease had arrived at a moment where Jews could be targeted so explicitly, and so lethally, in public space.

That question does not begin at Bondi. Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, Australia has seen a sustained wave of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist protest – much of it framed in the language of human rights, some of it more strident, even incendiary. Alongside this mobilisation has come a marked rise in antisemitic incidents: abusive chants at early demonstrations, harassment of visibly Jewish individuals, vandalism of synagogues and community institutions, graffiti, threats, social and professional exclusion, and a steady current of online vilification. Some of these episodes have been highly visible; many more have been ambient, cumulative, and privately absorbed. For the Jewish community, the sense has not been of isolated but of a gathering atmosphere – a shift in what can be said, and done, about Jews in public without consequence.

It is into this unsettled landscape that the Commission steps. Its task is not only to examine the failures that allowed Bondi to occur, but to consider whether that attack can be understood in isolation at all – or whether it belongs to a broader pattern of escalating hostility, contested language, and fraying social norms. In that sense, it is as much an inquiry into civic culture as it is into security.

Andrew Wirth’s submission is written with precisely that broader frame in mind. He contributes not as a representative of any organisation, but as a Jewish Australian – the child of Holocaust survivors, a member of a contemporary community that now finds itself, again, thinking seriously about questions of safety and belonging. His purpose is not to collapse legitimate criticism of Israel into antisemitism, nor to deny the moral force of Palestinian advocacy. Rather, it is to interrogate the relationship between the forms that advocacy has taken in Australia since October 2023 and the lived experience of many Jews during that same period.

He is, in effect, asking the Commission to look not only at events but at environment. To consider whether the prevailing ways of understanding harm – episodic, attributable, legally discrete — are adequate to a phenomenon that may instead be cumulative, ambiguous, and socially mediated. And to ask, quietly but insistently, whether Bondi was an isolated act of hatred, or the most violent expression of a climate that had already, for some time, been forming in plain sight.

The complete submission is republished in full below. As it is very lengthy, In That Howling Infinite has used AI to provide a comprehensive summary.

Much of the testimony before the Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion dealt not with abstract politics, but with the way the Israel-Palestine conflict has spilled into everyday Australian life: schools, workplaces, music venues, synagogues and online spaces. Among the most striking evidence was that of singer and author Deborah Conway, who described cancelled performances, organised protest campaigns, doxing, online abuse and threats directed at her for publicly identifying as both Jewish and Zionist. Whatever one’s views on Israel or Gaza, her testimony underscored the increasingly blurred line between political activism, social intimidation and hostility directed at Jews as Jews – a tension that sat at the heart of the inquiry’s hearings. Conroy’ testimony and that of others is also republished below.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

Long story short …

Wirth’s submission is, at heart, an attempt to change the lens through which the Commission looks – away from the forensic habit of isolating moments (a chant, a placard, a lone actor, a single atrocity) and toward something more diffuse and disquieting: the social atmosphere in which those moments become possible. He writes as a Jewish Australian, and as the son of survivors, but resists the pull of memoir. The authority he claims is not moral witness so much as analytic patience – an effort to describe how a climate forms, thickens, and, eventually, breaks.

His central contention is that the harms experienced by Jewish Australians since October 2023 are systemic and cumulative. Bondi – horrific, unprecedented – is not treated as an aberration but as a point of condensation, where a long-gathering set of pressures became visible in a single, devastating act. To understand that act, he argues, one must look not for a clean causal chain (this slogan → this shooter → this event), but for patterns of probability: the way repeated exposure to certain forms of rhetoric, symbolism, and social signalling can lower inhibitions, sharpen antagonisms, and render violence imaginable to those already inclined toward it. The analogy he reaches for is telling: not criminal law, but climate science. You cannot attribute a single storm to climate change with precision; you can, however, describe the conditions that make storms more frequent, more intense, more likely.

From this premise, the essay unfolds in widening circles.

He first dismantles the idea of a singular “pro-Palestinian movement.” What exists instead, he suggests, is an ecosystem: formal advocacy bodies fluent in the language of human rights; looser activist formations oriented toward protest and disruption; and a penumbra of fellow travellers – ideological extremists, vandals, conspiracists — who share space, slogans, and emotional energy if not formal affiliation. These elements are not centrally controlled, nor are they uniformly motivated. That, in a sense, is the point. The diversity allows for elasticity: respectable actors can maintain a principled public face while disclaiming the excesses of the wider milieu (“a few bad actors,” “not representative”), even as those excesses contribute to the overall tone and impact of the movement. Plausible deniability is not a bug but a feature.

Language is the next terrain. Wirth is careful not to claim that particular phrases are intrinsically violent in a narrow, lexical sense. Instead, he insists that meaning is contextual, historical, and relational. Words arrive carrying baggage. “Intifada,” whatever its literal translation, is heard by many Jews through the memory of suicide bombings and mass-casualty attacks; “from the river to the sea,” however it is intended, resonates with anxieties about elimination; “Zionists are…” constructions collapse a vast and internally diverse population into a single moral category, often freighted with the most toxic imagery available. The key point is not that every speaker intends harm, but that in a crowded, emotionally charged public sphere, ambiguity is not neutral. It creates room for multiple readings, including the most hostile ones, and allows those who wish to intimidate to do so under cover of contestability. The same words can be defended as benign and experienced as threatening – and both facts can be true at once.

Central to this slippage is the term “Zionist.” In activist discourse it operates as a floating signifier: sometimes a political descriptor, sometimes a moral indictment, sometimes a proxy for a people. Wirth’s claim – backed by survey data — is that the overwhelming majority of Australian Jews feel some connection to Israel and many are comfortable with the label “Zionist” in a broad, cultural or existential sense. To target “Zionists,” then, is in practice to target Jews as they understand themselves, even if the formal claim is otherwise. The distinction between Jew and Zionist, while logically defensible, does little work sociologically. Indeed, he suggests, the insistence on that distinction can become a way of telling Jews what they are allowed to be – a curious inversion in a discourse otherwise attentive to self-identification.

The essay then turns to causation – or rather, to the limits of conventional thinking about it. The familiar retort to concerns about protest rhetoric is that no direct link can be proven between speech and a specific act of violence. Wirth concedes the point and then sidesteps it. In complex systems, he argues, causation is rarely linear or attributable. The relevant question is not “did this slogan cause this attack?” but “does a given communicative environment increase or decrease the likelihood of such attacks occurring?” Here he draws on the literature around “stochastic violence”: the idea that repeated, dehumanising or inflammatory messaging can, over time, prime a small subset of individuals to act, even in the absence of explicit incitement. Responsibility is diffuse; effects are real. It is an uncomfortable model for legal systems built on individual intent, but a familiar one in other domains of risk.

If this is the mechanism, the effects are not confined to headline events. A large portion of the submission is devoted to what might be called the low-grade, high-frequency harms: insults, exclusion, intimidation, the steady drip of being cast as suspect or illegitimate. Synagogues require guards; schools adjust routines; people speak more cautiously, or not at all. There is a contraction of presence — a subtle withdrawal from the public square. Wirth is at pains to stress that for every reported incident there are many more that never reach formal channels but accumulate in private memory, at dinner tables, in the small recalibrations of daily life. This is where his argument edges closest to the experiential without relinquishing its analytic frame: harm as something lived continuously rather than episodically.

Against this backdrop, he is sharply critical of two patterns in the public response. The first is the tendency, among some pro-Palestinian advocates, to dismiss Jewish concerns as bad faith – “weaponisation,” an attempt to silence criticism of Israel, a manoeuvre in a political contest. This, he suggests, substitutes motive-hunting for engagement with the substance of the claims. The second is the reliance on generalised anti-racism frameworks as a sufficient policy response. Such frameworks, he argues, are necessary but not sufficient, because antisemitism does not map neatly onto the paradigms those frameworks were designed to address. Jews are often perceived simultaneously as powerful and vulnerable, insiders and outsiders – a dual coding that allows hostility to evade categories built primarily around visible disadvantage. Subsumed into the general, antisemitism risks disappearing.

He extends this scepticism to legal doctrine. Courts, tasked with balancing free expression against harm, tend to look for discrete, demonstrable injuries traceable to particular acts. But if the harm is cumulative, ambient, and probabilistic, that evidentiary demand becomes almost impossible to meet. The result is a persistent gap between lived experience and legal recognition – a sense, on the part of those affected, that the system cannot quite “see” what is happening. This is not, in his telling, an argument against free speech so much as a claim that the existing conceptual toolkit is ill-suited to a new class of problem.

The question of representation threads through the latter part of the submission. Wirth does not contest the right of anti-Zionist Jewish groups to participate in the debate, but he cautions against treating them as broadly representative. Their prominence, he suggests, owes less to their numbers than to their utility: they provide a form of internal validation for those who wish to deny any connection between anti-Zionist activism and antisemitic harm. The risk, for the Commission, is that such voices — legitimate but minority – might be weighted in a way that obscures the concerns of the larger community.

All of this leads to a set of recommendations that are, in tone, more calibrative than punitive. He does not call for the suppression of protest or the prohibition of criticism of Israel. Instead, he argues for clearer moral boundaries around language and conduct; for accountability within advocacy movements for what they tolerate as well as what they endorse; for policy approaches that acknowledge systemic harm; and, crucially, for investment in education – a rebuilding of the shared understandings that make any legal framework meaningful. Law, in his formulation, can draw lines; it cannot, by itself, restore the sensibility that gives those lines legitimacy.

Running beneath the analysis is a quieter, more disquieting claim: that the deepest failure of the past two years has been one of recognition. Not simply a failure to prevent specific acts, but a failure of institutions — governmental, cultural, civic – to articulate, early and clearly, that Jews are a vulnerable minority entitled to the same reflex of solidarity extended to others. Silence, in this reading, is not neutral. It is read, by all parties, as permission.

The essay closes, as it began, with Bondi –  not as origin but as revelation. A society that prides itself on its egalitarian reflexes is asked to consider whether, in this instance, those reflexes faltered; whether a movement framed in the language of rights allowed, in some of its forms, the targeting of a minority at home; and whether the balance between free expression and communal belonging has been misjudged. The question Wirth leaves hanging is not whether protest should be free – it must be – but whether it can remain so without eroding the conditions that make a plural civic life possible.

Author’s Note…

This opinion piece is one of several on the attitudes of progressives towards the Israel, Palestine and the Gaza war.

The first is Moral capture, conditional empathy and the failure of shock, a discussion on why erstwhile liberal, humanistic, progressive people from all walks of life have been caught up in what can be without subtly described as that anti-Israel machinery. Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty– regarding the Gaza war, intellectual dishonesty is everywhere, on both sides of the divide, magnified by mainstream and social media’s hunger for moral simplicity and viral outrage. Standing on the high moral ground is hard work! discusses the issues of free speech and “cancellation”, and boycotts with regard to the recent self-implosion of the Adelaide Writers’ Festival, one of the country’s oldest and most revered.

As governments federal and state weigh the prohibition of potentially inflammatory phrases, we also consider syntax and semantics. Lawyers parse syllables and activists insist that what is heard is not what is meant, and what is meant is not what is said. The words hover, untethered from consequence, yet curiously heavy with it. If words can be made infinitely flexible, then meaning itself becomes negotiable; and if meaning is negotiable, then so too are responsibility and harm. See: Same old stone, different rock. What’s in a word? and What’s in a word? A world of meaning and of pain 

There are moments when public argument stops being a search for truth and becomes a test of belonging. Facts are no longer weighed so much as auditioned; empathy is rationed; moral language hardens into a badge system, issued and revoked according to rules everyone seems to know but few are willing to articulate. One learns quickly where the trip-wires are, which sympathies are permitted, which questions are suspect, and how easily tone can outweigh substance.

What interests me here is not the quarrel itself – names, borders, histories—but the habits of mind it exposes. The ease with which conviction can slide into choreography. The way intellectual honesty is praised in the abstract and punished in practice. The curious transformation of empathy from a human reflex into a conditional licence, granted only after the correct declarations have been made.

Across these pieces I circle the same uneasy terrain: the shaping of facts to fit feelings; the capture of moral language by ideological gravity; the performance of righteousness as both shield and weapon. Cultural spaces that once prided themselves on curiosity begin to resemble courts, where innocence and guilt are presumed in advance and the labour lies not in thinking, but in signalling.

This is not an argument against passion, nor a plea for bloodless neutrality. It is, rather, a meditation on how quickly moral seriousness curdles into moral certainty – and how much intellectual work is required to stand on what we like to call the high ground without mistaking altitude for clarity.

The position of In That Howling Infinite with regard to Palestine, Israel and the Gaza war is neither declarative nor devotional; it is diagnostic. Inclined – by background, sensibility, and experience – to hold multiple truths in tension, to see, as the song has it, the whole of the moon. It is less interested in arriving at purity than in resisting moral monoculture and the consolations of certainty. That disposition does not claim wisdom; it claims only a refusal to outsource judgment or to accept unanimity as a proxy for truth.

On Zionism, it treats it not as a slogan but as a historical fact with moral weight: the assertion – hard-won, contingent, imperfect – that Jews are entitled to collective political existence on the same terms as other peoples. According to this definition, this blog is Zionist. It is not interested in laundering Israeli policy, still less in romanticising state power, but rejects the sleight of hand by which Israel’s existence is transformed from a political reality into a metaphysical crime. Zionism is not sacred, but its delegitimisation is revealing – because it demands from Jews what is demanded of no other nation: justification for being.

On anti-Zionism, it has been unsparing. It sees it not as “criticism of Israel” (which you regard as both legitimate and necessary) but as a categorical refusal to accept Jewish collective self-determination. What troubles it most is not its anger but its certainty: its moral absolutism, its indifference to history, its willingness to borrow the language of justice to license erasure. It is attentive to how anti-Zionism recycles older antisemitic patterns – collectivisation of guilt, inversion of victimhood, and the portrayal of Jews as uniquely malignant actors – while insisting, with studied innocence, that none of this concerns Jews at all. If not outright antisemitism, the line separating it from anti-Zionism is wafer—thin, and too often crosses over.

Running through all of this is a consistent stance: a resistance to moral theatre, an impatience with historical amnesia, and a belief that intellectual honesty requires limits – on language, on fantasy, and on the indulgent belief that one’s own righteousness exempts one from consequence. And a lifelong hatred of antisemitism. The new antisemitism looks a lot like the old hatred!

We are not asking culture to choose sides; we are asking it to recover judgment

See in In That Howling Infinite, A Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany. and also: This Is What It Looks Like, “You want it darker?” … Gaza and the devil that never went away … , How the jihadi tail wags the leftist dog, The Shoah and America’s Shame – Ken Burns’ sorrowful masterpiece, and Little Sir Hugh – Old England’s Jewish Question

A Royal Commission into Antisemitism: One Australian’s Submission

Aftermath of Bondi Beach massacre, Sydney 2025 (Image available under the Creative Commons)

Australia is in the midst of a major enquiry into antisemitism- a Royal Commission- following the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach. The community has been invited to make submissions. Below, I share mine. It is analytical rather than personal and represents my attempt to understand the links between anti-Zionist protest and harms to the Jewish community.

Who I am

I write as an Australian Jew.

I am writing entirely in my personal capacity and do not represent any Jewish communal, political or Zionist organisation. I am an engaged member of the Jewish community and regularly attend a local “egalitarian orthodox” synagogue.

I am a child of holocaust survivors. My father survived Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen concentration camps and death marches; my mother was hidden in a convent for the latter part of the second World War. All four of my grandparents were murdered in Auschwitz.

I strongly support the right of Australians to advocate for the welfare, human rights and self-determination of both Jewish and Palestinian communities. I have been involved in inter-communal dialogue both in Melbourne and in Israel-Palestine and am commited to a just outcome in Israel and Palestine.

I am a medical specialist in the public hospital system and an associate professor at at Melbourne University.

Aims of this submission

I am writing primarily to reflect on, and critically evaluate, common claims made in reference to the relationship between pro-Palestinian advocacy and harms affecting the Australian Jewish community.

My primary contentions are that:

  1. The adverse impacts of the protest movement need to be understood as a systemic and cumulative phenomenon- this includes chronic low level psychological harm, social exclusion and the generation of an atmosphere associated with a heightened risk of sporadic violence
  2. The heterogeneity of participants and their motivations, the ill-defined targets (Israel, Zionists or Jews), and the ambiguity of protest language and symbols, together make attribution of harm and intent difficult. This ambiguity and heterogeneity allow a protest environment that tacitly fosters exclusionary, vilifying and even violent behaviour while allowing protest spokespeople plausible deniability.
  3. Consequently, the courts and relevant legislation, which assess the protest movement on a “slogan by slogan” or “event by event” basis -that is, through the lens of individual cases – cannot adequately “see” the broad environment as experienced by the Jewish community. It is a case of forest and trees.

Background

The attack on December 14, 2025, was the worst act of antisemitic violence ever committed on Australian soil. Fifteen people were murdered at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach.

Some have drawn a straight line between the Bondi massacre and anti-Zionist incitement, particularly focusing on the slogan “Globalise the Intifada”. Anti-Zionist advocates, in contrast, attribute blame to the shooters’ ISIS connection and the influence of radical Sydney clerics, insisting that the Bondi shootings have nothing to do with peaceful anti-Zionist activism.

Yet this murder was, in the perpetrators own words, intended to condemn “the acts of ‘Zionists”. It seems implausible that this targeting of Zionists was entirely unrelated to two years of inflammatory anti-Zionist rhetoric or that hate speech played no role in pushing perpetrators, primed by fundamentalist influencers, to cross some threshold to action.

Most Jewish Australians view Bondi against a backdrop of over two years of escalating incitement and a hardening anti-Jewish atmosphere. The Opera House protest in October 2023 marked a turning point. Reported chants, including “Where are the Jews?” and “F*** the Jews”, suggested a real shift in what could be said about Jews in public, seemingly without consequence.

Since then, high-profile incidents, such as arson attacks on synagogues, have attracted significant media attention.  Less visible are cumulative, psychologically harmful effects of effects of chronic “low level” stigmatisation.

Many find it hard to avoid the conclusion that this environment may have lowered the threshold for violence. A long-standing vulnerability has been brought into sharper focus, prompting calls for a precautionary response, including greater restraint in protest language.

The Bondi tragedy has produced grief, fear and anger within the Jewish community, alongside shock and sympathy across the wider Australian society. The subsequent critical national conversation has led to the present Royal Commission. Could we, as a nation, have done more to counter antisemitism and ensure Jewish safety? Why did our security services fail?  Was anti-Zionist activism a contributing factor for Bondi?

If so, do we need constraints on forms of protest? Should constraints be established through legislation or, at a deeper level, through education and cultural change?

Debate over public discourse and anti-Jewish incidents

Palestinian advocacy organisations have condemned the violence at Bondi and expressed sympathy for the victims. However, Jewish expressions of fear or calls for reassurance and safety have typically been dismissed as “weaponising antisemitism”, silencing debate or even “defending genocide”.

Anti-Israel groups like US Jewish Voice for Peace and the Australian Palestine Advocacy Network insist their activism is guided by justice and human rights and rejects racism or violence. Those claims are in their mission statements. Jewish anti-Zionist commentators and groups have denied any possible relationship between the language of protest and the attack.  “Zero evidence”, according to one commentator.

Consequently, they have criticised Jewish calls for safety and protections, and government proposals to restrict aspects of protest, as overreach or an attack on free speech rather than an attempt to provide community safety.

This insistence that no restrictions be placed on the language and forms of protests is accompanied by several claims that warrant critical evaluation:

  1. That the pro-Palestinian movement is peaceful and simply protesting injustice (including alleged genocide)
  2. That the language of protest, including terms such as “Globalise the intifada” is inherently non-violent;
  3. That public protest is directed against Israel and Zionists and not against Jews;
  4. That consequently activist speech cannot be linked with violence, or harms more broadly, affecting Jews
  5. That the imputation of violent connotations is simply an attempt to stifle free speech.

How might we reconcile this Jewish experience of harm with claims by Palestinian advocacy groups that the movement is non-violent and explicitly rejects antisemitism?

Below, I address a number of key questions and issues in turn.

1.The pro-Palestinian movement is a complex ecosystem and not accurately characterised as entirely peaceful

Palestinian advocacy groups stress that their activism is grounded in human rights. They claim that violence against Jews cannot be attributed to a movement that explicitly rejects antisemitism or the use of violence. This is a superficially reassuring but incomplete framing. It fails to acknowledge the range of actors (and agendas) within the pro-Palestinian advocacy community and beyond it, not all of whom necessarily share these peaceful ideals.

This heterogeneity is even reflected in the several labels used to describe the movement: pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist. While they may be used interchangeably, they represent very different agendas and targets: supporting the rights of a people, opposing the policies of a state and opposing, and often vilifying, those who can be linked with that state- that is, Jews.

A 2014 study of over 20 Palestinian civil society groups by the General Delegation Of Palestine in Australia captures the heterogeneity of the groups – likely a fraction of the number of groups active in 2026.

The study notes that Palestinian organizations “often have multiple desired outcomes and target audiences and undertake different kinds of activities.” The study explicitly distinguishes “advocacy groups” and “activist groups”. The former are the public facing, suit and tie wearing (my words) groups, that speak the language of human rights and engage in, to quote the study, “persuasion, lobbying and negotiation”.

“Activist groups”, in contrast, are described as “denunciative” engaging in “protest, street demonstrations, strike actions, public meetings” and whose desired outcomes are “diffuse and not necessarily … within defined policy and political parameters”. They “articulate messages in different forums, to different audiences” with different “tone, tenor, and language of the message”… “in language that resonates with their niche constituencies.” Of course we are now also increasingly aware of Islamist (and) influences in Australia which we now know to have been connected to the Bondi massacre.

Beyond explicitly Palestinian groups lies a wider ecosystem. It includes direct-action networks, unaffiliated vandals, right-wing extremists, Islamic fundamentalist groups and “old school antisemites”. They often mobilise around the same events, language and grievances or share physical and online spaces with non-violent advocacy groups. Their presence may shape how protests are experienced by those on the receiving end.

Speaking at the Lowy Institute lecture ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess observed that activist groups are often not “centrally controlled” or “uniformly motivated,” and may include “individuals who are increasingly willing to embrace or threaten violence to achieve their goals.”

This heterogeneity within the activist community allows for plausible deniability when violent or threatening behaviour is observed For example, after chants of “F-ck the Jews” and “where’s the jews” were reported at the Opera house protest, Fahad Ali of the Palestinian Action Groups dismissed this as reflecting a “small group of troublemakers” The same disavowal was made regarding a pro-Palestinian bikie group. This allows spokespeople to claim entirely benign aims while wider affiliates of movement take a more aggressive approach to members of the Jewish community.

To put it simply: claims that the Palestinian advocacy community is entirely peaceful is a very incomplete description of reality.

2.The language and forms of protest are not unambiguously peaceful, but rather contain phrases and symbols with the potential to be interpreted as violent by elements in the protest movement and broader society

The language and symbolism of protest span a wide range. Some slogans are political and entirely unobjectionable: “Stop the war,” “Free Palestine”.

Then there are the explicitly or implicitly violent slogans and symbols that often accompany protest. They include phrases such as “where’s the Jews”, “f*** the jews” “death to IDF” and  “by any means necessary” as well as symbols (terrorist flags, pictures of the Ayatollah, the Jewish Star of David in rubbish bins)  Symbols of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran can be understood as implying support for their violent and eliminationist goals (described here, here, here, here, here). This celebration of violence was evident immediately after the Hamas massacre at the Opera House protest and the Lakemba celebration (and indeed there was further language of celebration and an anniversary event at Lakemba a year later.)

Slogans such as “Zionists are baby killers” and “all Zionists are terrorists” are clearly intended to, or can reasonably be expected to, incite hatred towards those who support Israel’s existence or are affiliated with Israel, regardless of their views on the conduct of the war.

In between are phrases whose meaning is contested, such as “from the river to the sea” and “globalise the intifada.” Many have expressed concern that such phrases are coded calls for violence or for the elimination of the Jewish state. Palestinian advocates have emphasised the innocent meaning of “river to the sea” and “Intifada” (here, here, here) and some go so far as to argue that attributing violent intent to such slogans is Islamophobic.

It is frequently explained, for example, that “intifada” simply means “shaking off” political oppression and is not inherently violent. But language does not operate through dictionary definitions alone. For many Jews, the word “intifada” evokes, and is inseparable from the Second Intifada — a sustained campaign of terrorism that killed more than 1,000 Israelis. That history inevitably shapes how the term is heard. As Susan Benesch of the Dangerous Speech Project explains, the experience of speech as “inflammatory” depends on the speaker, the audience, the medium and the context.

“Globalise the intifada” may carry one meaning in an academic lecture and quite another in a mass street march. Its impact can shift with the size, tone and location of a protest; with accompanying slogans (“death to the IDF,” “by any means necessary”); and with symbols associated with Hamas or Hezbollah. Such language may land very differently in demonstrations held immediately after the Hamas attacks of 2023 or in the wake of the Bondi terror attack. It will be experienced differently in the public square and outside a synagogue.

The activist community is not an army of philologists. Whatever the linguistic origins of “intifada”, its meaning is contested and may be interpreted differently by different groups. As the Palestinian led report mentioned above states, in some circumstances “…human rights and international law arguments can lose their meaning in inflammatory and, at times, ideological criticisms.”

It is that very ambiguity that allows those who do seek to intimidate (or even provoke violence) to use it with plausible deniability. As Susan Benesch states “One cannot make a list of words that are dangerous, since the way in which any message will be understood – like its effect on an audience – depends not only on its content but on how it is communicated…. The very same words can be highly inflammatory, or benign.”

3.The use of the term Zionist as the target of protest implicates most Jews despite claims by protesters that they are not antisemitic and do not target Jews

Activists claim to target Zionists and not Jews.

The problem is that the vast majority of Australian Jews are Zionists- if you target Zionists you are generally targeting Jews.

A 2023 Australian survey reported 80-90% of respondents indicated personal connectedness with and concern for Israel and 77% identified as Zionist. Most Australian Jews have cultural, religious or historical connections to Israel and support for the security and safety of its citizens, including for many Jews, close family. Some use the label Zionist to describe this connection. It is often an element of cultural identity and for Australia’s substantial post-Holocaust community, it carries connotations of “refuge”. For many Jews, this sense of connection does not imply endorsement of specific Israeli policies or leadership.

Anti-Zionists are well aware of this deep connection between Jews, Israel and Zionism, yet work hard to maintain the fiction that their activism does not target Jews.

They do it by presuming to tell Jews about their identity. (Something that would be considered offensive if directed at other groups. Jews are told that they are a disembodied “faith group” with no sense of peoplehood or organic connection to Israel. Palestinian advocates showcase the tiny minority of antizionist Jews who agree with them. Anti-Zionists insist that Zionism and Judaism are distinct noting that  “Not all Jews are Zionist” or “being Jewish is not identical to being Zionist”. This distinction is technically correct but doesn’t negate the connection of the vast majority of Jews with Israel.

Indeed, the identification of Zionists and Jews in the mental landscape of some activists is evoked by the use of classic antisemitic tropes in antizionist discourse. They speak of  “…the Jewish Lobby and the Zionist Lobby infiltrating” with their “Tentacles”, of powerful elites(including Jewish Law firms) and conspiracist notions  “We already know that Zionists are parasitic upon progressive spaces. It is under the guise of progressivism that Zionists launder their genocidal colonialism, while weaponising their influence to amplify occupation propaganda and steer cultural narratives away from Palestinian liberation.”

Thus, though the protest movement insists its focus is Israel and its policies, the use of the term Zionist does much unrecognised work in redirecting hostility from Israel to Jews. This reflects the multiple and conflicting resonances of the term Zionist in protest culture. In protest messaging, the term “Zionist” is a placeholder for a catalogue of evils: colonialism, racism, apartheid and genocide. It can be loaded with the most inflammatory rhetoric: Zionists as “child killers,” “Nazis” or “genociders.” It functions loosely as a political descriptor, a moral accusation and a marker of identity.

These dual resonances – Zionist as object of hate and Zionist as Jew – ripple through disparate communities, tacitly “criminalising” even the most benign connection with Israel and indirectly reinforcing antipathy towards Jews, without ever explicitly naming them. When “Zionist” functions simultaneously as a term of vilification and as a label many Jews apply to themselves, political critique almost inevitably slides into group-based hostility. The effect is to generate antipathy toward Jews without ever explicitly naming them.

It is not surprising that in some community sectors, a simple public expression of concern for the safety of Jews in Israel may be enough to evoke all the hostility now reflexly associated with the term Zionist. This leaves many Jews uncertain how to speak publicly at all.

Many Australians who support Palestinian rights in good faith may not recognise how protest language may facilitate this “slippage” of anger from Israel to Zionists, to Jews.  This slippage blurs the boundary between political critique and hostility toward the Jewish community.

A distressing incident in 2025 illustrates how boundaries between antisemitism and the language of anti-Zionist protest can blur. Year-5 Jewish students on an excursion were reportedly subjected to a barrage of insults from older students from another school including: “dirty Jews”, “baby killers”, and “Free Hezbollah”.

It is tragic that the Bondi attackers, allegedly motivated by opposition to “Zionists”, murdered Jews.

4.The reflex denial of any possible links between protest and violence is based on simplistic and outmoded understandings of causality in complex social systems

In response to Jewish community concerns about protest language and community safety, it is common to hear the reply that the relationship between speech and a specific terrorist act cannot be “proven”. This is technically true, but misleading. In complex systems, causation is a statistical concept.

It is widely accepted in the broader community that certain harms operate probabilistically: for example the relationship between climate change and extreme weather events is well recognised even though one cannot prove causation for an individual bush-fire or storm event. The same applies to the relationship between smoking and individual cases of lung cancer.

Similarly, there is a substantial literature supporting the view that the risk of harm from hate-speech is also probabilistic and operates at a population level.  This is true, even though we cannot attribute a given event (such as Bondi) to a specific persons, actions, slogan or protest event.

This phenomenon has been described as “stochastic terrorism” or “stochastic violence”. This has been defined as “…the use of mass communications to stir up … lone wolves to carry out violent or terrorist acts that are … individually unpredictable”. This literature recognises that violent acts are likely related to the emotional and cognitive effects of activism in the media and on the street. Psychological and linguistic studies and a recent major metanalysis of 55 studies on the impact of media messaging all describe similar mechanisms. This literature describes how rhetoric circulates within communities and can lower the threshold for violence in primed individuals. In these systems no one need explicitly call for violence, and no one is individually responsible. Risk arises through cumulative effects rather than direct incitement.

Susan Benesch of the Dangerous Speech Project describes dangerous speech as “Any form of expression (e.g. speech, text, or images) that can increase the risk that its audience will condone or commit violence against members of another group.” She further notes that “Hate speech … uses derogatory group slurs, metaphoric language, exaggeration, images, and symbols. … Its public expression ….allows like-minded individuals to find an echo chamber for their shared beliefs. And it has real and painful consequences for victims.”

Mike Burgess, speaking a month prior to the Bondi massacre, said that “Since October 2023, we’ve seen more provocative protests and a notable uptick in intentionally disruptive and damaging tactics by anti-Israel activists, including multiple acts of arson, vandalism and violent protest…” and “The conflict in the Middle East …. prompted protest, exacerbated tension, undermined social cohesion and elevated intolerance (making)  acts of politically motivated violence more likely. …. Inflammatory rhetoric and provocative, disruptive actions had been normalised, and the normalisation of violence and hatred against one community had created a permissive environment for similar behaviours in other communities.”

This is not an argument about direct causation or “collective blame”, but the debate over language and anti-Jewish violence requires the recognition of this well described sociological phenomenon and  constructive engage with its policy implications.

The inadequacy of frameworks premised on direct causation is not merely  theoretical but regularly surfaces in permissive court findings regarding the right to protest near synagogues, or to display language vilifying “Zionists”.

5.The harms to the Jewish community are not limited to dramatic violent acts but include chronic psychological and social harm

Bondi was a tragic event that finally shocked our community into recognising and responding to a problem that had been evident to most of the Jewish community for two years.

Pro-Palestinian/ anti-Zionist activism had invaded “intimate” Jewish spaces, with mobs outside synagogues or at recreational spaces in Jewish neighbourhoods. There has been vandalism of Jewish homes, schools, synagogues, community centres and of the offices of a university academic. Jews in the arts and other sectors of our community have been marginalised and doxxed and private businesses intimidated and shut down. There have been death threats to Jews and Jewish organisations.

A steady drum beat of vilification: “baby killers”, “genocidaires” and “Nazis” has created a charged and heated atmosphere in which many Jews have come to feel unwelcome or unsafe. For every act that hits the media there are countless stories, often related over the Sabbath dinner table, of personal slights, off-hand comments and slurs. There has been endless on-line hate. This incitement has been marked by episodes of violence, acts of arson and now murder.

The dramatic rise in incidents negatively impacting Australian Jews since October 2023 has been well documented in Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) incident reports, as have Jewish experiences of antisemitism (2024 survey ) and antisemitic attitudes held by non-Jewish Australians (2021, 2025, ASECA survey).

Hate speech itself can be profoundly harmful psychologically. This is true for Jews in Australia (and)  the US Jewish community just as it was for the indigenous community during the voice debate. For some antizionists, the intimidation and marginalisation of Jews is not a by-product of activism but rather a specific goal. ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess, commenting on anti-Israel activists observed: “Directly or indirectly, their actions can marginalise, stigmatise and frighten sections of the community.”

A 2024 survey conducted in the weeks after the start of the Gaza war (including approximately 8% of the adult Jewish population) reported that 64% felt that antisemitism was a big problem, far higher than in a 2017 survey. One in five had personally experienced an insult or harassment because they are Jewish and a similar number was less open in showing their identity in public. Similar findings have been reported in the UK, Europe and the US.

This is particularly sensitive in Australia’s post Holocaust community. As Jeremy Waldronwrote of hate speech: “It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like—or what other societies have been like—in the past. In doing so, it creates something like …a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word…”

6.Jewish community calls for support and safety reflect genuine grass roots concerns and are not simply political attempts to stifle legitimate debate as often claimed by anti-Zionist groups

Against the overwhelming evidence of adverse Jewish experiences, non-Jewish and Jewish pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist groups regularly attempt to downplay the issue by:

  • disputing definitions of antisemitism, survey methodology and measurement.
  • dismissing communal concerns as “weaponising” antisemitism
  • claiming Jews are simply conflating antisemitism with criticism of Israel.
  • claiming that antizionist slogans and activism have nothing to do with Jews because “not all Jews are Zionists” or “Zionism and Jewishness are not identical”. Such claims, while true, are facile and in no way negate the experiences and views of the vast majority of the Jewish community who have strong connections with and concerns for Israel and are targets for antizionist activism
  • focusing on antisemitism from the political right, distracting from the complex and cumulative effects of anti-Zionist speech and activism from the progressive left, religious fundamentalist and anti-Israel groups.

The pattern is one of disputing and distracting rather than engaging with patterns of fear, withdrawal and marginalisation.

This approach stands in opposition to recommendations in the AHRC Framework which stresses that the  approach to racism should be “community-centric” and recognise that racism as a “complex and shifting phenomenon”.

7.Claims that antisemitism can adequately be addressed through existing “universal” mechanisms are not supported by evidence

Anti-Zionists resist specific policies to respond to antisemitism, casting their lot with generalised anti-racism frameworks. They reject the Special Envoy’s report on antisemitism, in part for reasons of free speech. The claim that the AHRC Framework is sufficient as the primary mechanism to deal with antisemitism is flawed.

While society-wide approaches to racism are essential, Indigenous Australians, migrants, women, LGBTQ+ communities, Muslims and Jews all have different histories of oppression and face different challenges.

The need for targeted measures for antisemitism is not about moral priority but relates to its specific dynamic. Jews are often not recognised as a minority let alone a vulnerable one, because they are coded “white” and linked with power, money, conspiracy and influence. There is growing ignorance of antisemitism’s history, its genocidal expression within living memory. A UN report highlighting the lack of awareness of antisemitism’s modern manifestations.

It must also be noted that the AHRC document was framed and developed primarily to deal with indigenous disadvantage. Its preamble it states that: “racism operates by racialising various groups of people negatively to maintain the dominance of groups racialised as white….”. This strong conceptual frame around issues of colour raises questions about its suitability as the sole vehicle for addressing antisemitism.

The assertion made by Jewish anti-Zionists, that “general anti-racism” measures, including the AHRC Framework, will be effective for antisemitism does not reflect what is known about antisemitism nor about the AHRC Framework.

As human rights law academic Kenneth Marcus has observed, when  antisemitism is subsumed under generalised frameworks of disadvantage, it often disappears from view.

The Special Envoy’s plan, while open to criticism, is consonant with Global Guidelineswhich have been endorsed by over 40 states and regional groups, and consistent with UN recommendations that addressing antisemitism requires specific strategies in addition to general anti-racism measures.

In public statements the JCA has argued that calls to curb the most hostile forms of anti-Zionist speech risk making Jews less safe, by exposing them to blame for increased state repression. It is worth asking whether reframing such calls as political manoeuvres rather than expressions of communal fear does not itself heighten that risk — by casting concern for safety as bad faith.

8.Minority Jewish voices substantially misrepresent the concerns of the wider Australian Jewish community

The Jewish Council of Australia (JCA) has expressed the intention to engage with the Commission, as is their right. However, public positions taken so far by the JCA and other anti-Zionist Jewish groups raise concerns about the nature and impact of their likely submissions.

The JCA presents itself as an expert voice that provides a counterbalance to allegedly unrepresentative communal leadership bodies such as the ECAJ.

While Jewish peak bodies are not directly elected by the whole of community (what community peak bodies are?), they include a wide range of community organisations across the country and are closely aligned the community’s concerns regarding safety and connection with Israel. Concerns regarding community safety are widespread and a deep connection to Israel and concern for Israel’s welfare are shared by around 90% of Australian Jews. Around three quarters self-identify as Zionist.(2017, 2023 and 2024).

The JCA and other anti-Zionist groups have a small number of high-profile spokespeople, however their views are unlikely to reflect more than a small minority of a Jewish community of over 110,000. The JCA claims over 1,300 supporters. However, many claimed supporters are anonymous and signing on to their website entails endorsing values such as human rights, freedom and equality. not necessarily the anti-Zionist nature of the group. It is far from clear that their those who have signed endorse the JCA’s view that antisemitism is unrelated to progressive and antizionist activism.

This doesn’t delegitimise their participation or views but should have bearing on the weight given these views at the Royal Commission.

Anti-Zionist Jewish positions are often cited by the broader anti-Zionist advocacy community and by segments of the media and civil society. This is not because the JCA is representative of the community, but rather because their views suit the agenda of those who seek to vilify the Jewish community without restriction.

This “spoiler effect” is not without precedent.

The recent referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, though set in a different political context, is illustrative. Tanya Muscat and Katharina Wolf from Curtin University described how “No” proponents “… were selectively framed by media to present a picture of broad Indigenous opposition, thereby neutralising support for the Yes campaign…(this)  illustrates the need for communication strategies that are not only inclusive, but genuinely representative and responsive to the diversity within Indigenous communities.”

The Commission should be alert to the risk that anti-Zionist Jewish voices, amplified beyond their representative weight, may obscure the genuine concerns and aspirations of the wider Jewish community.

9.Jewish vulnerability is not adequately recognised in legal and progressive cultural frameworks

Over the last two years or more, hostile speech targeting Jews has circulated, escalated and become normalised in a manner that seems unimaginable were this another minority.

Cautious responses across government, media, legal and other civic institutions have contributed to a permissive environment in which hostile language and behaviour have gone unchallenged.

In part this has happened because concerns expressed by Jews regarding antisemitism are often understood primarily through the lens of the Israel–Palestine conflict, where they are interpreted as attempts to “silence protest”. They are also contested through disputes over definition or methodology.

At a deeper level, Jews are not widely recognised as a vulnerable minority, despite being one of Australia’s smallest communities and carrying profound collective trauma within living memory. Jews are targeted by “the right” as “non-white” and conspiratorial (with replacement theories proliferating, particularly in the US) as well as by progressives who characterise them as white, European, powerful and conspiratorial. This antipathy from both sides of the political spectrum is not experienced by other minorities, and other vulnerable groups typically do not offer solidarity to the Jewish community.

Existing legal and anti-discrimination mechanisms are designed to deal with harms attributable to individual people and events. As discussed above, much of the harm associated with the protest movement can be understood as cumulative in nature, with risks being statistical. This framing is more akin to climate change than to individual criminal behaviour and so grappling with the cumulative effects and diffuse responsibility of mass movements needs alternative conceptual approaches and  mechanisms of mitigation and redress.

The NSW Court of Appeal’s April 2026 decision striking down the Public Assembly Restriction Declaration scheme found that it imposed an impermissible burden on the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. The courts framework assumes that harms from political expression are discrete and traceable, and that a more precisely targeted instrument is always available and always superior.

The stochastic violence framework challenges both assumptions. Where harm operates through cumulative population-level exposure and threshold effects, demanding tight causal specificity as a condition of constitutional validity is demanding something the nature of the harm structurally cannot provide. Where the relevant risk is ambient and systemic rather than incident-specific, a broader precautionary mechanism may be more — not less — consistent with the underlying harm theory than a narrowly targeted one would be.

Legal mechanisms designed to adjudicate individual acts, individual intent and individual causation are poorly suited to harms that are diffuse, cumulative and probabilistically distributed across a population.

The Commission should draw two conclusions from this. First, that the safety concerns motivating the legislation were genuine and documented. Second, that the gap between what existing legal frameworks can address and what the harm actually requires cannot be closed by litigation. It requires policy development grounded in the empirical literature on dangerous speech and probabilistic violence — to develop regulatory responses that are both constitutionally defensible and adequate to the harm being addressed. That is precisely the kind of deeper recommendation this Commission is positioned to make.

10. This is not just another free speech/protest issue- the current protests are the first large-scale human rights protest movement in Australia that explicitly or implicitly targets an Australian minority community

The claim that anti-Zionist protest stands in the tradition of great Australian civic activism deserves scrutiny. Australia has a proud history of protest in the cause of human rights.

Opposition to the Vietnam War targeted government military policy. The anti-apartheid movement targeted a foreign regime. Activism for LGBTQ+ and Indigenous rights targeted discriminatory laws and the Australian state. In each case the object of protest was governmental policy or the policies of a foreign state.

No Australian minority community was targeted, vilified or made to feel unsafe in its own country as a direct consequence of the protest itself.

The anti-Zionist protest movement is different.  Its stated target is the Israeli government but, as argued above, the language and conduct of significant elements of the movement extend — through slippage and cumulative normalisation — from Israel, to Zionists, to Jews. The people bearing the cost are not governments or institutions. They are Jewish schoolchildren, Jewish academics, and Jewish families whose synagogues have been vandalised and whose neighbourhoods have been subject to intimidatory protest.

A human rights movement that targets a vulnerable minority undermines its own foundational premise. This not simply the case of speaking truth to power but rather a large movement directing its forces at a vulnerable minority.

Powerful and effective advocacy for Palestinian rights is entirely legitimate and possible without dehumanising language, without intimidation in Jewish communal spaces, and without slogans carrying violent resonances for a community that has known genocide within living memory.

Some notes from personal experience

My parents came to Australia to escape European antisemitism. It was largely a successful migration, and this country has been good to our family and to the Jewish community more broadly.

Antisemitism has nonetheless been a sporadic presence throughout my life. As a child I heard comments about Jews and money. Walking to synagogue in a kippah I have had “bloody Jews” shouted from passing car windows on several occasions. A close friend was beaten in a football ground car park while wearing a kippah . A few years ago a tradesman stormed out of my home after apparently noticing a Jewish artefact, shouting in the street as he left: “the Nazis should have finished you off.”

This was unpleasant but had never risen to the sense of a systematic anti-Jewish campaign.

Since October 2023 something has changed.

Partly it is what has been said and done — the graffiti, the vandalism of Jewish centres, the tearing down of hostage photographs from public walls. Partly it is what has not been said. I have watched colleagues receive institutional solidarity after attacks on their communities over time After October 7th 2023 I received communications from institutional leaders that mentioned Gaza, mentioned the conflict, but did not mention Jews, did not mention what had happened to Israeli civilians and did not acknowledge what the Australian Jewish community was living through. That silence communicated something profound.

I have watched security guards at synagogues and Jewish schools become so normalised that we have largely stopped remarking on it. Soon after October 7th 2023 a Jewish nursing home in Melbourne started to employ guards at the entrance. My uncle, a Holocaust survivor, needs guards to protect him from antisemitic attack in Melbourne in 2026.

The sense that there has been a tectonic shift in attitudes towards Jews is widely shared in my community, and it deserves to be taken seriously.

Conclusions and recommendations

The concerns currently being expressed by Australian Jews do not turn on Bondi.

Rather, Bondi has served to crystallise awareness of the sustained and normalised hostility toward a minority community. This has operated through language, symbolism, social pressure and physical intimidation in a civic environment that has consistently failed to recognise, constrain or respond to it with the seriousness applied to harms affecting other minorities.

There is a moral accounting that has not yet been done. For two years, government and civic institutions sent a series of signals — largely through acts of omission— that shaped the environment in which hostility toward Jews escalated and became normalised. Just two early examples were the silence after the Opera House protest in October ’23 and our Foreign Minister’s refusal to visit the Nova memorial while in Israel. The has been a continuing absence of clear public statements about what forms of protest and language are acceptable — not legally, but morally.

This continuing silence and apathy were read, by the Jewish community and by the protest movement, as tacit acceptance of unconstrained forms of protest. The failure of government to reinforce moral and civic norms has had consequences that no subsequent legislative response can fully undo.

A Royal Commission that focuses narrowly on security failures at Bondi, without grappling with this broader institutional failure of leadership, will fail.

The protest movement should address its own accountability. Palestinian advocacy organisations that present themselves as defenders of human rights carry a particular responsibility. Tolerating, excusing or deflecting attention from dehumanising language directed at Jews is a contradiction the Commission should name directly. “We reject antisemitism” in a mission statement is not accountability. Genuine commitment to human rights principles requires actively calling out vilifying language when it appears, refusing to share platforms with those who use it, and accepting that the credibility of a movement is shaped by what it tolerates as much as by what it explicitly endorses. The question the Commission should put to these organisations is not whether they intend harm, but rather whether they effectively provide cover for unacceptable conduct incompatible with the protection of human rights.

The Commission will hear from minority Jewish voices who are seeking to limit scrutiny of anti-Zionist activism and minimise the widely held concerns of the community they claim to represent. Anti-Zionist Jewish voices are amplified not because they reflect Australian Jewish experience but because they are useful to those who wish to deflect that scrutiny. It would be a serious failure if the genuine and widely held fears of over 100,000 Australian Jews were obscured by a small, unrepresentative minority whose positions are largely indistinguishable from those opposing any restraint on anti-Zionist activism.

The Commission should weigh the asymmetry of what is at stake. On one side of the balance sits some degree of restraint in the most inflammatory language and protest forms — forms that reasonable people can recognise as serving no legitimate advocacy purpose. On the other sits a community that has spent two years reporting fear, concealing identity in public, withdrawing from civic life, and watching its institutions firebombed while being told that its concerns are weaponisation, overreach, or simply the price of free speech. Freedom of speech is a central value. So is the right of a minority community to exist in civic space without being treated as a legitimate target. These are not equivalent considerations, and recommendations that treat them as symmetrical will not address the harm.

This is not a call for censorship, silencing debate or banning protest. It does not equate criticism of Israel with antisemitism. Nor is it a concern about mere Jewish discomfort relating to robust debate. The case for Palestinian rights is legitimate and can be made powerfully without language that dehumanises, without slogans that carry violent resonances, and without forms of protest that target Jewish communal spaces. The question is not whether advocacy is permissible. It is whether the most harmful modes of that advocacy are necessary to it.

What is at stake is not comfort but belonging: whether Australian civic spaces remain places where minorities can live, speak and participate without being treated as objects of collective hostility.

No regulatory or legislative response will be adequate without investment in the civic and educational foundations that make such responses meaningful. The past two years have exposed not only a failure of law and policy but a failure of shared understanding — across institutions, media and the general public — about what antisemitism is, how it operates.

Regulation addresses behaviour but education is needed to address the conditions that make certain behaviours seem acceptable. Any set of recommendations that omits this foundation is treating symptoms. The Commission should recommend that addressing antisemitism be incorporated into school curricula. The media and public institutions require structured guidance on recognising hate speech that operates through political framing.

The Commission is accordingly asked to consider the following recommendations:

  1. Recognise the systemic nature of the harm. The cumulative, probabilistic character of harm from hate speech and inflammatory protest language should be acknowledged explicitly. A framework built solely around adjudicating discrete incidents and provable individual causation will continue to fail the Jewish community as it has failed it for the past two years.
  2. Develop regulatory responses adequate to systemic harm. The NSW Court of Appeal’s invalidation of the post-Bondi protest restrictions indicates the limitations of current judicial processes to address the nature of harms experienced by the Jewish community. The Commission should recommend policy grounded in the empirical literature on speech and harm —that are both constitutionally defensible yet adequate to the nature of harms experienced by the Jewish community.
  3. Require accountability within the protest movement. Advocacy organisations that claim to reject antisemitism and violence bear a corresponding responsibility to actively call out vilifying language and intimidatory conduct within the broader protest ecosystem they share. Passive disavowal after the fact is not accountability. The Commission should consider whether organisations and individuals that claim human rights credentials while tolerating dehumanising language directed at Jews should continue to receive public legitimacy, funding or institutional support.
  4. Reject the adequacy of generalised anti-racism frameworks as the sole response.The AHRC Framework was developed primarily around racialised disadvantage and the experience of communities of colour. Antisemitism has a distinct dynamic — Jews are simultaneously coded as white and powerful by progressives, and as foreign and conspiratorial by the right — and is rendered invisible by generalised frameworks. Specific strategies, consistent with Global Guidelines endorsed by over 40 states and with UN recommendations, are warranted and should be implemented alongside, not instead of, broader anti-racism measures.
  5. Weigh community voices accurately. The Commission will hear from Jewish anti-Zionist groups whose positions diverge sharply from those of mainstream communal organisations and most community members. Their right to participate is not questioned. However the weight accorded their submissions should be proportionate to genuine representativeness, and the Commission should be alert to the amplification of minority Jewish voices to serve interests other than accurate representation of the Jewish community.
  6. Invest in education and civic foundations. The Commission should recommend that antisemitism — its history, its specific character and its modern manifestations — be reflected in institutional training.
  7. Demand moral leadership, not only legal mechanism. The most important failure of the past two years has not been legislative. It has been the failure of government, universities, media and civil society to say clearly and repeatedly that Jews are a vulnerable minority community entitled to the same recognition, solidarity and protection extended to other minorities; that their fears are legitimate; and that certain forms of language and protest are not made acceptable by being coded. No other minority is expected to bear resentments originating in distant conflict or in the acts of isolated individuals.

The “I’ll ride with you” movement, which supported Muslims who were feeling vulnerable to backlash following the  Lindt Café siege, exemplifies our community’s capacity to recognise and respond to minority vulnerability with solidarity. No equivalent solidarity was extended to the Jewish community in the wake of October 7th, or in the two years of escalating hostility that followed.

Randa Abdel-Fattah’s claim that “Zionists (i.e. most Jews) have no right to cultural safety” exemplifies the cloud that has hung unanswered over the Jewish community for far too long. This slogan, and the tragic downstream effects when such views become normalised (and even celebrated in some sectors), represent the deep challenge before the Royal Commission and the Australian community more broadly.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Andrew is a medical specialist working in Australia. He is a regular visitor to Israel and a member of an egalitarian shul in Melbourne. He is married and has three sons. He occasionally suffers from thought bubbles that transmogrify into written form.

Jewish singer Deborah Conway accuses Aussie actor of running anti-Semitic boycott campaign against her

Jewish singer Deborah Conway has accused an Australian actor of running an anti-Semitic boycott campaign against her that led to venues cancelling her shows.

Fifty-six witnesses were called in the Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion last week, sharing how “Nazi style slurs” are being hurled at children in schools that now look more like prisons due to increased security concerns in the wake of Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Conway, a Jewish Australian, told the commission several of her shows have been pulled over the last few years, claiming an Australian actor, who she did not name inside the hearing, had sent letters to venues stating “Deborah Conway is a self-confessed Zionist and a supporter of genocide”.

The letters also allegedly included words to the effect that if they were to platform her “you are complicit in genocide”.

“I think some of the venues found that incredibly disturbing and they pulled back,” Conway said.

Conway revealed the name of the actor she has accused of running the campaign while speaking outside the hearing, however NewsWire has chosen not to name the woman.

“She signed her name very boldly and openly and she was proud of the letter she had written,” Conway claimed outside the hearing on Monday.

Singer Deborah Conway has suffered a flurry of online abuse in the wake of October 7, 2023. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Deborah Conway Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Conway also detailed how in another instance, 70 people wearing balaclavas rocked up to a venue hitting pots and pans together, and said if they went ahead with one of Conway’s shows “we will make sure that we turn up with 300 people, and we will make sure that business is very hard for you”.

“So they pulled it, which I don’t blame them — I would too,” Conway said.

The musician also copped a flurry of online abuse after she and a group of about 600 Jewish creatives were doxxed in February 2024.

“I hope your entire family dies in an air strike and you have limbs amputated without aesthetics — I assume he means anaesthetics,” Conway read to the commission on Monday.

“I hope that after this happens you have no access to clean bandages, antibiotics or food.”

Conway called anti-Zionism a ‘genocidal impulse’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Anti-Zionism a ‘genocidal impulse’

Conway described anti-Zionism as a “genocidal impulse”, telling the hearing that “when people chant from the river to the sea … that is a call to end the entity of Israel”.

“I want there to be peace, I want there to be a two-state solution, I want everyone to just relax. Let everyone eat their hummus and get on with it,” Conway said.

“But unfortunately … we’re not living in the land of unicorns and rainbows.”

She said she can’t bear the idea of young artists who are being targeted and vilified for believing Israel should be allowed to exist.

“That’s their crime, and that’s a crime that I think is completely beyond the pale,” she said.

“When they say Zionism equals Nazism … genocide … and then they end up with a sign that goes in the bin.

“They’re throwing us all in the bin. It’s not going to end well.”

Conway is an Australian singer and songwriter. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Conway is an Australian singer and songwriter. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

‘Larger than life’: Tribute to slain Rabbi

The father of a 14-year-old who survived the Bondi attack with bullet wounds paid tribute to Rabbi Eli Schlanger who died in the Bondi attack on December 14 last year.

The speaker was present at the Chanukah by the Sea event where two gunmen allegedly opened fire, killing fifteen people.

“He was so happy, it was an amazing event ‘til the minute before,” the man said.

He described Mr Schlanger as “larger than life” and “an amazing human being” who was always ready to help.

His 14-year-old daughter was shot while shielding children during the attack, with the man saying his daughter had asked him afterwards “(Dad) why they hate us so much, why they want to kill us?”

The speaker also told the royal commission a Jewish community member brought their Mezuzah — a religious scroll placed at the door of Jewish Homes — to see if it was intact and correct.

Once he opened it he found a “Free Palestine” scroll in it instead of the religious verse.

‘No friends left’: Jewish 15yo targeted online

A 15-year-old Jewish boy, known only as ABB, detailed how he had been bullied since the end of 2024 and was targeted in a Minecraft chat group comprised of children from his school.

A Jewish teenager says he was targeted with anti-Semitic abuse while playing the popular online game Minecraft with kids from his school. Picture: Supplied by Telltale Games

A Jewish teenager says he was targeted with anti-Semitic abuse while playing the popular online game Minecraft with kids from his school. Picture: Supplied by Telltale Games

Someone had written “I hate the Jews” in the chat group at one stage, but his stomach turned “upside down” after someone commented “rabid filthy rotten gut-wrenching grotesque rabbi yamaka wearing bank owning iron doming Hashem following Jew” on another occasion.

“It made my stomach turn upside down, I really just had to step away from my computer for a little bit and then, when I came back, I think I just closed and logged off for the day,” the teen said.

The children continued with the abuse after the 15-year-old confronted them at school and “told them to stop because it was destroying my mental health”.

He didn’t tell his parents right away because he thought he could handle it, “but it just got out of hand”.

“I walked into their room and said I have no friends left,” the teen told the hearing.

His mother, ABD, said her son had “tears in his eyes” as he told them how his friends had locked him in a part of the game and left him alone to die.

“Appalled”, ABD said her stomach drops knowing how her son had “normalised” and had to “make his peace” with the ordeal.

“(He) accepted it as part of his school life,” she said.

His parents said the school handled the situation really well and held an investigation, with three of the children also apologising to ABB.

However if ABB is near the group too long at school they tell him to leave, the boy said.

“Every time I go up to them, because some of my other friends sit with them … if I stay there for a little too long, they’ll be like ‘get out of here’ or something like that,” ABB said.

ABB also told the hearing of how a group of Year 12s recently shouted something along the lines of “Hitler was right to kill them all”.

“I turned around expecting to see somebody staring at me or pointing at me but I found it was just a group of Year 12 boys who were just talking amongst themselves using it for general conversation,” he said.

The October 9, 2023 rally at the Opera House has been described as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate during the inquiry. Picture: NewsWire / Jeremy Piper

The October 9, 2023 rally at the Opera House has been described as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate during the inquiry. Picture: NewsWire / Jeremy Piper

The boy’s father, ABE, said he no longer recognises this country, telling the hearing people used to be “a lot more tolerant”.

“All of those Australian idioms that we have for people having a fair go, that seems to have been lost,” he said.

“I would like to see something come out of this commission where we can chart the course back towards that Australia, or that attitude that we had in Australia.”

Propaganda fuelling ‘disunity’ and ‘discord’

Rabbi Daniel Rabin, who is part of a synagogue in Caulfield in Melbourne, said “we wouldn’t be sitting here if this was just about criticism of Israel”, telling the hearing Australians are being fed propaganda which is fuelling the disunity the country is experiencing.

Mr Rabin acknowledged that criticism of Israel is OK, but “huge lies” are circulating, telling the commission the word “genocide” is being “thrown into everything”.

“It’s the seeping through of this propaganda that’s found it’s way everywhere,” he said.

Rabbi Daniel Rabin detailed a campaign of abusive calls his synagogue has received. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Rabbi Daniel Rabin Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

“I think there are those who naturally have this hateful mission, but I think it’s affecting many regular Australians who are being fed this narrative, which I think is causing so much of the disunity and this discord that we are finding ourselves in at the moment.”

He recounted a campaign of abusive calls his synagogue had received, with the phrase “baby killers” seeming to be the favourite.

“When you say somebody is a baby killer … I can’t think of anything more grotesque to say about a person,” he said.

“It’s actually mind boggling that people are accusing us of that and then calling our synagogues … it’s hurtful, it’s disgusting.”

Mr Rabin spoke of having eggs and anti-Semitic slurs thrown at him before October 7, 2023, but the abuse has increased in the wake of Hamas’ attack.

Just days after the attack a car passing by he and his 10-year-old son shouted out “horrific things” he didn’t feel comfortable repeating at the inquiry.

“Having my 10-year-old son with me, of course he looked at me and he said ‘Why do these people hate us?’” he said.

“And that was very confronting … very difficult to explain to him.”

Fifteen people were killed in the Bondi attack in December 2025. Picture: NewsWire / Flavio Brancaleone

Fifteen people were killed in the Bondi attack in December 2025. NewsWire / Flavio Brancaleone

Jewish musician’s career and business destroyed after doxxing

Jewish musician Joshua Moshe told the hearing how his life started to fall apart after he was doxxed, with he and his wife both receiving hate messages and threats.

The couple’s homeware shop in north Melbourne was vandalised with boycott stickers and graffiti in the wake of the doxxing, while photos of them both taken from their social media accounts and plastered with “Zionists” and “Boycotting”.

At one point he received a photo of his son along with a voicemail that said “You racist motherf***er better keep watching your motherf***ing back”.

The abuse forced the couple to close up their shop and move to a different spot in the city. “This was devastating to experience … ongoing torrent of messages.. I was feeling extremely anxious, devastated, feeling like my life was starting to unravel,” Mr Moshe said.

Musician Joshua Moshe told the hearing how his life started to fall apart after he was doxxed. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe  Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe and his partner Maggie May Moshe spoke with the media outside the hearing on Monday. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe and his partner Maggie May Moshe spoke with the media outside the hearing on Monday. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

A saxophonist and composer, Mr Moshe was part of an award-winning band for seven years up until the doxxing incident, when he found out via social media that he’d been kicked out of the band.

The band had posted an online post — which they recently issued an apology for — which said the group was “disgusted, deeply shocked and betrayed”, claiming Mr Moshe had made comments in a Zionist WhatsApp group.

“We explicitly condemn any form of Zionism, racism, bullying anti-Semitism and prejudice of any kind,” the post said.

Mr Moshe said the Zionism that he believed in was that Jewish people deserved a home in some part of their ancestral homeland.

ECAJ researcher targeted with ‘horrifying’ anti-Semitic caricature

Executive council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) research director Julie Nathan described the “horrifying” moment a sexualised caricature of her was shared on the internet.

The caricature was accompanied with the words “Julie simply desires to be filled with Aryan seed”.

“It’s very much a sexualisation, so you have this Jewish caricature, this is the feminine version of it, with the long, curly hair, and the long fingernails … It was horrifying to see” Ms Nathan told the royal commission.

Executive Council of Australian Jewry research director Julie Nathan says trying to keep track of anti-Semitic incidents online is ‘like trying to count the stars’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Executive Council of Australian Jewry research director Julie Nathan says trying to keep track of anti-Semitic incidents online is ‘like trying to count the stars’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Ms Nathan, who authors the Jewish group’s annual report on anti-Semitism in Australia, said a new form of anti-Semitism has emerged since October 7, 2023 telling the hearing there was a 316 per cent rise in anti-Semitic incidents in Australia according to their 2024-2025 annual report.

“We’re getting much more brazen and much more confident coming out and not ashamed or worried about it being anti-Semitic and inciting violence against Jews,” she said.

Online posts or publications are not included in the report “because there are so many it’s uncountable”, Ms Nathan said.

“It’s like trying to count the stars,” she said.

Pro-Palestine material is also not counted as anti-Jewish, with Ms Nathan explaining a “free Palestine” sticker would only be considered anti-Semitic if it was stuck on a synagogue or a Jewish school, for instance.

“Israel is a state like any other state, and just as we in Australia are free to criticise our government, our country … we accept that, and even though people may lie about things or may use offensive language,” Ms Nathan said.

“We accept that as being, you know, political discourse or political language. It’s only when it crosses the line into anti-Semitism, that’s when we will count it as anti Semitic.”

The incidents, which are all personally reviewed by Ms Nathan, are recorded under six different categories including: physical assault, vandalism, verbal abuse, hate messages, graffiti and material such as banners and stickers.

She spoke of some people on social media screenshotting the annual report and making fun of it, saying: “We’re doing well boys, let’s keep the momentum going”.

Chief executive officer of The Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau said scenes at a Western Sydney protest on October 8, 2023, ‘set the tone’ for the normalisation of Jewish hate. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Chief executive officer of The Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau sPicture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Ms Blicblau said online spaces have helped move anti-Semitism away from ‘shameful radical fringes’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Fireworks in the street is Israel was ‘counting its dead

Fireworks in the streets as Israel was “still counting its dead” in the wake of Hamas’ 2023 attack “set the tone” for the normalisation of Jewish hate in Australia, the leader of a Jewish organisation has told a hate inquiry.

Many pointed to the Sydney Opera House protest on October 9, 2023, as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate; however, Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau chief executive instead submitted that scenes at a Western Sydney protest the day prior were pivotal.

“The events of October 7 were described as a day of pride and courage,” Ms Blicblau told the royal commission on Monday.

“Cars were driving through Western Sydney setting off fireworks … that glorification of violence that night at a time when Israel was still counting its dead really set the tone for a permissive environment in which glorifying violence was accepted and permissible.”

Nine witnesses will give evidence on Monday. Picture: Gaye Gerard /NewsWire

 Picture: Gaye Gerard /NewsWire

Research from the Jewish body, which was established in 2024 to combat anti-Semitism, has revealed that most Australians can’t recognise anti-Semitic tropes.

Radical ideologies had converged in such a way that anti-Semitism was slipping into public discourse easier, Ms Blicblau said.

“They’re shrouded just enough in language, often of human rights, to be acceptable,” she said.

“Most Australians can’t recognise anti-Semitic tropes when they see them, so they’re presented with these hateful tropes and because they don’t recognise it as being anti-Semitic, it’s more likely to become normalised and accepted.”

Ms Blicblau also spoke to the role of online spaces in helping move anti-Semitism away from “shameful radical fringes”.

“The role of the internet and social media allows these hateful comments to reach millions of people within milliseconds, so in order to combat the new form (of anti-Semitism) … we need to operate there,” Ms Blicblau said.

The hearing continues