The wild ride of Nestor Makhno

Revolution, civil war and the horseman of the Steppe

The Russian Civil War was one of the great catastrophes of the twentieth century, although it is often overshadowed by the world wars that framed it. Between 1917 and 1922, across the vast territories of the collapsing Russian Empire, perhaps ten million people died from combat, famine, disease, terror, and reprisal. Reds fought Whites, Whites fought Greens, and Greens fought everyone. Autocrats fought anarchists, nationalists fought internationalists, peasants fought cities, and villages fought armies.

The conflict stretched from Poland to Vladivostok, from the Arctic Ocean to the Caucasus, and drew into its vortex Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Cossacks, Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, Mennonites, Germans, Czechs, Poles, and dozens of other peoples caught between competing visions of the future. and foreign powers inserted themselves into the chaos including Britain, Australia, the United States, and Japan.

As I wrote in an earlier essay, Red and white terror – the Russian revolution and civil war, this was not one war so much as many wars occurring simultaneously. It was less a civil war than a kind of World War 1.2: a continental struggle in which the old order died, and several incompatible new worlds attempted to be born.

The civil war was infamous for its cruelty, Fratricidal wars are bound to be cruel because of the lack of definable front lines, because of their instant extension into civilian life, and because of the terrible hatreds and suspicions which they engender. The fighting ranged right across the Eurasian landmass was violent beyond belief, especially the unspeakable cruelty of the Cossack atamans in Siberia.

All too often, whites represented the worst examples of inhumanity, yet on that score, the Bolsheviks were unbeatable. Reds and Whites are both revealed as more than comfortable burning villages, shooting traitors, suspected or real, and torturing and massacring prisoners, and men women and children caught in the crossfire.

There were many instances of racist violence mainly on the White side – particularly towards Jews. The Whites’ antipathy towards Jews was to some degree due to their perception that most senior Bolshevik were Jewish, but mostly it was that old devil that never went away, antisemitism. Retreat from the major cities brought out the worse in the Whites, with terrible massacres of Jews – although they were not the only perpetrators. It is estimated that there were some 1300 anti-Semitic pogroms in the Ukraine during the civil war, with some 50000 to 60000 killed by both sides. There were pogroms in Belarus also, but these were not nearly as murderous as in Ukraine. A Soviet report of 1920 mentions 150,000 dead and as many again badly injured.

Among the prophets, executioners, bandits, ideologues, adventurers, warlords, saints, opportunists and dreamers thrown up by that upheaval, few were more remarkable than Nestor Ivanovych Makhno: charismatic Ukrainian anarchist insurgent, peasant revolutionary, cavalry commander, military opportunist, libertarian idealist, and larger-than-life folk hero.

Unlike so many of his contemporaries, he survived. He survived the firing squads, the battlefields, the prisons, the epidemics, and the purges. Survived the tuberculous contracted in jail before the revolution and the many wounds inflicted throughout the war. The man who fought Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Ukrainian nationalists, Cossacks, White armies, Red armies and assorted local warlords eventually died not with a rifle in his hand but in a Paris hospital bed, impoverished and tubercular, an exile far from the black-earth steppe that had made him famous.

Or perhaps infamous – because Makhno belongs to that category of historical characters who stubbornly resist classification. The Whites hated him because he was a revolutionary peasant insurgent. The Bolsheviks hated him because he was a revolutionary peasant insurgent who refused to obey them. Ukrainian nationalists distrusted him because he placed anarchism before nationalism. Landowners feared him. Foreign occupiers hunted him. Even fellow anarchists sometimes regarded him with suspicion. Yet somehow this peasant from Huliaipole (now in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast of Ukraine) acquired an almost mythological stature.

A century later, artists still paint him, films are made about him, rock bands commemorate him. political activists still claim him, and historians still argue about him. Wikipedia’s entry about Nestor Makhno, is long, thorough, and extensively detailed, but makes for exciting reading with its comprehensive account of his colourful career during, before and after the civil war, and even, beyond the grave.

The two manga-style illustrations that prompted these reflections are themselves evidence of that enduring fascination.

Nestor Makhno, the Legend

The first thing one notices is that the artists are not attempting strict historical realism. The Makhno of these images is tall, windswept, and handsome, somewhere between a Cossack ataman, a samurai, and a western gunslinger. The black banner streams dramatically behind him. His gaze is fixed on some distant horizon. One expects a swelling Russian chorale to surge in the background panning across limitless grasslands.

The real Makhno was another man. Contemporary photographs show a relatively short, compact man, often clean-shaven, intense rather than imposing. His contemporaries remembered not his stature but his energy. He seemed perpetually in motion. Charismatic, restless, impulsive, brave, reckless, idealistic and pragmatic in equal measure. The sort of man who appears during periods of social collapse and seems almost generated by the turbulence itself.

Yet the artists understand something important: historical memory rarely preserves people as they actually were. It preserves them as they are remembered. The artwork therefore depicts not so much the historical Makhno as “Makhno the Legend”, the anarchist rebel rider of the Ukrainian steppe. And legends tell us as much about those who create them as they do about their subjects.

The flag in the first picture identifies his force as the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine. One speech bubble proclaims: “My ne khochemo zavoyovaty vladu – my khochemo zruynuvaty yiyi nazavzhdy!”  – “We do not want to seize power- we want to destroy it forever!” A poster declares: “No to authority! No to the Party! No to the State! Long live the free community!” Another slogan advocates “Free councils of free people.”

One can almost hear every bureaucrat in history grinding their teeth. For Makhno was that rarest of political creatures: an anarchist who genuinely seemed to mean it. Here was one who would have signed to Denearys Targaryen’s vow not to join the wheel but to break it.

A Kaleidoscope of Lost Futures

The popular memory of the Russian Civil War tends to reduce it to a struggle between Reds and Whites. Bolsheviks versus monarchists. Revolution versus reaction. Reality was considerably messier. The conflict resembled a kaleidoscope more than a chessboard.

The collapse of the Romanov Empire unleashed a bewildering array of competing visions. Monarchists wanted restoration. Liberals hoped for constitutional government. Socialist Revolutionaries dreamed of a peasant democracy. Bolsheviks sought proletarian dictatorship – with themselves as it unchallenged ruler. National movements emerged across the empire’s periphery. Foreign powers intervened. Countless local strongmen pursued their own ambitions. Entire regions changed hands repeatedly.

The lands between the Dnieper and the Don were particularly complex. They were never inhabited solely by Russians and Ukrainians in the neat modern national sense. These were borderlands in the deepest historical meaning of the word. Cossacks rode the steppe. Mennonite farmers cultivated colonies founded generations earlier. Jews lived in market towns and cities. Greeks inhabited settlements along the coast. Tartars maintained ancient communities. Armenians traded. Germans farmed. Merchants, smugglers, soldiers, pilgrims, revolutionaries and dreamers moved constantly through the landscape.

Every modern nation prefers neat origin stories. But history seldom cooperates.

Makhno emerged from this world of overlapping identities and competing loyalties. His Free Territory in southeastern Ukraine represented perhaps the most improbable political experiment of the entire Civil War: an attempt to create a libertarian society amidst one of the bloodiest upheavals in modern history.

Whether it could ever have survived is doubtful. The twentieth century belonged to states, bureaucracies, standing armies, intelligence services, and industrial administration. It rewarded those who could organise railways, requisition grain, count factory output and maintain prisons. Anarchism, though long part of Tsarist Russia’s political kaleidoscope, was a forlorn hope.

Makhno the Anarchist war lord had a precarious relationship with the ultimately ascendant Bolsheviks. Vladimir Lenin at one time looked upon him favourably. Leon Trotsky, commanding the Red Army, regarded him as a dangerous adventurer, an undisciplined partisan commander whose independence threatened revolutionary unity. Makhno regarded Trotsky as a would-be dictator masquerading as a liberator. Both men were, in their own ways, correct.

Their uneasy alliance against General Wrangel’s White Army in Crimea remains one of those moments when history briefly forces bitter enemies onto the same side before restoring them to mutual hostility. The Makhnovists helped defeat the Whites, but once that task was accomplished, the Bolsheviks turned on their troublesome allies.

The logic was almost inevitable. The Bolsheviks sought power. Makhno sought freedom from power. Those two projects could coexist only temporarily.

My old tutor Tibor Szamuely would undoubtedly have seen the episode as another illustration of what he called the Russian Tradition. Revolutions changed slogans and symbols, but the underlying gravitational pull of centralised authority remained remarkably constant. The old autocracy vanished. New forms emerged. Yet power continued to accumulate at the centre. The names changed. The structure endured. [See, in In That Howling Infinite, The Russian Tradition – Russia, Ukraine and Tibor Szamuely]

Yet for a brief moment Makhno’s movement offered a glimpse of a different possibility. That possibility was ultimately crushed, first by necessity, then by power, and finally by history itself.

Makhno and Anarchism

Makhno did not emerge from a vacuum. Like so much in Russian and Ukrainian history, he was both a product of his time and the inheritor of a much older tradition. The black banners that fluttered above the villages of southern Ukraine during the Civil War carried ideas whose roots stretched back decades, even centuries, nourished by peasant rebellion, intellectual dissent, and a deep suspicion of distant authority.

Russian anarchism emerged in the nineteenth century as a radical critique of both Tsarist autocracy and the centralising tendencies of socialism. Its two great theorists were Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, figures who remain among the most influential anarchist thinkers in history. Bakunin, the aristocratic revolutionary who spent years in prison and exile, rejected all forms of state power, arguing that liberation could never be achieved through a dictatorship, even one claiming to act on behalf of the workers. Kropotkin, the geographer and scientist, developed a more constructive vision, emphasising voluntary cooperation, mutual aid, and federations of free communities. Against the harsh Social Darwinism fashionable in his day, Kropotkin argued that cooperation was as important to survival as competition. Human beings, he believed, were capable of organising society without kings, bureaucrats, or party commissars.

These ideas found fertile ground in the Russian Empire. The vastness of the state, its bureaucratic inefficiency, and its often brutal methods of rule encouraged a culture of resistance. Anarchism attracted intellectuals, workers, and, perhaps most significantly, peasants. Long before Marxism became dominant, populist movements such as the Narodniks had romanticised the peasant commune as a foundation for a more egalitarian society. Although not anarchists in the strict sense, they helped create a political culture in which local self-government and suspicion of central authority were deeply valued.

The revolutionary years between 1905 and 1921 provided anarchism with its greatest opportunity. Across the empire, workers established councils, peasants seized land, and local militias sprang up with little regard for official authority. In the great cities anarchist groups were active among factory workers and sailors. The Kronstadt sailors, who would later revolt against Bolshevik rule in 1921 under the slogan “Soviets without Bolsheviks,” reflected many anarchist principles even if they were not uniformly anarchist in ideology.

It was in this turbulent environment that Nestor Makhno emerged. Born in 1888 into a poor peasant family in Huliaipole, a town in the steppe lands of southeastern Ukraine, Makhno encountered anarchism as a young man. Arrested for revolutionary activities after the 1905 Revolution, he spent years in Tsarist prisons where he came under the influence of anarchist intellectuals and immersed himself in the writings of Bakunin and Kropotkin. Prison served as his university.

When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, Makhno returned home and transformed theory into practice. His achievement was remarkable. Amid the chaos of civil war he helped create what became known as the. Makhnovshchina (loosely translated as “Makhno movement”), a vast anarchist experiment encompassing large areas of southern Ukraine. Villages elected their own councils. Land was redistributed. Local communities enjoyed a degree of autonomy rare in wartime. Makhno’s Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine ,often called the Black Army, defended these territories against a bewildering array of enemies: German occupiers, Ukrainian nationalists, White armies, and eventually the Bolsheviks themselves.

Military historians continue to marvel at Makhno’s campaigns. His forces perfected the use of the tachanka – a machine gun mounted on a horse-drawn cart – which allowed extraordinary mobility across the open steppe. His army repeatedly outmanoeuvred larger and better-equipped opponents. In 1919 and 1920, Makhno’s forces played a crucial role in defeating General Anton Denikin and later Baron Wrangel, two of the most formidable White commanders. Ironically, these victories helped secure the survival of the Bolshevik regime that would ultimately destroy the anarchist movement.

Makhno was not alone. Other anarchists left significant marks upon the revolutionary era. Volin (Vsevolod Eikhenbaum), an intellectual and organiser, sought to develop anarchist theory and worked closely with the Makhnovists. Lev Chernyi advocated individualist anarchism and was later executed by the Bolsheviks. Grigori Maximoff became a leading anarcho-syndicalist thinker in exile. Internationally, figures such as Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, both born in the Russian Empire, carried anarchist ideas to global audiences and later became disillusioned critics of Bolshevik authoritarianism.

Yet none combined military leadership, mass peasant support, and revolutionary vision quite as successfully as Makhno. His closest parallels are perhaps not found in Russia but elsewhere: Emiliano Zapata in Mexico, Buenaventura Durruti in Spain, or even the medieval peasant rebels who periodically erupted across Europe. Like them, Makhno embodied a recurring historical phenomenon: the attempt to create freedom from below rather than impose it from above.

The tragedy of Russian anarchism was that it found itself squeezed between two powerful forces. The Whites regarded it as revolutionary chaos; the Bolsheviks regarded it as a rival source of legitimacy. Both sought centralised authority, disciplined armies, and hierarchical control. Anarchism offered something messier and more elusive: local autonomy, voluntary association, and a belief that ordinary people could govern themselves. In the brutal arithmetic of the Civil War, such ideas proved difficult to defend.

Yet the legacy endured. Makhno became a folk hero to some, a bandit to others, and a symbol of resistance to authority for generations of radicals. His black flag bearing the slogan “We wish for freedom” represented more than a military movement. It expressed a persistent current in Russian and Ukrainian history – a stubborn refusal to accept that power must always flow from the centre, from the capital, from the party, or from the state. In a land famous for tsars, commissars, and strongmen, that may have been the most revolutionary idea of all.


Makhno (centre) with other Insurgent command staff in Huliaipole (1919)

The Black Banner and the Long Shadow of Empire

Makhno’s story emerged from one of the great turning points of modern history: the collapse of empires. The Russian Civil War was not simply a struggle between Reds and Whites. It was also a struggle over what would replace the Romanov Empire. Across the former imperial territories, peoples sought to determine their own futures. Finns, Poles, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians and many others attempted to carve nation-states from the wreckage of imperial collapse. Some succeeded. Others failed. All became caught up in the wider maelstrom.

The tragedy of the twentieth century is that many of those hard-won freedoms proved fleeting. The new states born from the ruins of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman empires found themselves trapped between larger and more powerful forces. First came the Nazi storm. Then came the Soviet one. Much of Central and Eastern Europe spent decades living under one form of domination or another. The promise of national self-determination so evident in the years immediately following the First World War often ended in occupation, dictatorship or subordination.

Yet history did not stop there.

The Soviet Union eventually followed the Romanov Empire into the graveyard of failed political systems. One by one, nations that had disappeared behind the Iron Curtain re-emerged as sovereign states. Flags long hidden returned to public squares. Languages once marginalised regained official status. Historical memories suppressed for decades resurfaced. The old imperial map dissolved once again.

Seen from this perspective, the present war in Ukraine is not simply a dispute over territory. It is part of a much longer historical argument about empire, sovereignty and identity.

A century after Reds, Whites and Greens fought across the same black-earth steppe, war once more rages in the lands where Makhno made his name. Huliaipole itself has found itself close to the front line. Mariupol, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson appear both in histories of the Civil War and in contemporary battlefield reports. The same landscape that once carried cavalry columns, tachanki those iconic horse drawn machine gun wagons )and, as this is Russia, sleighs), and armoured trains now carries tanks, drones, missile batteries and mechanised brigades.

The present conflict is not a replay of the Russian Civil War. Historical analogies are useful servants but dangerous masters. Yet the recurrence is striking. Once again Ukraine finds itself at the centre of a struggle shaped by the afterlife of empire.

At its heart lies a question that has echoed through East European history for more than a century: who has the right to determine Ukraine’s future?

An increasingly irredentist Russia, drawing heavily upon imperial memory and historical grievance, has launched an assault upon a former imperial possession that insists upon its own sovereignty and right to choose its own path. The arguments are framed in terms of security, history, ethnicity and geopolitics. Beneath them lies a much older issue. The Russian Empire fell. The Soviet Empire followed it. Must Ukraine forever remain part of another state’s historical imagination, or may it exist fully as itself?

It is impossible today to read about the Russian Civil War without occasionally experiencing moments of historical déjà vu. The geography is hauntingly familiar. Kharkiv. Kherson. Mariupol. Melitopol. Odesa. Kyiv. A century ago, armies advanced and retreated across these landscapes. Reds, Whites, Greens, nationalists, foreign interventionists and local militias fought for possession of the same territory. Entire populations found themselves trapped between competing visions of political destiny.

The circumstances are very different today and historical analogies always have limits. Yet the persistence of geography and geopolitics is striking. The lands between the Dnieper and the Don remain what they have long been: a frontier between competing narratives of the past and competing visions of the future.The same rivers flow. The same cities endure. The same questions of identity, sovereignty, memory and belonging continue to reverberate across the region.

History does not repeat itself exactly. But it often revisits old addresses.

One suspects Makhno would have found the question both familiar and irritating.He was never a nationalist in the conventional sense. Unlike Bandera and later Ukrainian nationalists, Makhno did not fight for a Ukrainian nation-state. He fought for something simultaneously larger and smaller: local autonomy, peasant self-government and anarchist freedom. He distrusted all states, whether Russian, Ukrainian, Bolshevik, White, German or otherwise.

This has made his legacy awkward for modern Ukraine. States generally prefer heroes who wanted states. Makhno wanted free councils of free people.

As a consequence, he occupies an unusual place in Ukrainian memory. Unlike Bandera or Shukhevych, he has never become a central pillar of official state mythology. Unlike the controversial legacy of the OUN-UPA or the Waffen-SS Galicia Division, debates surrounding Makhno are not primarily about nationalism. Instead, he exists in several overlapping forms at once: the historical insurgent commander, the libertarian icon celebrated by anarchists across the world, the regional folk hero of southern Ukraine, and increasingly, the son of Ukraine who resisted domination from distant centres of power.

None of these versions fully captures the man.

The historical Makhno remains elusive. His movement opposed antisemitic pogroms more consistently than many contemporary forces and included Jews within its ranks, yet it operated amidst the appalling violence and carnage of the Civil War and was never entirely untouched by it. His Free Territory represented one of the most ambitious anarchist experiments in modern history, yet it was also shaped by the brutal necessities of war. Admirers romanticise him. Critics emphasise the contradictions. Both have evidence on their side.

Perhaps that ambiguity explains his enduring fascination.

The unknown artist who created the image at the head of this essay gave his Makhno a modern Tryzub or trident belt buckle, a symbol of today’s Ukrainian resistance and resilience. It is a striking touch and a thoroughly anachronistic one. The symbol derives from the seals of Volodymyr the Great and modern Ukrainian statehood. Makhno himself never wore it.

The artist is making a statement. This is not merely Makhno the anarchist. This is Makhno the Ukrainian hero. The image therefore fuses three different figures into one. There is the historical insurgent Makhno of the 1918-21 Civil War. There is the anarchist her of libertarian mythology. And there is the modern Ukrainian patriot Makhno recruited into the story of national identity – retrospectively enlisted into a national story that he himself might have regarded with considerable scepticism. He spent much of his life rejecting national labels in favour of anarchist ones.

The anachronisms are historically dubious but symbolically powerful. But history rarely asks permission before appropriating its characters in an ongoing contest over memory.

Makhno in Red Army uniform, 1919

Twilight in Paris

And then there is the final act.

What happens after the war is over? Most stories conclude when the hero rides away. Real life begins afterwards. Makhno’s cavalry charges, victories, defeats and escapes belong to legend. The more intriguing question is what became of the dream once the banners were lowered.

Defeated but not destroyed, Nestor Makhno escaped the fate that overtook so many of his contemporaries. Unlike countless White and Red commanders, he did not perish on a battlefield, before a firing squad, or later in Stalin’s Great Terror. Unlike John Brown, Custer, and Davy Crockett or the Australians Ned Kelly and another horseman Harry “the Breaker” Morant, he did not die with his boots on. Miraculously, given the odds against him, he survived.

And improbably, the horseman of the steppe ended his days in Paris.

One imagines him there during the 1920s and early 1930s, sitting in smoky cafés among White émigrés, ex-Bolsheviks, anarchists, monarchists, refugees and stateless wanderers arguing about futures that had already vanished. The thunder of cavalry had faded into memory. The revolutionary epic had dissolved into reminiscence.

Nestor Makhno died on 25 July 1934 at the age of forty-five, worn down by tuberculosis, old wounds and years of hardship and, latterly, poverty. He was cremated and his ashes placed in the columbarium of Père Lachaise Cemetery. Not beneath a black banner. Not in the black earth of the Ukrainian steppe. Not in the town where his rebellion began. His ashes were placed not in the Ukrainian black earth but in niche 6686, a small compartment among thousands of others.

There is something wonderfully ironic, literary even, about that. The anti-clerical anarchist who spent his life fighting states, hierarchies and institutions, who once commanded tens of thousands of insurgents and rode across southern Ukraine pursued by enemies on every side, ends his journey among the famous dead of France, surrounded by poets, musicians, revolutionaries and dreamers.

History possesses a sense of humour.

Yet perhaps the final irony belongs to memory itself. For the world has turned another circle since his death.

The Black Army vanished and the Free Territory of the Makhnovshchina disappeared. They survive only in memory. Stalin’s Soviet Union rose and fell. The nations that struggled for freedom amidst the ruins of empire endured decades beneath first Nazi and then Soviet domination before re-emerging as sovereign states. The world that produced Makhno  passed into history, and now, in the lands where Makhno once rode beneath a black banner, another war is being fought over questions of empire, identity, memory and self-determination.

What would Nestor Makhno make of it all?  We cannot know. But one suspects he would recognise the landscape immediately. And perhaps that is why he refuses to stay buried. The ashes remain in Père Lachaise. The legend still rides the steppe.

There is a Russian word, toska, which Nabokov famously described as a spiritual anguish without precise object. A longing for something absent. A yearning that cannot quite be named. One suspects Makhno understood it. So did Chekhov. So did many of the exiles who haunted Paris in those years. For what is exile if not a prolonged conversation with vanished possibilities?

The revolutionary epic dissolved into memoirs, arguments and recollections. The thunder of cavalry became stories told over coffee and cigarettes. The dream survived. The dreamers grew old.

Yet Makhno remains. Not exactly as he was. Not exactly as he would have wished to be remembered. But alive nevertheless in paintings, songs, novels, political arguments, historical debates, and manga-inspired artwork.

The artist who gave him a Tryzub belt buckle and the physique of a cinematic hero understands something essential. Historical memory is not an archive. It is a conversation between past and present. Each generation creates the figures it needs. And so the anarchist who rejected states has become part of a national story. The peasant insurgent has become a folk hero. The historical man has become a legend.

The ashes rest quietly in Père Lachaise. The legend still rides the steppe. And somewhere beyond the horizon, beneath a black banner snapping in the wind, Nestor Makhno continues his endless charge toward a freedom that history never quite allowed him to reach.

Paul Hemphill, June 2026

For more on Russia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union in In That Howling Infinite, see Russky Mir – Russian history’s long shadow

Makhno, 1921. Wikipedia

Author’s note

For the dear departed, Père Lachaise is the best address in Paris. Some 300,000 people reste ici. A cavalcade of French cultural and political history, with a few foreign entombments, including the playwright Oscar Wild and Doors front-man and zeitgeist icon Jim Morrison.

I have always loved the place. I have wandered its avenues among the celebrated and the forgotten, the visited and the unvisited. It occurs to me that perhaps there is a verse yet to be written about those whose names draw no pilgrims and whose flowers have long since withered. Next time I find myself there, I think I shall seek out niche 6686 and offer a quiet dobryi den to the old anarchist.

The singers, and the dancers, and the actors, and the chancers,
The rebels and the statesmen, and the fallen communards,
Napoleonic Generals and politicians’ wives.
The poets and the dreamers, all those other famous lives.

Paul Hemphill, Chanson – living next to Jim

Coda: The Wall

History occasionally produces coincidences so perfect that a novelist would be accused of over-writing them.

Nestor Makhno spent his final years in Paris and today rests in the columbarium of Père Lachaise Cemetery. Visitors come to see Oscar Wilde, Jim Morrison, Édith Piaf, Chopin, Proust and a host of other luminaries. Few seek out the old anarchist from Huliaipole. Yet not far from where his ashes lie stands one of the most potent revolutionary monuments in Europe: Le Mur des Fédérés, the Wall of the Federals.

It was here, on 28 May 1871, that the last defenders of the Paris Commune made their final stand. After a week of savage street fighting- the Semaine Sanglante, the Bloody Week – surviving Communards retreated through the eastern districts of Paris, fighting among the tombs and avenues of Père Lachaise itself. Cornered among the graves and monuments, they were overwhelmed. One hundred and forty-seven prisoners were lined up against the wall and shot. Thousands more would be executed in the days that followed.

The image possesses an almost unbearable symbolism. Revolutionaries making their last stand in a cemetery, fighting among the dead before joining them.

For later generations of socialists, communists and anarchists, the Paris Commune became something far greater than its brief seventy-two-day existence. Marx regarded it as the first example of proletarian government. Lenin studied it obsessively. Trotsky drew military lessons from its failure. Bolshevik revolutionaries saw in the Commune both an inspiration and a warning. It represented what revolution could achieve, but also what happened when revolution hesitated.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they consciously invoked the Commune’s memory. Lenin famously noted with satisfaction when the Soviet regime survived longer than the Commune’s seventy-two days. Soviet propaganda elevated the Communards into secular saints of the revolutionary tradition. Streets, factories and institutions were named in their honour. Their red banner became one of the sacred relics of international socialism.

The symbolism endured even into the Space Age. The Soviet Union, which liked to present itself as the culmination of all previous revolutionary struggles, repeatedly invoked the Commune as a precursor to October 1917. A banner associated with the Paris Commune was ceremonially carried aboard an early Soviet space mission – a remarkable journey for a symbol born in the barricades of nineteenth-century Paris. One could scarcely imagine a more dramatic arc: from the cobblestones of Belleville to orbit around the Earth.

And here, perhaps, lies the final irony.

The Commune inspired the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks built the Soviet Union. Makhno spent much of his life fighting the Bolsheviks. Yet in death he came to rest within walking distance of the Wall of the Federals, among the ghosts of the very revolutionaries whose memory helped shape the revolutionary tradition that ultimately hunted him into exile.

The layers fold into one another like a Russian matryoshka doll. Open Makhno and one finds the Civil War. Open the Civil War and one finds the Revolution. Open the Revolution and one finds the Commune. Open the Commune and one finds the old dreams of liberty, equality and fraternity that first burst forth in revolutionary France. Each generation inherits the visions of those who came before, and each generation remakes them, sometimes beyond recognition.

One wonders what Makhno would have made of the Wall. He might have admired the courage of the Communards while distrusting those who later appropriated their memory. He might have reflected that revolutions, like nations, are often most attractive in defeat. Victors build institutions. Martyrs become legends.

And perhaps there is another lesson in Père Lachaise itself.

The cemetery gathers together monarchists and republicans, communists and anarchists, believers and atheists, poets and soldiers, dreamers and executioners. The quarrels that once seemed world-shattering now coexist in uneasy silence beneath the trees. The dead no longer argue.

Yet their stories continue to speak.

So when I eventually return to Père Lachaise and seek out niche 6686, I shall also walk to the Wall of the Federals and salute the ghosts of the old revolution. Between them lies much of the history of the modern age: revolution and reaction, hope and disappointment, dreams of freedom and the realities of power. The Communards fell there. Makhno rests nearby. The Soviet Union that claimed their inheritance has itself vanished into history.

And still the questions remain. The wall stands. The ashes remain. The legend rides on.

Le Mur des Fédérés, Pere Lachaise

Epilogue. Midnight in Paris (with apologies to Woody)

There is one final irony to Nestor Makhno’s story that deserves mention, because it reminds us how strange history can be.

When one thinks of Paris in the 1920s, one tends to think of Woody Allen’s Midnight in Paris, that charming fantasy in which a modern writer wanders the streets of Montparnasse at night and stumbles into the city’s golden age. There are Hemingway and Fitzgerald, Picasso and Gertrude Stein, Cole Porter at the piano, Salvador Dalí being magnificently Salvador Dalí, and a parade of artists, poets and dreamers whose names would come to define the twentieth century.

The film is whimsical, nostalgic and perhaps a little romanticised. But the extraordinary thing is that it is not entirely wrong. Paris really was like that.

The city into which Nestor Makhno arrived in exile was arguably the most intellectually crowded place on earth. Somewhere in Montparnasse, Ernest Hemingway was learning how to write short sentences and long silences. F. Scott Fitzgerald was turning glamour and self-destruction into literature. James Joyce was wrestling with language itself. Gertrude Stein was hosting salons where painters, writers and poets mingled late into the evening. Picasso and Matisse were redefining art. Stravinsky and Ravel were reshaping music. Josephine Baker was electrifying audiences. André Breton and the Surrealists were busy dismantling reality and rebuilding it according to dream logic.

And scattered among them were thousands of exiles.

The collapse of empires had turned Paris into a gathering place for the displaced. White Russian aristocrats who had fled the Revolution. Former tsarist officers reduced to driving taxis. Poets, philosophers and theologians trying to reconstruct vanished worlds. Jews escaping pogroms. Political refugees from every corner of Europe. Revolutionaries who had won and revolutionaries who had lost. Monarchists, liberals, socialists, anarchists, nationalists and stateless wanderers all sharing the same cafés, boulevards and boarding houses.

One can almost imagine the scene.

At one table sits Ivan Bunin, the future Nobel laureate, lamenting the Russia that had vanished. At another, the philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev debates faith and freedom. Across the room a young writer named Vladimir Nabokov quietly works on stories that few people yet read. Somewhere nearby Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman are arguing about anarchism. Victor Serge is reflecting on the revolution’s betrayal. Trotsky occasionally passes through the émigré world like Banquo’s ghost, carrying with him the memory of power and the certainty of future assassination.

And then there is Makhno.

Not the manga hero with the flowing coat and trident buckle. Not the legendary ataman galloping across the steppe beneath a black banner. Just a tired, impoverished former insurgent commander, his lungs damaged by tuberculosis, surviving on odd jobs, writing memoirs, arguing politics, and trying to make sense of a world that had moved on without him.

It is difficult not to feel a touch of svetlaya grust’ – that luminous melancholy the Russians understand so well – in contemplating the image. Somewhere in the city Hemingway is inventing modern prose while Makhno is remembering cavalry raids across the Donbas. Picasso is dismantling perspective while former White officers reminisce about the Crimea. Joyce is transforming literature while exiled revolutionaries debate futures that have already vanished.

The worlds scarcely intersect, yet they coexist in the same city.

And perhaps they were not as far apart as they appear.

For all their differences, many of these figures were grappling with the same underlying question. The old world had collapsed. What would replace it? The question haunted the artists as surely as it haunted the revolutionaries. Some sought answers through politics, some through nationalism, some through religion, some through art. All were living among the ruins of certainties.

History often encourages us to imagine neat compartments: politics here, literature there, art somewhere else. The reality is usually messier and more interesting. The horseman of Huliaipole, the author of Ulysses, the creator of Cubism, the composer of The Rite of Spring, the future Nobel laureates, the forgotten exiles, the dreamers, the drunks, the philosophers and the refugees all inhabited the same city at the same moment.

Paris was large enough to contain them all.

Which means that somewhere, perhaps on a damp evening in Montparnasse, while jazz drifted from a nearby club and rain glistened on the pavement, Nestor Makhno may have walked past Hemingway on his way to a café argument, or crossed paths with Picasso without either man recognising the other.

Woody Allen would have appreciated the coincidence.

History, after all, often writes better stories than novelists.

Author’s note: Paris has a myriad of attractions for history tragics. For me, there are three ‘must sees’ that are at the top of the ‘out there’ list. Les Catacombes de Pariss are one. The folk cabaret Au Lapin is another. and the third is La Cimetière du Père-Lachaise, the most famous cemetery in the world.

Makhno in Red Army uniform, 1919

Makhno, 1921. Wikipedia

The Great Unravelling – modern history is built on exodus and displacement 

And who will live in the house after us, my father?
The house, my son, will remain as it was!
Why did you leave the horse alone?
To keep the house company, my son.
When their residents go, the houses will die.
Together we will hold on
until we return.
When, my father?
Tomorrow, my son, and perhaps in another day or two!
That tomorrow trailed behind them, chewing the wind
in the endless winter nights.
Mahmoud Darwish

Two years ago, in an essay in In That Howling Infinite published entitled Modern history is built upon exodus and displacement we wrote: “The term ethnic cleansing is elusive and politically charged. In an age of endemic conflict, identity politics and competing narratives, it has become a contested and often diluted concept invoked with increasing frequency. Yet, it remains undefined in law. Unlike genocide or war crimes, it has never been codified as a distinct offence under international law, and so its use is contested.”

Henry Ergas’s essay begins from a premise that is not wrong in itself: the Palestinian Nakba did not occur in isolation from the twentieth century’s wider history of mass displacement. Modernity proved remarkably adept at producing refugees. The collapse of empires, the rise of nation-states, world wars, partitions and revolutions uprooted tens of millions of people. Greeks and Turks, Armenians, Germans, Poles, Indians and Pakistanis, Jews from Arab lands, and many others found themselves swept into movements of population that often combined violence, dispossession and the attempt to create more homogeneous states.

This broader historical context matters because contemporary discussion of Israel–Palestine often proceeds as though 1948 emerged from a vacuum. It did not. The creation of Israel, the Palestinian exodus, and the simultaneous flight and expulsion of Jews from Arab countries all unfolded in a world where population transfer – while morally disturbing to modern sensibilities – was often treated by governments as regrettable but practical statecraft.

Yet Ergas then moves beyond historical context into a stronger argument: that the Palestinians constitute a unique exception because their refugee status became institutionalised rather than resolved. Here too there is a substantial point beneath the rhetoric. Unlike most post-war refugee populations, Palestinian refugee status passed across generations through UNRWA rather than being handled under the broader UNHCR framework. The expectation of return became central to Palestinian national identity and politics. The refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza and elsewhere became not simply humanitarian spaces but political spaces.

But this is where the argument narrows and history becomes more selective.

The essay tends to compress a complex chain of causes into a single line of responsibility. The 1948 refugee crisis did not arise simply because Arab leaders invaded and then refused to absorb the consequences. As discussed previously, historians describe a more tangled picture: military collapse, fear, local expulsions, battlefield conditions, psychological warfare, direct expulsions in some areas, and decisions by Arab authorities all played roles that varied from place to place.

Nor does the proposition that Arab states “created” the refugee crisis command broad historical consensus. What is more broadly accepted is that many Arab states subsequently chose policies that preserved refugee distinctiveness rather than encouraging full integration, often because permanent absorption was seen as abandoning claims of return or acquiescing in Israel’s legitimacy.

There is also a danger in drawing too neat a lesson from other twentieth-century displacements. Many of those “successful” examples came after immense suffering and often under conditions we would now regard as profoundly unjust. The Greek–Turkish exchange, the expulsions of Germans from Eastern Europe, and Partition in India all left deep scars that continue to shape politics generations later. Stability eventually emerged, but stability and justice are not identical things.

This recalls themes from that earlier essay of ours. There,  the argument was not that ethnic cleansing or forced population movements are unique, nor that Israel–Palestine should be detached from wider historical patterns. Rather, the point was almost the opposite: modern history itself appears built on recurring acts of uprooting and demographic engineering. Michael Mann called this “the dark side of democracy”: the tendency of modern states toward homogeneity, where political belonging becomes increasingly tied to identity.

The distinction matters because Ergas implicitly suggests that history eventually tidies itself up – that refugees are absorbed, wounds heal, and life moves on, except in the Palestinian case. The historical record appears less orderly. Displacement rarely disappears; it becomes memory, and memory becomes politics.

The Armenian diaspora still carries the memory of 1915. Partition remains embedded in Indian and Pakistani consciousness. The descendants of expelled Germans preserved memory of lost homelands for decades. Jewish memory of exile persisted for two millennia and became central to Zionism itself. Human beings have shown little inclination simply to reconcile themselves to history and forget.

Which brings us back to a previous discussion about stories and belonging in our Blue remembered hills (2) – the history we hold within us – Tolkien’s sub-creation, Scruton’s observations on home, Tyrion Lannister’s line that “there is nothing more powerful than a good story.” Nations are, among other things, stories people tell about themselves. Refugees do not merely lose houses or land; they lose continuity – the narrative linking memory, place and identity.

Palestinians constructed such a narrative around the Nakba. Israelis constructed one around return after exile and persecution. Both narratives contain truths; both contain mythologies; both can harden into absolutes.

That perhaps is the deeper tragedy. The problem was never simply refugee camps or UN agencies or demographic statistics. It was that two peoples built foundational stories around dispossession and return in the same small strip of land – your earlier “TARDIS nation”: a place physically tiny but historically and emotionally vast, where centuries of memory somehow occupy the same ground at the same time.

The twentieth century produced many displaced peoples. Most eventually found states, borders or political settlements that transformed exile into citizenship. Palestinians remain suspended between memory and statehood, between return and permanence. Whether this makes their situation unique is debatable. That it makes it unusually enduring is harder to deny.

The unravelling, then, may not be the Nakba itself, nor UNRWA, nor even 1948. It may be the wider unraveling of an older assumption: that history’s brutal rearrangements eventually settle into stable endings. History has shown a disconcerting habit of reopening what people believed was closed. And memory, unlike borders, seldom remains where states draw the lines.

What about ‘Whataboutism’?

When one widens the frame as we have dine here, an accusation appears sooner or later, often delivered with a certain weary certainty: whataboutism. The implication is not merely that one has made a weak argument but that one has committed a kind of moral sleight of hand- that by widening the frame one is really narrowing the conscience; that by speaking of Greeks and Armenians, Germans and Jews, Indians and Pakistanis, Bosnians and Rohingya, one is attempting to diminish Palestinians by dissolving them into statistics.

The charge deserves attention because there is such a thing as genuine whataboutism. The old Soviet formulation – and what about your own crimes? – was never an attempt at understanding. It was an escape hatch, a manoeuvre for changing the subject rather than addressing it. One suffering became a shield against discussing another. The object was evasion.

But comparison and evasion are not the same thing.

History itself is an exercise in comparison. Historians are forever placing one event beside another, not because they believe suffering can be ranked on some grotesque league table of misery, but because isolated events often become clearer when seen against a wider landscape. The Nakba did not occur on another planet. It unfolded amid a twentieth century that seemed to possess a grim talent for uprooting people from ancestral homes and redistributing them across maps with ruler-straight borders and bureaucratic efficiency. The century moved populations around with astonishing confidence, as though nations were puzzles whose pieces merely needed rearranging.

To note this is not to say that Palestinian suffering was unimportant, or unreal, or somehow cancelled out by the suffering of others. Human beings do not experience tragedy comparatively. Nobody standing beside a burning village pauses to think, yes, but larger displacements occurred elsewhere. People experience loss in the singular. The family home is not less mourned because millions of others lost theirs too.

And yet memory and history often operate differently. Memory looks inward. History looks outward. Memory says: this happened to us. History asks: where else has this happened, and why?

Perhaps the tension lies there.

Because the Holy Land –  a curious, poorly understood TARDIS territory, tiny on a map and infinite in emotional and historical dimensions – contains overlapping stories of exile and return. Palestinians built a national memory around dispossession; Israelis built one around return after exile and persecution. Both stories contain truth. Both contain myth. Both contain wounds carried across generations.

To place one beside wider human experience is not necessarily to belittle it. Sometimes it is the opposite. Sometimes it is an attempt to recognise that the Palestinian tragedy was not an aberration committed by monsters from another species, but part of a recurring and deeply human pattern – our alarming capacity to convince ourselves that peace, security or national redemption can be achieved by separating peoples and remaking maps.

The question, then, is not whether comparison itself is suspect. It is whether comparison is being used to illuminate or to dismiss.

The former enlarges understanding. The latter shrinks it.

And perhaps that distinction matters, because if modern history teaches anything, it is that human beings have shown little talent for forgetting and remarkable talent for carrying stories — stories of homes left behind, keys kept in drawers, vanished streets and remembered landscapes — across decades and across oceans.

Borders may eventually settle.

Memory seldom does.

Keys, homelands and the stories we carry within us

We did not weep
when we were leaving –
for we had neither
time nor tears
and there was no farewell.
We did not know
at the moment of parting
that it was a parting
so where would our weeping 
have come from?”
Taha Muhammad Ali

There is perhaps a further answer to the question of whether widening the frame becomes a form of whataboutism, and it lies in something written years earlier in In That Howling Infinite, in an essay on Mahmoud Darwish, Ismail Shammout and the symbolism of al-’awda –  return: Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]

That essay did not begin with demographic tables, refugee agencies, diplomatic resolutions or arguments about international law. It began instead with Darwish’s father and son, with a house left behind and a horse kept company in the absence of those who had gone. It entered history through memory rather than politics. The language was intimate and domestic because exile is experienced first not through abstractions but through ordinary things: streets once walked, kitchens once occupied, olive trees, neighbourhoods and names. Long before displacement becomes a political problem, it is a human one.

Darwish understood Palestine not merely as territory but as metaphor: a homeland certainly, but also a language of longing, absence and dispossession. Palestine became not simply a place on a map but a way of expressing exile itself. Around that idea grew al-’awda, the dream of return, symbolised by al-muftah, the key that appears throughout refugee camps, paintings and political iconography. The key became more than metal. It became continuity –  evidence that interrupted lives had not entirely ended. Villages might disappear, maps be redrawn, and landscapes altered beyond recognition, but the key remained as a quiet refusal to surrender memory.

The earlier essay eventually moved into more contested territory, discussing UNRWA, inherited refugee status and the possibility that institutions established to preserve refugee welfare had also preserved expectation itself, transforming temporary exile into a political condition transmitted across generations. Yet the order in which those arguments appeared matters. The essay did not begin by reducing Palestinians to a demographic question or a bureaucratic problem. It first sought to understand what loss meant to those who carried it.

Perhaps that touches upon the larger issue raised here. Comparative history and lived memory often ask different questions and operate at different scales. History asks about patterns, causes and precedents. It seeks connections and broader landscapes, comparing one experience with another to understand how societies and states behave across time. Memory is more particular and less interested in patterns. It concerns itself with the singular experience of those who lost something and who continue to carry the memory of that loss.

The two perspectives are not necessarily opposed, but neither are they interchangeable. Statistics without memory can become sterile and detached. Memory without wider historical context can harden into myth, becoming a self-contained narrative resistant to complication.

This has been a recurring theme across earlier discussions – from Tolkien’s idea of sub-creation and Scruton’s reflections on belonging to Tyrion Lannister’s observation that there is nothing in the world more powerful than a good story. Stories are not merely embellishments laid over identity; they often become identity itself. They explain where people came from, who they are, and where they imagine themselves to be going.

Palestinians built such a story around the Nakba and the hope of return. Jews built one around exile and return as well: Jerusalem remembered across centuries, prayers ending with Next Year in Jerusalem, memory transformed into national aspiration. Both peoples, in different ways, carried keys. Some were literal objects passed through generations; others existed in memory and imagination.

Perhaps this explains why the accusation of whataboutism can feel misplaced in such discussions. Comparison does not necessarily diminish suffering by placing it alongside other suffering. Sometimes it attempts the opposite. Sometimes it seeks to recognise that exile, loss and the desire for return are among the oldest and most enduring of human experiences.

The danger lies not in telling stories but in mistaking stories for complete maps of reality. A key can indeed open a door, but after enough years –  after generations have passed, after landscapes have changed and houses have disappeared – it may become something else entirely. It becomes not a practical instrument but a memory carried in the hand, a reminder that home is not always a physical place waiting patiently at the end of a road. Sometimes it survives most completely in the minds of those still searching for it.

In That Howling Infinite, May 2026

In That Howling Infinite  has recently published a long essay explaining its position with regard to what is probably the most intractable conflict in modern times: One Land, Two Peoples: History, Memory, Continuity, and Inheritance 

See also in In That Howling Infinite, Modern history is built upon exodus and displacement, Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout , We did not weep when we were leaving – the poet of Nazareth 

The featured picture at the head of this blog post is one of Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout’s striking illustrations of Al Nakba, the dispossession of tens of thousands of Palestinian Arabs during Israel’s war of independence, from In That Howling Infinite’s Visualizing the Palestinian Return – the art of Ismail Shammout]

Al Miftah

How the Arab world recast the Nakba

Every May, Nakba Day, with its noisy demonstrations on our streets, brings the same charge against Israel: that the displacement of some 700,000 Palestinians in 1948 was a unique crime in modern history. The reverse is closer to the truth. Almost nothing about the Palestinian exodus was singular. What was singular – and which still disfigures the lives of Palestinians, Israelis and the wider world – is what was done with it ­afterwards.

For two centuries, modern states have been built on the unmixing of peoples. The idea is older than the romantic nationalists who weaponised it. Ferdinand and Isabella expelled the Jews from Spain in 1492, and Philip III the Moriscos a century later, precisely because they could no longer imagine a unified crown ruling a religiously mixed people. France’s revolutionary Jacobins, alarmed at Breton, Provencal and Alsatian, declared linguistic uniformity the price of citizenship; Mazzini and his epigoni said much the same for Italy.

Even that arch-liberal John Stuart Mill argued in 1861 that ­representative institutions could scarcely function in countries divided among “different nationalities” speaking different languages.

Bismarck drew the operational conclusion, expelling tens of thousands of Polish and Jewish “foreigners” from Prussia’s eastern provinces in 1885-86 – a program regarded at the time as enlightened statecraft and applauded throughout the liberal press of central Europe.

The unmixing accelerated as the great land empires – Ottoman, Habsburg, Romanov – gave way to nation-states. The Crimean War alone drove 900,000 Muslims from the Caucasus and Crimea into Ottoman territory; the Balkan Wars and the First World War uprooted two million more.

By 1923, the movements were no longer an incidental consequence of war; they were being designed. The burning of Smyrna in September 1922, which destroyed one of the great cosmopolitan cities of the eastern Mediterranean and drove 200,000 Greeks and Armenians into the harbour while Allied warships looked on, made any continued Greek presence in Anatolia impossible – and the world’s diplomats simply codified the new reality.

The Lausanne Convention of January 1923 compelled roughly 1.3 million Greek Orthodox to leave Anatolia for Greece and 400,000 Muslims to leave Greece for Turkey, stripping each of nationality, their possessions and any right of return. Cretan Muslims who had never seen Anatolia and knew only Greek were shipped to Anatolia; Cappadocian Greeks who knew only Turkish were shipped to Greece.

Set against the Armenian genocide of 1915, the exchange was hailed as humane and progressive, and Athens and Ankara settled into the longest peace they had ever known. Raymond Poincare spoke for the age when he concluded that “the mixture of populations of different races and religions has been the main cause of troubles and of war”.

That lesson governed what came next. In 1944, with Hitler’s empire collapsing, Churchill told the Commons he was “not alarmed by the prospect of the ­disentanglement of populations”. The Potsdam Agreement formalised it, providing for the expulsion of 12 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe.

The 1948 Palestinian exodus, known in Arabic as the Nakba. Picture: via Getty Images

The 1948 Palestinian exodus, known in Arabic as the Nakba. Picture: via Getty Images

The German share of Czechoslovakia’s population fell from 23 per cent to less than 2 within five years, under Benes’ decrees that stripped ethnic Germans of citizenship and property overnight. Equally, Poland’s minorities, 30 per cent of its inter-war population, were reduced to under 5 per cent; in 1947, the Ukrainian remnant was forcibly scattered across the new western territories to prevent any cohesive ethnic block reforming.

Meanwhile, the dismantling of Japan’s empire moved another five million Japanese back from Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin, often after long internment, while Koreans and Chinese were marched in the opposite direction. And in 1947, Partition uprooted between 12 and 20 million people on the subcontinent; Pakistani Punjab’s Hindus and Sikhs went from 20 per cent of the population to 0.2 per cent in four years, amid massacres on the Lahore-Delhi railway that nobody who lived through them ever forgot.

Shortly afterwards it was the turn of the Jewish communities of Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Morocco.

Some 800,000 people, whose ancestors had lived in those lands for two millennia, were evicted, forced to flee or statutorily expelled, losing their nationality and all their assets in the process. Iraq’s Jews, once 40 per cent of Baghdad’s population and producers of the country’s first finance minister, were down to under 1 per cent within five years.

In each case the expectation was the same: the receiving state would absorb its co-religionists or co-ethnics and prevent revanchism. Ataturk’s Turkey did exactly that – any attempts by the Muslims expelled from Greece to organise politically were firmly ­repressed.

So did the Allied occupiers, and then Adenauer’s Federal Republic, banning refugee parties in Germany and shutting down any attempt at creating new ones. Forced to accommodate to their new country, West Germany’s 12 million expellees – many of whom either spoke no German or antique forms of German locals could barely understand – powered the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) and helped ­rebuild Germany’s fabled network of small firms.

Nor were they alone in proving a source of flexibility and innovation. In West Bengal, Hindus expelled from East Bengal transformed the jute industry, making it a pillar of India’s economy. The million-odd North Koreans who fled south during and after the Korean War, Chung Ju-yung of Hyundai prominent among them, supplied the entrepreneurial core of what became the South Korean miracle.

Israel, for its part, absorbed almost the entirety of the displaced Jews of the Arab lands: Operation Ezra and Nehemiah airlifted some 120,000 Iraqi Jews in 1950-51; Operation Magic Carpet flew 49,000 Yemenite Jews to Israel in 1949-50; Operation Moses, in 1984, collected the Beta Israel from the Sudanese desert, every wave transforming the country and yielding generations of military heroes and entrepreneurs.

Palestinian fighters beside a burned-out Israeli Haganah supply truck near Jerusalem in 1948. Picture: via Getty Images

Palestinian fighters beside a Haganah supply truck near Jerusalem in 1948. Picture: Getty Images

The pain was always immense; the absorption, almost everywhere, successful. Almost everywhere. For the Palestinians were the single, decisive exception.

In 1948, the Arab states had launched a war the Arab League’s Secretary-General announced would be “a war of extermination and a memorable massacre comparable to the Mongol massacres and the Crusades”, urged on by the rector of Cairo’s Al-Azhar Mosque, who told Muslims resident in Mandatory Palestine to “leave the territory temporarily so that our warriors can freely undertake their task of extermination”.

But unlike every other immediate historical precedent, the Arab states, having lost the war, refused to absorb the refugees their own actions had created. King Abdullah I of Jordan, who alone among Arab leaders had been prepared to come to terms with Israel and absorb the Palestinians, was assassinated at al-Aqsa in 1951 – a warning that subsequent Arab rulers heeded, until Anwar Sadat repeated the gesture in 1981 and met the same fate.

Predictably, the UN played a major role in the tragedy. Of the roughly 50 million people displaced by the Second World War and its aftermath, only two groups – Koreans and Palestinians – were given country-specific UN refugee agencies, and both were meant to be temporary. The UN Korean Reconstruction Agency wound up in 1958. UNRWA’s own founding report warned that “sustained relief operations inevitably contain the germ of human deterioration” and committed to speedily shut down.

Seven decades later, UNRWA still exists. It employs roughly 31,000 staff to serve almost six ­million registered “refugees”, the overwhelming majority of whom were born decades after 1948 and have never set foot in Mandatory Palestine. A fifth-generation Gazan whose ancestors left Jaffa remains classified as a refugee in a way that would be inconceivable anywhere else on earth.

The result was not merely administrative absurdity but political radicalisation. From the Cairo Agreement of 1969 onwards, the Palestinian camps in Lebanon became autonomous political and military zones. There and elsewhere, UNRWA facilities rapidly evolved into an integral part of the terrorist infrastructure.

Refugeehood ceased to be a temporary humanitarian condition and became an institutionalised political identity organised around the goal of destroying Israel, in an illusion that has instead destroyed generation after generation of Palestinians.

The Nakba charade

Those, in short, are the historical realities. But they do nothing to prevent the annual Nakba charade from insisting that Israel committed a uniquely monstrous act of “ethnic cleansing” in 1948.

Well, if ethnic homogenisation was truly the goal, Israel pursued it with startling incompetence. Arab citizens of Israel today are roughly a fifth of the population, a share slightly larger than at independence. And far from being “ethnically cleansed”, Israel is by far the most plural state in its region with its population Jewish (Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, Ethiopian, Russian), Arab Muslim, Christian, Druze, Circassian and Baha’i.

Compare that with northern Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots went from 82 per cent of the population in 1973 to zero within two years of the Turkish invasion.

Erdogan nevertheless stands among the loudest voices accusing Israel of practising precisely what Turkey has long excelled at – the expulsion and displacement of unwanted peoples, most recently the Kurds of northern Syria. Nor is Turkey alone. Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemeni workers in 1990 in retaliation for Sana’a’s tilt towards Saddam Hussein, while Kuwait expelled every single one of its 400,000 Palestinians in 1991 for the same offence.

These were not isolated episodes of political vengeance or wartime coercion. They formed part of a much broader regional trajectory: the ongoing, largely forced displacement and disappearance of the Muslim Middle East’s non-Muslim and minority populations.

Albert Hourani’s Minorities in the Arab World (1947) brilliantly mapped a region whose Christians, Jews, Yazidis, Druze, Alawites and countless smaller communities sustained a dense and intricate civic fabric. It was, unfortunately, a world on the cusp of extinction.

Today, the Christian share of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon combined – around 11 per cent in 1945 – has fallen to 3 per cent, and the decline is accelerating. Syria’s Christians have declined from 9.7 per cent of its population in 1970 to under 2 per cent today; Iraq’s, once above 6 per cent, are well under 1 per cent; Egypt’s Copts continue their long erosion, from 8 per cent to no more than 3 per cent. Lebanon’s Christians, who made up over half of the population in 1970, are now below a third.

Nor is it a question of Christians alone. The Zoroastrians, whose religion once shaped an empire from the Indus to the Nile, have vanished from the Arab Middle East.

The Yazidis were enslaved and slaughtered in their thousands at Sinjar by Islamic State in 2014, in what was unquestionably a genocide. The Man­daeans of southern Iraq, who numbered 60,000 a generation ago, are now a remnant of perhaps 4,000. Almost everywhere, the Baha’is and Ahmadis have fled.

Stark contrast

As for the Jews, they are entirely gone, a population of close to a million across the Arab world reduced to a few thousand, almost all elderly; Egypt’s once 80,000-strong community now numbers in the low hundreds, and Yemen’s 50,000-strong Jewry, planted there in antiquity, was essentially lifted out by Operation Magic Carpet, with the Houthi takeover erasing the few that remained.

The trend is unmistakeable, the contrast stark. While the West accommodates ever more Muslims, the Arab world accommodates ever fewer non-Muslims. Its activists and their Western fellow travellers demand multiculturalism elsewhere; they ruthlessly deny it at home. They denounce Israel; but they are the ones engaged in the systematic destruction of ethnic and religious variety.

That is the historical fact the Nakba charade cannot accommodate. The 20th century normalised population transfer on a colossal scale, and the suffering it caused was sustained, widespread and ­immense.

But no international movement emerged demanding the restoration of Breslau to Germany, the ethnic reconstitution of the Sudetenland, a right of return for the Jews thrown out of the Arab lands, or hereditary refugee status for the descendants of the enormous population movements that swept across what had been British India. The displaced were expected to rebuild their lives where they arrived. However ­brutal the process, however bitter the pain, the governing assumption was clear: refugeehood was to disappear, not reproduce itself across generations.

The Palestinians alone were taught a different lesson – and that is the true Palestinian uniqueness. They were told not to end refugeehood but to preserve and reify it; not to build a future where they were, but to await the destruction of the state beside them; not to reconcile themselves to history, but to believe that history itself could be reversed.

For 75 years, generation after generation has been raised on that promise. It has brought not return but ruin, not recovery but repeated catastrophe. And as Gaza now demonstrates once again, it is the Palestinians themselves who pay the highest price for the post-war world’s longest and costliest political fraud.

The past is never past … and reappears unexpectedly

Time is an ocean but it ends at the shore
You may not see me tomorrow

Bob Dylan

A wander through the foggy ruins of time …

We had been having conversations at home about Jewish people I had known when I was a young schoolboy. We’ve had a lot to talk about on matters like this in this hate filled times. I recalled that from memory, there were not that many to speak of. In those days, in the early and mid-1960s at Moseley Grammar School in Birmingham, there were, as I remember it, only four openly Jewish boys in the school. There may have been a Jewish teacher, but I’m not certain. Though Moseley was non-denominational, it was very much C of E in plain clothes. The Jewish boys and Catholics like myself – they weren’t many of these either, a dozen, maybe –  would enter the daily school assembly after the routine prayers and hymns, walking in like latter day penitents to stand in the back row. We were excused from scripture lessons even though these studied the same Old Testament – “excused” meant we would still sit in the classroom but could do private study (though I enjoyed listening in on the lesson).

Now, we often talk about memory here at In That Howling Infinite. Memories of our pasts, our younger selves, do not arrive with trumpets. They present themselves all of a sudden, unannounced and often sideways: through a stray remark on the couch of an evening; through a conversation about people once known; through one of those odd moments when the mind, unbidden, opens a door long thought shut and a forgotten face enters the room.

And Nicholas Molnar walked through that door …

On impulse, I went looking for one of those Jewish lads, one whom I had been friends with during my final years of Grammar School; and Google brought up an obituary that reminded me that while I was busy becoming older, so was he.

It was written by members of the the Forres Friends of Woods and Fields, an environmental and community garden group based some 40 km east of the northern Scottish town of Inverness, and it paid tribute to their founder and chairperson who had just passed on. It got me wandering and wondering through my backpages

We were born in the same year, 1949, and arrived at Moseley at roughly the same time, in September 1960, remaining there until the summer of 1967 (though I stayed another year). The son of German/Austrian parents who had escaped from Nazi Germany, Nick was small of stature, with curly hair, a prominent nose, and friendly, laughing eyes – an expression that always seemed on the verge of amusement. He was very bright, academically gifted, and a natural actor.

School drama productions in those days had a peculiar and often unimaginative tendency to cast according to what teachers thought somehow “fitted”. Nick, being Jewish, often found himself cast in Jewish roles. Looking back now, one raises an eyebrow at the assumptions involved, but at the time it seemed merely how the world worked.

I remember him particularly in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot and Wolf Mankowitz’s dark comedy The Bespoke Overcoat, a poignant and comic reimagining of Nikolai Gogol’s The Overcoat, itself a story carrying echoes of Jewish life and exile. These were esoteric two-handers (not quite what one would expect in grammar school drama production*) with one of the other Jewish boys – Chris Field, another outstanding student and gifted actor. The pair of them together had an ease on stage that some people spend a lifetime trying to acquire. Nick’s brother in law wrote to me recently of his prodigious mastery of comic timing in The Bespoke Overcoat: ‘I had been putting in a good deal of time at The Crescent Theatre and thought I knew a bit about stagecraft, but had to admit that I was no match for him when it came to acting talent. Taking stock in a garment warehouse, he brought the house down with: “Two dozen Flying Jackets?…. ( long pause) …With such a coat a man can fly?”’

Young Nick, on the left, with his dad and brother

I cannot recall how Nick and I became pals. Nor do I remember much about the details of our friendship. But I often visited his home – in Moseley, I think, not far from our school – probably during school holidays.

I do recall that he bought a canoe and took to paddling Brum’s many canals. “Canoe, canal,” he would often refrain. At the time I thought it quite eccentric.

He then bought a second-hand Lambretta scooter. Those scooters possessed a strange glamour, belonging to a brave new world of Mods and movement and urban freedom – and, indeed, rebellion. A couple of my schoolmates had one and sported those long-tailed parkas that later featured in Quadrophenia. I envied them for the speed and freedom and would have loved to do likewise, but that required means and parental permission, and I had neither.

And then our schooldays drew to an end and we put off schoolboy things and ventured out into the wide world – the great divide that so often arrives at the end of adolescence: university, cities, the widening world.

Nick went up to university in London. I am fairly sure it was the LSE, or somewhere very near it in central London. I hitched down to visit him and stayed in his bedsit –  an atmosphere peculiar to student life where one exists in a halfway house between adolescence and whatever comes next.

Was it once or several times? I cannot recall. But I have an image of scooting through wet, wintry streets on the back of a Lambretta.

And he took me to what I recall as the Soviet Bookshop, though it may well have been Collet’s in Charing Cross Road. We had both developed a left-wing outlook on the world, and London at that time possessed a whole ecology of ideas. One could drift through central London moving from second-hand bookshops to political shops to cafés where everybody seemed convinced history itself had reached a point of imminent transformation.

352 Charing Cross Road, London

Young people have always believed they stand on the threshold of a new age, but the late sixties had a particular confidence in this regard. Revolutions seemed possible. Societies looked malleable. One felt that history had become less a thing to study than a thing with which one might personally engage.

This was the life, I thought, mindful that I too would soon be taking that road.

Within a year I had left Birmingham for Reading in Oxfordshire and my own particular diversions, and, distractions. Unlike my upper sixth peers, I spent an extra year at Moseley, an unplanned and strange sabbatical during which I hitchhiked around Britain and nurtured my interest in history and politics. In what looks now in retrospect as one of life’s strange coincidences, in the Spring of 1967, I traveled the A98, the long road linking Aberdeen to Inverness – passing through Forres. I slept on the roadside somewhere near the Culloden battlefield and woke in the morning covered in snow.

Though London featured prominently, creatively and romantically in my university years, and I lived there from 1971 until 1978,  and though Nick and I may often have been in close proximity – I returned to that Russian book store several times , buying Lenin’s polemical pamphlets for my uni studies, Russian Revolution posters, and even, inspired by seeing Jethro Tull live, a balalaika (which I never learned to play) – I was never to see him again.

Until he walked through that door in our conversations here in the Tarkeeth forest – in the form of an obituary.

We lost touch – around 1968 –  as people sometimes do. Lives branch quietly. Then suddenly fifty or sixty years have passed and one discovers that entire lives have unfolded beyond one’s sight.

The strangest thing is that memory often preserves people at a fixed age. In my mind’s eye Nick remained perpetually young: climbing onto his Lambretta in his mod anorak, wandering through London, talking undergraduate politics, dropping me at the Tube station for my hitchhike back to Birmingham for school on Monday morning, and then heading off toward some unknowable future.

There is something poignant and bittersweet in discovering that the person you met a lifetime ago had not vanished after all, but had simply carried on further down the road, a.road that, for all its geographical, cultural, and social differences, might have been running parallel to my own.

Riffing on Nick’s biography – a life of service to community and environment as described below in the Forres Friends tribute –  I too became involved in student politics and protests in 1968 and 1969, including demonstrations against the Vietnam War in London, though I later parted company with politics in pursuit of more hedonistic things. I too travelled after graduation – my destiny lay in the Middle East and along the famous Hippie Trail to India and back.

My journey eventually carried me to Australia, where I now live out my latter years in a wildlife reserve and conservation area in the forests of northern New South Wales, caring for the bush while my wife tends our large vegetable garden. En route I have been an accountant, a folk singer, and an activist in Australia’s interminable forest wars.

People often imagine lives changing direction dramatically. We speak of transformations and reinventions. Yet perhaps character is more like a river than a sequence of disconnected events. It bends; it narrows; it widens; but somehow remains recognisably itself.

I had gone looking for a boy I once knew and found a life instead – a rich, generous, deeply lived life that had unfolded beyond my sight. We began with a door opening and a familiar face walking back into the room, but behind that remembered face lay an entire unseen life. There is a curious sadness in such rediscoveries. I found Nick again after all these years, only to discover that he had already rounded the bend and passed out of sight.

As Bob Dylan’s lines at the head of this memoire tell us, it is a reminder of how finite life is …

Paul Hemphill, May 2026

* But then again, maybe not. The young teacher who looked after school drama was of a bohemian bent, and in extracurricular drama classes, he introduced us sixth-formers to the plays of the “Angry Young Men” (a prominent group of working- and middle-class British writers and playwrights who emerged in 1950s postwar Britain), including Arnold Wesker and Joe Orton, and organised outings to the old Birmingham Repertory Theatre (back then, in its Stevenson Street location) to see contemporary plays. Regarding that school production of The Bespoke Overcoat, there actually a third, albeit minor character in the play: Fender’s cruel boss, Ranting. Another old school chum made contact recently (see the comments below) having read this tribute, and informed me that he played that part – “the only gentile” in the tiny cast.

In Tall Tales, small stories and eulogies, see more about my London in the nineteen sixties and seventies:  A Window on a Gone World … London days; Something about London; Song of the Road (1) – my hitchhiking days;; and Ciao Pollo di Soho – the cafe at the end of the M1

In That Howling Infinite has also written more generally about the nature of nostalgia. See: Blue remembered hills – a land of lost contentment (There is a précis of this below), and Blue remembered hills (2) – the history we hold within us

Forres Friends of Woods and Fields founder Nick Molnar passes away peacefully

Garry McCartney, The Northern Scott, 09 December 2025

A hard-working member of the community with a passion for the environment has passed away.

Forres Friends of Woods and Fields (FFWF) founder and chairman, Nick Molnar, 76, is survived by his wife and fellow volunteer Pippa, brother Michael, sister Nina and their families.

Nick (right) in the early days of the Chapelton polytunnel funded by the Berry Burn windfarm Community Fund.
The early days of the Chapelton polytunnel funded by the Berry Burn windfarm Community Fund.

FFWF chairman, Mick Drury, confirmed he also leaves the charity’s 26 diverse acres of land to be continued to be used for local community food production as well as a space to reconnect with nature.

The town has lost a core member of the community,” he said. “Nick was known for his warmth, helpfulness and involvement with a range of local projects. He had a lifetime’s commitment to the land and to building community.”

Nick was born in 1949 in Hertfordshire to German/Austrian refugees from the Nazi regime of the Second World war, spending most of his childhood in Birmingham.

He studied anthropology at university in London, taking part in student protests in 1967. After graduating, he travelled the world.

Nick then lived in Camphill communities in Norway, Ireland, England and Perthshire – supporting people with additional needs through work on the land. Camphill communities are residential communities and schools that provide support for the education, employment, and daily lives of adults and children with developmental disabilities, mental health problems, or other special needs.

Nick sowing in the Chapelton polytunnel.

 

Over the last five years, FFWF has been Nick’s life’s work, particularly after establishing its community garden at Chapelton.

Mick said: “His commitment and hard work have left a lasting legacy. A core group of volunteers meet there to work together weekly, harvesting for their own needs and making regular donations to Moray’s foodbank.”

The group’s summer open days are very popular now – Nick was always on-hand to welcome attendees and build new relationships.

“He’d always be out supporting the town’s apple and tattie days,” added Mick. “At home, he and Pen would be busy preserving soft fruits, making pickles and chutneys, sauerkraut and kimchi.”

Nick at the growing field and garden near Chapelton Farm.
Nick at the growing field and garden near Chapelton Farm.

Nick’s love of traditional skills and crafts of the countryside led to him trying his hand. Scything was a particular interest, and he was arrested for scything genetically modified crops on the Black Isle in 2001 when a test site was established there.

He was a keen reader and had a great interest in folk music, learning to play the violin in recent years.

Nick passed away at home just over a week after suffering a serious stroke. He was supported by his family, by Kate Clark from the Pushing up the Daisies bereaved charity, and with the “wonderful” assistance of the district nurses.

He was given a quiet send-off at Chapelton, with piper Rory O’Connell and a private green burial. There will be a life celebration for Nick in the new year. Messages of condolence are asked to be sent to forresfriends@gmail.com.

“We are blessed to have known Nick,” finished Mick, “and we will miss him greatly.”

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About Forres, Findhorn and Camphill

Forres is an historic market town in Moray in northeast Scotland, situated approximately 25 miles (40 km) east of Inverness and about 12 miles (19 km) west of Elgin, nestled between fertile farmland and the coast of the Moray Firth. Just 5 miles (8 km) north-east of Forres, a journey of little more than ten minutes by car, lies the small coastal village of Findhorn, set beside Findhorn Bay and opening onto the North Sea. Although distinct places, Forres and Findhorn have long existed in each other’s orbit: one a traditional Highland town with ancient roots, the other a village internationally known for its ecological and communal experiments.

Within this landscape sits Forres Friends of Woods and Fields (FFWF), a community woodland and garden project founded in 2020 by my old school chum Nic Molnar, who served as its founder and chair. The organisation brings together practical environmental work with a strong sense of community life, creating shared spaces where volunteers plant and grow food, manage woodland, support biodiversity, and learn sustainable land practices. Yet projects such as this are about more than gardens and trees. Their ethos is equally social: people gathering for a few hours of work, conversation, and companionship – “a blether and a cup of tea,” as the organisation itself cheerfully puts it. In that sense, FFWF reflects an older village ideal recast in modern form: a communal space where practical labour and human connection become intertwined.

The broader region also carries the influence of the Camphill Communities, an international movement founded in Scotland in 1940 by Karl König and fellow refugees from Nazi Europe. Based on principles of shared living and mutual care, Camphill sought to create communities in which people with learning disabilities and additional support needs lived and worked as equal participants rather than as institutional recipients of care. Farms, gardens, workshops, schools, and shared homes became central features of community life. The Moray region around Forres and Findhorn later developed into one of Camphill’s most significant centres, helping establish the area’s reputation for social innovation, community-based living, and environmental engagement. The underlying principles of König’s Camphill school were derived from concepts of education and social life outlined decades earlier by anthroposophistRudolf Steiner(1861–1925). Today there are over 100 communities worldwide, in more than 20 countries, mainly in Europe, but also in North America and Southern Africa

Findhorn itself added another layer to this local culture through the emergence of the Findhorn Foundation, whose experiments in ecological living and sustainability attracted international attention from the 1960s onward. Together, these overlapping influences –  the traditional town of Forres, the intentional and ecological communities of Findhorn, the Camphill movement, and local initiatives such as Forres Friends of Woods and Fields – have created a small corner of Scotland that is geographically modest yet unusually rich in ideas about community, stewardship, and shared ways of living.

Précis: Blue Remembered Hills — a land of lost contentment

Nostalgia is one of those curious human afflictions that sits somewhere between memory and myth. The Greeks called it nostos: the longing for home, the ache of return. Homer built The Odyssey around it. Houseman called childhood “the land of lost content”. We all know the feeling: that sudden gust of memory carrying with it a place that perhaps never quite existed in the form we remember it. A song, a smell, a taste, a street corner glimpsed through rain –  and suddenly one is standing again in those “blue remembered hills”.

The trouble is that nostalgia can be both consolation and deception. Memory does not preserve the past like amber trapping an insect; it edits, softens, rearranges and, occasionally, invents. It is less a historical archive than a film editor’s cutting room. We tend to remember not the world as it was, but the world as it felt. Childhood roads seem wider when revisited, old houses smaller, old certainties larger. Looking backward is a little like looking in a rear-view mirror: objects appear closer than they really are.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Quite the opposite. Nostalgia often provides continuity in a world moving at bewildering speed. Long-term memory can become a kind of inner refuge, perhaps even biology’s consolation prize for ageing. As we move through life, the past gradually acquires sovereignty over the present. The older we get, the more we discover that Hartley was probably right: the past really is another country. More disconcertingly, we begin to realise it has become home.

Yet nostalgia also has its darker uses. It can become what South Park hilariously called “memberberries”: seductive little fragments of selective memory that rot the brain with sentimental half-truths. “Remember when things were better?” they whisper. Remember when streets were cleaner, people knew their place, children behaved, and chips came wrapped in newspaper? The problem is that these memories often airbrush out the less attractive features of the era: poverty, prejudice, corporal punishment, rigid social hierarchies, casual cruelty and exclusion. There is a tendency to remember cohesion while forgetting whom that cohesion excluded.

And nowhere is this more visible than in those sprawling Facebook nostalgia communities now largely colonised by us boomers. They are fascinating anthropological sites – digital village greens where people gather not to discuss wars, elections or grand historical events but milkmen, street sweepers, bin men, old sweets, cassettes and television programmes long vanished into history.

At first glance it all appears harmless enough: a warm bath of collective memory. Yet beneath pictures of “proper bin men” and school playgrounds often lurk deeper currents of anxiety and resentment. The mundane becomes symbolic. The old milkman becomes shorthand for social trust; the local high street for community; black-and-white photographs of tidy streets for a world supposedly more ordered and comprehensible.

What many are mourning, however, may not be the world itself so much as their own place within it. We do not merely miss old streets or old songs; we miss younger versions of ourselves inhabiting them. We miss possibility. We miss novelty. We miss being twenty and imagining that life was still unfolding rather than slowly arranging itself into memory.

The political danger arrives when nostalgia stops being reflective and becomes restorative — when longing for the past becomes a demand to reconstruct it. The right has often understood this instinct well. It does not necessarily need to persuade people of a compelling future if it can offer an idealised yesterday. “Take back control”, “make things great again”, “return to traditional values”: all are variations on the same emotional melody.

But return tickets are unavailable. The past cannot be restored because it never truly existed in the form imagined. There were never really “good old days”; there were simply days – complicated, contradictory and viewed through younger eyes.

None of this means memory should be discarded. Far from it. There is immense pleasure in basking in les temps perdus. I happily indulge in musical rabbit holes and Facebook reminiscences myself. Songs especially are magical portals because music does not merely remind us of the past –  it briefly resurrects it. A song can collapse fifty years in three minutes.

But I would still choose today.

For all its noise and absurdity, for all the algorithms, grievances and existential clutter of modern life, today contains wonders unimaginable to my younger self. Medicine keeps people alive who once would not have survived. Knowledge sits literally in our hands. Distances have collapsed. Possibilities have expanded.

The trick perhaps is to hold memory gently: to enjoy nostalgia without becoming captive to it. To remember that we are, as Maria Popova put it, all our previous selves stacked inside us like Russian matryoshka dolls –  not discarded versions, but incorporated ones.

The little boy still exists somewhere in the old streets and schoolyards and songs. He is still playing in the enchanted forest with Pooh and Christopher Robin.

 

Blue remembered hills (2) – the history we hold within us

What unites people?” Armies? Gold? Flags?” No. It’s stories, he said. “There’s nothing in the world more powerful than a good story. Nothing can stop it. No enemy can defeat it. And who has a better story than Bran the Broken? The boy who fell from a high tower and lived… He’s our memory. The keeper of all our stories. The wars, weddings, births, massacres, famines, our triumphs, our defeats, our past. Who better to lead us into the future?”
Tyrion Lannister, Game of Thrones, Season 8

A couple of years ago In That Howling Infinite published a long meditation on nostalgiaentitled Blue remembered hills – a land of lost contentment. It wandered through Housman and Homer, Facebook nostalgia groups and old LPs and cassette tapes, Spike Milligan and Dusty Springfield, milkmen and memberberries, touching along the way on memory, ageing, and that curious ache that seems to settle upon us as the years accumulate and our lives begin to look less like roads stretching ahead and more like maps folded and unfolded over time.

This ramble through memory’s brambles was never really about the past itself. It was about our relationship with the past – why we keep glancing over our shoulders even as technology either frog-marches us unwillingly into the future or lures us there like the sirens of yore; why old songs can unexpectedly inflict  sweet pain; why memories unsummoned but never ignored can transport us across decades with a force that no deliberate act of memory quite manages. It was very much about that peculiar territory where memory, longing and identity overlap.

In an essay published in The Australian and republished below, sociologist Frank Furedi covers much the same terrain, thought from a somewhat different direction and with a more explicitly political destination in mind.

It him brought me back immediately to Blue Remembered Hills because I realised we were traversing similar landscapes, though perhaps by different paths. He is concerned principally with nostalgia as a cultural and political phenomenon; I was more interested in nostalgia as a human condition, a state of mind, perhaps even a permanent feature of consciousness itself. Yet the overlap is considerable, and worth exploring.

Furedi begins with an observation that feels difficult to dispute. In contemporary political and cultural discourse, nostalgia is rarely employed as a neutral descriptor. It usually arrives as an accusation. To describe someone as nostalgic is no longer simply to suggest wistfulness or sentimentality; it increasingly carries implications of intellectual weakness or moral deficiency. Nostalgia becomes shorthand for reactionary impulses, coded language for a desire to return to a world in which minorities “knew their place,” women remained within prescribed roles, social conformity prevailed, and authority went largely unquestioned. This conservatism itself is often dismissed as little more than “weaponised nostalgia.”

Furedi argues that this caricature misses something fundamental about human beings. We require continuity. Individuals and societies alike need some sense of connection across time if they are to understand themselves. Identity does not simply emerge from acts of self-invention. We understand who we are partly through knowing where we have come from, and that understanding is transmitted through families, customs, traditions, rituals, stories and shared memories. Drawing upon psychologists such as Erik Erikson and Roy Baumeister, Furedi suggests that stable identities depend upon linking past, present and future together. When that continuity is disrupted, people become untethered. The de-authorisation of the past – the tendency to regard inherited traditions chiefly through the lens of their failures – risks creating citizens detached not merely from particular customs but from historical memory itself. In this formulation, nostalgia becomes less an irrational yearning for a golden age than a search for home.

Reading him, I was reminded immediately of Roger Scruton’s small-c conservatism and also of one of the most resonant lines in English literature, from Thomas Babington Macaulay’s Horatius at the Bridge: “And how can man die better/Than facing fearful odds/For the ashes of his fathers/And the temples of his gods?”

The line is often invoked in patriotic contexts, but its significance extends well beyond nationalism. Macaulay was attempting to articulate what people fight for when circumstances become existential. They do not fight primarily for policy settings or administrative arrangements or economic forecasts. They fight for inheritance. “The ashes of his fathers” speaks of continuity itself – reverence for ancestors, memory, sacrifice, lineage and identity accumulated across generations. “The temples of his gods” points towards those sacred structures, literal and metaphorical, that provide coherence and meaning: religion perhaps, but also customs, symbols, institutions and moral frameworks. And “facing fearful odds” follows naturally once these things matter deeply enough.

In Macaulay’s poem, the Roman soldier is not merely defending a bridge into Rome. He is defending an entire civilisational story and all that has been invested in this: ancestry, faith and ultimate sacrifice – the belief that preserving one’s inherited world can be a noble undertaking. The late British philosopher Roger Scruton understood something similar. His conservatism was not fundamentally ideological but ecological. Human beings live within webs of affection and obligation that they inherit rather than construct. Home, family, language, neighbourhood and nation are not assembled from scratch like flat-pack furniture. They are inherited houses, perhaps imperfect and drafty, requiring repair and maintenance, but home, nonetheless. Burning them down because some parts are structurally unsound rarely ends well.

This is where Blue Remembered Hills perhaps parts company slightly with Furedi, because while it shares his concern regarding continuity, it remains cautious about nostalgia itself – or more accurately, nostalgia in excess.

As it observed, “nostalgia is not just wanting to go back to something that no longer exists but wanting to go back because it no longer exists”. That distinction matters because memory is not a neutral recording device. Memory is an artist, and often a romantic one. It edits and embellishes. It softens edges and airbrushes imperfections. Like objects in a rear-view mirror, the past often appears larger and closer than it actually was. The roads where we grew up seem wider; summers seem longer; music seems better; friendships seem deeper; and the world itself somehow appears more coherent and comprehensible.

Or, as in AE Housman’s “land of lost content”, “The happy highways where I went/And cannot come again”, the oft remembered lines from The Shropshire Lad. The crucial phrase here is not happy but cannot come again, because the longing itself derives partly from irretrievability. The ache comes not simply from what was, but from knowing it has gone forever.

This is where the distinction made by the late artist and scholar Svetlana Boym becomes useful. She wrote of two forms of nostalgia: restorative nostalgia which attempts to rebuild the lost world and reflective nostalgia which simply contemplates its loss.

The distinction matters enormously because much contemporary politics increasingly resembles restorative nostalgia. Whether in “Make America Great Again”, “Take Back Control” ans national flag marches in England and Australia, or broader calls to restore traditional values, the promise offered is not remembrance but return. Yet return is impossible. The world changes, and we change with it. Lewis Carroll put it succinctly through Alice: “It’s no use going back to yesterday, because I was a different person then”. Reflective nostalgia, by contrast, understands that the longing itself may reveal something important.

This was what was fascinated about the Facebook nostalgia communities discussed in Blue Remembered Hills. On the surface, people appear to be reminiscing about milkmen, trams, proper binmen, fish-and-chip shops, sweet shops, old television programmes and the countless banalities of everyday life. Yet they are rarely mourning the objects themselves. Nobody seriously wants coal deliveries or outside toilets back. Very few wish to exchange modern medicine for the old days or surrendering a smart phone wired to the world for queuing up outside a telephone kiosk in winter rain and then fumbling with pennies to connect.  What they seem to miss is something much harder to define: predictability, familiarity, social coherence and a sense that the world itself made sense.

And here lies the danger, because loss can become attached to myth. The comments beneath nostalgic posts often drift rapidly from warm recollection towards grievance. “Everyone knew their place.” “People respected authority.” “Families stayed together.” “Children behaved.” “Things were simpler.” Much of Blue Remembered Hills wandered through precisely these landscapes because nostalgia communities frequently become repositories not merely for memory but also for disappointment and dislocation.

Not always, of course. Often, they are charming and deeply touching. But they can also become vessels carrying resentment. The difficulty is that social solidarity and exclusion frequently travelled together. The supposedly cohesive worlds people remember often contained rigid hierarchies and invisible outsiders. There was always an “other”, Irish, Catholics, West Indians, travellers, beatniks and hippies, homosexuals, single mothers, long-haired layabouts, anyone deemed insufficiently conformist. The problem with some nostalgic narratives is not that they remember the past, but that they remember selectively.

Yet contemporary culture often risks making the opposite error. If some nostalgists remember only the good, many contemporary critics remember only the bad. History becomes reduced to oppression, traditions become little more than systems of exclusion, and inherited identities become sources of guilt rather than belonging. Continuity itself becomes suspect.

But human beings do not thrive in a historical vacuum. People need stories. They need rootedness. They need to feel themselves situated within something larger than themselves. Otherwise identity becomes an endless project of self-construction. Perhaps this explains something of our present condition – that strange mixture of anxiety and certainty, fragmentation and tribalism. If the old maps are discarded and no convincing new maps emerge, people begin drawing their own, often with thick permanent marker.

So perhaps Frank Furedi and Blue Remembered Hills are not ultimately in disagreement after all. Furedi reminds us that continuity matters. Our concern was simply to remind us that memory lies – or at least embellishes. Nostalgia is perhaps neither pathology nor virtue. It may simply be part of being human.

We cannot live entirely in the past, but neither can we sever ourselves from it. The challenge is to carry forward what was best without importing what was worst; to preserve solidarity without exclusion, belonging without mythmaking, and continuity without embalming it. Or, as Roger Scruton might have put it, to repair the house rather than set fire to it.

Because ultimately Horatius was not defending stones and timber. He was defending meaning itself. And perhaps all of us, in one way or another, spend our lives doing much the same thing – carrying fragments of home with us as we move through time, searching always for those blue remembered hills shimmering in the distance, knowing perfectly well that we cannot return there, yet unwilling entirely to let them disappear beneath the horizon.

Coda: the power of stories

Recall the quotation at the head of this article – Tyrion Lannister’s’s final speech in Game of Thrones, addressed to the assembled nobles of the erstwhile Seven Kingdoms of Westeros.

It fits remarkably well into the thread running through both Furedi and Blue Remembered Hills, because beneath all the discussion of nostalgia, continuity, memory and belonging sits a simpler and much older question: how do human beings hold themselves together across time? Tyrion’s speech, whatever one thought of the controversial series ending itself, touched on something ancient and surprisingly profound:

“What unites people? Armies? Gold? Flags?…There’s nothing in the world more powerful than a good story.”

The speech sits very comfortably beside Macaulay’s “the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods.” Armies may defend states, gold may purchase influence, and flags may function as symbols around which people rally, but stories explain why any of these things matter in the first place. Beneath institutions and political structures there almost always lies a narrative – some account of who we are, where we came from, and what obligations and meanings flow from that inheritance.

Rome was held together not merely by its legions but by stories about Rome itself – Romulus and Remus suckled by the she-wolf, Cincinnatus leaving his plough to save the Republic and returning quietly to his farm, Horatius standing at the bridge against impossible odds. Britain carried stories of Dunkirk and the Blitz spirit, of endurance and muddling through. America possesses its frontier myth and constitutional narratives. Australia has Gallipoli and the digger tradition, Ned Kelly and the battler, Clancy of the Overflow and the secular civic religion of giving everyone “a fair go”.

Whether these stories are entirely true in a strict historical sense is almost beside the point. They function as interpretive frameworks, shared narratives through which societies understand themselves and situate individuals within a larger continuity extending backward and forward through time.

This perhaps returns us to what Furedi is really lamenting. Beneath his discussion of nostalgia lies not simply concern over the loss of affection for the past but anxiety regarding a broader loss of confidence in inherited stories themselves. Increasingly our old narratives are subjected, often quite rightly, to forensic examination. We ask difficult questions. Who was excluded? Who suffered? Whose voices were ignored or omitted? Such questions are entirely legitimate and indeed necessary. Historical narratives that are immune from criticism become dogma.

Yet something else can be lost if all inherited stories are reduced solely to exercises in power, domination or hypocrisy. Human beings do not seem able to live indefinitely without narratives that locate them in time and place. Remove old stories entirely and people rarely become liberated, detached rational actors. More often they begin constructing new tribes, new identities and new mythologies of their own.

Blue Remembered Hills circled around much the same thought without quite expressing it this directly. The Facebook nostalgia groups it wrote about, with their endless photographs of everyday life in those golden, olden days, were never really about the objects themselves. These fragments were really pieces of larger stories people were attempting to preserve. What they were saying, consciously or otherwise, was something closer to: this is where I came from; this is the world that made me; this is how I understand myself.

That may explain why nostalgia can be both comforting and dangerous. Stories bind communities together, but stories can also become myths. The “good old days” can cease being memory and become something approaching scripture. The selective recollection of the past can harden into certainty, grievance and exclusion.

Which is why Tyrion’s choice of Bran becomes more interesting than it first appears. Bran is not presented as the strongest warrior, the wealthiest lord, or the most charismatic leader. Tyrion describes him instead as: “our memory. The keeper of all our stories.” And the important word there is all. Not some stories. Not only the glorious ones. The wars and the weddings, the triumphs and the massacres, the births and the famines, the victories and the defeats. In other words, continuity without selective amnesia, memory without mythmaking.

A people who remembers only their triumphs eventually become propagandists; a people who remember only their crimes risk becoming paralysed by self-reproach. A mature culture probably requires both: stories that inspire affection and belonging, and stories that remind us where we failed and what we learned.

Which returns us, inevitably, to Horatius standing at the bridge, and perhaps also to those blue remembered hills shimmering on Housman’s horizon. We do not ultimately fight for stones and timber, borders and institutions alone. We fight for meaning, for the stories that tell us who we are, where we came from, and why any of this matters.

If Tyrion was right, and he probably was, then what ultimately joins past and future is not power at all. It is narrative itself. We are, in the end, storytelling creatures carrying old tales forward as we walk into countries, we have not yet seen.

Paul Hemphill, May 2026

See also in In That Howling Infinite, Blue remembered hills – a land of lost contentment. A précis of this follows Furedi’s essay.

What’s so wrong with the good old days? In defence of nostalgia

Frank Furedi, The Australian, 21 May 2026

Nostalgia isn’t a political insult. Populists and conservatives are condemned for attachment to the values associated with ‘the good old days’. Here’s why we need it.

In the Western world – particularly among the intelligentsia and the cultural elites – nostalgia has a bad press. As one study of how the use of this label is seen or used stated: “To have one’s ideas, program, policies or style labelled ‘nostalgic’ is to be on the end of one of the most enduring and non-negotiable insults in modern political discourse.” The accusation of nostalgia serves to delegitimate individuals and movements by associating it with outdated and irrelevant sentiments.

Nostalgia is continually affixed to ideological attacks on populism and conservatism. Typically, the coupling of nostalgia with conservatism and populism serves to signify the fear of facing up to the present and an irrational escape into a mythical past. Time and again the accusation of nostalgia is coupled with a denunciation of everything its practitioners value about the past.

Critics of nostalgia contend that the “good old days” never existed. They insist that those who idealise the world of intact families, stable communities and solid intergenerational bonds are living a lie. These critics assert that people who possess an affinity to the past do so because in the old days racial minorities knew their place, women were confined to the kitchen and the LGBTQ+ community had no visibility or voice. Writing in this vein, one critic stated, “conservatism is just weaponised nostalgia”.

It is worth noting that anyone who voices a positive attitude towards Australia’s past is likely to be accused of the reactionary crime of nostalgia. So earlier this year, commentary broadcast on the ABC suggested that former prime minister John Howard’s legacy represented “nostalgia for a whiter, more conservative Australia”.

In the same vein, Tony Abbott’s book, Australia, is frequently denounced as the product of colonial nostalgia. Those labelled as members of the Nostalgia Right are regarded as irredeemable racists and xenophobes.

John Howard during Question Time, December 1999.

John Howard during Question Time, December 1999.

Critics of nostalgia do not merely caution people about the problem of living in the past: they also seek to delegitimate the values and customs that prevailed in yesteryear.

The aim of the political critique of nostalgia is to distance society morally from its history. Its goal is to undermine a nation’s sense of cultural continuity. Australian conservatives and populists are frequently attacked for invoking three nostalgic pasts: the social order and prosperity of the 1950s Menzies era; the celebration of the nation’s connection with the British monarchical past, and; the social solidarity that prevailed in pre-multicultural Australia.

Yet maintaining a sense of historical and cultural continuity with the past is essential if we are to know where we come from and who we are. So don’t get defensive when you are told off for being nostalgic.

Without falling into the trap of uncritically celebrating the “good old days”, it is vital to affirm the legacy of our past, especially the sense of solidarity and community we are at risk of losing.

Nostalgia assists the maintenance of cultural continuity.

The sense of historical continuity plays an important role in the constitution of the self. Understanding where we come from influences and strengthens individuals’ sense of who they are. A feeling of continuity with the experience of previous generations lends stability to a people’s identity.

Continuity across time is achieved through the intergenerational transmission of a community’s way of life and its ideals. It is difficult to develop a sturdy sense of community identity without a shared memory and a common attachment to conventions or customs that are rooted in the past.

The sense of continuity across time is, as psychologist Roy Baumeister stated, one of the defining criteria of identity. This point was echoed by American social psychologist Kenneth Keniston, when he stated, “one of the chief tasks of identity formation is the creation of a sense of self that will link the past, the present and the future”.

The common ground on which people live requires a shared understanding of where members of a community come from. Learning about the past helps children to know their place in the world and develop their identity. German psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, who formulated the concept of an identity crisis, attached great importance to providing young people with a sense of cultural continuity. He noted that “true identity … depends on the support which the young individual receives from the collective sense of identity characterising the social groups significant to him: his class, his nation, his culture”.

Tea and army cake refreshed then-Prime Minister Robert Menzies on a visit to Seymour military camp back in 1939. Picture:News Corp

Tea and army cake refreshed then-Prime Minister Robert Menzies on a visit to Seymour military camp back in 1939. Picture:News Corp

For socialisation to occur successfully, adults draw on the experience of previous generations to provide young people with a meaningful account of adulthood. Erikson remarked that the values with which children are trained “persist because the cultural ethos continues to consider them ‘natural’ and does not admit of alternatives”.

He observed: “They persist because they have become an essential part of the individual’s sense of identity, which he must preserve as a core of sanity and efficiency. But values do not persist unless they work, economically, psychologically and spiritually; and I argue that to this end they must continue to be anchored, generation after generation, in early child training; while child training, to remain consistent, must be embedded in a system of continued economic and cultural synthesis.”

Valuing the past

The socialisation of children is key to the transmission of this legacy of the past. It is integral to an intergenerational transaction whereby moral norms are communicated by authoritative adults to the young. Though this form of socialisation is likely to be perceived as impregnated with nostalgia by the technocratic-managerial elites, it is essential for providing the young with roots.

Once the moral status of the past is put into question, the achievement of a stable identity becomes fraught with uncertainty. The de-authorisation of the past renders the experiences of the older generations redundant and complicates the task of socialisation. Adulthood becomes compromised by its association with the past. Instead of being able to serve as a model to the young, it ceases to serve that role effectively.

Erikson’s reference to the “collective sense of identity” that adults communicate to young people has as its premise the capacity of the older generation to communicate a model of identity to their offspring. However, with the loss of the “sense of the past”, cultural continuity has become disrupted and the capacity of adults to serve as models to the young has diminished.

Nostalgia can be understood as the cultural antithesis to the loss of a sense of the past. As sociologist Fred Davis noted, nostalgia “leads us to search among remembrances of persons and places of our past in an effort to bestow meaning upon persons and places of our present”. From the anti-populist standpoint, the very search for meaning in tradition and the experience of the past is likely to encourage opposition to the value system of the defenders of the cultural status quo.

A yearning for home

Instead of responding to the critics of nostalgia by dismissing the charge of being drawn towards it, it is preferable to embrace it. Nostalgia refers to a yearning for home. It expresses an understandable and genuine sense of cultural loss underwritten by the belief that values that had once provided the unity of social relations and personal experience have become marginalised.

Populists and conservatives are on solid ground when they seek to reconnect with the legacy of their nation’s past. Those who possess a positive orientation towards the past should not be seen as emotionally illiterate, naive simpletons. Through their nostalgic orientation, they attempt to retrieve and develop sources of identity, agency or community.

Tony Abbott’s book, Australia, is frequently denounced as the product of colonial nostalgia. Picture: Jane Dempster / The Australian

Tony Abbott. Jane Dempster / The Australian

The attempt to forge a sense of historical continuity is a prerequisite for providing the present with the sturdy foundation needed to face the future. Those who have become detached from the past inevitably become obsessed with inventing an identity to the point that they become detached from the project of facing the future. Call it what you will, but the attempt to forge a consciousness of historical continuity makes an indispensable contribution to the creation of a bridge between the past and the present, and the present and the future. It is an effective way of cultivating a genuine sensibility of belonging.

Nostalgia is not only good for society but also for the wellbeing of individuals. Studies suggest that those who “reminisce are more likely to keep friends and expand social networks”, and are able to forge closer and more durable relations than those who are indifferent to their past. Common sense suggests that the individual’s attempt to forge and maintain a sense of continuity with the past assists the development of an individual’s identity and feeds the soul of society.

In the 21st century, the main distinguishing feature of movements labelled as populist is their tendency to challenge the cultural values espoused by the political establishment. Often, the challenge posed by populist movements to elite values is expressed through their reluctance to abandon customs and traditions that elites have discarded: sentiments described by the use of that confusing term “nostalgia”.

Yet without a close connection with the past, we become prisoners of fate. Why? Because we can only truly understand what humanity has achieved so far and acquire insight into what it can achieve in the future by evaluating the experience of our forebears. The legacy of the past provides the moral and intellectual resources for developing a 21st-century narrative of what solidarity and community looks like. Very importantly, it also provides the foundation for freedom.

Once society becomes de-historicised, it will become lost in a timeless wasteland. Those with an impoverished historical imagination are doomed to embark on an eternal quest for meaning because we become connected and situated in time through cultivating an empathetic relationship with the past as members of a community. Without such an attachment, we struggle to intuit where we have come from and are constantly in search of an identity. Navigating our way into the future is harder when we are deprived of a means to assimilate the experience of our ancestors. Put simply, to determine where to go, we need to know where we came from.

It’s an Australia that did exist

In Australia, hostility towards nostalgia is motivated by a venomous hatred towards the nation’s past. Take the hatred directed at former opposition leader Peter Dutton. According to the National Indigenous Times, his “path to the party leadership has been defined not by nation-building, nor a vision for Australia’s future, but through obstruction and division, wedded with a nostalgia for an Australia that never truly existed”.

Peter Dutton is another pilloried for valuing nostalgia and the past. Picture: Dan Peled /Getty Images

Peter Dutton. Dan Peled /Getty Images

The reference to an “Australia that never truly existed” is frequently invoked by critics of nostalgia. Implicit in this statement is the dispossession of Australia’s historical legacy of any positive features.

Populist conservatives do not want to go back to a golden age, but nor do they want their communities to be dispossessed of the customs and ways of being that made them who they are.

Keeping alive the traditions, customs and rituals that have inspired their communities over the generations provides populism with the cultural power to motivate millions of people. It provides the foundation for the kind of cultural security that allows people to face the future.

Frank Furedi is a sociologist, author and former professor of sociology at the University of Kent. This is an edited extract from his new book, In Defence of Populism (Polity Press), which will be published on May 22 in Australia

Précis: Blue Remembered Hills — a land of lost contentment

Nostalgia is one of those curious human afflictions that sits somewhere between memory and myth. The Greeks called it nostos: the longing for home, the ache of return. Homer built The Odyssey around it. Houseman called childhood “the land of lost content”. We all know the feeling: that sudden gust of memory carrying with it a place that perhaps never quite existed in the form we remember it. A song, a smell, a taste, a street corner glimpsed through rain — and suddenly one is standing again in those “blue remembered hills”.

The trouble is that nostalgia can be both consolation and deception. Memory does not preserve the past like amber trapping an insect; it edits, softens, rearranges and, occasionally, invents. It is less a historical archive than a film editor’s cutting room. We tend to remember not the world as it was, but the world as it felt. Childhood roads seem wider when revisited, old houses smaller, old certainties larger. Looking backward is a little like looking in a rear-view mirror: objects appear closer than they really are.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Quite the opposite. Nostalgia often provides continuity in a world moving at bewildering speed. Long-term memory can become a kind of inner refuge, perhaps even biology’s consolation prize for ageing. As we move through life, the past gradually acquires sovereignty over the present. The older we get, the more we discover that Hartley was probably right: the past really is another country. More disconcertingly, we begin to realise it has become home.

Yet nostalgia also has its darker uses. It can become what South Park hilariously called “memberberries”: seductive little fragments of selective memory that rot the brain with sentimental half-truths. “Remember when things were better?” they whisper. Remember when streets were cleaner, people knew their place, children behaved, and chips came wrapped in newspaper? The problem is that these memories often airbrush out the less attractive features of the era: poverty, prejudice, corporal punishment, rigid social hierarchies, casual cruelty and exclusion. There is a tendency to remember cohesion while forgetting whom that cohesion excluded.

And nowhere is this more visible than in those sprawling Facebook nostalgia communities now largely colonised by us boomers. They are fascinating anthropological sites — digital village greens where people gather not to discuss wars, elections or grand historical events but milkmen, street sweepers, bin men, old sweets, cassettes and television programmes long vanished into history.

At first glance it all appears harmless enough: a warm bath of collective memory. Yet beneath pictures of “proper bin men” and school playgrounds often lurk deeper currents of anxiety and resentment. The mundane becomes symbolic. The old milkman becomes shorthand for social trust; the local high street for community; black-and-white photographs of tidy streets for a world supposedly more ordered and comprehensible.

What many are mourning, however, may not be the world itself so much as their own place within it. We do not merely miss old streets or old songs; we miss younger versions of ourselves inhabiting them. We miss possibility. We miss novelty. We miss being twenty and imagining that life was still unfolding rather than slowly arranging itself into memory.

The political danger arrives when nostalgia stops being reflective and becomes restorative — when longing for the past becomes a demand to reconstruct it. The right has often understood this instinct well. It does not necessarily need to persuade people of a compelling future if it can offer an idealised yesterday. “Take back control”, “make things great again”, “return to traditional values”: all are variations on the same emotional melody.

But return tickets are unavailable. The past cannot be restored because it never truly existed in the form imagined. There were never really “good old days”; there were simply days — complicated, contradictory and viewed through younger eyes.

None of this means memory should be discarded. Far from it. There is immense pleasure in basking in les temps perdus. I happily indulge in musical rabbit holes and Facebook reminiscences myself. Songs especially are magical portals because music does not merely remind us of the past — it briefly resurrects it. A song can collapse fifty years in three minutes.

But I would still choose today.

For all its noise and absurdity, for all the algorithms, grievances and existential clutter of modern life, today contains wonders unimaginable to my younger self. Medicine keeps people alive who once would not have survived. Knowledge sits literally in our hands. Distances have collapsed. Possibilities have expanded.

The trick perhaps is to hold memory gently: to enjoy nostalgia without becoming captive to it. To remember that we are, as Maria Popova put it, all our previous selves stacked inside us like Russian dolls — not discarded versions, but incorporated ones.

The little boy still exists somewhere in the old streets and schoolyards and songs. He is still playing in the enchanted forest with Pooh and Christopher Robin.

 

An Australian Jew’s submission to the Royal Commission

The Royal Commission into Antisemitism was convened in the shadow of the Bondi Beach massacre of December 2025, when fifteen people were murdered at a Hanukkah gathering in what has been described as the deadliest antisemitic attack in Australian history. It was, on any reading, a rupture –  not only because of its scale, but because it forced into the open a question that had been building, uneasily, for more than two years: how a country that prides itself on pluralism and civic ease had arrived at a moment where Jews could be targeted so explicitly, and so lethally, in public space.

That question does not begin at Bondi. Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, Australia has seen a sustained wave of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist protest – much of it framed in the language of human rights, some of it more strident, even incendiary. Alongside this mobilisation has come a marked rise in antisemitic incidents: abusive chants at early demonstrations, harassment of visibly Jewish individuals, vandalism of synagogues and community institutions, graffiti, threats, social and professional exclusion, and a steady current of online vilification. Some of these episodes have been highly visible; many more have been ambient, cumulative, and privately absorbed. For the Jewish community, the sense has not been of isolated but of a gathering atmosphere – a shift in what can be said, and done, about Jews in public without consequence.

It is into this unsettled landscape that the Commission steps. Its task is not only to examine the failures that allowed Bondi to occur, but to consider whether that attack can be understood in isolation at all – or whether it belongs to a broader pattern of escalating hostility, contested language, and fraying social norms. In that sense, it is as much an inquiry into civic culture as it is into security.

Andrew Wirth’s submission is written with precisely that broader frame in mind. He contributes not as a representative of any organisation, but as a Jewish Australian – the child of Holocaust survivors, a member of a contemporary community that now finds itself, again, thinking seriously about questions of safety and belonging. His purpose is not to collapse legitimate criticism of Israel into antisemitism, nor to deny the moral force of Palestinian advocacy. Rather, it is to interrogate the relationship between the forms that advocacy has taken in Australia since October 2023 and the lived experience of many Jews during that same period.

He is, in effect, asking the Commission to look not only at events but at environment. To consider whether the prevailing ways of understanding harm – episodic, attributable, legally discrete — are adequate to a phenomenon that may instead be cumulative, ambiguous, and socially mediated. And to ask, quietly but insistently, whether Bondi was an isolated act of hatred, or the most violent expression of a climate that had already, for some time, been forming in plain sight.

The complete submission is republished in full below. As it is very lengthy, In That Howling Infinite has used AI to provide a comprehensive summary.

Much of the testimony before the Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion dealt not with abstract politics, but with the way the Israel-Palestine conflict has spilled into everyday Australian life: schools, workplaces, music venues, synagogues and online spaces. Among the most striking evidence was that of singer and author Deborah Conway, who described cancelled performances, organised protest campaigns, doxing, online abuse and threats directed at her for publicly identifying as both Jewish and Zionist. Whatever one’s views on Israel or Gaza, her testimony underscored the increasingly blurred line between political activism, social intimidation and hostility directed at Jews as Jews – a tension that sat at the heart of the inquiry’s hearings. Conroy’ testimony and that of others is also republished below.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

Long story short …

Wirth’s submission is, at heart, an attempt to change the lens through which the Commission looks – away from the forensic habit of isolating moments (a chant, a placard, a lone actor, a single atrocity) and toward something more diffuse and disquieting: the social atmosphere in which those moments become possible. He writes as a Jewish Australian, and as the son of survivors, but resists the pull of memoir. The authority he claims is not moral witness so much as analytic patience – an effort to describe how a climate forms, thickens, and, eventually, breaks.

His central contention is that the harms experienced by Jewish Australians since October 2023 are systemic and cumulative. Bondi – horrific, unprecedented – is not treated as an aberration but as a point of condensation, where a long-gathering set of pressures became visible in a single, devastating act. To understand that act, he argues, one must look not for a clean causal chain (this slogan → this shooter → this event), but for patterns of probability: the way repeated exposure to certain forms of rhetoric, symbolism, and social signalling can lower inhibitions, sharpen antagonisms, and render violence imaginable to those already inclined toward it. The analogy he reaches for is telling: not criminal law, but climate science. You cannot attribute a single storm to climate change with precision; you can, however, describe the conditions that make storms more frequent, more intense, more likely.

From this premise, the essay unfolds in widening circles.

He first dismantles the idea of a singular “pro-Palestinian movement.” What exists instead, he suggests, is an ecosystem: formal advocacy bodies fluent in the language of human rights; looser activist formations oriented toward protest and disruption; and a penumbra of fellow travellers – ideological extremists, vandals, conspiracists — who share space, slogans, and emotional energy if not formal affiliation. These elements are not centrally controlled, nor are they uniformly motivated. That, in a sense, is the point. The diversity allows for elasticity: respectable actors can maintain a principled public face while disclaiming the excesses of the wider milieu (“a few bad actors,” “not representative”), even as those excesses contribute to the overall tone and impact of the movement. Plausible deniability is not a bug but a feature.

Language is the next terrain. Wirth is careful not to claim that particular phrases are intrinsically violent in a narrow, lexical sense. Instead, he insists that meaning is contextual, historical, and relational. Words arrive carrying baggage. “Intifada,” whatever its literal translation, is heard by many Jews through the memory of suicide bombings and mass-casualty attacks; “from the river to the sea,” however it is intended, resonates with anxieties about elimination; “Zionists are…” constructions collapse a vast and internally diverse population into a single moral category, often freighted with the most toxic imagery available. The key point is not that every speaker intends harm, but that in a crowded, emotionally charged public sphere, ambiguity is not neutral. It creates room for multiple readings, including the most hostile ones, and allows those who wish to intimidate to do so under cover of contestability. The same words can be defended as benign and experienced as threatening – and both facts can be true at once.

Central to this slippage is the term “Zionist.” In activist discourse it operates as a floating signifier: sometimes a political descriptor, sometimes a moral indictment, sometimes a proxy for a people. Wirth’s claim – backed by survey data — is that the overwhelming majority of Australian Jews feel some connection to Israel and many are comfortable with the label “Zionist” in a broad, cultural or existential sense. To target “Zionists,” then, is in practice to target Jews as they understand themselves, even if the formal claim is otherwise. The distinction between Jew and Zionist, while logically defensible, does little work sociologically. Indeed, he suggests, the insistence on that distinction can become a way of telling Jews what they are allowed to be – a curious inversion in a discourse otherwise attentive to self-identification.

The essay then turns to causation – or rather, to the limits of conventional thinking about it. The familiar retort to concerns about protest rhetoric is that no direct link can be proven between speech and a specific act of violence. Wirth concedes the point and then sidesteps it. In complex systems, he argues, causation is rarely linear or attributable. The relevant question is not “did this slogan cause this attack?” but “does a given communicative environment increase or decrease the likelihood of such attacks occurring?” Here he draws on the literature around “stochastic violence”: the idea that repeated, dehumanising or inflammatory messaging can, over time, prime a small subset of individuals to act, even in the absence of explicit incitement. Responsibility is diffuse; effects are real. It is an uncomfortable model for legal systems built on individual intent, but a familiar one in other domains of risk.

If this is the mechanism, the effects are not confined to headline events. A large portion of the submission is devoted to what might be called the low-grade, high-frequency harms: insults, exclusion, intimidation, the steady drip of being cast as suspect or illegitimate. Synagogues require guards; schools adjust routines; people speak more cautiously, or not at all. There is a contraction of presence — a subtle withdrawal from the public square. Wirth is at pains to stress that for every reported incident there are many more that never reach formal channels but accumulate in private memory, at dinner tables, in the small recalibrations of daily life. This is where his argument edges closest to the experiential without relinquishing its analytic frame: harm as something lived continuously rather than episodically.

Against this backdrop, he is sharply critical of two patterns in the public response. The first is the tendency, among some pro-Palestinian advocates, to dismiss Jewish concerns as bad faith – “weaponisation,” an attempt to silence criticism of Israel, a manoeuvre in a political contest. This, he suggests, substitutes motive-hunting for engagement with the substance of the claims. The second is the reliance on generalised anti-racism frameworks as a sufficient policy response. Such frameworks, he argues, are necessary but not sufficient, because antisemitism does not map neatly onto the paradigms those frameworks were designed to address. Jews are often perceived simultaneously as powerful and vulnerable, insiders and outsiders – a dual coding that allows hostility to evade categories built primarily around visible disadvantage. Subsumed into the general, antisemitism risks disappearing.

He extends this scepticism to legal doctrine. Courts, tasked with balancing free expression against harm, tend to look for discrete, demonstrable injuries traceable to particular acts. But if the harm is cumulative, ambient, and probabilistic, that evidentiary demand becomes almost impossible to meet. The result is a persistent gap between lived experience and legal recognition – a sense, on the part of those affected, that the system cannot quite “see” what is happening. This is not, in his telling, an argument against free speech so much as a claim that the existing conceptual toolkit is ill-suited to a new class of problem.

The question of representation threads through the latter part of the submission. Wirth does not contest the right of anti-Zionist Jewish groups to participate in the debate, but he cautions against treating them as broadly representative. Their prominence, he suggests, owes less to their numbers than to their utility: they provide a form of internal validation for those who wish to deny any connection between anti-Zionist activism and antisemitic harm. The risk, for the Commission, is that such voices — legitimate but minority – might be weighted in a way that obscures the concerns of the larger community.

All of this leads to a set of recommendations that are, in tone, more calibrative than punitive. He does not call for the suppression of protest or the prohibition of criticism of Israel. Instead, he argues for clearer moral boundaries around language and conduct; for accountability within advocacy movements for what they tolerate as well as what they endorse; for policy approaches that acknowledge systemic harm; and, crucially, for investment in education – a rebuilding of the shared understandings that make any legal framework meaningful. Law, in his formulation, can draw lines; it cannot, by itself, restore the sensibility that gives those lines legitimacy.

Running beneath the analysis is a quieter, more disquieting claim: that the deepest failure of the past two years has been one of recognition. Not simply a failure to prevent specific acts, but a failure of institutions — governmental, cultural, civic – to articulate, early and clearly, that Jews are a vulnerable minority entitled to the same reflex of solidarity extended to others. Silence, in this reading, is not neutral. It is read, by all parties, as permission.

The essay closes, as it began, with Bondi –  not as origin but as revelation. A society that prides itself on its egalitarian reflexes is asked to consider whether, in this instance, those reflexes faltered; whether a movement framed in the language of rights allowed, in some of its forms, the targeting of a minority at home; and whether the balance between free expression and communal belonging has been misjudged. The question Wirth leaves hanging is not whether protest should be free – it must be – but whether it can remain so without eroding the conditions that make a plural civic life possible.

Author’s Note…

This opinion piece is one of several on the attitudes of progressives towards the Israel, Palestine and the Gaza war.

The first is Moral capture, conditional empathy and the failure of shock, a discussion on why erstwhile liberal, humanistic, progressive people from all walks of life have been caught up in what can be without subtly described as that anti-Israel machinery. Shaping facts to feelings – debating intellectual dishonesty– regarding the Gaza war, intellectual dishonesty is everywhere, on both sides of the divide, magnified by mainstream and social media’s hunger for moral simplicity and viral outrage. Standing on the high moral ground is hard work! discusses the issues of free speech and “cancellation”, and boycotts with regard to the recent self-implosion of the Adelaide Writers’ Festival, one of the country’s oldest and most revered.

As governments federal and state weigh the prohibition of potentially inflammatory phrases, we also consider syntax and semantics. Lawyers parse syllables and activists insist that what is heard is not what is meant, and what is meant is not what is said. The words hover, untethered from consequence, yet curiously heavy with it. If words can be made infinitely flexible, then meaning itself becomes negotiable; and if meaning is negotiable, then so too are responsibility and harm. See: Same old stone, different rock. What’s in a word? and What’s in a word? A world of meaning and of pain 

There are moments when public argument stops being a search for truth and becomes a test of belonging. Facts are no longer weighed so much as auditioned; empathy is rationed; moral language hardens into a badge system, issued and revoked according to rules everyone seems to know but few are willing to articulate. One learns quickly where the trip-wires are, which sympathies are permitted, which questions are suspect, and how easily tone can outweigh substance.

What interests me here is not the quarrel itself – names, borders, histories—but the habits of mind it exposes. The ease with which conviction can slide into choreography. The way intellectual honesty is praised in the abstract and punished in practice. The curious transformation of empathy from a human reflex into a conditional licence, granted only after the correct declarations have been made.

Across these pieces I circle the same uneasy terrain: the shaping of facts to fit feelings; the capture of moral language by ideological gravity; the performance of righteousness as both shield and weapon. Cultural spaces that once prided themselves on curiosity begin to resemble courts, where innocence and guilt are presumed in advance and the labour lies not in thinking, but in signalling.

This is not an argument against passion, nor a plea for bloodless neutrality. It is, rather, a meditation on how quickly moral seriousness curdles into moral certainty – and how much intellectual work is required to stand on what we like to call the high ground without mistaking altitude for clarity.

The position of In That Howling Infinite with regard to Palestine, Israel and the Gaza war is neither declarative nor devotional; it is diagnostic. Inclined – by background, sensibility, and experience – to hold multiple truths in tension, to see, as the song has it, the whole of the moon. It is less interested in arriving at purity than in resisting moral monoculture and the consolations of certainty. That disposition does not claim wisdom; it claims only a refusal to outsource judgment or to accept unanimity as a proxy for truth.

On Zionism, it treats it not as a slogan but as a historical fact with moral weight: the assertion – hard-won, contingent, imperfect – that Jews are entitled to collective political existence on the same terms as other peoples. According to this definition, this blog is Zionist. It is not interested in laundering Israeli policy, still less in romanticising state power, but rejects the sleight of hand by which Israel’s existence is transformed from a political reality into a metaphysical crime. Zionism is not sacred, but its delegitimisation is revealing – because it demands from Jews what is demanded of no other nation: justification for being.

On anti-Zionism, it has been unsparing. It sees it not as “criticism of Israel” (which you regard as both legitimate and necessary) but as a categorical refusal to accept Jewish collective self-determination. What troubles it most is not its anger but its certainty: its moral absolutism, its indifference to history, its willingness to borrow the language of justice to license erasure. It is attentive to how anti-Zionism recycles older antisemitic patterns – collectivisation of guilt, inversion of victimhood, and the portrayal of Jews as uniquely malignant actors – while insisting, with studied innocence, that none of this concerns Jews at all. If not outright antisemitism, the line separating it from anti-Zionism is wafer—thin, and too often crosses over.

Running through all of this is a consistent stance: a resistance to moral theatre, an impatience with historical amnesia, and a belief that intellectual honesty requires limits – on language, on fantasy, and on the indulgent belief that one’s own righteousness exempts one from consequence. And a lifelong hatred of antisemitism. The new antisemitism looks a lot like the old hatred!

We are not asking culture to choose sides; we are asking it to recover judgment

See in In That Howling Infinite, A Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany. and also: This Is What It Looks Like“You want it darker?” … Gaza and the devil that never went away … , How the jihadi tail wags the leftist dog, The Shoah and America’s Shame – Ken Burns’ sorrowful masterpiece, and Little Sir Hugh – Old England’s Jewish Question

A Royal Commission into Antisemitism: One Australian’s Submission

Aftermath of Bondi Beach massacre, Sydney 2025 (Image available under the Creative Commons)

Australia is in the midst of a major enquiry into antisemitism- a Royal Commission- following the terrorist attack at Bondi Beach. The community has been invited to make submissions. Below, I share mine. It is analytical rather than personal and represents my attempt to understand the links between anti-Zionist protest and harms to the Jewish community.

Who I am

I write as an Australian Jew.

I am writing entirely in my personal capacity and do not represent any Jewish communal, political or Zionist organisation. I am an engaged member of the Jewish community and regularly attend a local “egalitarian orthodox” synagogue.

I am a child of holocaust survivors. My father survived Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen concentration camps and death marches; my mother was hidden in a convent for the latter part of the second World War. All four of my grandparents were murdered in Auschwitz.

I strongly support the right of Australians to advocate for the welfare, human rights and self-determination of both Jewish and Palestinian communities. I have been involved in inter-communal dialogue both in Melbourne and in Israel-Palestine and am commited to a just outcome in Israel and Palestine.

I am a medical specialist in the public hospital system and an associate professor at at Melbourne University.

Aims of this submission

I am writing primarily to reflect on, and critically evaluate, common claims made in reference to the relationship between pro-Palestinian advocacy and harms affecting the Australian Jewish community.

My primary contentions are that:

  1. The adverse impacts of the protest movement need to be understood as a systemic and cumulative phenomenon- this includes chronic low level psychological harm, social exclusion and the generation of an atmosphere associated with a heightened risk of sporadic violence
  2. The heterogeneity of participants and their motivations, the ill-defined targets (Israel, Zionists or Jews), and the ambiguity of protest language and symbols, together make attribution of harm and intent difficult. This ambiguity and heterogeneity allow a protest environment that tacitly fosters exclusionary, vilifying and even violent behaviour while allowing protest spokespeople plausible deniability.
  3. Consequently, the courts and relevant legislation, which assess the protest movement on a “slogan by slogan” or “event by event” basis -that is, through the lens of individual cases – cannot adequately “see” the broad environment as experienced by the Jewish community. It is a case of forest and trees.

Background

The attack on December 14, 2025, was the worst act of antisemitic violence ever committed on Australian soil. Fifteen people were murdered at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach.

Some have drawn a straight line between the Bondi massacre and anti-Zionist incitement, particularly focusing on the slogan “Globalise the Intifada”. Anti-Zionist advocates, in contrast, attribute blame to the shooters’ ISIS connection and the influence of radical Sydney clerics, insisting that the Bondi shootings have nothing to do with peaceful anti-Zionist activism.

Yet this murder was, in the perpetrators own words, intended to condemn “the acts of ‘Zionists”. It seems implausible that this targeting of Zionists was entirely unrelated to two years of inflammatory anti-Zionist rhetoric or that hate speech played no role in pushing perpetrators, primed by fundamentalist influencers, to cross some threshold to action.

Most Jewish Australians view Bondi against a backdrop of over two years of escalating incitement and a hardening anti-Jewish atmosphere. The Opera House protest in October 2023 marked a turning point. Reported chants, including “Where are the Jews?” and “F*** the Jews”, suggested a real shift in what could be said about Jews in public, seemingly without consequence.

Since then, high-profile incidents, such as arson attacks on synagogues, have attracted significant media attention.  Less visible are cumulative, psychologically harmful effects of effects of chronic “low level” stigmatisation.

Many find it hard to avoid the conclusion that this environment may have lowered the threshold for violence. A long-standing vulnerability has been brought into sharper focus, prompting calls for a precautionary response, including greater restraint in protest language.

The Bondi tragedy has produced grief, fear and anger within the Jewish community, alongside shock and sympathy across the wider Australian society. The subsequent critical national conversation has led to the present Royal Commission. Could we, as a nation, have done more to counter antisemitism and ensure Jewish safety? Why did our security services fail?  Was anti-Zionist activism a contributing factor for Bondi?

If so, do we need constraints on forms of protest? Should constraints be established through legislation or, at a deeper level, through education and cultural change?

Debate over public discourse and anti-Jewish incidents

Palestinian advocacy organisations have condemned the violence at Bondi and expressed sympathy for the victims. However, Jewish expressions of fear or calls for reassurance and safety have typically been dismissed as “weaponising antisemitism”, silencing debate or even “defending genocide”.

Anti-Israel groups like US Jewish Voice for Peace and the Australian Palestine Advocacy Network insist their activism is guided by justice and human rights and rejects racism or violence. Those claims are in their mission statements. Jewish anti-Zionist commentators and groups have denied any possible relationship between the language of protest and the attack.  “Zero evidence”, according to one commentator.

Consequently, they have criticised Jewish calls for safety and protections, and government proposals to restrict aspects of protest, as overreach or an attack on free speech rather than an attempt to provide community safety.

This insistence that no restrictions be placed on the language and forms of protests is accompanied by several claims that warrant critical evaluation:

  1. That the pro-Palestinian movement is peaceful and simply protesting injustice (including alleged genocide)
  2. That the language of protest, including terms such as “Globalise the intifada” is inherently non-violent;
  3. That public protest is directed against Israel and Zionists and not against Jews;
  4. That consequently activist speech cannot be linked with violence, or harms more broadly, affecting Jews
  5. That the imputation of violent connotations is simply an attempt to stifle free speech.

How might we reconcile this Jewish experience of harm with claims by Palestinian advocacy groups that the movement is non-violent and explicitly rejects antisemitism?

Below, I address a number of key questions and issues in turn.

1.The pro-Palestinian movement is a complex ecosystem and not accurately characterised as entirely peaceful

Palestinian advocacy groups stress that their activism is grounded in human rights. They claim that violence against Jews cannot be attributed to a movement that explicitly rejects antisemitism or the use of violence. This is a superficially reassuring but incomplete framing. It fails to acknowledge the range of actors (and agendas) within the pro-Palestinian advocacy community and beyond it, not all of whom necessarily share these peaceful ideals.

This heterogeneity is even reflected in the several labels used to describe the movement: pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist. While they may be used interchangeably, they represent very different agendas and targets: supporting the rights of a people, opposing the policies of a state and opposing, and often vilifying, those who can be linked with that state- that is, Jews.

A 2014 study of over 20 Palestinian civil society groups by the General Delegation Of Palestine in Australia captures the heterogeneity of the groups – likely a fraction of the number of groups active in 2026.

The study notes that Palestinian organizations “often have multiple desired outcomes and target audiences and undertake different kinds of activities.” The study explicitly distinguishes “advocacy groups” and “activist groups”. The former are the public facing, suit and tie wearing (my words) groups, that speak the language of human rights and engage in, to quote the study, “persuasion, lobbying and negotiation”.

“Activist groups”, in contrast, are described as “denunciative” engaging in “protest, street demonstrations, strike actions, public meetings” and whose desired outcomes are “diffuse and not necessarily … within defined policy and political parameters”. They “articulate messages in different forums, to different audiences” with different “tone, tenor, and language of the message”… “in language that resonates with their niche constituencies.” Of course we are now also increasingly aware of Islamist (and) influences in Australia which we now know to have been connected to the Bondi massacre.

Beyond explicitly Palestinian groups lies a wider ecosystem. It includes direct-action networks, unaffiliated vandals, right-wing extremists, Islamic fundamentalist groups and “old school antisemites”. They often mobilise around the same events, language and grievances or share physical and online spaces with non-violent advocacy groups. Their presence may shape how protests are experienced by those on the receiving end.

Speaking at the Lowy Institute lecture ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess observed that activist groups are often not “centrally controlled” or “uniformly motivated,” and may include “individuals who are increasingly willing to embrace or threaten violence to achieve their goals.”

This heterogeneity within the activist community allows for plausible deniability when violent or threatening behaviour is observed For example, after chants of “F-ck the Jews” and “where’s the jews” were reported at the Opera house protest, Fahad Ali of the Palestinian Action Groups dismissed this as reflecting a “small group of troublemakers” The same disavowal was made regarding a pro-Palestinian bikie group. This allows spokespeople to claim entirely benign aims while wider affiliates of movement take a more aggressive approach to members of the Jewish community.

To put it simply: claims that the Palestinian advocacy community is entirely peaceful is a very incomplete description of reality.

2.The language and forms of protest are not unambiguously peaceful, but rather contain phrases and symbols with the potential to be interpreted as violent by elements in the protest movement and broader society

The language and symbolism of protest span a wide range. Some slogans are political and entirely unobjectionable: “Stop the war,” “Free Palestine”.

Then there are the explicitly or implicitly violent slogans and symbols that often accompany protest. They include phrases such as “where’s the Jews”, “f*** the jews” “death to IDF” and  “by any means necessary” as well as symbols (terrorist flags, pictures of the Ayatollah, the Jewish Star of David in rubbish bins)  Symbols of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran can be understood as implying support for their violent and eliminationist goals (described here, here, here, here, here). This celebration of violence was evident immediately after the Hamas massacre at the Opera House protest and the Lakemba celebration (and indeed there was further language of celebration and an anniversary event at Lakemba a year later.)

Slogans such as “Zionists are baby killers” and “all Zionists are terrorists” are clearly intended to, or can reasonably be expected to, incite hatred towards those who support Israel’s existence or are affiliated with Israel, regardless of their views on the conduct of the war.

In between are phrases whose meaning is contested, such as “from the river to the sea” and “globalise the intifada.” Many have expressed concern that such phrases are coded calls for violence or for the elimination of the Jewish state. Palestinian advocates have emphasised the innocent meaning of “river to the sea” and “Intifada” (here, here, here) and some go so far as to argue that attributing violent intent to such slogans is Islamophobic.

It is frequently explained, for example, that “intifada” simply means “shaking off” political oppression and is not inherently violent. But language does not operate through dictionary definitions alone. For many Jews, the word “intifada” evokes, and is inseparable from the Second Intifada — a sustained campaign of terrorism that killed more than 1,000 Israelis. That history inevitably shapes how the term is heard. As Susan Benesch of the Dangerous Speech Project explains, the experience of speech as “inflammatory” depends on the speaker, the audience, the medium and the context.

“Globalise the intifada” may carry one meaning in an academic lecture and quite another in a mass street march. Its impact can shift with the size, tone and location of a protest; with accompanying slogans (“death to the IDF,” “by any means necessary”); and with symbols associated with Hamas or Hezbollah. Such language may land very differently in demonstrations held immediately after the Hamas attacks of 2023 or in the wake of the Bondi terror attack. It will be experienced differently in the public square and outside a synagogue.

The activist community is not an army of philologists. Whatever the linguistic origins of “intifada”, its meaning is contested and may be interpreted differently by different groups. As the Palestinian led report mentioned above states, in some circumstances “…human rights and international law arguments can lose their meaning in inflammatory and, at times, ideological criticisms.”

It is that very ambiguity that allows those who do seek to intimidate (or even provoke violence) to use it with plausible deniability. As Susan Benesch states “One cannot make a list of words that are dangerous, since the way in which any message will be understood – like its effect on an audience – depends not only on its content but on how it is communicated…. The very same words can be highly inflammatory, or benign.”

3.The use of the term Zionist as the target of protest implicates most Jews despite claims by protesters that they are not antisemitic and do not target Jews

Activists claim to target Zionists and not Jews.

The problem is that the vast majority of Australian Jews are Zionists- if you target Zionists you are generally targeting Jews.

A 2023 Australian survey reported 80-90% of respondents indicated personal connectedness with and concern for Israel and 77% identified as Zionist. Most Australian Jews have cultural, religious or historical connections to Israel and support for the security and safety of its citizens, including for many Jews, close family. Some use the label Zionist to describe this connection. It is often an element of cultural identity and for Australia’s substantial post-Holocaust community, it carries connotations of “refuge”. For many Jews, this sense of connection does not imply endorsement of specific Israeli policies or leadership.

Anti-Zionists are well aware of this deep connection between Jews, Israel and Zionism, yet work hard to maintain the fiction that their activism does not target Jews.

They do it by presuming to tell Jews about their identity. (Something that would be considered offensive if directed at other groups. Jews are told that they are a disembodied “faith group” with no sense of peoplehood or organic connection to Israel. Palestinian advocates showcase the tiny minority of antizionist Jews who agree with them. Anti-Zionists insist that Zionism and Judaism are distinct noting that  “Not all Jews are Zionist” or “being Jewish is not identical to being Zionist”. This distinction is technically correct but doesn’t negate the connection of the vast majority of Jews with Israel.

Indeed, the identification of Zionists and Jews in the mental landscape of some activists is evoked by the use of classic antisemitic tropes in antizionist discourse. They speak of  “…the Jewish Lobby and the Zionist Lobby infiltrating” with their “Tentacles”, of powerful elites(including Jewish Law firms) and conspiracist notions  “We already know that Zionists are parasitic upon progressive spaces. It is under the guise of progressivism that Zionists launder their genocidal colonialism, while weaponising their influence to amplify occupation propaganda and steer cultural narratives away from Palestinian liberation.”

Thus, though the protest movement insists its focus is Israel and its policies, the use of the term Zionist does much unrecognised work in redirecting hostility from Israel to Jews. This reflects the multiple and conflicting resonances of the term Zionist in protest culture. In protest messaging, the term “Zionist” is a placeholder for a catalogue of evils: colonialism, racism, apartheid and genocide. It can be loaded with the most inflammatory rhetoric: Zionists as “child killers,” “Nazis” or “genociders.” It functions loosely as a political descriptor, a moral accusation and a marker of identity.

These dual resonances – Zionist as object of hate and Zionist as Jew – ripple through disparate communities, tacitly “criminalising” even the most benign connection with Israel and indirectly reinforcing antipathy towards Jews, without ever explicitly naming them. When “Zionist” functions simultaneously as a term of vilification and as a label many Jews apply to themselves, political critique almost inevitably slides into group-based hostility. The effect is to generate antipathy toward Jews without ever explicitly naming them.

It is not surprising that in some community sectors, a simple public expression of concern for the safety of Jews in Israel may be enough to evoke all the hostility now reflexly associated with the term Zionist. This leaves many Jews uncertain how to speak publicly at all.

Many Australians who support Palestinian rights in good faith may not recognise how protest language may facilitate this “slippage” of anger from Israel to Zionists, to Jews.  This slippage blurs the boundary between political critique and hostility toward the Jewish community.

A distressing incident in 2025 illustrates how boundaries between antisemitism and the language of anti-Zionist protest can blur. Year-5 Jewish students on an excursion were reportedly subjected to a barrage of insults from older students from another school including: “dirty Jews”, “baby killers”, and “Free Hezbollah”.

It is tragic that the Bondi attackers, allegedly motivated by opposition to “Zionists”, murdered Jews.

4.The reflex denial of any possible links between protest and violence is based on simplistic and outmoded understandings of causality in complex social systems

In response to Jewish community concerns about protest language and community safety, it is common to hear the reply that the relationship between speech and a specific terrorist act cannot be “proven”. This is technically true, but misleading. In complex systems, causation is a statistical concept.

It is widely accepted in the broader community that certain harms operate probabilistically: for example the relationship between climate change and extreme weather events is well recognised even though one cannot prove causation for an individual bush-fire or storm event. The same applies to the relationship between smoking and individual cases of lung cancer.

Similarly, there is a substantial literature supporting the view that the risk of harm from hate-speech is also probabilistic and operates at a population level.  This is true, even though we cannot attribute a given event (such as Bondi) to a specific persons, actions, slogan or protest event.

This phenomenon has been described as “stochastic terrorism” or “stochastic violence”. This has been defined as “…the use of mass communications to stir up … lone wolves to carry out violent or terrorist acts that are … individually unpredictable”. This literature recognises that violent acts are likely related to the emotional and cognitive effects of activism in the media and on the street. Psychological and linguistic studies and a recent major metanalysis of 55 studies on the impact of media messaging all describe similar mechanisms. This literature describes how rhetoric circulates within communities and can lower the threshold for violence in primed individuals. In these systems no one need explicitly call for violence, and no one is individually responsible. Risk arises through cumulative effects rather than direct incitement.

Susan Benesch of the Dangerous Speech Project describes dangerous speech as “Any form of expression (e.g. speech, text, or images) that can increase the risk that its audience will condone or commit violence against members of another group.” She further notes that “Hate speech … uses derogatory group slurs, metaphoric language, exaggeration, images, and symbols. … Its public expression ….allows like-minded individuals to find an echo chamber for their shared beliefs. And it has real and painful consequences for victims.”

Mike Burgess, speaking a month prior to the Bondi massacre, said that “Since October 2023, we’ve seen more provocative protests and a notable uptick in intentionally disruptive and damaging tactics by anti-Israel activists, including multiple acts of arson, vandalism and violent protest…” and “The conflict in the Middle East …. prompted protest, exacerbated tension, undermined social cohesion and elevated intolerance (making)  acts of politically motivated violence more likely. …. Inflammatory rhetoric and provocative, disruptive actions had been normalised, and the normalisation of violence and hatred against one community had created a permissive environment for similar behaviours in other communities.”

This is not an argument about direct causation or “collective blame”, but the debate over language and anti-Jewish violence requires the recognition of this well described sociological phenomenon and  constructive engage with its policy implications.

The inadequacy of frameworks premised on direct causation is not merely  theoretical but regularly surfaces in permissive court findings regarding the right to protest near synagogues, or to display language vilifying “Zionists”.

5.The harms to the Jewish community are not limited to dramatic violent acts but include chronic psychological and social harm

Bondi was a tragic event that finally shocked our community into recognising and responding to a problem that had been evident to most of the Jewish community for two years.

Pro-Palestinian/ anti-Zionist activism had invaded “intimate” Jewish spaces, with mobs outside synagogues or at recreational spaces in Jewish neighbourhoods. There has been vandalism of Jewish homes, schools, synagogues, community centres and of the offices of a university academic. Jews in the arts and other sectors of our community have been marginalised and doxxed and private businesses intimidated and shut down. There have been death threats to Jews and Jewish organisations.

A steady drum beat of vilification: “baby killers”, “genocidaires” and “Nazis” has created a charged and heated atmosphere in which many Jews have come to feel unwelcome or unsafe. For every act that hits the media there are countless stories, often related over the Sabbath dinner table, of personal slights, off-hand comments and slurs. There has been endless on-line hate. This incitement has been marked by episodes of violence, acts of arson and now murder.

The dramatic rise in incidents negatively impacting Australian Jews since October 2023 has been well documented in Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) incident reports, as have Jewish experiences of antisemitism (2024 survey ) and antisemitic attitudes held by non-Jewish Australians (2021, 2025, ASECA survey).

Hate speech itself can be profoundly harmful psychologically. This is true for Jews in Australia (and)  the US Jewish community just as it was for the indigenous community during the voice debate. For some antizionists, the intimidation and marginalisation of Jews is not a by-product of activism but rather a specific goal. ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess, commenting on anti-Israel activists observed: “Directly or indirectly, their actions can marginalise, stigmatise and frighten sections of the community.”

A 2024 survey conducted in the weeks after the start of the Gaza war (including approximately 8% of the adult Jewish population) reported that 64% felt that antisemitism was a big problem, far higher than in a 2017 survey. One in five had personally experienced an insult or harassment because they are Jewish and a similar number was less open in showing their identity in public. Similar findings have been reported in the UK, Europe and the US.

This is particularly sensitive in Australia’s post Holocaust community. As Jeremy Waldronwrote of hate speech: “It does this not only by intimating discrimination and violence, but by reawakening living nightmares of what this society was like—or what other societies have been like—in the past. In doing so, it creates something like …a sort of slow-acting poison, accumulating here and there, word by word…”

6.Jewish community calls for support and safety reflect genuine grass roots concerns and are not simply political attempts to stifle legitimate debate as often claimed by anti-Zionist groups

Against the overwhelming evidence of adverse Jewish experiences, non-Jewish and Jewish pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist groups regularly attempt to downplay the issue by:

  • disputing definitions of antisemitism, survey methodology and measurement.
  • dismissing communal concerns as “weaponising” antisemitism
  • claiming Jews are simply conflating antisemitism with criticism of Israel.
  • claiming that antizionist slogans and activism have nothing to do with Jews because “not all Jews are Zionists” or “Zionism and Jewishness are not identical”. Such claims, while true, are facile and in no way negate the experiences and views of the vast majority of the Jewish community who have strong connections with and concerns for Israel and are targets for antizionist activism
  • focusing on antisemitism from the political right, distracting from the complex and cumulative effects of anti-Zionist speech and activism from the progressive left, religious fundamentalist and anti-Israel groups.

The pattern is one of disputing and distracting rather than engaging with patterns of fear, withdrawal and marginalisation.

This approach stands in opposition to recommendations in the AHRC Framework which stresses that the  approach to racism should be “community-centric” and recognise that racism as a “complex and shifting phenomenon”.

7.Claims that antisemitism can adequately be addressed through existing “universal” mechanisms are not supported by evidence

Anti-Zionists resist specific policies to respond to antisemitism, casting their lot with generalised anti-racism frameworks. They reject the Special Envoy’s report on antisemitism, in part for reasons of free speech. The claim that the AHRC Framework is sufficient as the primary mechanism to deal with antisemitism is flawed.

While society-wide approaches to racism are essential, Indigenous Australians, migrants, women, LGBTQ+ communities, Muslims and Jews all have different histories of oppression and face different challenges.

The need for targeted measures for antisemitism is not about moral priority but relates to its specific dynamic. Jews are often not recognised as a minority let alone a vulnerable one, because they are coded “white” and linked with power, money, conspiracy and influence. There is growing ignorance of antisemitism’s history, its genocidal expression within living memory. A UN report highlighting the lack of awareness of antisemitism’s modern manifestations.

It must also be noted that the AHRC document was framed and developed primarily to deal with indigenous disadvantage. Its preamble it states that: “racism operates by racialising various groups of people negatively to maintain the dominance of groups racialised as white….”. This strong conceptual frame around issues of colour raises questions about its suitability as the sole vehicle for addressing antisemitism.

The assertion made by Jewish anti-Zionists, that “general anti-racism” measures, including the AHRC Framework, will be effective for antisemitism does not reflect what is known about antisemitism nor about the AHRC Framework.

As human rights law academic Kenneth Marcus has observed, when  antisemitism is subsumed under generalised frameworks of disadvantage, it often disappears from view.

The Special Envoy’s plan, while open to criticism, is consonant with Global Guidelineswhich have been endorsed by over 40 states and regional groups, and consistent with UN recommendations that addressing antisemitism requires specific strategies in addition to general anti-racism measures.

In public statements the JCA has argued that calls to curb the most hostile forms of anti-Zionist speech risk making Jews less safe, by exposing them to blame for increased state repression. It is worth asking whether reframing such calls as political manoeuvres rather than expressions of communal fear does not itself heighten that risk — by casting concern for safety as bad faith.

8.Minority Jewish voices substantially misrepresent the concerns of the wider Australian Jewish community

The Jewish Council of Australia (JCA) has expressed the intention to engage with the Commission, as is their right. However, public positions taken so far by the JCA and other anti-Zionist Jewish groups raise concerns about the nature and impact of their likely submissions.

The JCA presents itself as an expert voice that provides a counterbalance to allegedly unrepresentative communal leadership bodies such as the ECAJ.

While Jewish peak bodies are not directly elected by the whole of community (what community peak bodies are?), they include a wide range of community organisations across the country and are closely aligned the community’s concerns regarding safety and connection with Israel. Concerns regarding community safety are widespread and a deep connection to Israel and concern for Israel’s welfare are shared by around 90% of Australian Jews. Around three quarters self-identify as Zionist.(2017, 2023 and 2024).

The JCA and other anti-Zionist groups have a small number of high-profile spokespeople, however their views are unlikely to reflect more than a small minority of a Jewish community of over 110,000. The JCA claims over 1,300 supporters. However, many claimed supporters are anonymous and signing on to their website entails endorsing values such as human rights, freedom and equality. not necessarily the anti-Zionist nature of the group. It is far from clear that their those who have signed endorse the JCA’s view that antisemitism is unrelated to progressive and antizionist activism.

This doesn’t delegitimise their participation or views but should have bearing on the weight given these views at the Royal Commission.

Anti-Zionist Jewish positions are often cited by the broader anti-Zionist advocacy community and by segments of the media and civil society. This is not because the JCA is representative of the community, but rather because their views suit the agenda of those who seek to vilify the Jewish community without restriction.

This “spoiler effect” is not without precedent.

The recent referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament, though set in a different political context, is illustrative. Tanya Muscat and Katharina Wolf from Curtin University described how “No” proponents “… were selectively framed by media to present a picture of broad Indigenous opposition, thereby neutralising support for the Yes campaign…(this)  illustrates the need for communication strategies that are not only inclusive, but genuinely representative and responsive to the diversity within Indigenous communities.”

The Commission should be alert to the risk that anti-Zionist Jewish voices, amplified beyond their representative weight, may obscure the genuine concerns and aspirations of the wider Jewish community.

9.Jewish vulnerability is not adequately recognised in legal and progressive cultural frameworks

Over the last two years or more, hostile speech targeting Jews has circulated, escalated and become normalised in a manner that seems unimaginable were this another minority.

Cautious responses across government, media, legal and other civic institutions have contributed to a permissive environment in which hostile language and behaviour have gone unchallenged.

In part this has happened because concerns expressed by Jews regarding antisemitism are often understood primarily through the lens of the Israel–Palestine conflict, where they are interpreted as attempts to “silence protest”. They are also contested through disputes over definition or methodology.

At a deeper level, Jews are not widely recognised as a vulnerable minority, despite being one of Australia’s smallest communities and carrying profound collective trauma within living memory. Jews are targeted by “the right” as “non-white” and conspiratorial (with replacement theories proliferating, particularly in the US) as well as by progressives who characterise them as white, European, powerful and conspiratorial. This antipathy from both sides of the political spectrum is not experienced by other minorities, and other vulnerable groups typically do not offer solidarity to the Jewish community.

Existing legal and anti-discrimination mechanisms are designed to deal with harms attributable to individual people and events. As discussed above, much of the harm associated with the protest movement can be understood as cumulative in nature, with risks being statistical. This framing is more akin to climate change than to individual criminal behaviour and so grappling with the cumulative effects and diffuse responsibility of mass movements needs alternative conceptual approaches and  mechanisms of mitigation and redress.

The NSW Court of Appeal’s April 2026 decision striking down the Public Assembly Restriction Declaration scheme found that it imposed an impermissible burden on the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. The courts framework assumes that harms from political expression are discrete and traceable, and that a more precisely targeted instrument is always available and always superior.

The stochastic violence framework challenges both assumptions. Where harm operates through cumulative population-level exposure and threshold effects, demanding tight causal specificity as a condition of constitutional validity is demanding something the nature of the harm structurally cannot provide. Where the relevant risk is ambient and systemic rather than incident-specific, a broader precautionary mechanism may be more — not less — consistent with the underlying harm theory than a narrowly targeted one would be.

Legal mechanisms designed to adjudicate individual acts, individual intent and individual causation are poorly suited to harms that are diffuse, cumulative and probabilistically distributed across a population.

The Commission should draw two conclusions from this. First, that the safety concerns motivating the legislation were genuine and documented. Second, that the gap between what existing legal frameworks can address and what the harm actually requires cannot be closed by litigation. It requires policy development grounded in the empirical literature on dangerous speech and probabilistic violence — to develop regulatory responses that are both constitutionally defensible and adequate to the harm being addressed. That is precisely the kind of deeper recommendation this Commission is positioned to make.

10. This is not just another free speech/protest issue- the current protests are the first large-scale human rights protest movement in Australia that explicitly or implicitly targets an Australian minority community

The claim that anti-Zionist protest stands in the tradition of great Australian civic activism deserves scrutiny. Australia has a proud history of protest in the cause of human rights.

Opposition to the Vietnam War targeted government military policy. The anti-apartheid movement targeted a foreign regime. Activism for LGBTQ+ and Indigenous rights targeted discriminatory laws and the Australian state. In each case the object of protest was governmental policy or the policies of a foreign state.

No Australian minority community was targeted, vilified or made to feel unsafe in its own country as a direct consequence of the protest itself.

The anti-Zionist protest movement is different.  Its stated target is the Israeli government but, as argued above, the language and conduct of significant elements of the movement extend — through slippage and cumulative normalisation — from Israel, to Zionists, to Jews. The people bearing the cost are not governments or institutions. They are Jewish schoolchildren, Jewish academics, and Jewish families whose synagogues have been vandalised and whose neighbourhoods have been subject to intimidatory protest.

A human rights movement that targets a vulnerable minority undermines its own foundational premise. This not simply the case of speaking truth to power but rather a large movement directing its forces at a vulnerable minority.

Powerful and effective advocacy for Palestinian rights is entirely legitimate and possible without dehumanising language, without intimidation in Jewish communal spaces, and without slogans carrying violent resonances for a community that has known genocide within living memory.

Some notes from personal experience

My parents came to Australia to escape European antisemitism. It was largely a successful migration, and this country has been good to our family and to the Jewish community more broadly.

Antisemitism has nonetheless been a sporadic presence throughout my life. As a child I heard comments about Jews and money. Walking to synagogue in a kippah I have had “bloody Jews” shouted from passing car windows on several occasions. A close friend was beaten in a football ground car park while wearing a kippah . A few years ago a tradesman stormed out of my home after apparently noticing a Jewish artefact, shouting in the street as he left: “the Nazis should have finished you off.”

This was unpleasant but had never risen to the sense of a systematic anti-Jewish campaign.

Since October 2023 something has changed.

Partly it is what has been said and done — the graffiti, the vandalism of Jewish centres, the tearing down of hostage photographs from public walls. Partly it is what has not been said. I have watched colleagues receive institutional solidarity after attacks on their communities over time After October 7th 2023 I received communications from institutional leaders that mentioned Gaza, mentioned the conflict, but did not mention Jews, did not mention what had happened to Israeli civilians and did not acknowledge what the Australian Jewish community was living through. That silence communicated something profound.

I have watched security guards at synagogues and Jewish schools become so normalised that we have largely stopped remarking on it. Soon after October 7th 2023 a Jewish nursing home in Melbourne started to employ guards at the entrance. My uncle, a Holocaust survivor, needs guards to protect him from antisemitic attack in Melbourne in 2026.

The sense that there has been a tectonic shift in attitudes towards Jews is widely shared in my community, and it deserves to be taken seriously.

Conclusions and recommendations

The concerns currently being expressed by Australian Jews do not turn on Bondi.

Rather, Bondi has served to crystallise awareness of the sustained and normalised hostility toward a minority community. This has operated through language, symbolism, social pressure and physical intimidation in a civic environment that has consistently failed to recognise, constrain or respond to it with the seriousness applied to harms affecting other minorities.

There is a moral accounting that has not yet been done. For two years, government and civic institutions sent a series of signals — largely through acts of omission— that shaped the environment in which hostility toward Jews escalated and became normalised. Just two early examples were the silence after the Opera House protest in October ’23 and our Foreign Minister’s refusal to visit the Nova memorial while in Israel. The has been a continuing absence of clear public statements about what forms of protest and language are acceptable — not legally, but morally.

This continuing silence and apathy were read, by the Jewish community and by the protest movement, as tacit acceptance of unconstrained forms of protest. The failure of government to reinforce moral and civic norms has had consequences that no subsequent legislative response can fully undo.

A Royal Commission that focuses narrowly on security failures at Bondi, without grappling with this broader institutional failure of leadership, will fail.

The protest movement should address its own accountability. Palestinian advocacy organisations that present themselves as defenders of human rights carry a particular responsibility. Tolerating, excusing or deflecting attention from dehumanising language directed at Jews is a contradiction the Commission should name directly. “We reject antisemitism” in a mission statement is not accountability. Genuine commitment to human rights principles requires actively calling out vilifying language when it appears, refusing to share platforms with those who use it, and accepting that the credibility of a movement is shaped by what it tolerates as much as by what it explicitly endorses. The question the Commission should put to these organisations is not whether they intend harm, but rather whether they effectively provide cover for unacceptable conduct incompatible with the protection of human rights.

The Commission will hear from minority Jewish voices who are seeking to limit scrutiny of anti-Zionist activism and minimise the widely held concerns of the community they claim to represent. Anti-Zionist Jewish voices are amplified not because they reflect Australian Jewish experience but because they are useful to those who wish to deflect that scrutiny. It would be a serious failure if the genuine and widely held fears of over 100,000 Australian Jews were obscured by a small, unrepresentative minority whose positions are largely indistinguishable from those opposing any restraint on anti-Zionist activism.

The Commission should weigh the asymmetry of what is at stake. On one side of the balance sits some degree of restraint in the most inflammatory language and protest forms — forms that reasonable people can recognise as serving no legitimate advocacy purpose. On the other sits a community that has spent two years reporting fear, concealing identity in public, withdrawing from civic life, and watching its institutions firebombed while being told that its concerns are weaponisation, overreach, or simply the price of free speech. Freedom of speech is a central value. So is the right of a minority community to exist in civic space without being treated as a legitimate target. These are not equivalent considerations, and recommendations that treat them as symmetrical will not address the harm.

This is not a call for censorship, silencing debate or banning protest. It does not equate criticism of Israel with antisemitism. Nor is it a concern about mere Jewish discomfort relating to robust debate. The case for Palestinian rights is legitimate and can be made powerfully without language that dehumanises, without slogans that carry violent resonances, and without forms of protest that target Jewish communal spaces. The question is not whether advocacy is permissible. It is whether the most harmful modes of that advocacy are necessary to it.

What is at stake is not comfort but belonging: whether Australian civic spaces remain places where minorities can live, speak and participate without being treated as objects of collective hostility.

No regulatory or legislative response will be adequate without investment in the civic and educational foundations that make such responses meaningful. The past two years have exposed not only a failure of law and policy but a failure of shared understanding — across institutions, media and the general public — about what antisemitism is, how it operates.

Regulation addresses behaviour but education is needed to address the conditions that make certain behaviours seem acceptable. Any set of recommendations that omits this foundation is treating symptoms. The Commission should recommend that addressing antisemitism be incorporated into school curricula. The media and public institutions require structured guidance on recognising hate speech that operates through political framing.

The Commission is accordingly asked to consider the following recommendations:

  1. Recognise the systemic nature of the harm. The cumulative, probabilistic character of harm from hate speech and inflammatory protest language should be acknowledged explicitly. A framework built solely around adjudicating discrete incidents and provable individual causation will continue to fail the Jewish community as it has failed it for the past two years.
  2. Develop regulatory responses adequate to systemic harm. The NSW Court of Appeal’s invalidation of the post-Bondi protest restrictions indicates the limitations of current judicial processes to address the nature of harms experienced by the Jewish community. The Commission should recommend policy grounded in the empirical literature on speech and harm —that are both constitutionally defensible yet adequate to the nature of harms experienced by the Jewish community.
  3. Require accountability within the protest movement. Advocacy organisations that claim to reject antisemitism and violence bear a corresponding responsibility to actively call out vilifying language and intimidatory conduct within the broader protest ecosystem they share. Passive disavowal after the fact is not accountability. The Commission should consider whether organisations and individuals that claim human rights credentials while tolerating dehumanising language directed at Jews should continue to receive public legitimacy, funding or institutional support.
  4. Reject the adequacy of generalised anti-racism frameworks as the sole response.The AHRC Framework was developed primarily around racialised disadvantage and the experience of communities of colour. Antisemitism has a distinct dynamic — Jews are simultaneously coded as white and powerful by progressives, and as foreign and conspiratorial by the right — and is rendered invisible by generalised frameworks. Specific strategies, consistent with Global Guidelines endorsed by over 40 states and with UN recommendations, are warranted and should be implemented alongside, not instead of, broader anti-racism measures.
  5. Weigh community voices accurately. The Commission will hear from Jewish anti-Zionist groups whose positions diverge sharply from those of mainstream communal organisations and most community members. Their right to participate is not questioned. However the weight accorded their submissions should be proportionate to genuine representativeness, and the Commission should be alert to the amplification of minority Jewish voices to serve interests other than accurate representation of the Jewish community.
  6. Invest in education and civic foundations. The Commission should recommend that antisemitism — its history, its specific character and its modern manifestations — be reflected in institutional training.
  7. Demand moral leadership, not only legal mechanism. The most important failure of the past two years has not been legislative. It has been the failure of government, universities, media and civil society to say clearly and repeatedly that Jews are a vulnerable minority community entitled to the same recognition, solidarity and protection extended to other minorities; that their fears are legitimate; and that certain forms of language and protest are not made acceptable by being coded. No other minority is expected to bear resentments originating in distant conflict or in the acts of isolated individuals.

The “I’ll ride with you” movement, which supported Muslims who were feeling vulnerable to backlash following the  Lindt Café siege, exemplifies our community’s capacity to recognise and respond to minority vulnerability with solidarity. No equivalent solidarity was extended to the Jewish community in the wake of October 7th, or in the two years of escalating hostility that followed.

Randa Abdel-Fattah’s claim that “Zionists (i.e. most Jews) have no right to cultural safety” exemplifies the cloud that has hung unanswered over the Jewish community for far too long. This slogan, and the tragic downstream effects when such views become normalised (and even celebrated in some sectors), represent the deep challenge before the Royal Commission and the Australian community more broadly.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Andrew is a medical specialist working in Australia. He is a regular visitor to Israel and a member of an egalitarian shul in Melbourne. He is married and has three sons. He occasionally suffers from thought bubbles that transmogrify into written form.

Jewish singer Deborah Conway accuses Aussie actor of running anti-Semitic boycott campaign against her

Jewish singer Deborah Conway has accused an Australian actor of running an anti-Semitic boycott campaign against her that led to venues cancelling her shows.

Fifty-six witnesses were called in the Royal Commission on Anti-Semitism and Social Cohesion last week, sharing how “Nazi style slurs” are being hurled at children in schools that now look more like prisons due to increased security concerns in the wake of Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Conway, a Jewish Australian, told the commission several of her shows have been pulled over the last few years, claiming an Australian actor, who she did not name inside the hearing, had sent letters to venues stating “Deborah Conway is a self-confessed Zionist and a supporter of genocide”.

The letters also allegedly included words to the effect that if they were to platform her “you are complicit in genocide”.

“I think some of the venues found that incredibly disturbing and they pulled back,” Conway said.

Conway revealed the name of the actor she has accused of running the campaign while speaking outside the hearing, however NewsWire has chosen not to name the woman.

“She signed her name very boldly and openly and she was proud of the letter she had written,” Conway claimed outside the hearing on Monday.

Singer Deborah Conway has suffered a flurry of online abuse in the wake of October 7, 2023. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Deborah Conway Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Conway also detailed how in another instance, 70 people wearing balaclavas rocked up to a venue hitting pots and pans together, and said if they went ahead with one of Conway’s shows “we will make sure that we turn up with 300 people, and we will make sure that business is very hard for you”.

“So they pulled it, which I don’t blame them — I would too,” Conway said.

The musician also copped a flurry of online abuse after she and a group of about 600 Jewish creatives were doxxed in February 2024.

“I hope your entire family dies in an air strike and you have limbs amputated without aesthetics — I assume he means anaesthetics,” Conway read to the commission on Monday.

“I hope that after this happens you have no access to clean bandages, antibiotics or food.”

Conway called anti-Zionism a ‘genocidal impulse’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Anti-Zionism a ‘genocidal impulse’

Conway described anti-Zionism as a “genocidal impulse”, telling the hearing that “when people chant from the river to the sea … that is a call to end the entity of Israel”.

“I want there to be peace, I want there to be a two-state solution, I want everyone to just relax. Let everyone eat their hummus and get on with it,” Conway said.

“But unfortunately … we’re not living in the land of unicorns and rainbows.”

She said she can’t bear the idea of young artists who are being targeted and vilified for believing Israel should be allowed to exist.

“That’s their crime, and that’s a crime that I think is completely beyond the pale,” she said.

“When they say Zionism equals Nazism … genocide … and then they end up with a sign that goes in the bin.

“They’re throwing us all in the bin. It’s not going to end well.”

Conway is an Australian singer and songwriter. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Conway is an Australian singer and songwriter. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

‘Larger than life’: Tribute to slain Rabbi

The father of a 14-year-old who survived the Bondi attack with bullet wounds paid tribute to Rabbi Eli Schlanger who died in the Bondi attack on December 14 last year.

The speaker was present at the Chanukah by the Sea event where two gunmen allegedly opened fire, killing fifteen people.

“He was so happy, it was an amazing event ‘til the minute before,” the man said.

He described Mr Schlanger as “larger than life” and “an amazing human being” who was always ready to help.

His 14-year-old daughter was shot while shielding children during the attack, with the man saying his daughter had asked him afterwards “(Dad) why they hate us so much, why they want to kill us?”

The speaker also told the royal commission a Jewish community member brought their Mezuzah — a religious scroll placed at the door of Jewish Homes — to see if it was intact and correct.

Once he opened it he found a “Free Palestine” scroll in it instead of the religious verse.

‘No friends left’: Jewish 15yo targeted online

A 15-year-old Jewish boy, known only as ABB, detailed how he had been bullied since the end of 2024 and was targeted in a Minecraft chat group comprised of children from his school.

A Jewish teenager says he was targeted with anti-Semitic abuse while playing the popular online game Minecraft with kids from his school. Picture: Supplied by Telltale Games

A Jewish teenager says he was targeted with anti-Semitic abuse while playing the popular online game Minecraft with kids from his school. Picture: Supplied by Telltale Games

Someone had written “I hate the Jews” in the chat group at one stage, but his stomach turned “upside down” after someone commented “rabid filthy rotten gut-wrenching grotesque rabbi yamaka wearing bank owning iron doming Hashem following Jew” on another occasion.

“It made my stomach turn upside down, I really just had to step away from my computer for a little bit and then, when I came back, I think I just closed and logged off for the day,” the teen said.

The children continued with the abuse after the 15-year-old confronted them at school and “told them to stop because it was destroying my mental health”.

He didn’t tell his parents right away because he thought he could handle it, “but it just got out of hand”.

“I walked into their room and said I have no friends left,” the teen told the hearing.

His mother, ABD, said her son had “tears in his eyes” as he told them how his friends had locked him in a part of the game and left him alone to die.

“Appalled”, ABD said her stomach drops knowing how her son had “normalised” and had to “make his peace” with the ordeal.

“(He) accepted it as part of his school life,” she said.

His parents said the school handled the situation really well and held an investigation, with three of the children also apologising to ABB.

However if ABB is near the group too long at school they tell him to leave, the boy said.

“Every time I go up to them, because some of my other friends sit with them … if I stay there for a little too long, they’ll be like ‘get out of here’ or something like that,” ABB said.

ABB also told the hearing of how a group of Year 12s recently shouted something along the lines of “Hitler was right to kill them all”.

“I turned around expecting to see somebody staring at me or pointing at me but I found it was just a group of Year 12 boys who were just talking amongst themselves using it for general conversation,” he said.

The October 9, 2023 rally at the Opera House has been described as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate during the inquiry. Picture: NewsWire / Jeremy Piper

The October 9, 2023 rally at the Opera House has been described as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate during the inquiry. Picture: NewsWire / Jeremy Piper

The boy’s father, ABE, said he no longer recognises this country, telling the hearing people used to be “a lot more tolerant”.

“All of those Australian idioms that we have for people having a fair go, that seems to have been lost,” he said.

“I would like to see something come out of this commission where we can chart the course back towards that Australia, or that attitude that we had in Australia.”

Propaganda fuelling ‘disunity’ and ‘discord’

Rabbi Daniel Rabin, who is part of a synagogue in Caulfield in Melbourne, said “we wouldn’t be sitting here if this was just about criticism of Israel”, telling the hearing Australians are being fed propaganda which is fuelling the disunity the country is experiencing.

Mr Rabin acknowledged that criticism of Israel is OK, but “huge lies” are circulating, telling the commission the word “genocide” is being “thrown into everything”.

“It’s the seeping through of this propaganda that’s found it’s way everywhere,” he said.

Rabbi Daniel Rabin detailed a campaign of abusive calls his synagogue has received. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Rabbi Daniel Rabin Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

“I think there are those who naturally have this hateful mission, but I think it’s affecting many regular Australians who are being fed this narrative, which I think is causing so much of the disunity and this discord that we are finding ourselves in at the moment.”

He recounted a campaign of abusive calls his synagogue had received, with the phrase “baby killers” seeming to be the favourite.

“When you say somebody is a baby killer … I can’t think of anything more grotesque to say about a person,” he said.

“It’s actually mind boggling that people are accusing us of that and then calling our synagogues … it’s hurtful, it’s disgusting.”

Mr Rabin spoke of having eggs and anti-Semitic slurs thrown at him before October 7, 2023, but the abuse has increased in the wake of Hamas’ attack.

Just days after the attack a car passing by he and his 10-year-old son shouted out “horrific things” he didn’t feel comfortable repeating at the inquiry.

“Having my 10-year-old son with me, of course he looked at me and he said ‘Why do these people hate us?’” he said.

“And that was very confronting … very difficult to explain to him.”

Fifteen people were killed in the Bondi attack in December 2025. Picture: NewsWire / Flavio Brancaleone

Fifteen people were killed in the Bondi attack in December 2025. NewsWire / Flavio Brancaleone

Jewish musician’s career and business destroyed after doxxing

Jewish musician Joshua Moshe told the hearing how his life started to fall apart after he was doxxed, with he and his wife both receiving hate messages and threats.

The couple’s homeware shop in north Melbourne was vandalised with boycott stickers and graffiti in the wake of the doxxing, while photos of them both taken from their social media accounts and plastered with “Zionists” and “Boycotting”.

At one point he received a photo of his son along with a voicemail that said “You racist motherf***er better keep watching your motherf***ing back”.

The abuse forced the couple to close up their shop and move to a different spot in the city. “This was devastating to experience … ongoing torrent of messages.. I was feeling extremely anxious, devastated, feeling like my life was starting to unravel,” Mr Moshe said.

Musician Joshua Moshe told the hearing how his life started to fall apart after he was doxxed. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe  Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe and his partner Maggie May Moshe spoke with the media outside the hearing on Monday. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Musician Joshua Moshe and his partner Maggie May Moshe spoke with the media outside the hearing on Monday. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

A saxophonist and composer, Mr Moshe was part of an award-winning band for seven years up until the doxxing incident, when he found out via social media that he’d been kicked out of the band.

The band had posted an online post — which they recently issued an apology for — which said the group was “disgusted, deeply shocked and betrayed”, claiming Mr Moshe had made comments in a Zionist WhatsApp group.

“We explicitly condemn any form of Zionism, racism, bullying anti-Semitism and prejudice of any kind,” the post said.

Mr Moshe said the Zionism that he believed in was that Jewish people deserved a home in some part of their ancestral homeland.

ECAJ researcher targeted with ‘horrifying’ anti-Semitic caricature

Executive council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) research director Julie Nathan described the “horrifying” moment a sexualised caricature of her was shared on the internet.

The caricature was accompanied with the words “Julie simply desires to be filled with Aryan seed”.

“It’s very much a sexualisation, so you have this Jewish caricature, this is the feminine version of it, with the long, curly hair, and the long fingernails … It was horrifying to see” Ms Nathan told the royal commission.

Executive Council of Australian Jewry research director Julie Nathan says trying to keep track of anti-Semitic incidents online is ‘like trying to count the stars’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Executive Council of Australian Jewry research director Julie Nathan says trying to keep track of anti-Semitic incidents online is ‘like trying to count the stars’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Ms Nathan, who authors the Jewish group’s annual report on anti-Semitism in Australia, said a new form of anti-Semitism has emerged since October 7, 2023 telling the hearing there was a 316 per cent rise in anti-Semitic incidents in Australia according to their 2024-2025 annual report.

“We’re getting much more brazen and much more confident coming out and not ashamed or worried about it being anti-Semitic and inciting violence against Jews,” she said.

Online posts or publications are not included in the report “because there are so many it’s uncountable”, Ms Nathan said.

“It’s like trying to count the stars,” she said.

Pro-Palestine material is also not counted as anti-Jewish, with Ms Nathan explaining a “free Palestine” sticker would only be considered anti-Semitic if it was stuck on a synagogue or a Jewish school, for instance.

“Israel is a state like any other state, and just as we in Australia are free to criticise our government, our country … we accept that, and even though people may lie about things or may use offensive language,” Ms Nathan said.

“We accept that as being, you know, political discourse or political language. It’s only when it crosses the line into anti-Semitism, that’s when we will count it as anti Semitic.”

The incidents, which are all personally reviewed by Ms Nathan, are recorded under six different categories including: physical assault, vandalism, verbal abuse, hate messages, graffiti and material such as banners and stickers.

She spoke of some people on social media screenshotting the annual report and making fun of it, saying: “We’re doing well boys, let’s keep the momentum going”.

Chief executive officer of The Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau said scenes at a Western Sydney protest on October 8, 2023, ‘set the tone’ for the normalisation of Jewish hate. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Chief executive officer of The Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau sPicture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Ms Blicblau said online spaces have helped move anti-Semitism away from ‘shameful radical fringes’. Picture: NewsWire / Damian Shaw

Fireworks in the street is Israel was ‘counting its dead

Fireworks in the streets as Israel was “still counting its dead” in the wake of Hamas’ 2023 attack “set the tone” for the normalisation of Jewish hate in Australia, the leader of a Jewish organisation has told a hate inquiry.

Many pointed to the Sydney Opera House protest on October 9, 2023, as a critical turning point in the rise of Jewish hate; however, Dor Foundation Tahli Blicblau chief executive instead submitted that scenes at a Western Sydney protest the day prior were pivotal.

“The events of October 7 were described as a day of pride and courage,” Ms Blicblau told the royal commission on Monday.

“Cars were driving through Western Sydney setting off fireworks … that glorification of violence that night at a time when Israel was still counting its dead really set the tone for a permissive environment in which glorifying violence was accepted and permissible.”

Nine witnesses will give evidence on Monday. Picture: Gaye Gerard /NewsWire

 Picture: Gaye Gerard /NewsWire

Research from the Jewish body, which was established in 2024 to combat anti-Semitism, has revealed that most Australians can’t recognise anti-Semitic tropes.

Radical ideologies had converged in such a way that anti-Semitism was slipping into public discourse easier, Ms Blicblau said.

“They’re shrouded just enough in language, often of human rights, to be acceptable,” she said.

“Most Australians can’t recognise anti-Semitic tropes when they see them, so they’re presented with these hateful tropes and because they don’t recognise it as being anti-Semitic, it’s more likely to become normalised and accepted.”

Ms Blicblau also spoke to the role of online spaces in helping move anti-Semitism away from “shameful radical fringes”.

“The role of the internet and social media allows these hateful comments to reach millions of people within milliseconds, so in order to combat the new form (of anti-Semitism) … we need to operate there,” Ms Blicblau said.

The hearing continues

The US-Iran war … beware of false analogies

President Donald Trump has described the US bombing campaign against Iran as “a little excursion,” then a “skirmish,” then a “mini-war” – ostensible breaches of a subsequent ceasefire are called “trifles”. He was doing something powerful men have always done: reach for a word small enough to sit comfortably in a sentence while the fires it describes are still burning, without actually committing to the potential political consequences calling the conflict a war. The gesture is familiar. Vladimir Putin called his invasion of Ukraine a “special military operation.” History, in the end, has usually insisted on its own vocabulary. What begins as euphemism tends to end as a chapter heading.

The US-Iran conflict – a sustained bombing campaign, a naval blockade constricting a fifth of the world’s oil supply, and an increasingly fragile ceasefire – is, by any honest accounting, a war. That we have not yet fully agreed to call it one is itself revealing. Language shapes the choices we are willing to contemplate; the choices we refuse to contemplate have a habit of being made for us, usually at greater cost and on someone else’s timetable.

But naming the war is only the first act of reckoning. The second – and more treacherous – is understanding it. And here, almost instinctively, we reach backwards. Before the first campaign has properly unfolded, the analogies arrive.

For this is what nations do when confronted with uncertainty: they search the past for usable maps. Yet wars are not equations, and analogies illuminate only by partial light. Gallipoli warns of overconfidence and the fantasy of the decisive stroke. Crimea evokes mismanagement and systemic incoherence. Vietnam and Iraq conjure the slow dread of entanglement – wars that move, expensively and violently, without ever quite arriving at conclusion.

We rarely encounter a new war on its own terms. Before the first campaign has properly unfolded, it is already being narrated through the past – the Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – names invoked less as history than as instruments of comprehension. This reflex is not mere intellectual laziness. War, in its immediacy, is too vast, too contradictory, to grasp without scaffolding; analogy supplies the frame. It tells us where to look for overconfidence, where to suspect mismanagement, where to anticipate drift. Yet it also does something subtler, and more dangerous: it invites us to believe that the present can be read off the past, that by matching patterns we might master outcomes.

The essay that follows proceeds from that tension. It does not treat these conflicts as competing verdicts on America’s confrontation with Iran, but as different lenses trained on different moments of a war’s life: conception, execution, and duration. Each captures a recognisable failure mode – the decisive stroke that overreaches, the system that cannot align means to ends, the conflict that persists beyond its rationale. To “refight” these wars in argument is not simply to indulge historical memory; it is to reveal how deeply our strategic thinking remains shaped by unresolved experiences. The past, in this sense, is not behind us. It is the grammar in which we continue to write the present.

Seeking storylines to explain the present

The quest begins, as these often do, reaching backwards in search of a usable past, a storyline that suits the present and what is now unfolding between America and Iran.

No war arrives naked; it comes draped in analogy. War is too large, too chaotic, to apprehend all at once; analogy shrinks it to something graspable. Analogies, like maps, tell you where to look, but also, just as often, where not to. Gallipoli (1915–16) is summoned, and Crimea (1853–56), and then, inevitably, Vietnam (1955-75, the war of my generation, though one that we British chose not to join) and Iraq (2003-11), those twin lodestars of modern American unease. Each is offered up as a key. Each, in its way, fits a lock. None, taken alone, opens the door.

Start with the British campaign during WWI to seize the strategic Dardanelles straits with the aim of threatening Istanbul and taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war. That analogy tends to be invoked by those who see overconfidence at the top: a belief that a bold stroke – decapitation strikes, limited escalation, a sharp application of force – can produce a decisive political outcome in a complex theatre. Gallipoli was conceived as a shortcut around stalemate; it became a lesson in underestimating geography, logistics, and the enemy’s will. If the critique is that Washington imagined a controlled, almost surgical confrontation with Iran that would bend reality to its design, then Gallipoli fits – particularly in its early optimism curdling into stubborn, costly entanglement.

There is something almost aesthetic about the Gallipoli temptation. It promises clarity. A narrow strait, a defined objective, a hinge upon which the whole great mechanism might turn. Strategy reduced to geometry. Yet wars have a way of refusing such elegance. The Turkish defence stiffened; the terrain asserted itself; the timetable dissolved into dust and flies and blood. The decisive stroke became an extended ordeal. And here the analogy deepens: not merely in the initial miscalculation, but in the dawning realisation that what was meant to be quick has become something else entirely – sticky, resistant, unyielding.

The Crimean War comparison is subtler, and in some ways more damning. Ostensibly a campaign by Britain and France (ironically, the architects of the Dardanelles venture) to challenge Czarist Russia’s design on the ailing Ottoman Empire – the so-called Eastern Question. Crimea was not just a military muddle; it was a war of misaligned systems: unclear objectives, poor coordination, inflated rhetoric masking administrative incompetence, and a media environment that amplified both heroism and absurdity (the Charge of the Light Brigade as both myth and indictment). If the Iran conflict appears strategically incoherent – multiple actors, shifting goals, allies pulling in different directions, public narratives outpacing operational reality – then Crimea begins to look uncomfortably familiar. It’s less about one disastrous decision and more about a system that cannot quite align means with ends.

Here the failure is quieter, but more pervasive. Not the single grand error, but the accumulation of smaller ones: supply chains that falter, commands that overlap, allies who agree in principle but diverge in practice. Crimea is what happens when the machinery of war – bureaucratic, logistical, political – fails to mesh. The guns fire, the troops advance, the dispatches glow with rhetoric, but somewhere beneath it all the connection between effort and outcome frays. One might say, borrowing that withering line in the 1960 Encyclopedia Britannica, that it becomes “perhaps the most ill-managed campaign in English history” – and the sting lies precisely in that word managed. Not conceived, not fought, but managed: as though war were an administrative exercise that has slipped its clerical bounds.

And then, inevitably, we arrive at America’s misbegotten wars in Indochina and Iraq. When people reach for these, they are usually pointing to something deeper: not the opening moves, but the trajectory. Vietnam is the archetype of gradual escalation into a conflict that cannot be cleanly won because its political premises are flawed. Iraq (particularly post-2003) adds another layer: the illusion of quick victory followed by insurgency, fragmentation, and the long tail of unintended consequences. If Iran becomes a drawn-out contest of proxies, asymmetric retaliation, and domestic fatigue – where tactical successes accumulate but strategic clarity recedes – then Vietnam/Iraq is the more predictive analogy.

Vietnam was once called “chaos without a compass,” and the phrase endures because it captures the feeling of the war more than its formal doctrine. There was, in fact, a compass – containment, credibility, dominoes – but it spun uncertainly, pointing in several directions at once. Washington oscillated between coercion and restraint, escalation and negotiation, measuring progress in tonnage dropped and bodies counted, even as the political centre of gravity drifted further out of reach. The war moved, violently and expensively, but it did not arrive. It accumulated.

Iraq echoes that pattern but begins differently – with a burst of clarity that dissolves into ambiguity. The regime falls; the statue topples; the map is redrawn in a matter of weeks; victory is declared. And then the afterlife begins. Insurgency, sectarian fracture, proxy entanglement- the slow discovery that winning the war is not the same as securing the peace. Iraq is what happens when the end state is assumed rather than constructed. It is, in that sense, less a campaign than a condition.

Set beside these, the earlier analogies sharpen. Gallipoli was not “chaos without a compass” at the outset; it had a very clear aim. Nor was it quite Crimea’s administrative farce, though elements of mismanagement crept in as the campaign stalled. Its distinctive flaw was the belief that a bold, limited stroke could shortcut the hard arithmetic of war – geography, supply, enemy adaptation. When that belief failed, the campaign slid, almost reluctantly, toward something more protracted, more wearing, with flashes of Crimean dysfunction flickering at the edges.

And this is the point at which the analogies begin to overlap, to blur into one another. The opening may be Gallipoli: confident, compressed, persuasive in its apparent simplicity. The conduct may drift toward Crimea: systems straining, coordination fraying, rhetoric outrunning reality. The trajectory may lengthen into Vietnam or Iraq: time stretching, purpose thinning, the war becoming less an event than an environment.

So which is most apt? If you’re judging initial strategic conception: then it is Gallipoli. If you’re judging systemic dysfunction and coalition incoherence: it’s Crimea. If you’re judging likely long-term dynamics and risk of quagmire: look to Vietnam and Iraq.

Forced to choose one, the most useful analogy is probably Iraq (with a Vietnam shadow). It captures both the confidence of the opening act and the chronic instability that can follow when political end states are ill-defined. Gallipoli was a failed gamble; Iraq became a condition. And it is the risk of becoming a condition – open-ended, absorbing, resistant to tidy resolution – that should trouble policymakers more than the memory of any single historical blunder.

For there is something peculiarly modern in that transformation. Nineteenth-century wars could be mismanaged; early twentieth-century campaigns could be disastrously conceived; but late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century conflicts have a habit of enduring. They slip their temporal bounds. They resist conclusion. They persist in the form of insurgencies, proxy struggles, regional destabilisations, so-called “forever wars” – echoes rather than endings.

History, in this sense, does not repeat so much as it offers a set of recurring traps, each labelled in a different hand. The names change – Lone Pine and The Nek, Balaclava, Khe Sanh, Fallujah – but the pattern is recognisable: ambition outruns understanding; institutions struggle to keep pace with intention; time erodes clarity; and strategy discovers, too late, that the map was never the territory.

The past, obligingly, provides the metaphors. The present decides which of them it is willing to become.

Forever wars and the persistent Eastern Question

Ironically, the repercussions and ricochets of the Crimea and Gallipoli linger still in the “forever wars” of the Ottoman Succession that continue to be fought in the Levant. Though the “sick man of Europe” has long gone, so-called “Eastern Question” that he precipitated is with us still.  And the irony is not merely poetic, it is structural.

The Crimean War and Gallipoli were not just episodes in the long decline of the Ottoman Empire; they were moments in which the European powers tried, and failed, to manage that decline without resolving it. The Eastern Question – what to do with a weakening empire whose territories sat athwart trade routes, faiths, and ambitions – was never answered. It was deferred, patched, internationalised, moralised, and, when necessary, fought over. But never settled.

Crimea was, in essence, a war about containment without clarity. Britain and France fought not to destroy the Ottoman Empire, nor to reform it decisively, but to prevent Russia from exploiting its weakness. The result was a kind of geopolitical holding operation – costly, confused, and inconclusive. The patient survived, but the illness deepened. The war did not solve the Eastern Question; it ensured that it would return, more complicated than before.

Gallipoli, sixty years later, was almost the inverse: an attempt at decisive intervention that miscarried. Where Crimea sought to stabilise the system, Gallipoli tried to break it open – knock the Ottomans out of what became known as The Great War, reorder the strategic map, and force a resolution. It failed, and in failing, prolonged the life of the very problem it aimed to solve. When the Ottoman Empire did finally collapse in 1918, it did so not through elegant strategy but through cumulative exhaustion – and the settlement that followed (the infamous Sykes–Picot agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne that ended the Great War and shaped the modern Middle East, the mandates, improvised borders, and the legacies inherited by Israel and Palestine, by Syria and Lebanon, and by Iraq carried within it the seeds of future instability.

And here is the connective tissue to the present: the “forever wars” of the Levant are, in a very real sense, the afterlife of those unresolved choices.

The Ottoman system, for all its inequities, provided a kind of imperial coherence – a loose, often improvised order that managed diversity through hierarchy rather than uniformity. Its removal created a vacuum that external powers attempted to fill with lines on maps and imported state structures, often indifferent to local realities, including religious and ethnic divisions. The mandates were not solutions; they were transitional fictions that hardened into permanence. The Eastern Question did not end; it metastasised.

Thus the region becomes a palimpsest of earlier interventions:

  • The Crimean instinct persists in modern coalition warfare – external powers seeking to contain instability without fully committing to its resolution, managing symptoms rather than causes.
  • The Gallipoli impulse reappears in periodic attempts at decisive intervention – strikes, invasions, regime-change strategies – each promising to reset the board, each discovering the board is more complicated than imagined.
  • And over all this hangs the long shadow of Vietnam and Iraq: the recognition that once engaged, these conflicts do not conclude cleanly, but evolve into layered, persistent struggles involving states, militias, proxies, and narratives.

What we call “forever wars” are, in this sense, not aberrations but continuations – the modern form of an old, unanswered question. The Ottoman Empire is gone, but the strategic problem it embodied remains: a region where internal fractures intersect with external interests, where no single power can impose order, and where every intervention alters the conditions for the next.

There is a quiet, almost melancholic symmetry in this. Nineteenth-century statesmen spoke of the “Sick Man of Europe” as though the problem were a patient to be diagnosed and treated. But the illness was never confined to the patient; it was embedded in the system around him. Remove the patient, and the condition does not disappear – it redistributes itself.

So when modern observers reach for Gallipoli, or Crimea, or Vietnam, or Iraq, they are not merely searching for analogies of method. They are circling, perhaps without quite naming it, the persistence of a problem without closure.

The Eastern Question was never answered. It simply changed its language.

Challenging the analogies

You can’t really make sense of the analogies – Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – without restoring Iran itself to the centre of the frame. Otherwise the country becomes a backdrop, a stage upon which other powers replay their historical anxieties. But Iran is not the Ottoman Empire in decline, nor Iraq in 2003, nor Vietnam in 1965. It is an old state with a long memory of being acted upon – and that memory shapes how it acts now.

What changes, once you bring Iran back in, is the direction of the analogy. The earlier comparisons mostly describe how outside powers misjudge wars. Iran’s history reminds you how those same powers are often experienced from the inside – as intrusion, manipulation, or existential threat.

Iran enters the story not as an abstraction – “the enemy,” “the regime,” “the theatre” – but as a historical actor formed in the crucible of the very system the earlier analogies describe.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Persia was itself entangled in a version of the Eastern Question, pressured by Russian and British imperial competition, its sovereignty compromised, its politics penetrated. The First World War and its aftermath did not dismantle Iran as they did the Ottoman Empire, but they confirmed its vulnerability to external design. The Second World War made that vulnerability explicit: Anglo-Soviet occupation in 1941, the removal of Reza Shah, and the installation of his son – an early demonstration that great powers could, when required, rearrange Iran’s internal order.

From there, the pattern sharpens. The 1953 coup against the democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh – engineered by Britain and the United States – lodges itself in Iranian political consciousness as a defining moment: not simply a change of government, but a lesson about the limits of independence in a world of larger powers. The Shah’s subsequent rule, modernising yet authoritarian, Western-aligned yet domestically brittle, becomes the next act in this long drama of externally entangled sovereignty.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 then reads, in part, as a rupture with that pattern- a violent reassertion of autonomy, clothed in religious language but grounded in political memory. “Neither East nor West” was not just a slogan; it was a rejection of the very dynamics that had shaped Iran’s modern history. Yet revolutions do not escape geography. The new regime inherits the same strategic environment, the same pressures, the same suspicions.

The Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) is crucial here. For eight years, Iran fights a brutal, attritional conflict against Saddam Hussein – largely isolated, facing external support flowing to its adversary. This is Iran’s Vietnam, one might say, but with a different lesson drawn: not the futility of war, but the necessity of endurance. The war entrenches a doctrine of asymmetry, resilience, and proxy capability – precisely the features that later confound American strategy in the region.

From that point on, the Islamic Republic is not simply surviving; it is adapting. It builds networks – Hezbollah, militias, regional alliances – not as ideological ornaments but as strategic depth. It becomes, in effect, a state that has internalised the lessons of the very wars others use as analogies. Where outside observers see Vietnam or Iraq looming, Iranian planners see something else: a long game in which time, patience, and indirection offset conventional inferiority.

To reinsert Iran into the narrative is to complicate every analogy. Gallipoli assumes an opponent who will react predictably to a decisive blow; Iran’s history suggests otherwise. Crimea assumes mismanagement on one side; Iran’s experience reminds us that what appears as dysfunction externally may be met by coherence internally. Vietnam and Iraq warn of quagmires; Iran has, in many respects, built its strategy around drawing others into them.

In that sense, the question is not only which past war America risks refighting, but which past experiences Iran believes it is reliving – or avenging. The 1953 coup, the isolation of the 1980s, the long memory of foreign interference: these are not background details, but active ingredients in the present.

And so our frame subtly shifts. It is no longer simply about the hazards of analogy, or the repetition of strategic error, but about the collision of historical memories. One side reaches for Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq- warnings drawn from its own past misjudgments. The other carries a different archive: intervention, resistance, survival.

Between those two archives lies the present conflict – less a replay of any single war than a convergence of many, each side reading from a different script, each convinced, in its own way, that history has already shown it how this story goes.

Conclusion

To refight old wars in the mind is, at one level, an act of prudence. It reminds us that others have stood at similar thresholds, armed with confidence, intelligence, and good intentions – and have nonetheless misjudged the terrain, the enemy, or themselves. But there is a fine line between learning from history and being governed by it. Analogy can clarify; it can also constrain. It can sharpen perception, or it can trap us in inherited scripts, seeing Gallipoli where the problem is administrative, or diagnosing Vietnam when the flaw lies in the opening wager.

The deeper unease running through these comparisons is not simply that wars go wrong, but that they linger – that they slip their boundaries and become conditions rather than episodes. From the mismanaged campaigns of Crimea to the failed gambles of Gallipoli, from the disorientation of Vietnam to the long aftermath of Iraq, one sees not repetition but recurrence: ambition outrunning understanding, institutions straining to keep pace, time eroding clarity. And beneath it all, especially in the Levant, the longer echo of an older, unanswered question – how to order a region where external power and internal fracture are perpetually entangled.

History does not offer a single, authoritative mirror. It offers a cabinet of them, each slightly warped, each catching a different angle of the present. The task is not to choose one reflection and mistake it for reality, but to recognise the distortions for what they are – and to ask, with some humility, whether we are illuminating the path ahead or merely retracing, with greater eloquence, the steps that led others into the same uncertain ground.

The Western cabinet of mirrors – Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, Iraq – captures recurring pathologies: the overconfident opening stroke, the misaligned machinery, the war that lingers beyond its logic. Yet these are, inescapably, insider narratives. They describe how campaigns look from the bridge, the штаб, the situation room. They are diagnoses of our own errors.

What the Iranian story, set against the longer afterlife of the Eastern Question, forces back into view is the perspective from the other shore. The Young Turks, confronting encroachment and dismemberment, did not experience Gallipoli as a misjudged Allied gamble; they experienced it as a defence of survival. Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese did not inhabit “chaos without a compass”; they pursued a coherent, if costly, struggle against a foreign presence. Iraqi insurgents, and later ISIS in its own brutal and aberrant way, did not parse the war as a case study in post-conflict planning; they resisted, adapted, endured, and exploited.

They did not conduct war games about us. They fought.

Iran belongs in that lineage – not as an analogue, but as an heir to a particular historical consciousness: one shaped by intervention, by imposed settlements, by long wars of attrition, and by the conviction that time can be turned into a weapon. From that vantage, what appears to Western observers as drift or dysfunction may look like opportunity; what is feared as quagmire may be cultivated as strategy.

And so the question shifts. It is no longer simply which past war America risks refighting, but whether the very act of choosing among Gallipoli, Crimea, Vietnam, and Iraq obscures the more important reality: that the other side is not reading from the same book – or as many commentators are reminding us today, “the enemy has a vote”. One side searches its history for warnings about overreach; the other draws from its own past a repertoire of resistance.

History, then, does not just offer competing analogies. It offers competing memories. And where those memories diverge – where one side analyses and the other endures – there lies the most persistent danger: not that we will repeat the past, but that we will misunderstand the present, even as we describe it with perfect historical fluency.

In That Howling Infinite, May 2026

Read more about history  in In That Howling Infinite in Foggy Ruins of Time.

On World War I, see Ottoman Redux – an alternative, The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the birth of Türkiye and November 1918 – the counterfeit peace. On the Balfour Declaration and its repercussions, see The hand that signed the paper. On Vietnam, see The Ballad of Denton Crocker – a Vietnam elegy, Tim Page’s War – a photographer’s Vietnam journey, and Shadows in search of a name … requiem for a war. On the US-Iran war, see Chaos in without a compass … Donald Trump’s Persian “excursion”

Whitewashing slavery’s deep and dark history

Forward. The Gravest Crime – and selective conscience

On March 25, the UN General Assembly declared the transatlantic slave trade the “gravest crime against humanity.” 123 countries voted in favour, three against, and 52 abstained – including the UK, all 27 EU member states and Australia.

The moral core is unobjectionable. The slave trade was monstrous, its consequences did not end with abolition, and saying so plainly is not theatre  –  it is history. But UN resolutions are not history lectures. They are political instruments.

This one was carefully engineered. Its most controversial element was the recognition of slavery as a violation of jus cogens  – peremptory norms of international law binding on all states. Not a historical observation, but a legal foundation for future liability claims. The EU noted the resolution’s “unbalanced interpretation of historical events” and legal references inconsistent with international law, including retroactive application of rules that simply did not exist at the time.

The 123 who voted yes include states with active, present-tense records of forced labour and ethnic persecution. Their zeal for condemning 18th-century European slave traders carries a faint whiff of convenience. And the Western abstentions were the diplomatic equivalent of leaving before the bill arrives – not endorsement, but not courage either.

Slavery was real. The suffering was immense. But a resolution shaped by reparations politics and the arithmetic of bloc voting is not the act of collective moral reckoning it claims to be. It is politics, dressed, as so much UN business is, in the language of justice.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Whitewashing slavery’s deep and dark history

Slavery sits in the human story like a dark, deep river that refuses to keep to its banks. It runs from the Assyrian deportations and Roman estates, mines and galleys, through the markets of old Baghdad and the longships on the rivers of Keven Rus, down into the Atlantic crossings from Africa to the Americas and thence to Europe. and out again into the contract-labour regimes and hidden rooms of the present. Names change – thrall, concubine, slave, servant, “sponsored worker” – but the underlying grammar is stubborn: power converting vulnerability into utility, often with a theory to justify it and a market to sustain it.

Into this long, uneasy history steps the modern urge to judge it – to apportion blame, to rank crimes, to extract from the past a usable morality for the present. The UN resolution is one such attempt: part commemoration, part indictment, part politics by other means. A counter-brief insists that this particular ledger has been selectively drawn, that some entries are inked in heavily while others are left in the margin or omitted altogether. Between them lies not a settled account but a contested one, in which the Atlantic system with its Islamic trades, and African agency, “King Cotton” and John Brown, and modern forms of coercion all jostle for place and proportion.

The following essay does not endeavour to tidy that argument into a single verdict. It widens the frame without dissolving the particulars; to hold in view both the universality of slavery and the distinctiveness of its forms; to recognise the rarity of abolition without mistaking it for completion. History, in this register, is less a courtroom than a map – dense, overlapping, and resistant to clean lines.

The deep and dark river 

That UN resolution formally condemned slavery as a universal crime – indeed, the “gravest crime”. But, in practice it narrows its indictment to the transatlantic trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, presenting it as a distinctively Western, racialised, and capitalist enterprise.

It is precise, almost prosecutorial, assigning blame, embedding the trade in a narrative of structural injustice that echoes into the present. Yet it grows evasive when confronting the forces that ended slavery: the Enlightenment, abolitionist movements, legal reforms – reduced to a kind of historical afterthought.

More significantly, as economist and commentator Henry Ergas argues in an article in The Australian, republished below, the resolution omits the long and substantial history of slavery in the Islamic world – trans-Saharan, Red Sea, Indian Ocean – systems that endured for centuries, moved millions, and in many places persisted well into the modern era. Unlike in the West, he contends, there was no sustained, institutionalised moral revolt against slavery at scale; abolition came late, often under external pressure, and in some cases remains incomplete in practice.

He pushes further. By declaring the slave trade “the greatest” crime against humanity, the resolution risks collapsing distinctions – most notably between exploitation and extermination – thereby, in his reading, relativising the Holocaust. And finally, he notes the political choreography: strong support from authoritarian states and those with troubling contemporary records, contrasted with the hesitant abstention of many Western democracies.

That is his case – straightforward, and cleanly drawn –  perhaps a little too cleanly. Because once we widen the frame, the lines begin to blur in ways that resist both the UN’s moral staging and Ergas’s counter-brief.

Slavery is not an aberration of one civilisation but a near-constant of many; and it spans millenia. The Assyrians and Persians deported whole populations as instruments of empire. Sennacherib and other potentates would empty a conquered land of its indigenous peoples and replace them with deportees from another conquest. The Romans built an economy on servile labour whilst the Byzantines continued the practice. Muslim caliphates and emirates, including the Abbasids and Ayyubids, Mamluks and Ottomans, sustained vast networks of concubinage and domestic and military slavery.

The Vikings – often reduced in popular memory to picturesque if violent raiders – operated something closer to a transcontinental syndicate. The river systems of the Rus, threading south through the Volga and Dnieper, connected the Baltic to the Black Sea and Baghdad. Silver flowed north; human beings flowed south. This was not episodic plunder but a business model – structured, repeatable, and profitable. And conducted across astonishing distances. Baghdad and York sat at the far ends of a human supply chain. [The illustration at the head of this article is that of a young Slavic woman being sold into slavery by Vikings to a Persian merchant (Image: Tom Lovell / National Geographic)]

So, in short. Salvery has existed in some form in almost every known civilisation. In the ancient world, captives were routinely taken, bought, sold, and traded. Greek city-states enslaved defeated populations; Rome built much of its economy on slave labour; raiding societies from the Eurasian steppe to the Atlantic world, and across the ocean, among the First Nations people of the Americas, treated slavery as part of warfare and survival. For most of human history, slavery was seen less as a moral evil than as an accepted social institution, however tragic it might be for those caught within it.

It is necessary therefore to resist any account that isolates the Atlantic trade as if it emerged sui generis from European wickedness. The Islamic world sustained large-scale slave systems over a long durée; and African polities were not merely passive victims but active participants in capture and sale; Arab traders were integral intermediaries. The Atlantic system, or “the Middle Passage” and “Triangular Trade” as it was euphemistically described, depended in its operation on a web of local agency as well as European demand. To acknowledge that is not to dilute culpability but to complicate it – uncomfortably, but necessarily.

And yet – here the counterweight – the Atlantic system was not merely one more iteration of an ancient practice. In the Americas – north and south –  fused race, heredity, and commerce into something peculiarly rigid and self-reproducing. Slavery became not just a condition but a caste, encoded in law and biology, and scaled through plantation economies that fed a global market. Cotton, sugar, coffee and tobacco were not marginal commodities but engines of early modern capitalism. The system’s brutality was not incidental; it was structural.

It is here that the North American story assumes its central, paradoxical role. Chattel slavery became both foundational and explosive – so deeply embedded in the economy that its removal threatened the entire edifice, and yet so morally corrosive that it generated its own opposition. The American Civil War was among many things, the moment when that contradiction could no longer be managed rhetorically or regionally; it was settled, instead, in blood. Abolition here was not simply argued into being; it was fought into being.

Slavery was America’s original sin, and its malign influence ricochets still through its politics and society. [See American historian Sarah Churchwell’s.chilling account of darkest Dixie in In That Howling Infinite’s The Wrath to Come. Gone With the Wind and America’s Big Lie]

Which brings us to what may be the most historically unusual feature in all of this: not slavery itself, but the sustained movement to abolish it. The West generated, from the 17th century onward, a mounting moral and political challenge to slaver, in legal cases, religious agitation, popular campaigns – that eventually dismantled it – significant help from the Royal Navy. Comparable, system-wide movements were less evident in the Islamic world, where dissent existed but did not crystallise into mass abolitionism with similar force or effect.

The distinction matters. Saying it did not happen is a statement of fact; suggesting it could not have happened, or that its absence reflects some deeper civilisational failing, goes beyond the evidence. The divergence likely owes as much to political economy, state structure, and the contingencies of modernity as to theology alone. Which is where English historian and The Rest is History podcaster Tom Holland’s excellent doorstop of a book Dominion hovers, suggestively, over the argument [See In That Howling Infinite’s Getting back to the garden – Tom Holland’s Dominion 

Holland’s claim – broadly put – is that the moral vocabulary underpinning abolition in the West owes much to a Christian inheritance: the elevation of the weak, the insistence on the equal worth of souls, the suspicion of unrestrained power. Even as the Enlightenment secularises these ideas, it carries their imprint. One need not follow him into every chapel of that argument to see the outline: abolition is historically anomalous, and anomalies tend to have genealogies. The West did not simply stumble into anti-slavery; it argued its way there, drawing on intellectual and moral resources that had been accumulating, often ambivalently, for centuries.

One must exercise caution here. Moral discomfort with slavery existed elsewhere and earlier, even if it did not produce mass abolitionist movements in the same way as in the West. Nor does the existence of Western abolition somehow erase the brutality or scale of European colonial slavery, particularly the Atlantic slave trade and plantation economies. The West occupies both roles in history: architect of the largest racialised slave system in modern history, and birthplace of the most influential abolitionist movements against it.

History is often untidy like that.

Old poison, new bottles

The story end in the 19th century however much resolutions might prefer it to. The Gulf states remind us that abolition in law does not always mean abolition in practice. The kafala system – sponsorship, contract labour – operates in a grey zone where dependence can harden into coercion. Passports withheld, mobility constrained, recourse limited: not chattel slavery, but an echo, or perhaps a mutation. History rarely repeats itself verbatim; it adapts, keeping the structure while altering the terminology.

And then there are the moments when the past returns not as echo but as revival. ISIS, with its enslavement of Yazidi women, did not merely exploit chaos; it articulated a doctrine. Slavery, and most particularly, sexual slavery, was justified, systematised, and bureaucratised with price lists, allocations, and rules, and even, trans-national trafficking: one captive ended up in Gaza where she was eventually rescued from a war zone. It was, in the grimmest sense, a reactivation of an old logic under modern conditions. Old poison in new bottles. If abolition was an anomaly, here was the reminder that anomalies can be reversed.

Governments and citizens of ostensibly westernized states should look to their self-awarded laurels. We should be wary of treating coercion as something that happens “over there.” The exploitation of domestic workers – underpaid, over- controlled , sometimes effectively trapped – appears not only in the Gulf but in Lebanon, Israel, and also parts of Western Europe and North America, where immigration status and private households create shadows the law struggles to reach. And closer still, in our own economies, sweatshop labour, debt bondagea and various forms of servitude persist at the margins, along with physical violence and sexual exploitation – which is precisely why regulation, inspection, and enforcement remain not moral luxuries but necessities.

Against this broader canvas, the UN resolution begins to look less like a statement of history than a negotiation, negation, even – of memory. Its selectivity – foregrounding Western guilt, backgrounding Western abolition, omitting other systems – is not unusual in such documents; it is, in some sense, as we have often seen, their defining feature. They are less concerned with completeness than with consensus, less with analysis than with alignment. Countries with difficult presents often find it convenient to condemn curated pasts.

Ergas is justified in objecting to that selectivity. Where he overreaches is in answering it with a counter-selectivity of his own – one that risks understating the distinctiveness of the Atlantic system and overstating the clarity of civilisational contrasts. History, inconveniently, refuses to stay within either brief.

On the question of the Holocaust, however, his warning lands. To rank atrocities – to declare one “the greatest” – is to turn history into a macabre competition. More importantly, it obscures differences of intent. Most slave systems, however brutal, were premised on exploitation; the Holocaust was premised on annihilation. That distinction is not a matter of moral bookkeeping but of historical substance.

And so we arrive, circuitously, at a position that satisfies no one entirely – which is probably how one knows it is closer to the truth.

Slavery is not the property of any one civilisation; it is a recurrent human institution, appearing wherever power, profit, and permission align. The Atlantic trade is distinctive but not unique; Islamic and African systems are substantial but not singular; modern forms persist under altered names and legal veneers. What is genuinely unusual is the emergence of sustained, organised movements that declare slavery illegitimate and succeed – partially, unevenly – in abolishing it.

Between the UN’s moral narrowing and Ergas’s corrective widening lies a more uncomfortable landscape: one in which culpability is diffuse, agency is shared, and progress, where it occur, is contingent, fragile, and slow. The past does not arrange itself into neat indictments or tidy vindications. It lingers, instead, as habit and warning.

And, if one is honest, as a question still not fully answered.

On the Holocaust comparison, Ergas is on firmer ground. Collapsing all historical crimes into a single ranked category – the greatest” – is less analysis than moral theatre. The distinction between exploitation and extermination is not pedantic; it goes to intent. The Nazi project was annihilatory in a way most slave systems, however cruel, were not. History flattens at our peril.

And then there is the politics of the thing. UN resolutions are not monographs; they are negotiated texts, shaped by blocs, interests, and the quiet arithmetic of votes. Selectivity is almost baked in – as is prejudice. Countries with uncomfortable presents often find safety in condemning selective pasts. Western abstentions, too, are rarely acts of intellectual surrender; more often they are the diplomacy of not quite wanting to pick a fight that cannot be cleanly won.

Unfinished business 

So we end where we began, with a familiar tension. Yes, slavery is a near-universal inheritance, and any telling that singles out one civilisation to the exclusion of others is suspect. But neither does the universality of the crime dissolve its particular forms. The Atlantic system, the Islamic trades, ancient chattel systems – they rhyme, but they are not identical verses.

And there remains a broader, less comfortable truth: the story of slavery is not a morality play with a single villain, but a long human habit, periodically challenged, never entirely extinguished, and always ready, given the right circumstances and excuses, to return.

History, in other words, refuses both the courtroom brief and the absolution. It is messier than Ergas allows, but also less conveniently moralised than the resolution he criticises.

It leaves us not ranking guilt, but paying closer attention. The Atlantic system was distinctive; the Islamic and other trades were vast and enduring; African rulers and Arab merchants were participants as well as intermediaries; the West generated powerful abolitionist movements even as it profited from what it eventually condemned. None of these claims cancels the others. Together they form a picture that is, at once, more accurate and less flattering than any single narrative allows.

And the present refuses to sit quietly beneath the verdicts we pass on the past. The exploitation of domestic workers in the Gulf, Lebanon, Israel, and parts of Western Europe; the persistence of sweatshop labour, debt bondage, and coerced work within Western economies themselves – these are not historical footnotes but contemporary reminders. Laws and conventions matter, but so do inspection, enforcement, and the unglamorous work of closing the gap between principle and practice.

Which is why the most suspect posture, at the end of such an inquiry, is self-congratulation. There is no stable ground here for laurel wreaths, no civilisational vantage point from which to survey a completed moral victory. At best there is a difference in degree – of scrutiny, of institutional capacity, of willingness to act. And even that requires constant renewal.

Slavery, in its older forms, has been dismantled in many places; in its newer guises, it adapts. The question is less who was worst than who is still looking, and still prepared to do something about what they find.

Postscript: Etymology

The history lingers, as it often does, in the words. They carry within themselves their own freight.

“Slave” in English carries within it a map of early medieval Europe. The term is widely traced to the Latin sclavus, itself derived from Sclavus – “Slav” – a reflection of the large numbers of Slavic peoples captured and sold through the trading networks that ran from the Baltic down the great river systems to Byzantium and the Islamic world. What began as an ethnonym hardened into a condition. By the High Middle Ages the word had shed its geographic specificity and settled into general use- esclave, schiavo, esclavo, slave – the person eclipsed by the status, the origin story buried in the syllable. The modern word is not, in itself, a slur; but its lineage is a reminder of how readily a name can be stripped of personhood and repurposed as a category of subjection.

Arabic offers a parallel, though not an identical one. The root ʿabd (عبد) denotes a servant or slave, but in its primary register it is theological: ʿabd Allāh, servant of God – a posture of submission before the divine rather than a description of worldly bondage. Yet the plural ʿabīd (عبيد) – once a straightforward term for slaves – acquired, over time and in certain contexts, a sharper edge, used for Black slaves and, by extension, Black people more generally. In modern usage it can carry derogatory force, depending on context and intent, illustrating how a neutral descriptor can drift into insult as it absorbs the hierarchies of the societies that use it.

In both cases, language records a quiet transformation. A people becomes a condition; a condition gathers associations; those associations harden into overtones that may wound long after their origins are forgotten. The vocabulary survives the systems that shaped it, carrying their traces forward – compressed, half-visible, but still there for those inclined to listen.

Afterword: Thraldom, it’s unwinding and its afterlives

A final turn of the lens, back to northern Europe, where the language and the practice briefly align – and then, tellingly, reappear in altered guises.

In Anglo-Saxon England, þræl – thrall – named a condition within a broader spectrum of unfreedom. These were the captured, the indebted, the born into it: men and women who laboured in households and on estates, who could be bought and sold, though not yet within the fully racialised, hereditary system that would later define Atlantic chattel slavery. The boundaries were hard but not always impermeable. Manumission occurred; over generations, absorption was possible. It was a system of subjection, but not yet a totalising one.

The British port of Bristol stands as a reminder of how visible and organised that system could be. It became wealthy with the transatlantic slave trade. But in the 11th century it also functioned as a significant slaving port, exporting captives – often from Wales and the Welsh borderlands – into Irish and wider networks. This was not an anomaly but a node in a broader medieval traffic in human beings, linking the British Isles to circuits that extended, directly and indirectly, toward the Mediterranean and beyond.

Nor was England unique. Across medieval Europe, slavery persisted in varied forms: Italian city-states drew on Black Sea supplies; Iberian polities, both Muslim and Christian, trafficked in captives amid the long wars of the Reconquista; eastern Europe fed human cargo into Byzantine and Islamic markets. The word “slave” itself, with its Slavic root, is a linguistic fossil of that traffic (see below)..

And yet, in England at least, something shifted – and the Norman Conquest appears to have hastened it. On the eve of 1066, Domesday would soon record servi in significant numbers, perhaps around a tenth of the population. By the 12th century, however, chattel slavery had largely withered. The causes were less a single decree than a convergence. The Norman regime imported a more continental feudal logic, in which labour was bound to land rather than owned outright; a villein, fixed, dues-paying, and reproductively stable, was often more useful than a saleable slave. The Church, already critical of slave trading – Wulfstan of Worcester’s condemnation of the Bristol trade is emblematic. – found firmer footing in the new order, aligning moral pressure with institutional power. Trade patterns shifted too, as England’s orientation tilted across the Channel, loosening older Irish Sea networks that had sustained export markets.

None of this amounted to abolition in the modern sense. What replaced slavery was serfdom: a different architecture of dependence, less overtly transactional but hardly free. The change was real, but it was also a translation—from one form of unfreedom into another, quieter one.

And, as if to underline the point, elements of the older logic resurfaced later under new names. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Britain exported large numbers of indentured labourers – many English, but also Scots and Irish, including prisoners of war and political rebels after uprisings – to the American colonies and the Caribbean. Bound by contract rather than owned outright, they nonetheless occupied a coercive world of limited rights, harsh discipline, and restricted movement. The loss of the American colonies in 1783 did not end this habit of displacement; it redirected it. Transportation – of convicts and dissidents – to Australia became the next imperial outlet for managing surplus and troublesome populations, a system different in law but recognisably akin in its logic of removal and compelled labour [see in In That Howling InfiniteFarewell to Old England forever … reappraising The Fatal Shore 

Meanwhile, further east, a different trajectory prevailed. In eastern Europe and Russia, serfdom did not wither but intensified. From the late medieval period into the early modern era, landlords consolidated control over peasant populations, binding them ever more tightly to the land and to service. In Russia, this culminated in a system that, by the 18th century, bore striking resemblances to slavery in practice, if not always in name – serfs bought, sold, and mortgaged along with estates, their mobility sharply curtailed, their obligations exacting. Emancipation would come late: 1861 in Russia, and even then imperfectly, leaving behind structures of dependency that proved stubbornly durable.

Which is, perhaps, the thread worth keeping in hand. Systems of coercion rarely disappear cleanly; they evolve, recur and rephrase. From thrall to serf, from market to manor, from indenture to transportation, from eastern estate to western plantation. The names change; the grammar does not. Waiting, as ever, for the conditions that allow it to harden once again. waiting, as ever, for the conditions that allow it to harden once again.

In that Howling Infinite, May Day 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to researching, drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: directed and selected, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany


Coda

When this essay was published on Facebook, it elicited several comments that amounted to a polemical defense of the West that began with a legitimate historical observation – slavery was historically near-universal and abolitionism emerged most powerfully from Enlightenment Europe – but then overextended  the claim into a triumphalist narrative about Western moral uniqueness and non-Western incapacity for self-criticism. Its tone is combative, culturally chauvinistic, and marked by sweeping generalisations about “the Third World,” Islamic societies, Arabs, and Asian civilisations.

Intellectually, they mixed valid historical points with selective history, rhetorical exaggeration, and resentment politics. They treated “the West” as unusually self-critical and morally generative, while caricaturing other societies as conformist or authoritarian. The result is less a sober historical analysis than a reaction against contemporary anti-Western discourse, expressed through broad-brush civilisational language.

A more balanced critique might read as follows:

Slavery has existed in some form in almost every known civilisation. In the ancient world, captives were routinely taken, bought, sold, and traded. Greek city-states enslaved defeated populations; Rome built much of its economy on slave labour; raiding societies from the Eurasian steppe to the Atlantic world treated slavery as part of warfare and survival. For most of human history, slavery was seen less as a moral evil than as an accepted social institution, however tragic it might be for those caught within it.

One of the major intellectual shifts of the Enlightenment era was the emergence, particularly in Western Europe and North America, of the idea that slavery itself was morally illegitimate. Philosophical ideas about natural rights, combined with religious and humanitarian movements, helped give rise to organised abolitionism. Britain, France, and the United States were deeply implicated in the Atlantic slave trade, yet they also produced influential movements that eventually challenged and dismantled it. Modern international norms against slavery owe much to these developments.

At the same time, slavery was not uniquely Western, nor was opposition to injustice confined solely to the West. Different forms of servitude and human bondage existed across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas, and criticism of oppression has emerged within many cultures and traditions. The historical record is complex: societies can simultaneously perpetrate injustice and generate the ideas that challenge it.

Contemporary debates about slavery and colonialism sometimes oversimplify history by treating Europe and the West as uniquely culpable, while overlooking the broader global history of slavery. But responding to that simplification with sweeping condemnations of non-Western societies is equally reductive. A more useful approach is to recognise both the universality of slavery in human history and the particular historical significance of the abolitionist movements that emerged during the Enlightenment and after.

UN resolution on slavery falsifies history by ignoring Islamic world’s role

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 1 May 2026

The UN resolution on slavery has sparked debate over historical interpretation. Picture: Getty Images

The UN resolution sparks debate over historical interpretation: Getty Images

Henry Ergas, The Australian, 1 May 2026

That the African slave trade was a monstrosity, inflicting unspeakable cruelty on millions of innocent victims, is beyond dispute. But the resolution the UN General Assembly passed two weeks ago, marking the trade’s commemoration, is nothing less than an appalling falsification of history.

Formally, the resolution condemns the African slave trade as a whole. Substantively, every concrete reference targets the transatlantic trade, fixating on a “racialised capitalist system” and its purported Western antecedents. The cumulative effect is unmistakeable: to brand the trade a distinctively Western crime. To sustain that impression, the resolution parades a sequence of decrees, starting with the papal bulls of 1452 and 1455, which it casts as the founding charters of the enslavement and “structural racism” that still unjustly impoverishes Africa, thereby grounding a claim to substantial reparations.

Yet, having been forensically specific about blame, the text turns conspicuously evasive when it confronts the forces that brought the Atlantic trade to an end. The Enlightenment, the abolitionist movements, and the Western legal and political campaigns that culminated in the trade’s eventual demise are, it appears, unmentionable.

While the offending decrees are named, dated and indicted, the tide of opposition to slavery, which gathered momentum in the 17th century, is dismissed as “certain legal challenges and judicial developments in the 18th century” that “questioned the legality and morality of chattel enslavement”.

That descent into vagueness reflects a deliberate strategy: to particularise the guilt while diluting the credit. Merely cataloguing the misrepresentations, confusions and factual errors this strategy produces would require far more space than is available here. What is especially striking, however, are the omissions.

It is, for example, intellectually dishonest to invoke the papal bulls of 1452 and 1455 while ignoring Pope Paul III’s bull of 1537, which denounced as an invention of the devil the idea that native peoples “should be treated as dumb brutes created for our service”, and affirmed “that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty”.

Paul III’s exhortations had limited immediate effect; so too did Cartwright’s Case (1569), which declared that England’s air was “too pure for slaves to dwell in”. What matters is what they reveal: an unceasing moral interrogation of slavery within the West itself – an interrogation that gave abolitionism the bedrock on which to build.

Here, too, the resolution’s selectivity is purposeful. It allows it to avoid an obvious and crucial comparator: the long history of slavery under Islamic rule, which it ignores altogether. From the Arab conquests to the early 20th century, some 14 million black slaves were transported into the lands of Islam via the trans-Saharan, Red Sea and Indian Ocean routes, with nearly a million more carried beyond the East African coast. Add to these more than a million white slaves, and the total comfortably exceeds the 10 million to 12 million who landed in the Americas.

Yet the numbers are not what is most significant. The salient fact is the absence of any sustained doctrinal or institutional challenge to the morality and legality of the slave trade within the Islamic world – even where it starkly contradicted the Koranic prohibition on enslaving Muslims. As Bruce Hall shows in his study of Saharan and Sahelian slavery, by the 19th century – when the West was vigorously suppressing chattel slavery – the operative presumption among Maliki jurists was that black Africans, routinely described as “savages”, were enslavable by default, whatever their faith.

There were individuals who objected strenuously to chattel slavery, such as Syrian reformer Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1855-1902); but no Muslim opponent of slavery ever forged those concerns into a mass movement. Bernard Lewis’s verdict that “even the most radical Muslim modernists” fell well short of matching the fervour and effectiveness of Western abolitionists retains all its force.

It is therefore unsurprising that Islam’s leading theologians, far from championing abolition, actively resisted it – beginning with the infamous 1855 fatwa, issued with the full authority of Mecca’s Shaykh Jamal, which declared any prohibition of the slave trade “contrary to the holy law of Islam” and any official who attempted to enforce it “lawful to kill”.

Nor is it surprising that Saudi Arabia and Yemen abolished slavery only in 1962, the United Arab Emirates in 1964, Oman in 1970, and Mauritania – after repeated ineffectual measures – in 2007. Moreover, even where slavery was formally abolished, forms of vassalage have remained firmly in place: of the 10 countries with the highest incidence of “modern slavery”, eight are majority-Muslim.

But the resolution does not merely distort history by pretending Islamic slavery didn’t exist. It declares the slave trade “the greatest” crime against humanity ever committed. Although not explicitly stated, a central purpose of this travesty – which converts the horrors of the past into a “suffering Olympics” – is again transparent: to relativise the Holocaust.

It is frankly obscene to degrade moral evaluation into a body count, with medals of ignominy awarded by a show of hands. Yet even in so repulsive a spectacle, realities should have been allowed to intrude. Those realities are well known. Death rates in the Holocaust – whose unrelenting aim was the complete extermination of Jews – were close to or above 90 per cent. So complete was the indifference to fatalities that the German railways were paid whether the Jews being shipped by them lived or died during their transport – and the few who survived the journeys were killed, on average, within days of arrival.

In contrast, as investor Thomas Starke wrote to Captain James Westmore in 1700, “the whole benefit of the voyage lyes in your care of preserving negroes’ lives”. As a result, strenuous efforts were made to ensure slaves remained alive and saleable, including by granting handsome bonuses to captains for high survival rates and imposing stiff penalties for excess mortality.

Although those efforts hardly eliminated the trade’s horrors, they did mean that by the late 18th century, death rates for black slaves on the “middle passage” had declined dramatically, to the point where they were only marginally greater than those for crews. To pretend otherwise is to erase the distinction between exploitation and extermination: for there was nothing in the slave trade even remotely comparable to the systematic mass murder at the heart of the Holocaust.

But to acknowledge those facts – which flatly contradict the assault on the standing of the Holocaust – might have eroded the overwhelming support the resolution secured. And the composition of that support says everything one needs to know about the resolution.

Thus, every one of the 20 countries that have the highest incidence of modern slavery and forced labour cynically voted in its favour; so did all the authoritarian states that participated in the vote, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; and, again with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it received the active backing of every Muslim-majority country.

Yet that is not the real tragedy. Rather, it is that only three Western countries – the US, Israel and Argentina – had the decency to vote against the falsification of history, instead of abstaining, as Australia and the European Union did. Those three were willing to oppose this charade. Why weren’t we?

 

The Predatory Hegemon – how Trump wields American power

In his Global Public Square “take” on CNN last weekend, American commentator Fareed Zakaria discussed political scientist Stephen M. Walt’s recent article in Foreign Affairs: The Predatory Hegemon – how Trump wields American Power. He distilled Walt’s thesis into a phrase at once elegant and accusatory: the United States, he suggested, has drifted from an “enlightened hegemony” – a system in which power was exercised with an eye to legitimacy, stability, and long-term advantage – toward something more immediate, more transactional, and ultimately more predatory.

Walt’s essay gives that intuition a harder edge. He is not merely describing a tonal shift in American foreign policy, but a reorientation of its strategic logic – a change in how power understands itself, justifies itself, and, crucially, sustains itself.

The older model, Zakaria’s enlightened hegemon, was always something of a paradox, a balancing act performed with varying degrees of grace. The United States built a global order that advantaged itself, certainly, but did so by embedding its dominance in institutions, alliances, and norms that others found tolerable, even beneficial. It is tempting to see this as benevolence; it is more accurate to see it as enlightened self-interest, a recognition that power travels further when it is partially disguised as cooperation.

Consider the architecture: NATO as both shield and tether; the Bretton Woods institutions as both stabilisers and amplifiers of American economic influence; open markets that allowed others to prosper while quietly anchoring them within a U.S.-centred system. Even American restraint – selective, inconsistent, sometimes hypocritical – played a role. By not always extracting the maximum possible gain, Washington lowered the incentives for resistance. It made its leadership feel less like domination and more like gravity: inescapable, but not actively oppressive.

Zakaria’s emphasis falls on this temporal discipline. The United States, at its postwar best, accepted short-term costs – trade imbalances, alliance burdens, the irritations of multilateral compromise – in exchange for long-term influence. It invested in a system that would, over time, repay those investments many times over. The wager worked, not perfectly, but well enough: allies aligned, rivals were constrained, and the American-led order acquired a kind of grudging legitimacy.

Walt does not romanticise this past. He is too much the realist for that. He knows the system was riddled with contradictions: interventions justified in the name of norms that were selectively applied, economic openness that coexisted with strategic coercion, ideals that bent under pressure. But – and this is the hinge of his argument – the system’s imperfections did not negate its utility. On the contrary, they were often part of its flexibility. What mattered was that the United States appeared to play by rules it had helped create, and that appearance mattered enormously.

Against this backdrop, Trump’s approach, across both terms, but especially in its more fully articulated second incarnation, appears not as a mere policy adjustment but as a philosophical break. Walt’s term, “predatory hegemony,” is deliberately provocative, but also precise. The United States remains the central power in the system; what changes is how it treats the system itself.

Alliances, in this telling, are no longer strategic communities but balance sheets. NATO becomes a venue for cost-sharing disputes; Asian alliances are framed in terms of payments and protection fees. The language of shared purpose gives way to the language of reciprocity stripped to its transactional core: what are you paying, and what are we getting? There is a certain brutal clarity in this – no more pretence, no more sentimental talk of values – but it comes at a cost. Alliances that once rested on a mixture of interest and trust begin to tilt toward interest alone, and interest, as history reminds us, is a notoriously fickle glue.

In the economic realm, the shift is equally stark. Trade and finance become explicit instruments of leverage, deployed not only against adversaries but against partners. Tariffs are imposed with a freedom that disregards institutional constraints; sanctions proliferate; export controls tighten. Interdependence – once celebrated as a stabilising force – is recast as a field of vulnerabilities to be exploited. The system, in effect, is turned inside out: what was designed to bind becomes a means to coerce.

Zakaria’s gloss on this is telling. He notes that the United States has always used economic power strategically, but that it once did so within a framework that preserved the overall attractiveness of the system. Under a predatory model, that framework erodes. The message sent to the world is no longer “join us and prosper,” but “join us, and be prepared to be squeezed.” The rational response, for others, is not enthusiastic participation but cautious diversification.

Walt’s third line of argument concerns norms and institutions, the often invisible scaffolding of the international order. Here, too, the change is less about abandonment than about downgrading. Agreements become optional, commitments provisional, rules contingent on immediate advantage. The United States does not necessarily withdraw from every institution, but it treats them as tools rather than constraints, to be used when convenient and ignored when not.

Again, Zakaria’s lament is that something subtle but vital is lost in this process: legitimacy as a force multiplier. The old order worked, in part, because others believed – however imperfectly – that it was more than a façade for American power. Strip away that belief, and cooperation becomes thinner, more conditional, more brittle.

All of which leads to Walt’s central concern: that predatory hegemony, for all its apparent toughness, is strategically myopic. It operates on a shortened time horizon, prioritising immediate, tangible gains over diffuse, long-term benefits. In economic terms, it applies a high discount rate to the future. Why tolerate an imbalance today for a payoff tomorrow when you can extract a concession now?

The answer, in the older model, was that the future payoff was larger and more durable. By maintaining a system that others trusted and depended on, the United States ensured a steady stream of influence, cooperation, and alignment. By contrast, predation yields diminishing returns. Allies coerced too often begin to hedge. Partners subjected to pressure seek alternatives. Rivals exploit the cracks.

One might say – stretching the metaphor, but not too far – that enlightened hegemony was a form of cultivation, while predatory hegemony is a form of harvesting. The former assumes renewal; the latter risks depletion.

Walt is particularly attuned to the feedback effects of this shift. By treating allies as clients, the United States encourages them to behave like clients – transactional, calculating, ready to shop around. By weaponising interdependence, it incentivises others to de-risk and decouple, thereby reducing the very leverage Washington seeks to wield. By disregarding norms, it lowers the costs for others to do the same. The hegemon, in short, models the behaviour it will later lament.

Zakaria, for his part, situates this within a broader narrative of American political change. The appetite for the burdens of leadership has waned; the patience required for long-term strategy has thinned; the domestic rewards accrue to visible wins rather than invisible stability. Enlightened hegemony, in this reading, was not just a foreign policy doctrine but a political achievement, sustained by a consensus that no longer holds.

And here the essay acquires a slightly elegiac tone. For what is being described is not merely a shift in tactics but the possible unravelling of a particular idea of order—one in which power and restraint were, if not reconciled, then at least held in productive tension. Walt’s realism strips away nostalgia, but it does not eliminate the sense that something functionally valuable is being lost.

The unresolved question – hovering over both Walt’s analysis and Zakaria’s commentary – is whether this transformation is contingent or structural. Is predatory hegemony a phase, a deviation that can be corrected by a future administration rediscovering the uses of restraint? Or does it reflect deeper currents in American society and politics, suggesting a more permanent recalibration?

If the former, the system may yet be repaired, though not without scars. Trust, once eroded, is slow to rebuild; institutions, once weakened, do not spring back fully formed. If the latter, then the post-1945 order begins to look less like a stable architecture and more like a historical anomaly – a period in which an unusually powerful state chose, for its own reasons, to exercise power with a degree of restraint that history rarely sustains.

The irony. – one that both Walt and Zakaria, in their different registers, seem to appreciate – is that the older model of enlightened hegemony was not naïve but deeply pragmatic. It recognised that in a complex, interdependent world, the most effective way to maintain dominance was often to make that dominance acceptable. Predatory hegemony, by contrast, risks proving that the most direct expression of power is not always the most effective.

And so we return, as these arguments often do, to a question of time. Not simply what the United States can extract today, but what kind of world it is shaping for tomorrow – and whether that world will still, in any meaningful sense, run through Washington.

For now, the shift is unmistakable. The language has changed; the assumptions have shifted; the system is being tested from within. The hegemon remains, formidable as ever. But it no longer quite plays the same game. And the other players, watching closely, are already beginning to adjust their moves – quietly, pragmatically, and with an eye, as ever, to the long term.

Peace brokers

The following picture, featuring as it does the key players in Trump’s transactional diplomacy is an apt illustration of Walt’s thesis.

The “Board of Peace” is in essence a Trumpian confection of narcissism and megalomania, wrapped around what began, one must concede, as a not wholly foolish premise. Announced at Davos between lectures on Europe’s decline and intimidating talk of Greenland’s future, it was offered as a world-historical corrective – a leaner, sharper alternative to the United Nations, capable of doing, as Trump put it, “pretty much whatever we want to do,” albeit now “in conjunction” with the very institution it implicitly rebukes.

That hedge – in conjunction with the UN – betrays both ambition and unease. For all its frustrations, the UN remains the only broadly legitimate architecture for peace-making, its dysfunction less a design flaw than a record of unresolved rivalries. Trump’s instinct is to bypass such encumbrances: to replace the labyrinth with a boardroom, procedure with deal-making, paralysis with will. If peace were merely a coordination problem, this might even work. But peace is never merely procedural.

And the Board of Peace, for all its architectural neatness, rests on far shakier ground – a stage set awaiting actors who may never agree to the script, and a script that assumes conflicts can be edited rather than endured.

A body intended to gather the decisive actors of the age has assembled, thus far, a scattering of small and middle powers, most of them keen to curry Trump”# favour, whilst the big players keep tore distance. The Europeans hover at the edges; China sees no advantage in diluting its influence under a Trump-chaired forum; Russia, a principal source of present disorder, remains undecided about joining the mechanism meant to restrain it. A peace table without the principal enablers and disruptors is not an innovation so much as a rehearsal.

And what of the Board’s  raison d’etre? Gaza and the implementation of Trump’s ambitious and arguably impossible “Twenty Point Plan”. It is there, loitering offstage, the ghost at the feast – unmistakably present in its absence, and as ever, intractable, morally fraught and resistant to shortcuts. Under an “enlightened hegemonic” model, it would demand sustained, often frustrating engagement – a willingness to absorb political cost in pursuit of incremental progress. Under a more predatory or transactional model, it becomes something else: a crisis to be managed, a variable in a broader strategic equation, or, at times, a problem to be worked around rather than through.  See In That Howlong Infinite’s Gaza Sunrise or False Dawn (2) Spectacle or strategy?

What about the venue, the United States Institute of Peace?  This was created in the late Cold War, not as an instrument of policy execution but as a buffer against its excesses: a congressionally funded, ostensibly bipartisan body designed to study conflict, train mediators, convene adversaries, and inject into Washington’s bloodstream a measure of patience. Its board was meant to reflect that mission – drawn from across government, the military, academia, and civil society, combining practitioners with thinkers, hawks with doves, all under the assumption that peace required pluralism, process, and time.

It was, in short, an institutional expression of what Zakaria later calls enlightened hegemony: the idea that American power could be made more durable – more effective, even – by embedding it in norms, procedures, and habits of restraint. It was never glamorous. Its successes were rarely visible. But it represented a wager that the slow, untelevised work of conflict resolution was not ancillary to power, but constitutive of it.

Now place that inheritance alongside the renaming.

To recast the United States Institute of Peace as the Donald J. Trump Institute of Peace is not merely to change a sign; it is to alter the centre of gravity. The original name gestures outward- to a national project, even a universal aspiration. The new name turns inward, attaching the idea of peace to a single, highly particular figure. Given Trump’s public persona – combative, transactional, attuned to victory and recognition – the effect is jarring. There is an unmistakable note of narcissistic inscription here, as though peace were not a condition to be cultivated but a brand to be owned.

Layer onto that his long-standing preoccupation with the Nobel Peace Prize- the sense, often voiced, that it is an accolade he ought to have received – and the renaming begins to look like a kind of symbolic compensation. If peace cannot be awarded, it can be appropriated; if it cannot be conferred, it can be named. The irony is not subtle: an institution built to depersonalise the pursuit of peace now bears the name of a man whose approach to conflict has been anything but disinterested.

Into this reframed space step the individuals in the photograph.

At the centre sits Donald Trump, President, whose foreign policy instincts – whatever label one prefers – tilt toward the immediate and the demonstrable. Alliances are assessed in terms of cost and return; diplomacy is valued for the deals it produces; outcomes are to be visible, claimable, ownable. Gaza, in this schema, is less a process to be patiently engaged than a problem that stubbornly resists the kind of resolution that can be announced from a lectern. It is, therefore, both central and strangely unsuited to his method.

To one side, J.D. Vance, Vice President, leans away – his posture almost a visual footnote to his politics. Vance represents a current of scepticism about the entire postwar architecture: alliances as burdens, interventions as misadventures, institutions like the USIP as relics of an overextended America. His interest is not in refining the Board’s work but in questioning its premise of necessity.

Behind them, Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, carries the formal responsibility for American diplomacy. His role, traditionally, would align closely with the Board’s ethos: sustaining alliances, managing crises, preserving channels. Yet here he appears slightly off-axis, as though translating between two languages—one institutional, one transactional. Gaza, for him, is not optional; it demands engagement. But the tools available are shaped by a broader shift away from the very processes the Board was designed to support.

Next, Jared Kushner, whose entrée into diplomacy came not through the usual apprenticeships but through proximity and trust. His approach – most visible in the Abraham Accords – privileged state-to-state normalisation and deal-making, often sidestepping the Palestinian question rather than confronting it. Gaza, in that sense, was not resolved but deferred, treated as a complication that could be managed while other, more tractable agreements were pursued.

Beside him, Steve Witkoff, another figure from the world of real estate and finance, reinforces the sense that diplomacy here is being conducted by negotiators rather than stewards. His expertise lies in closing deals, aligning incentives, reading counterparts – skills not irrelevant to diplomacy, but distinct from the slow cultivation of legitimacy and trust that institutions like the USIP were built to foster.

This is, then, a kind of board of directors of the Board of Peace, in composition if not in spirit: a gathering of individuals whose orientations toward conflict and resolution are divergent, even dissonant. Their gazes in the photograph – scattered, non-convergent – capture that lack of shared focus. They are in the same room, under the same banner, but not quite engaged in the same enterprise.

Which brings us back to Walt and Zakaria.

Zakaria’s “enlightened hegemony” lives in the architecture of the institution—in the idea that power can be extended by embedding it in processes others trust. Walt’s “predatory hegemony” is visible in the orientation of the actors – in the preference for leverage over legitimacy, transaction over system, immediacy over patience.

The photograph, in this sense, is not merely illustrative; it is diagnostic.

  • The Board of Peace: conceived as a guardian of process, pluralism, and long-term thinking.
  • The renaming: a shift from institutional ethos to personal branding, from shared endeavour to individual inscription.
  • The individuals: a mix of diplomats, sceptics, and dealmakers, each carrying a different theory of what peace is and how it is achieved.
  • The context of Gaza: a test case that exposes the limits of transactional approaches and the absence – or attenuation – of sustained mediation.

And threaded through it all, the larger question both Walt and Zakaria pose from different angles: whether the United States still believes that its power is best exercised by building systems others will inhabit, or whether it has turned, more decisively, toward extracting advantage within systems it no longer feels bound to sustain.

The Board still sits. The name still proclaims peace – twice over, now, with the addition of a personal signature. But the scene suggests something unsettled: an institution designed for one kind of hegemony now operating within another.

And the eye, moving across the image, cannot quite find a single point of convergence—only a series of individuals, each holding a piece of the argument, while the larger coherence—the thing the Board was meant to supply – remains, like Gaza itself, unfinished, unresolved, and just out of frame.

In That Howling Infinite, April 2026

This essay was written in conversation with an AI language model, which contributed to drafting, phrasing, and conceptual articulation. What appears here is not unmediated thought, but considered thought: selected, tested, revised and revised again, and owned.

See also in In That Howling InfiniteA Political World – Thoughts and Themes, and A Middle East Miscellany

A Grand Day Out … a Sydney Harbour Sunday

 

There are paintings that record a place, and there are paintings that quietly stage a civilisation. One such is Montague Scott’s “A Day’s Picnic on Clark Island, Sydney Harbour, 1870”. It is not only a picture, but also, a social map disguised as a picnic. This a small, almost incidental scrap of sandstone, sandstone, scrub and sunlight, a nine hectare punctuation mark in the long sentence of Port Jackson, is made to carry the full theatre of colonial aspiration.

One visualises it from the comfort of a Bondi Junction hotel room where we have scored a harbour view. As the Sydney Harbour ferries slide between headland and bridge, homing to Circular Quay and small boats scurry hither and thither, there it sits, Clark Island, one small outcrop among many. Part of the Sydney Harbour National Park, it lies off the suburb of Darling Point, in the eastern part of the harbour between the famous bridge and The Heads. Rocky and uninhabited, no ferry goes to it. To picnic there, or to get wed, bring your own boat, and like Scott’s picnickers, your own, your own provisions, and indeed, your own little piece of Sydney civilisation.

It was not always leisure. The island bears the name of Lieutenant Ralph Clark, an officer of the First Fleet of 1798. In the early days of the Crown colony New South Wales, when food was scarce, naval officers were allowed to keep their own vegetable gardens – were tended by convicts. Ralph established one such garden on the island, but it failed as any produce was soon stolen on an account the limited rations available at the time. In February 1790, Clark wrote: “some boat had landed since I had been there last and taken away the greatest part … it is impossible for anybody to attempt to raise any Garden stuff here, before it comes to perfection, they will steal it”. who attempted -heroically, futilely- to grow vegetables there. The garden failed as hunger prevailed.


And yet, less than a century later, here we are with tablecloths laid, champagne poured, parasols unfurled against a sun that has forgotten entirely the desperation that once haunted this same rock.

We can see it now – the harbour, not yet surrounded by an affluent built-environment, breathing in the background, indifferent and immense, while the island hosts its temporary republic of manners.

Let’s take an imaginary walk among the picnickers.

A Day’s Picnic on Clark Island, Sydney Harbour, Montague Scott 1870. State Library of NSW

Beginning on the far right – though one is tempted to say at the edge of the performance – there stands that overdressed couple, composed as if for a portrait rather than a picnic. They are ready for weather, for scrutiny, perhaps even for judgement, but not, it seems, for enjoyment. He carries seriousness like a second coat; she, something quieter, more dutiful. They stand apart, as though unsure whether to join the play or merely observe it.

Moving inward, the mood softens. Three ladies sit upon a rocky ledge, receiving the attentions of a young man who has understood, at least, the basic social contract: bring pastries. They accept with visible pleasure. His binoculars hang at his waist – a curious detail, suggesting that between flirtations he might survey the harbour, indulge in a little birdwatching, a bush walk maybe,  though brief given the geography, or simply give to the impression of purpose. Behind them, a couple dine more privately, their bone china and cutlery asserting that intimacy, like civilisation, is portable.

In front, a young man plays with his dog. Two truths present themselves: first, that the artist cannot do dogs for quids; and second, that across centuries and continents, dogs will always be suckers for a tossed twig.

Directly behind, the full apparatus of domestic order has been unpacked and assembled. A family sits to Sunday lunch as if the island had always intended to host them. They’ve brought the works – table, tablecloth, and tableware and, it seems, a Sunday roast or two. The lady of the house looks on as hubbie carves, and a friend or relative serves. Three children amuse themselves, one absorbed in a book, already drifting into another world. It is less a picnic than a transplantation: the home, briefly uprooted and replanted on rock.

Nearby, another couple negotiate the rituals of courtship and consumption. He pours her a glass of something nice – “don’t mind if I do” says she. His frock coat and her Sunday Best – even here, leisure must be properly dressed. There is a an open picnic basket in front of them, although it could be a relic of a previous shindig – like the overturned box that lies near it.

To their left, a more expansive gathering unfolds. A bearded gentleman in a fine top hat dispenses champagne to three ladies, who hold out their glasses – those broad, shallow ones said to be modelled on doomed Queen Marie Antoinette’s breast. Behind him, another gentleman hovers with another bottle, whilst a manservant waits impassively or merely bored. Further along, a smaller cluster echoes the same ritual – three figures, more champagne, more conversation. The island, it seems, runs on effervescence.

Down at the waterline, a new arrival: a woman being helped from a boat by a gentleman whose striped trousers and careful posture suggest both elegance and intent. There is something faintly theatrical about it – an entrance posed and painted, a tableau within a tableau.

To the left again, a quieter duet: a bewhiskered elderly man with his newspaper, momentarily lowering it to engage with the world beyond print, as his companion points something out across the harbour. News meets horizon, the immediate interrupts the reported.

Beyond them, a small drama of manners: a gentleman doffing his hat to two ladies, while in front a young girl reads aloud, her mother listening beneath a black parasol. The mother’s gaze, however, is not wholly on the page; it slips sideways, catching something – or someone – of interest. Perhaps the gentleman with the pipe nearby, who seems poised between contemplation and flirtation. He belongs to a group of men engaged in what could be a discussion of life, the universe, and everything – or, more likely, the women within earshot.

In front of this cluster, a young woman wrestles with a parasol that refuses to cooperate – an object lesson in the limits of decorum when confronted with mechanism. And just beyond, one of the painting’s more revealing episodes: a young man kneeling with hammer and chisel, chipping at the island itself, while three ladies watch and collect the fragments. Souvenirs. Pieces of place extracted and preserved. It is hard not to see in this a miniature of the larger colonial habit: encounter, remove, remember.

In the background, figures gather at the shoreline—two women and a man, their attention directed outward, though at what precisely we cannot say. To their left, two young people sit looking over the harbour, the young man holding a telescope, extending his vision beyond the island’s modest boundaries. Even here, even now, the horizon calls.

And so the painting resolves itself not into a single scene but into a series of conversations and negotiations between formality and ease, between intimacy and display, between possession and transience. Clark Island, once the site of a failed garden and the small thefts of hungry men, has become a stage on which a different kind of appetite is satisfied: for leisure, for status, for connection, for the fleeting illusion that one can, for an afternoon, arrange the world to one’s liking.

From a harbour-view room in Bondi Junction, one might look out and imagine the same island, still there, still waiting. No ferry goes to it. You must choose to arrive, as they did, with your provisions and your intentions. And when you leave, you take something with you – not vegetables, not even stone, but impressions: polished, selective, and just a little illusory.

The island remains. The picnic disperses. The performance, as ever, was the point.

Acknowledgement

Clark Island – traditionally known as Billong-olola or Be-lang-le-wool – is part of the Gadigal people’s country within the Eora Nation.

Today, its history is not just remembered but performed and taught through Aboriginal-owned Tribal Warrior Cultural Cruises, which bring visitors to the island for a living cultural experience. These tours showcase traditional coastal life – fishing, food gathering, dance, and storytelling – while educating visitors about the island’s pre-European history, environment, and enduring cultural meaning. This picturesque outcrop in Sydney Harbour is, in fact, an active site of cultural memory and renewal, where the oldest story of the island continues to be told.

Paul Hemphill, Sydney November 2025

 

For other incidental stories in In That Howling Infinite, see Tall tales, small stories, obituaries and epiphanies. https://howlinginfinite.com/tall-tales-small-stories-obituaries-epiphanies/

Islands, from the first time we saw,
We could wait for this moment, like rocks on the shore.
We can never be closer, somehow,
For the moment that lasts, is this moment now.

Mike Oldfield

Apart from its title, this song is totally unrelated to this story, but I republish it here because I like it a lot. I could’ve chosen Islands in the Stream, or I am Sailing, but these would’ve been even more incongruous. Enjoy.

Dire straits. The bottleneck that behaves like a universe

Oil tankers, container ships and bulk carriers shimmer all over the horizon to the left of the windswept beach here at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. They have been bottled up in the Persian Gulf ever since the US and Israel launched the war on Iran more than a month ago.  To the right, with the Iranian coast only 65km away, the dark-blue sea is completely empty. Only a handful of vessels a day manage to cross the Strait of Hormuz, down from well over a hundred ­before the war. They take a circuitous route through Iranian territorial waters, often paying the Iranian regime a hefty toll.

Tehran’s ability to control this international waterway, through which one-fifth of the worldwide oil supply used to pass, has become Iran’s biggest leverage against the US, its Gulf neighbours and the global economy. Whether the war ends in a success or defeat for Iran depends first and foremost on whether Tehran emerges from this conflict still holding the strait – and, with it, the keys to the worldwide energy markets.

Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 3 Aptil 2026

What follows is a piece for history tragics – and for all who, metaphorically or intellectually, nostalgically or romantically, still yearn to “go down to the sea in ships and do business in deep waters”. For those who hear, beneath the churn of headlines and hot takes, the older music: the creak of hulls, the logic of tides, the long memory of trade and war written across the surface of the world.

Because when the Strait tightens, when Hormuz flickers from map detail to global anxiety, there is a reflex, almost tidal in itself, to reach backwards. To steady the present with the ballast of the past. The antique mariners Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh, the classical strategists Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder, the catechisms of geopolitics and sea power half-remembered, half-invoked. The old grammar returns: command the sea, command the world.

And yet, while the past is summoned, it does not settle easily over the present. It frays at the edges. It argues back.

Some voices insist on restoring the full weight of history – reminding us that the Persian Gulf was not merely sailed but administered: the Royal Navy’s long vigil, the latticework of protectorates, Aden and Suez as imperial hinges. Sea power, in this telling, was never abstract; it was local, granular, enforced in specific places against specific resistances. Empire did not “command” the sea so much as continuously work it.

Others, just as insistent, suggest the sea’s primacy has already ebbed. Pipelines, railways, overland corridors – the new Silk Roads – quietly subvert the tyranny of chokepoints. Hormuz matters, yes, but not as it once did. The map has thickened; the old determinisms loosen.

And threading through it all – more unsettling than either nostalgia or revision – is a harder recognition: that the balance has tilted. That it is now easier to disrupt the sea than to command it. That a few well-placed risks – mines, missiles, drones, or even the rumour of these can achieve what fleets once guaranteed.

Which is precisely why this moment—and this place—invites a longer gaze. For Hormuz is not merely a crisis point. It is a lens. A narrow passage through which history, strategy, and imagination are forced to pass in close quarters, revealing not just what we think we know about the sea – but how much of that knowledge still holds when the waters grow tight.

And so we follow the thread.

A choke point and a global hinge

The essay, republished below, by English historian and author Peter Francopan turns on an old, almost Elizabethan intuition – Walter Raleigh’s dictum that “whoever commands the sea commands the trade… and so the world” – and asks whether it still holds in the age of drones, pipelines, and petro-politics. The Strait of Hormuz, that narrow, anxious funnel through which a fifth of the world’s oil must pass, becomes his stage: not merely a geographic chokepoint, but a historical echo chamber where empires, from the Portuguese to the British to the Americans, have tested the proposition that control of the sea is control of destiny.

The core argument is deceptively simple. However much globalisation has diversified supply chains, the world remains perilously dependent on a handful of maritime arteries. Hormuz is the most critical of them. Iran, by geography alone, sits with its hand on the tap.

What follows is a kind of strategic paradox. The United States possesses overwhelming naval superiority, yet cannot easily guarantee safe passage. Iran, comparatively weak in conventional terms, can still disrupt—through mines, missiles, drones, and plausible threat alone—the flow of global energy. Control, in other words, has become asymmetrical: it is easier to deny the sea than to command it.

Frankopan folds this into a wider historical arc. Sea power has long structured global order – from the Iberian empires to Pax Britannica to the American century—but it has never been absolute. It is contingent, fragile, and dependent on political will as much as on fleets. The current crisis exposes that fragility. The cost of keeping Hormuz open – economically, militarily, psychologically – may exceed what even a superpower is willing to bear indefinitely.

Layered atop this is his reading of Trump’s confrontation with Iran: a clash driven as much by misapprehension and political impulse as by coherent strategy. The implication (never quite stated, but hovering like heat haze) is that great powers still stumble into old traps—overestimating control, underestimating local resolve.

Obstacle Course. Credit: New York Times

Command of the sea, or command of risk?

If Frankopan writes like the historian he is, the comments read like a dockside argument, a fractured chorus of rum, empire, drones, and Trump all sloshing together.

Several bridle at Francopan’s selectivity. Where, they ask, is the Royal Navy in the Gulf? The British protectorates? Aden? The Portuguese seizure of Hormuz in 1515? There is something almost touching here: a yearning to reinsert imperial continuity into a narrative that feels too compressed, too presentist. History, they insist, is longer – and perhaps more reassuring – than Frankopan allows.

Yet beneath the pedantry lies a point: chokepoints are never just geography; they are administered spaces, historically managed through bases, treaties, and coercion. Hormuz did not simply “matter”—it was made to matter, policed into significance.

A sharper critique comes from those who accuse Frankopan of naval determinism, of succumbing to Mackinder in sea going form. Where, they ask, are the pipelines, the highways of the modern Silk Road? If oil can flow overland, if energy can be rerouted, then the tyranny of chokepoints diminishes. The vulnerability of Hormuz is not just a military problem but a failure of diversification. If the Strait can be “closed,” it is because the world has allowed it to remain indispensable. Overland infrastructure does exist, but not at sufficient scale, nor with sufficient redundancy, to replace maritime flow quickly. The sea remains cheaper, denser, stubbornly dominant. Mackinder haunts the room after all.

Then there is the Trump versus Iran morality play. And here, the thread fractures into familiar ideological lines. One camp sees Trump as reckless, blundering into war without strategy; another as a hard realist confronting an implacable regime. But more interesting than the partisan positions is the shared assumption beneath them: that the conflict must be read through the personality of a single leader. Structural forces – energy dependency, regional rivalries, the logic of deterrence – fade into the background. The theatre of personality displaces the machinery of geopolitics.

Meanwhile, a darker undercurrent runs through several comments: casual talk of forcing the Strait, toppling regimes, even nuclear options. The language slips, almost unconsciously, from analysis into annihilation. One is reminded how easily strategic abstraction can become moral amnesia.

What the article and its commentariat together reveal is not a consensus but a tension – between old frameworks and new realities.

Francopan is right, broadly, that chokepoints still matter. Geography has not been abolished. Hormuz remains a lever capable of moving the world.

But his critics are right, too, that the nature of control has shifted. The age of decisive naval supremacy – Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway – has given way to something murkier. Control is now probabilistic. It lies in deterrence, in risk calculation, in the shadow of what might be done rather than what is done.

Iran does not need to “command” the Strait in Raleigh’s sense. It need only make others doubt that it is safe.

And here the deeper irony emerges. The more globalised the world becomes, the more sensitive it is to disruption at key nodes. Interdependence, that liberal promise, doubles as systemic fragility. A few missiles, a handful of drones, a rumour of mines—and the bloodstream of the global economy clots.

The comments circle this insight without quite naming it. They argue about navies versus pipelines, Trump versus Tehran, Britain versus decline- but beneath it all is a shared unease: that no one, not even the United States, can fully guarantee the openness of the system on which everyone depends.

Raleigh revisited

Raleigh’s maxim survives, but in altered form. To command the sea once meant mastery – fleets, flags, unquestioned passage. Now it means something closer to managing uncertainty, policing risk, absorbing disruption. Or, to invert it (and perhaps this is the real lesson of Hormuz): whoever can unsettle the sea can unsettle the world.

The Strait, narrow and ancient, becomes a kind of TARDIS of geopolitics – small on the map, vast in consequence, containing within it centuries of empire, trade, ambition, and miscalculation. You can sail through it in hours. You can be trapped by it for decades. Hormuz is one of those places where scale misbehaves.

On the chart it is almost an afterthought: a narrow blue incision between Iran and Oman, barely 21 nautical miles at its tightest navigable squeeze. A cartographer’s margin note. You could blink and miss it, the way you might skim over a comma in a long sentence. And yet – inside that comma, the world pauses.

Tankers queue like thoughts that cannot quite be completed. Insurance markets twitch. Futures spike. Admirals rediscover their relevance. Presidents improvise resolve. Somewhere in Delhi or Shanghai, a planner recalculates the cost of keeping the lights on. The Strait is not large, but it contains largeness: economics, empire, anxiety, history – all folded into a channel so narrow that a missile battery on one shore can imagine the other.

That is the TARDIS trick: disproportion. Interior vastness concealed within exterior modesty. A space where time thickens. Because Hormuz is not just a place. – it is an accumulation. Portuguese forts, British gunboats, American carrier groups, Iranian fast boats – all still present in the mind, layered like ghost traffic moving in opposite directions through the same confined lane.
And like the TARDIS, it distorts power. The strong discover their strength is conditional; the weak discover they possess a lever. To command the sea here is less about domination than about enduring the possibility of interruption.

It is gigantically small, metaphorically huge, a bottleneck that behaves like a universe.

In a wide ocean, power projects as a roar – carrier groups, satellite grids, the choreography of dominance. In a narrow strait, the same power ricochets. It echoes, distorts, sometimes even dampens. The voice is still large; the space refuses to carry it cleanly.

Hormuz does this to everyone. It compresses asymmetry into something almost theatrical. A superpower arrives with an orchestra; a regional actor needs only a well-timed cymbal crash – mines, missiles, the rumour of both – and suddenly the symphony falters. Not silenced, but unsettled. Hesitant. Listening to itself.

It tells us less about the decline of hegemony than about the environments in which hegemony operates. Power at sea is expansive; power in a choke point is negotiated, contingent, on the edge

The old imperial instinct – force the passage- still murmurs in the background (you can hear it in the comments: convoy the ships, clear the mines, damn the cost). But the modern world hesitates, because the cost is no longer just ships sunk – it is markets convulsed, alliances strained, escalation spiralling in ways that do not end neatly at the waterline.

Which leaves us with a paradox worthy of the place: the hegemon can still roar – but here, in this narrow theatre, it must decide whether the echo is worth the noise.

In That Howling Infinite, March 2026

Hormuz: Iran’s dire Strait

Command the seas and you command the world

Peter Francopan, Unherd, March 12 2026

Historians these days doubt that Sir Walter Raleigh ever laid down his cloak to stop Queen Elizabeth I from stepping in a puddle. They do agree, though, that he understood the nature and benefit of maritime power. “Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade,” he wrote in A Discourse of the Invention of Ships in the early 17th century. “Whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself”.Raleigh lived in a different era, of course — one that most of us imagine as a time of swashbuckling sailors and risk-taking pirates, when control of the High Seas was a competition between the European states building empires in both the New and Old Worlds.

This was also an age when geography mattered every bit as much as resources. Many of the first European footholds overseas were chosen less for what lay in the ground than for where they sat along the great sea routes that were beginning to bind the world together. The Portuguese seizure of Malacca in 1511 was not about spices growing nearby but about controlling the narrow maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea through which much of Asia’s trade passed.

The same strategic logic shaped the expansion of the British empire. Outposts were established above all because of their position along the world’s shipping arteries. The British occupation of Gibraltar in 1704 secured control over the entrance to the Mediterranean and the vital route between the Atlantic and Europe’s inland sea. In the Caribbean, islands such as Jamaica — seized from the Spanish in 1655 — were major naval and commercial hubs sitting astride the shipping lanes linking the Americas and Europe. Likewise, further south, control of Cape of Good Hope allowed Britain to dominate the maritime passage between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.The empire that Raleigh’s generation started building was not only created through conquest and extraction: it was built through the control of the sea lanes and strategic points that allowed commerce, information and manpower to move across the oceans. The same ports that handled cargo could shelter naval squadrons, repair ships and project force across vast distances. Britain’s empire was fuelled by sugar, silver, slaves and more; but it was built on being able to move these at will across the oceans, and on the islands, harbours and strongpoints that underpinned maritime, economic and imperial power.

These days, we have become used to future-gazers insisting that the future belongs to those who control data and algorithms, or satellites and space rockets, or rare earths and critical minerals. Ships, shipping, and transport networks do not sound quite so exciting, so fresh or so unknown. To a historian, though, in a world that is hyper-connected, logistics are king.

In its heyday, Britain’s reach rested heavily getting the basics right. At Gibraltar, ships entering or leaving the Mediterranean could refuel and undergo repairs, while Malta secured British control of Mediterranean shipping routes. Further east, Aden functioned as a crucial coaling station at the mouth of the Red Sea once steam navigation transformed long-distance travel; or there was Singapore, which, from the early 19th century, grew into a key naval base guarding the approaches between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Each of these places mattered less for what they produced than for the services they provided: coal, water, repairs, provisions, intelligence and protection. Ships could not roam the oceans indefinitely; they required an interconnected chain of harbours capable of maintaining hulls, repairing sails or (later) overhauling, to provision with fresh food and water. Maritime power was not just about ships, captains and crews — but about a dense mesh of locations that were spread out around the world and reinforced each other.

Over time, however, it became easy to forget just how central these routes and nodes were. In the decades after the end of the Cold War, the world entered a period of globalisation underpinned by overwhelming American economic, political and military power — and by the mantra of free trade being the engine of prosperity and the bedrock of the international world order. Attention shifted elsewhere, and strategists and commentators forgot about shipping lanes. Yet as geopolitical competition intensifies and the world moves into a more multipolar era, the importance of the arteries of global commerce has once again become startlingly clear.Maritime transport moves over 80% of goods traded worldwide. Around 11 billion tons of goods are transported by sea each year — roughly one and a half tons per person. Ships carry around two thirds of global oil production, as well as around a fifth of natural gas, moving energy to places where they are most needed. Without global shipping networks, computers can’t be switched on, assembly lines can’t work, and houses can’t be heated.While the crisis in Iran and the Gulf have focused attention on oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and petroleum products, global shipping is fundamental in almost every aspect of daily life. Seaborne trade moves almost two billion tonnes of iron ore per year, with major exporters in countries like Australia, Brazil and South Africa being matched with demand in China, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere. Hundreds of millions of tonnes of bauxite and alumina are sent by sea from mines and processing plants in Guinea, Indonesia and Australia, as are tens of millions of tonnes of copper ores from Chile, Peru and south East Asia.

Global shipping is not just the backbone of international trade; it is crucial in keeping the world fed. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, a UN body, international trade plays a crucial role in supporting global food security by linking food surplus with deficit areas and enabling access to basic food products. 80% of agricultural commodities are transported by sea, with shipping again playing a crucial role in matching “breadbasket regions” with those that suffer from food production deficits.As Sir Walter Raleigh would have recognised, globalisation makes control of the seas more, not less important; as peoples, regions, goods and resources get moved from one part of the planet to another, dependencies rise — and so, therefore, do vulnerabilities. Things that we take for granted are always ones that we should pay special attention to, not least since it never seems to cross people’s mind that small shocks can have major implications.

In the summer of 2011, Thailand experienced catastrophic flooding as a result of unusually high levels of rainfall, which had an enormous impact on global car production. At the time, Thailand was one of the world’s leading producers of hard-disk drives and wiring harnesses for cars, as well as electronics modules. As factories closed because of flooding, the effects spilled over into the global economy. Hard drive prices doubled in a matter of weeks; shortages of parts crippled automotive production not only in Thailand, but across Asia, North America and even Europe. The associated costs ran to tens of billions of dollars.

If that gives one example of the risks that come from the assumption that supply chains are dependable, then another comes from Covid-19. Lockdowns and collapsing industrial demand caused an immediate decline in maritime activity. Global maritime trade volumes fell sharply, with estimates suggesting a reduction of as much as 10% in the first eight months of 2020, representing cargo worth at least $225 billion in trade value — if not considerably more, precipitating an unprecedented logistics crunch.

In the past few days we have seen another classic case of the risks posed by pressure on supply chains. Energy markets have been spooked by the implications of attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf following US and Israeli strikes on Iran, with oil prices almost doubling in a matter of days. But it is shipping prices that have truly gone through the roof. Spot charter rates for LNG carriers are six times larger than they were before 28 February — a rise some industry experts refer to as “unthinkable”. Some charterers are paying as much as 10 times the rate they paid before the attacks on Iran began to secure prompt tonnage because of the scale of the shock.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s key chokepoints, a narrow stretch that connects the Gulf with the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, a crossroads where geology and geography dovetail to create perfect opportunities for disruption.

Bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south, the Strait is one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways. At its narrowest navigable point, the shipping lanes are only a few kilometres wide in each direction, meaning that at a time of conflict — such as today — the ability to restrict shipping is considerable. Considerable volumes of goods pass through the Strait — something that is clear from the fact that Jebel Ali in Dubai is the ninth-busiest port in the world. But Hormuz is more crucial to global energy markets, with around 15 million barrels of oil passing through each day, equivalent to about one-fifth of global petroleum consumption. Other chokepoints are significant; but Hormuz is the most important oil chokepoint in the world.At the moment, almost no shipping is transiting the Strait, with an estimated 1000 vessels waiting for the conflict with Iran to pass. A small handful of ships have sailed through, with several others reported to be trying their luck by either claiming to be Chinese or by turning off transponders that reveal both their location and their true identities. More than a dozen ships have been damaged so far, with Iran saying that British ships are “legitimate targets”.Political leaders have tried to project confidence. Donald Trump said that merchant crews and shipowners simply needed to show “some guts” if they wanted trade to keep moving through the Strait. Yet the reality suggests that courage alone is rarely enough to keep maritime commerce flowing during wartime. Guts are one thing; a US Navy ship being damaged by Iranian mines, missiles or attacks from land is another. For now, then, such are the risks to crews, cargo and hulls that shipping in the Gulf is at a standstill.Just how high the strategic stakes have become is clear from the military deployments now underway. That message has not been lost on Greece, Italy or France — all of which have dispatched warships towards the Gulf to secure maritime traffic and monitor the Strait, although it remains unclear whether or how they will solve the problem of getting traffic moving again. In Britain, there has been fierce criticism of the Royal Navy’s absence from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, but the absence is not imminently solvable. It is the result of the British government’s catastrophic lack of foresight, decades of not investing in the sort of naval forces one needs in this century.Trump has insisted that the shutdown in the Gulf is temporary and that oil, gas and more besides will soon start to flow again. It is typical fighting talk from a president who chose to start a confrontation with Iran because he was not able to understand why the regime in Tehran had refused to “capitulate” to American demands regarding nuclear enrichment, ballistic missile programmes and more.Trump came to office promising never to drag the US into “forever wars”, sneering at the “so-called nation-builders, neocons or liberal nonprofits” from who had inflicted disaster on the Middle East. Now, while Trump and his team work out how to stop Iran from inflicting damage on its neighbours, others must pay the price. India imports the overwhelming majority of its oil and gas by sea, partly because it has access to a limited network of pipelines. So the collapse of shipments from the Gulf is producing an existential crisis: although the US has granted a “temporary waiver” to allow Delhi to buy Russian oil, the facts that the rupee has weakened sharply, and that authorities are reportedly speeding up customs procedures to allow faster unloading, are signs that compression of logistics at sea is already having ripple effects. Moscow emerges as an unexpected beneficiary of the crisis, as the spike in oil and gas prices will provide much-needed relief to a beleaguered economy. Russia’s geopolitical role could be additionally bolstered by the country’s purported long-standing “security concept for the Persian Gulf” as an off-ramp for the US intervention in Iran.The consequences of the current crisis, however, extend well beyond the coming days or even the coming weeks. What we are witnessing is not simply a temporary disruption in the Gulf, but a reminder of a deeper truth about how power works in the modern world. Maritime routes remain the arteries through which prosperity, security and resilience flow. Data, algorithms, satellites and artificial intelligence may dominate the language of the 21st-century economy, but they still depend on the movement of physical goods across oceans. Microchips require minerals, energy and specialised manufacturing equipment that must be transported. Data centres require copper, aluminium, rare earths and vast amounts of energy infrastructure. Without ships and secure sea lanes, even the most advanced digital economy quickly runs into very practical limits. Power is and always has been about logistics.For Britain in particular, this requires a series of profound shifts. The protection of shipping routes is already a central strategic task. The Gulf is one theatre where the risks are currently obvious, but it is far from the only one. The North Atlantic and the High North are rapidly emerging as arenas of growing geopolitical competition as melting Arctic ice opens new routes and as submarine cables, energy infrastructure and shipping lanes become ever more exposed to interference and disruption.These are not challenges that can be addressed through strategy documents or policy papers; they require investment in ships, in platforms, in training and in the infrastructure that allows maritime forces to operate effectively across long distances. They also require the rebuilding of the kind of interconnected networks of ports, facilities and partnerships that once underpinned Britain’s global reach. In an increasingly multipolar world — one in which predation, risk-taking and opportunism are often rewarded — maritime resilience will become a defining measure of national strength.In that sense, the current crisis offers a glimpse of the future. Control and protection of shipping routes is key to stability, to reduction of risk and to long-term national resilience. The resources on which new economies depend may have changed, technologies may have evolved and ships may look different. But the underlying reality remains exactly the same as when Raleigh wrote four hundred years ago: whoever commands the sea commands far more than the sea itself.

Peter Frankopan is the author of The Silk Roads (2015), The New Silk Roads (2018), and The Earth Transformed (2023). He is also a Professor of Global History at Worcester College, Oxford

A curated selection of comments from Unherd readers

This includes everything that carries an argument, stripped of noise but not over-pruned. There was a lot buried in that thread once one scraped away the rhetorical noise. Francopan’s essay and the comments rehearse empire, contest strategy, litigate politics, invoke technology, argue personality. They reach for certainty and find, instead, contingency.
Here they are:

Historical framing matters. Analyses of maritime power that ignore Britain’s long role in the Persian Gulf, its protectorates, and control of trade routes through Aden and Suez are incomplete. Control of sea lanes has always been exercised locally, even when its effects are global.

There is a fundamental tension between classical naval theory and modern infrastructure realities. Traditional doctrines of sea power emphasise chokepoints, yet pipelines, rail corridors, and overland routes increasingly challenge that dominance. Disruption of maritime trade today may reflect failures of diplomacy and diversification as much as limits of military power.
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is clear, but control is asymmetric. It is easier to threaten shipping than to secure it. A weaker power can impose risk without achieving dominance, using missiles, drones, and dispersed systems that are difficult to eliminate.

Modern warfare reinforces this asymmetry. Low-cost technologies can disrupt high-value assets, raising questions about the long-term viability of traditional force projection. At the same time, countermeasures are evolving, suggesting an ongoing cycle of adaptation.The scale of resources required to secure global shipping is immense. Sustained convoy operations would demand naval capacity that is not readily available. Even if assembled, such efforts would be costly and unlikely to restore previous economic conditions quickly.Alternative strategies exist but are slow to implement. Expanding pipelines, rerouting supply chains, and hardening vessels can reduce vulnerability, but require long-term investment and coordination.

Many states failed to prepare despite the predictability of such a crisis.There is deep disagreement over the nature of the current conflict. Some view it as a necessary confrontation with a regime that threatens regional and global stability. Others see a lack of clear objectives, inconsistent strategy, and the risk of open-ended escalation.The question of escalation remains unresolved. One side retains capacity to intensify, while the other relies on disruption. Proposals for decisive action raise further uncertainties about feasibility, consequences, and post-conflict stability.

Regime survival is interpreted differently. Some argue that mere survival constitutes success under pressure; others contend that survival after severe degradation would represent strategic defeat.Geopolitical decision-making often operates without clear or fixed end states. Objectives may shift in response to opportunity, reflecting the contingent nature of strategy rather than coherent long-term planning.

Historical analogies are widely used but often misleading. Claims of past maritime dominance are contested, with evidence that control has always been partial and constrained by other factors such as air power and competing theatres of war.

Debate over Western power reveals competing narratives. Some emphasise decline, overstretch, and lack of strategic coherence. Others point to enduring capabilities and the need for renewed investment, particularly in naval forces.

The scale of global security challenges exceeds the capacity of individual states. Effective responses likely require collective action, yet coordination remains difficult and politically constrained.

New vulnerabilities complicate traditional strategy. Subsea infrastructure, including data cables, represents a vast and exposed network that is difficult to defend, illustrating the expanding scope of strategic risk.

Legal frameworks exist but are contested in practice. International law mandates freedom of navigation, yet interpretations of neutrality and belligerency vary, particularly in complex conflicts.

Economic interdependence amplifies the consequences of disruption. Even limited interference with key trade routes can trigger wider global effects, including energy shocks and recessionary pressures.

At root, the issue is no longer simply control of the sea. The emerging reality is a system where disruption, deterrence, and alternative routing shape outcomes as much as traditional dominance.